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This	   project	   explains	   Polish	   non-­‐violence	   and	   Algerian	   violence	   under	   martial	   law	   following	  
peaceful	  protests	  against	  comparable	  material	  deprivation	  and	  authoritarian	  political	  exclusion.	  
From	  narratives	  of	  state	  formation,	   institutional	  performance,	  and	  social	  movement	  evolution	  
in	  postwar	  Poland	  and	  postcolonial	  Algeria	  a	  conditional	  model	  derives	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  
opposition	  strategies	  from	  divergent	  practical	  citizenship	  regimes	  in	  formally	  similar	  autocratic	  
systems.	   It	  argues	   that	  distinct	   regimes	  of	   citizen-­‐subjectivity	  under	  authoritarian	  governance	  
foster	  divergent	  practices	  of	  resistance	  and	  evaluations	  of	  states	  before	  and	  during	  emergency	  
conditions	  that	  reduce	  activists	  to	  biological	  life,	  tempting	  violence.	  Where	  citizenship	  regimes	  
differentiate	  social	  resources	  (means	  of	  protest)	  from	  state	  resources	  (means	  or	  sovereignty),	  
affording	  regime	  opponents	  actual	  or	  immanent	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  social	  agitation	  remains	  
non-­‐violent	  despite	  objectively	  comprehensive	  political	  and	  social	  dispossession;	  in	  contrast,	  by	  
subordinating	  social	  to	  state	  resources,	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  regimes	  under	  martial	   law	  
wholly	  eliminate	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  provoking	  violence.	  Neither	  the	  formal	  political	  regime-­‐
type	  nor	  the	  immediate	  experience	  of	  social	  suffering	  or	  political	  abjection	  distinguishes	  violent	  
from	  non-­‐violent	  responses	  to	  despotism;	  rather,	  violent	  versus	  non-­‐violent	  protest	  strategies	  
express	  discrepant	  evaluations	  of	  regime	  coercion,	  reflecting	  the	  elimination	  versus	  endurance	  
of	   the	  citizenship	  regime	  that	   formed	  the	   iterated	  systemic	  subjectivity	  of	   regime	  opponents.	  
    
 
Poland’s	   worker-­‐based	   citizenship	   regime	   endured	   fiscal	   crisis	   and	   martial	   law	   because	   it	  
provided	   differentiated	   social	   resources:	   regime	   opponents	   had	  means	   independent	   of	   state	  
solvency	   to	  compel	  policy	  concessions	  by	  withdrawing	   labor	  power	   from	   industries	  pivotal	   to	  
ruling-­‐elite	   incumbency.	   But	   Algeria’s	   client-­‐based	   citizenship	   –	   based	   on	   undifferentiated	  
resources	   –	   tied	   activists’	   systemic	   means	   of	   compulsion	   to	   state	   largesse.	   Differentiated	  
citizenship	   regimes	   endure	   state	   crises	   because	   citizens	   retain	   the	   social	   resources,	   however	  
suspended,	  of	   systemic-­‐subjectivity	   that	  ground	   their	  evaluations	  of	   state	  actions,	  minimizing	  
incentives	   to	   violent	   pressure	   on	   ruling	   classes.	   Undifferentiated	   citizenship	   regimes	   perish	  
under	  state	  bankruptcy	  or	  force,	  eradicating	  social	  resources	  and	  channeling	  the	  recuperation	  
of	  subjectivity	  to	  anti-­‐systemic	  acts.	  In	  short,	  Polish	  workers	  could	  strike	  and	  threaten	  the	  state	  
under	  martial	   law;	   Algerian	   clients	  were	   effectively	   expelled	   from	  political	   status.	   In	   forming	  
opposition	  strategies,	  citizens	  judge	  state	  policies	  or	  legitimacy,	  but	  also	  their	  status	  as	  systemic	  
subjects.	  Evaluations	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  reflect	  experiences	   in	  using	  social	  resources,	  not	  
merely	  immediate	  material	  or	  political	  conditions.	  The	  research	  design	  does	  not	  test	  a	  general	  
theoretical	   model	   linking	   citizenship-­‐subjectivity	   regimes	   to	   experiential	   evaluations	   of	  
objective	   dehumanization,	   but	   its	   conceptual	   and	   causal	   variable	   analyses	   may	   complement	  
other	   studies	   of	   state	   institutions	   and	   social	   agitations	   by	   promoting	   subject	   formation	   over	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   Starting	  with	  empirical	  observations	  of	  protest	  movements	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  under	  
authoritarian	  rule,	  this	  thesis	  addresses	  a	  puzzle	  of	  persistent	  concern	  to	  academic,	  intellectual,	  
and	  practical	  political	  thought:	  how	  to	  explain	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  social	  action.	  The	  project	  
has	  many	  moving	  parts,	  which	  this	  preface	  summarizes	  as	  simply	  as	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  text	  
accessible	  despite	  some	  technical	  discussions.	  
	   The	  question	  I	  pose	  concerns	  varied	  protest	  strategies	  under	  authoritarian	  governance.	  
It	   is	   now	  clear	   that	  whatever	   their	   common	   formal	  properties	  –	   such	  as	   the	  absence	  of	   civic	  
rights	  and	  political	  freedoms	  or	  prevalence	  of	  central	  bureaucracies	  and	  command	  economies	  –	  
the	  authoritarian	  “regime	  type”	  has	  varied	  as	  much	  as	  the	  democratic	  in	  social	  organization.	  It	  
is	  also	  now	  widely	  appreciated	  that	  authoritarian	  efforts	   to	   incorporate	  citizens	  while	  gaining	  
their	  loyalty	  or	  securing	  their	  acquiescence	  has	  inspired	  diverse	  citizen	  responses	  in	  autocratic	  
states:	   from	  support	   to	  passivity	   to	  resistance.	  Building	  on	  this	  growing	  sense	  of	   the	  diversity	  
internal	  to	  authoritarian	  governance,	  my	  essay	  examines	  the	  trajectories	  of	  revolt	  against	  Polish	  
and	  Algerian	  despotism.	  In	  particular,	  it	  inquires	  into	  the	  discrepant	  strategic	  choices	  of	  Polish	  
and	  Algerian	  dissidents	  after	  ruling	  elites	  crushed	  their	  non-­‐violent,	   intra-­‐systemic	  protests	  by	  
imposing	  draconian	  emergency	  conditions	  (1981	  and	  1992,	  respectively).	  My	  puzzle	  is	  this:	  Why	  
did	  Polish	  activists	  remain	  non-­‐violent	  while	  Algerian	  activists	  turned	  to	  armed	  conflict	  despite	  
experiencing	  similar	  state	  brutality,	  political	  exclusion,	  and	  social	  suffering.	  	  
	   I	  propose	  that	  the	  different	  regimes	  through	  which	  the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  authoritarian	  
states	  centralized	  their	  populations	  and	  politicized	  their	  citizens	  distinguished	  these	  outcomes.	  
Specifically,	  I	  ascribe	  the	  quintessentially	  contrasting	  results	  of	  martial	  law	  to	  Poland’s	  worker-­‐
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based	  citizenship	   formation	  and	  Algeria’s	  client-­‐	  and,	  briefly,	  voter-­‐based	  citizenship.	  Because	  
Polish	  workers	  retained	  their	  capacity	  to	  compel	  state	  concessions	  by	  striking	  even	  under	  state	  
fiscal	  crisis	  and	  military	  rule,	  they	  had	  an	  incentive	  to	  remain	  committed	  to	  their	  non-­‐violent	  or	  
“self-­‐limiting”	  revolution.	  In	  contrast,	  Algerian	  clients	  and	  then	  voters	  lost	  all	  systemic	  capacity	  
to	  influence	  ruling	  elites,	  since	  state	  bankruptcy	  and	  coercion	  in	  effect	  de-­‐naturalized	  activists,	  
reducing	   them	   to	   internal	   political	   refugees.	   Polish	  workers	   retained	  power	   against	   the	   state	  
because	  ruling	  classes	  needed	  their	  labor	  power	  to	  run	  the	  industrial	  economy;	  Algerian	  clients-­‐
turned-­‐voters	  lost	  all	  citizen-­‐efficacy	  because	  the	  state	  did	  not	  depend	  on	  their	  contribution.	  	  
	   I	   extrapolate	   from	   these	   empirical	   findings	   an	   explanatory,	   and	  exploratory,	  model	   of	  	  	  
violent	   and	   non-­‐violent	   social	   agitation	   based	   on	   conceptual	   claims	   about	   citizenship	   and	  
subjectivity	  and	  about	   regime	  differentiation.	   I	   claim	  that	  citizenship	   regimes	   foster	  particular	  
subjects,	  thus	  subjectivities,	  as	  one	  basis	  of	  state-­‐citizen	  systems.	  Roughly	  I	  equate	  citizenship	  
regimes,	   the	   objective	   structure	   of	   meaningful	   membership,	   with	   systemic	   subjectivity,	   the	  
formative	  experience	  of	   this	  structured	  membership.	  That	   is,	   I	   link	  them	  but	  they	  are	  distinct	  
objective	   and	   subjective	   features	   of	   state-­‐citizen	   interaction.	   Polish	   citizens,	   for	   instance,	  
became	  systemic	  subjects	  as	  workers,	  in	  a	  worker-­‐citizenship	  regime,	  or	  one	  could	  say,	  but	  for	  
stylistic	   reasons	   rarely	   will,	   through	   worker-­‐citizen	   subjectivization.	   Algerian	   citizens	   became	  
systemic	  subjects	  as	  clients	  and,	   in	  a	  fleeting	  reform,	  as	  voters.	  All	  this	  means	  that	  Polish	  and	  
Algerian	   authoritarian	   rulers	   cultivated	   discrete	   systemic	   subjectivities,	   that	   is,	   specific	   sub-­‐
types	   of	   political	   agency,	   through	   effective	   and	   practical	   citizenship	   regimes;	   in	   turn,	   those	  
regimes	   are	   defined	   by	   political	  means	   or	   social	   resources	   afforded	   citizens	   to	   confront	   and	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communicate	   with	   the	   state.	   Systemic	   subjectivities	   are	   orientations	   to	   the	   state,	   ways-­‐of-­‐
being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐political-­‐world,	  cultivated	  by	  the	  social	  resources	  of	  citizenship	  regimes.	  	   	  
	   I	   claim,	   too,	   that	   differentiated	   and	   undifferentiated	   citizenship	   regimes	   have	   distinct	  
effects	  on	  systemic	  subjectivity	  and	  thus	  on	  whether	  dissidents	  continue	  to	  experience	  effective	  
citizenship	   under	   the	   state	   of	   exception.	   Differentiation	   refers,	   then,	   to	   the	   separation	   as	  
opposed	  to	  conflation	  of	  state	  and	  social	  resources.	  A	  differentiated	  citizenship	  regime	  provides	  
social	  resources	  that	  remain	  intact	  during	  state	  fiscal	  crisis.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Polish	  state	  relied	  
on	  citizens’	  labor	  to	  fund	  state	  functions.	  That	  gave	  the	  workers	  social	  resources	  that	  remained	  
powerful	   even	   when	   the	   state	   experienced	   fiscal	   crisis.	   Citizens’	   labor	   power	   constituted	   a	  
differentiated	   worker-­‐citizenship	   regime,	   which	   therefore	   remained	   the	   basis	   of	   systemic	  
subjectivity	   under	   Polish	  martial	   law.	   Algerians	   became	   subjects	   through	   an	  undifferentiated	  
patron-­‐client	  citizenship	  regime;	  parasitic	  on	  state	  revenue,	  its	  social	  resources	  vanished	  under	  
fiscal	  retrenchment	  and	  military	  coercion.	  	  
	   The	   endurance	   of	   worker-­‐citizenship,	   or	   systemic	   subjectivity,	   yielded	   intra-­‐systemic	  
non-­‐violence	  in	  Poland	  while	  the	  evaporation	  of	  client-­‐	  and	  then	  voter-­‐citizenship	  fostered	  anti-­‐
systemic	   violence	   in	   Algeria.	   This	   project	   argues	   that	   to	   endow	   citizens	   with	   reliable	   social	  
resources	  to	  affect	  elite	  political	  decisions	  is	  to	  form	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  –	  in	  effect,	  a	  systemic	  
political	  means	  or	  site	  to	  act	  as	  a	  willful	  subject.	  To	  redress	  one’s	  grievances	  successfully	   in	  a	  
citizenship	  regime	  is	  to	  have	  systemic	  subjectivity:	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  means	  or	  a	  site	  within	  a	  
polity	  where	  one’s	  willful	  action	  can	  accomplish	  one’s	  social	  objectives.	  Where	  activists	  retain	  
their	   social	   resources	  and	   thus	  possess	   systemic	   subjectivity,	   they	   remain	  non-­‐violent.	   This	   is	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the	  structural	  or	  objective	  element	  of	  my	  model,	  which	  I	  will	  elaborate	  briefly	  before	  discussing	  
the	  hermeneutic	  or	  subjective	  element.	  
	   Two	  premises	  underpin	  this	  hypothesis	  –	  first,	  a	  distinction	  between	  formal-­‐institutional	  
and	  informal-­‐citizenship	  regimes;	  second,	  an	  insistence	  that	  citizenship	  regimes	  satisfy	  a	  human	  
desire	  for	  subjectivity	  “in	  the	  first	   instance,”	  deprivation	  of	  which	  increases	  their	   likelihood	  of	  
violence	   as	   the	   remaining	  means	   of	   subjective	   assertion.	   First,	   then,	   formal-­‐institutional	   and	  
informal-­‐citizenship	  regimes	  both	  matter,	  but	  the	  latter	  constitute	  the	  dominant	  practical	  mode	  
of	  communicative	  and	  coercive	   interaction	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  members	  of	  a	  polity.	  
Citizenship	  regimes	  set	  effective	  means	  or	  reliable	  if	  tacit	  rules	  for	  ordinary	  people	  to	  appeal	  to	  
officials	   or	   press	   rulers	   to	   address	   grievances.	   They	   thus	   provide	   regular	   channels	   of	   state-­‐
society	  reciprocity	  or	  antagonism.	  To	  illustrate,	  elections	  in	  a	  formally	  democratic	  regime	  may	  
be	  discredited	  while	  grassroots	  and	   shop	   floor	  mobilizations	  effect	  desired	  policy	   changes.	   In	  
such	  a	  scenario	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  operates	  through	  popular	  activism	  rather	  than	  electoral	  
rituals.	  Citizenship	  regimes	  create	  mutual	   linkages	  between	  states	  and	  citizens	   that	  centralize	  
political	  activity	  but	  can	  also	  distribute	  or	  decentralize	  material	  benefits.	  The	  means	  possessed	  
by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  compel	  state	  concessions	  –	  such	  as	  campaigning,	  bargaining,	  protesting,	  
or	  striking	  –	  are	  their	  actual	  social	  resources,	  the	  tools	  or	  weapons	  discussed	  above	  that	  citizens	  
deploy	   to	   express	   grievances	   or	   resist	   the	   state;	   they	   are	   the	   political	   heuristics	   of	   effective	  
citizenship	  or	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  In	  sum,	  then,	  the	  social	  resources	  established	  by	  citizenship	  
regimes	   produce	   discrete	   political	   or	   systemic	   subjectivities.	   Citizens	   become	   subjects	   when	  
social	  resources,	  the	  effective	  means	  of	  regular	  state-­‐citizen	  interaction,	  shape	  their	  responses	  
to	   public	   misfortunes,	   i.e.,	   when	   they	   act	   on	   their	   citizenship	   regimes	   to	   achieve	   systemic	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subjectivity.	  The	  second	  premise,	  then,	  is	  that	  humans	  pursue	  systemic	  subjectivity	  first	  via	  the	  
formal	  and	  informal	  state-­‐citizen	  resources	  that	  constitute	  the	  citizenship	  regime;	  and,	  second,	  
via	  means,	  often	  violent,	  outside	  state-­‐supported	  formal	   institutoons	  and	   informal	  norms.	  So,	  
systemic	  subjectivity	  is	  an	  ontological	  desire	  for	  political	  will	  that	  always	  seeks	  its	  fulfillment.	  	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  hermeneutic	  or	  subjective	  part	  of	  the	  model,	  I	  propose	  that	  perceptions,	  based	  on	  
historical,	  experiential	  evaluations,	  are	  central	  to	  the	  political	  operations	  of	  citizenship	  regimes,	  
social	  resources,	  and	  systemic	  subjectivities.	  This	  is	  pivotal	  in	  explaining	  why	  equally	  repressive	  
autocratic	  state	  violence	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  sustained	  non-­‐violence	  in	  Poland	  but	  triggered	  
social	  violence	  in	  Algeria.	   I	   link	  the	  distinct	  phenomena	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  militancy	  under	  
objectively	  similar	  political	  exclusion	  and	  social	  suffering	  to	  their	  polar	  experiential	  evaluations	  
of	   their	   citizenship	   regimes’	   ongoing	   relevance	   under	   martial	   law.	   Even	   though	   the	   strike	  
option,	   the	   social	   resource	   that	   constituted	   Poland’s	   citizenship	   regime,	   was	   objectively	  
suspended	   under	   the	   state	   of	   emergency,	   experience	   had	   taught	   Poles	   that	   their	   systemic	  
subjectivity	  was	  in	  abeyance	  rather	  than	  destroyed.	  In	  contrast,	  Algerian	  citizens	  knew	  that	  they	  
had	  no	  actual	  or	  potential	  social	  resources	  when	  the	  state	  could	  not	  finance	  the	  patron-­‐client	  
citizenship	  regime	  or	  countenance	  an	   Islamist	  electoral	   triumph.	   In	  short,	  activists	  respond	  to	  
state	  violence	  and	  dispossession	  historically,	  experientially,	  asking	  whether	  the	  social	  resources	  
or	   citizenship	   regime	   that	   gave	   them	   political	   strength	   in	   the	   past	   had	   been	   suspended	   or	  
annihilated.	  I	  infer	  that	  state	  opponents	  who	  perceive	  their	  citizenship	  regime	  to	  be	  potentially	  
revived,	  as	  in	  Poland,	  will	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  non-­‐violent	  or	  intra-­‐systemic	  activism;	  dissidents	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   The	   two	  elements	  of	   the	  explanatory	  model	  presented	  here	  are	   “structural-­‐objective”	  
and	  “hermeneutic-­‐subjective”	  because	  the	  endurance	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime,	  notably	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  Poland’s	  non-­‐violent	  Solidarity	  movement,	  is	  divided.	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  social	  resources	  
appear	  to	  be	  present,	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  factories,	  trains,	  shipyards,	  and	  mines	  still	  exist	  and	  the	  
state	  still	  needs	  their	  productivity	  and	  revenues;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  citizen-­‐regime	  is	  under	  
attack	  and	  inoperable.	  The	  social	  resources	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship	  are	  subjectively	  inspiring	  but	  
objectively	  useless,	  and	  activists	  respond	  to	  this	  ambivalence	   in	  making	  strategic	  decisions.	   In	  
contrast,	   the	   eradication	   of	   the	  Algerian	   client-­‐	   and	   (briefly)	   voter-­‐citizenship	  was	  undivided.	  
Objectively	  and	  subjectively,	  activist	  and	  disengaged	  Algerian	  citizens	  were	  politically	  negated.	  
My	  argument	  therefore	  is	  that	  an	  explanation	  of	  sustained	  collective	  violence	  will	  often	  require	  
both	  structural-­‐objective-­‐institutional	  and	  hermeneutic-­‐subjective-­‐ethnographic	  components.	  	  	  
	   To	  review	  the	  argument	  combining	  both	  components:	  states	  create	  citizenship	  regimes	  
by	  providing	  significant	  social	  resources	  that	  generate	  legible,	  reliable,	  and	  practical	  channels	  of	  
communication	   and	   coercion	   between	   ruling	   elites	   and	   ordinary	   citizens.	   Citizenship	   regimes	  
vary	  in	  response	  to	  state	  insolvency	  or	  repression;	  those	  based	  on	  social	  resources	  autonomous	  
from	  fiscal	  crisis	  or	  martial	  law	  are	  differentiated	  and	  endure	  in	  hard	  times.	  The	  endurance	  of	  a	  
differentiated	  citizenship	  regime	  is	  objectively	  and	  subjectively	  visible	  under	  state	  coercion,	  so	  
it	  is	  perceptible	  even	  when	  paralyzed	  by	  state	  agencies.	  Activists	  who	  discern	  the	  endurance	  of	  
systemic	  subjectivity	  in	  their	  recoverable,	  if	  suspended,	  social	  resources	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  resort	  
to	  violent	  or	  other	  anti-­‐systemic	  protest	  strategies.	  Extrapolating	  from	  the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  
cases,	   the	  choice	   to	  engage	   in	  violent	  or	  non-­‐violent	   strategies	  depends	  on	  whether	   subjects	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judge	   that	   there	   is	   a	   likelihood	   of	   restoring	   previously	   effective	   citizenship	   regimes	   and	   thus	  
reviving	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  	  
	   Assuming	   a	   naïve	   account	   of	   subjectivity1,	   citizenship	   regimes	  may	   be	   said	   to	   situate	  
self-­‐transparent	  agents	  and	  their	  desires	   in	  either	  horizontal	  or	  vertical	  social	  ties,	  segmented	  
or	   seamless	   political	   spaces,	   and	   differentiated	   or	   undifferentiated	   systems	   of	   effective	  
membership.	  If	  the	  core	  argument	  of	  the	  thesis	  links	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  before	  and	  during	  
martial	   law	  to	  discrete	  strategic	  outcomes,	   it	   could	  seem	  otiose	   to	   raise	  questions	  of	  history,	  
evaluation,	   memory,	   and	   especially	   subjectivity	   at	   all.	   But	   I	   insist	   on	   including	   the	   latter	  
categories,	  and	  in	  claiming	  that	  there	  was	  equivalent	  suffering	  and	  dispossession	  in	  Poland	  and	  
Algeria	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  martial	  law.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  coincidence	  of	  different	  citizenship	  
regimes	  but	  identical	  experiences	  of	  immediate	  systemic	  objectification	  is	  a	  fruitful	  paradox	  for	  
understanding	  political	  violence.	   I	   try	   to	   resolve	   this	  paradox	  by	  showing	  that	   the	  citizenship-­‐
regime	  forms	  subjects	  whose	  evaluations	  of	  present	  circumstances	  include	  previous	  iterations	  
of	  state-­‐society	  contestation.	  An	  exclusively	  structural	  account	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  incentives	  
must,	   in	   other	   words,	   be	   supplemented	   by	   an	   account	   of	   experiential	   evaluations	   partially	  
shaped	   by	   subjects’	   historical	   relationship	   to	   the	   state.	   My	   argument	   thus	   incorporates	  
memories	  of	  past	  experiences	  that	  influence	  current	  evaluations.	  I	  hold	  that	  there	  is	  something	  
excessively	   conventional	   in	  an	  even	  heuristic	  acceptance	  of	   the	  enlightenment	   subject	  as	   the	  
analysand	  of	  social	  explanation.	  I	  use	  the	  case	  narratives	  and	  outcomes	  to	  analyze	  this	  problem	  
of	  subject-­‐formation	  in	  social	  science,	  namely,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  braiding	  objective	  and	  subjective	  
features	  of	  political	  violence	  in	  reliable	  social	  research.	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   The	  trajectory	  of	   the	  dissertation	  reflects	   the	  path	  of	  explanation	   I	   followed,	   from	  the	  
empirical	   observations	   and	  analytical	   puzzles	   about	  disparate	  activist	   strategies	  under	   similar	  
political	  regimes	  to	  enduring	  debates	  about	  the	  appropriate	  social	  ontology	  of	  political	  science.	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  chapters	  of	  the	  project	  report	  the	  question-­‐answer-­‐question	  dialectic	  of	  the	  
inquiry,	  where	   resolutions	   to	  puzzles	  generated	  subsequent	  puzzles	  and	  potential	   resolutions	  
that	  raised	  analytical	  concerns	  and	  challenged	  seemingly	  settled	  findings	  or	  propositions.	  This	  
work,	  in	  short,	  follows	  the	  path	  of	  explanation:	  deriving	  violence	  or	  non-­‐violence	  from	  varying	  
structural	   features	  of	  authoritarian	   regimes	  yields	   insights	   into	  divergent	  actor-­‐evaluations	  of	  
comparably	   brutal	   martial	   law,	   which	   in	   turn	   refines	   the	   objectification/re-­‐subjectivization	  
thesis,	   provoking	   finally	   a	   reconsideration	   of	   how	   the	   field	   envisions	   subjectivity	   between	  
rational-­‐calculation	   and	   situated	   motivation.	   Most	   simply,	   I	   argue	   that	   violence	   evinces	   a	  
mobilized	  subjectivity	  rather	  than	  a	  morbid	  subject	  whose	  will-­‐to-­‐freedom	  rises	  up	  to	  reclaim	  
human	  dignity,	  as	  in	  the	  regnant	  Fanonian	  paradigm.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  project	  is	  to	  situate	  
and	  join	  debates	  about	  subjectivity	  and	  social	  knowledge.	  As	  my	  histories	  raised	  conceptual	  and	  
methodological	   issues,	   they	   demanded	   conceptual	   and	   philosophical	   reflections	   on	   violence,	  
causality,	  objectivity,	   and	   subjectivity.	  Taken	   together,	   then,	   the	  chapters	   report	   the	  dialectic	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Whenever  we  seemed  
To  have  found  the  answer  to  a  question  
One  of  us  untied  the  string  of  the  old  rolled-­‐up  
Chinese  scroll  on  the  wall,  so  that  it  fell  down  and  
Revealed  to  us  the  man  on  the  bench  who  
Doubted  so  much.  
  
I,  he  said  to  us,  
Am  the  doubter.    I  am  doubtful  whether  
The  work  was  well  done  that  devoured  your  days.  
Whether  what  you  said  would  still  have  value  for  anyone  if  it  
Were  less  well  said.  
Whether  you  said  it  well  but  perhaps  
Were  not  convinced  of  the  truth  of  what  you  said.  
Whether  it  is  not  ambiguous;  each  possible  misunderstanding  
Is  your  responsibility.    Or  it  can  be  unambiguous  
And  take  the  contradictions  out  of  things;  is  it  too  unambiguous?  
If  so,  what  you  say  is  useless.    Your  thing  has  no  life  in  it.  
Are  you  truly  in  the  stream  of  happening?    Do  you  accept  
All  that  develops?    Are  you  developing?    Who  are  you?    To  whom  
Do  you  speak?    Who  finds  what  you  say  useful?    And,  by  the  way:  
Is  it  sobering?    Can  it  be  read  in  the  morning?  
Is  it  also  linked  to  what  is  already  there?    Are  the  sentences  that  were  
Spoken  before  you  made  use  of,  or  at  least  refuted?    Is  everything  verifiable?  
By  experience?    By  which  one?    But  above  all  
Always  above  all  else:    how  does  one  act  
If  one  believes  what  you  say?    Above  all:    how  does  one  act?  
  
Reflectively,  curiously,  we  studied  the  doubting  
Blue  man  on  the  scroll,  looked  at  each  other  and  
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NOTE	  ON	  STYLE	  
	  
	  
How	  astonishing	  it	  is	  that	  language	  can	  almost	  mean,	  
and	  frightening	  that	  it	  does	  not	  quite.	  	  Love,	  we	  say,	  
God,	  we	  say,	  Rome	  and	  Michiko,	  we	  write,	  and	  the	  words	  




Robert	   Merton	   mocked	   the	   “squirrel-­‐like	   collector	   of	   innumerable	   good	   things	   to	  
learn.”2	  While	   preparing	   a	   genealogy	   of	   the	   “dwarf-­‐on-­‐the-­‐shoulders-­‐of-­‐giants	   aphorism”	   he	  
had	  stumbled	  onto	  an	  absurdity:	  
	  
I	   had	   been	   industriously	   collecting,	   like	   a	   squirrel	   in	   your[3]	   own	   backyard	   but	   without	   his[4]	  
presumably	   assured	   knowledge	   of	   why	   he	   is	   doing	   what	   he	   is	   doing,	   every	   little	   nut	   of	   an	  
allusion	   to	   the	  epigram	  and	  providently	   storing	   it	  away.	   Like	   that	   furry	   rodent,	   I	  didn’t	  always	  
remember	   where	   I	   had	   put	   the	   things…Everybody	   knows,	   of	   course,	   that	   the	   aphorism	   goes	  
back	  to	  Didacus	  Stella	  (in	  Luc.	  10,	  tom.	  2)	  and	  may	  have	  originated	  there	  –	  who	  can	  say?	  	  
	  
What	  if	  documents,	  data,	  sources,	  and	  ideas	  point	  not	  to	  conclusive	  provenances	  or	  apodictic	  
truths	   but	   only	   to	   one	   another?	  Do	  we	   invent	  whatever	   knowledge	   transcends	   the	   “horrible	  
mélange”5	  of	  history?	  Are	  our	  texts	  mere	  fabrications,	  our	  reasoning	  adornments,	  our	  research	  
ornaments	  dangling	  from	  willful	  perspectives?6	  To	  adduce	  Merton’s	  wicked	  irony,	  Who	  can	  say	  
what	  everybody	  knows?	  
	  Hardly	  a	  shrugging	  relativist,	  Merton	  assiduously	  tracked	  the	  gnomic	  adage	  we	  owe	  our	  
mentors.7	  But	  the	  damage	  was	  done	  –	  another	  archivist	  stricken	  by	  the	  “roundabout	  route	  to	  
Bartlett’s	   Familiar	   Quotations.”8	   Evidence	   and	   intellect	   converge	   in	   this	   dilemma.	   Adding	   is	  
expected	  to	  subtract:	  more	  data,	  documents,	  arguments,	  and	  tested	  hypotheses	  should	  mean	  
less	  supposition,	  estimation,	   intuition,	  and	  mystification.	  But	  then	  ethnography9	  produces	  and	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releases	   new	   details,	   stories,	   significations,	   and	   perspectives.	   To	   embrace	   the	   proliferation	  
endemic	  to	  a	  truth	  procedure	  of	  open	  investigation	  is	  to	  risk	  adding	  without	  subtracting.	  	  	  
I	  am	  grateful	  to	  many	  giants.	  Even	  they	  are	  grateful.	  “Derrida	  once	  said	  he	  writes	  only	  
because	  he	  reads,	  and	  he	  reads	  only	  because	  there	  are	  these	  authors	  to	  read	  time	  and	  again.	  
He	  ‘owes’	  them	  something	  or,	  perhaps,	  everything,	  if	  only	  because	  he	  could	  not	  write	  without	  
them:	   their	  writing	  exists	  as	   the	  precondition	  of	  his	  own;	   their	  writing	  constitutes	   the	  means	  
through	  which	  his	  own	  writing	  voice	  is	  animated	  and	  secured.”10	  Derrida	  imbricates	  the	  means-­‐
ends	  and	   subjects-­‐objects	  of	   ethnographic	   inscription	   to	  explore	  how	   textual	   “preconditions”	  
configure	  the	  worldly	  effects,	  constraints,	  and	  exclusions	  of	  writing.	  He	  sees	  texts	  as	  braids	  of	  
creative	  motions,	  discursive	  traces,	  interstitial	  disruptions,	  and	  supplementary	  significations,	  as	  
a	  tormented	  unraveling.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   My	   project	   comprises	   empirical,	   conceptual,	   argumentative,	   and	   speculative	   inquiries	  
laden	  with	  anxieties	  about	  the	  boundaries	  of	  disciplinary	  validation,	  analytical	  digression,	  and	  
nomadic	  citation.	   I	  want	  this	  work	  to	  straddle	  and	  cross	   lines,	  often	  denied	   in	  the	  profession,	  
among	  demonstration,	  doubt,	  and	  discovery.	  The	  artifices	  by	  which	  we	  define	  puzzles	  and	  find	  
solutions	  can,	   I	   suspect,	   identify	  or	   test	  hypotheses	  about	  social	  action;	  but	   the	  status	  of	  our	  
exclusions	  remains	  little	  discussed.	  As	  with	  Merton’s	  recursive	  citations,	  discovery	  lies	  on	  both	  
sides	  of	  demonstration,	  goaded	  or	  guided	  by	  doubts	  about	  ideal-­‐types,	  initial	  conditions,	  and	  all	  
that	  is	  held	  constant.	  But	  the	  counter-­‐peril	  to	  over-­‐simplifications	  is	  infinite	  regression.	  Desire,	  
taste,	   or	   bias	   decides	   the	   terminus,	   the	   same	   choice-­‐mechanism	   at	   play	   when	   we	   “[write]	  
through	  and	  not	  just…about”	  a	  text,	  conceding	  our	  “inability	  to	  quote	  without	  also	  creating.”12	  
	   This	   image	  of	  writing	   alchemizes	  words	   and	   things13,	  which	   co-­‐inscribe,	   lest	   reflection	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devolve	   into	  detached	  abstraction.14	  The	  symbiosis	  of	  narrative	  and	  situated	  realities	  conveys	  
specificity,	  multiplicity,	  and	  perhaps	  universality.	  As	  W.	  G.	  Sebald	  remarked,	  about	  his	  memoir:	  
	  	  
[O]ne	  thing	  takes	  you	  to	  another,	  and	  you	  make	  something	  out	  of	  these	  haphazardly	  assembled	  
materials.	  And,	   as	   they	  have	  been	  assembled	   in	   this	   random	   fashion,	   you	  have	   to	   strain	   your	  
imagination	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  things.	  If	  you	  look	  for	  things	  that	  
are	   like	   the	   things	   you	  have	   looked	   for	  before,	   then,	  obviously,	   they’ll	   connect	  up.	  But	   they’ll	  
only	   connect	  up	   in	  an	  obvious	   sort	  of	  way,	  which	  actually	   isn’t,	   in	   terms	  of	  writing	   something	  
new,	  productive.	  So	  you	  have	  to	  take	  heterogeneous	  materials	  in	  order	  to	  get	  your	  mind	  to	  do	  
something	  it	  hasn’t	  done	  before.15	  	  	  
	  
Is	  there	  some	  other	  way	  to	  think,	  speak,	  or	  write	  –	  some	  other	  path	  from	  origin	  to	  originality?	  Is	  
there	  another	  way	   to	   assert	   veracity	   in	   guarded	   language	  games?	  The	   synthetic,	   overflowing	  
style	  of	  my	  inquiry	  evinces	  a	  dialectical	  fidelity	  to	  empirical	  accounts	  of	  coercion	  and	  resistance,	  
objects	  and	  subjects,	  pasts	  and	  presents,	  and	  experiences	  and	  calculations.	  Fealty	  to	  concrete	  
events	  disciplines	  the	  “heterogeneous	  materials”	  that	  allow	  the	  “mind	  to	  do	  something	  it	  hasn’t	  
done	  before.”	  As	  Vargas	  Llosa	  says,	  “This	  process	   is	   literally	  a	  cannibalization:	  these	  materials	  
are	   fully	   digested	   by	   the	   new	   reality,	   transformed	   into	   a	   distinct	   and	   integral	   substance.”16	  
Situations	  and	  texts	  govern	  the	  purposeful	  creativity	  of	  social	  argumentation,	  conditioning	  and	  
challenging,	  if	  not	  impeaching,	  reliable	  social	  knowledge.	  Back	  once	  more	  to	  Merton	  –	  Who	  can	  
say	  what	  everybody	  should	  know?	  
My	  desire	  is	  to	  communicate	  a	  thesis	  about	  how	  social	  resources	  form	  citizen-­‐subjects	  
through	  historical-­‐material	  experiences	  that,	  under	  duress,	  structure	  the	  evaluations	  of	  regimes	  
that	  shape	  protest	  strategies.	  It	  is	  a	  simple	  humanist	  idea	  –	  people	  decide	  what	  they	  want	  and	  
how	  to	  act	  based	  on	  who	  they	  are;	  who	  they	  are	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  history,	  culture,	  or	  experience.	  
But	  it	  entails	  a	  daunting	  research	  apparatus	  and	  I	  walk	  a	  line	  between	  excessive	  and	  inadequate	  
philosophical	  and	  ethnographic	  documentation.	  Here	  the	  unbearably	  already-­‐late	  David	  Foster	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Wallace	   haunts	  me.	  Manic	   citations,	   recondite	   diction,	   rationalist	   “anality,”	   and	  melancholic	  
cynicism	  protected	  his	  steeply	  humanist	  realism;	  he	  once	  said	  along	  these	  lines:	  
	  
There’s	  a	  way,	  it	  seems,	  that	  reality’s	  fractured	  right	  now,	  at	  least	  the	  reality	  that	  I	  live	  in.	  And	  
the	   difficulty	   about	   writing	   about	   that	   reality	   is	   that	   text	   is	   very	   linear	   and	   it’s	   very	   unified,	  
and…I,	   anyway,	   am	  constantly	  on	   the	   lookout	   for	  ways	   to	   fracture	   the	   text	   that	   aren’t	   totally	  
disorienting	  –	  I	  mean,	  you	  can	  take	  the	  lines	  and	  jumble	  them	  up	  and	  that’s	  nicely	  fractured,	  but	  
nobody’s	  gonna	  read	  it.17	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Social	  science	  registers	  a	  worry	  that	  linear	  and	  unified	  analyses	  may	  reduce	  empirical	  realities	  
by	  bracketing	  the	  origins,	  affect,	  and	  rationality	  of	  violence	  that	  complicate	  political	  action.	  We	  
may	  need	  “different	  modes	  of	  discourse,	  a	  different	  writing”18	  to	  envisage	  this	  plurality,	  as	  our	  
language	  itself	  must	  convey,	  contain,	  and	  reflect	  the	  dense	  objects	  it	  explores.	  	  
Violence	   and	   non-­‐violence	   make	   demands	   on	   our	   language	   to	   encompass	   them,	   to	  
indulge	   ruminations	   equal	   to	   the	   unspeakable	   kernels	   of	   killing,	   dying,	   or	   living.	   But	   does	  
adequate	  language	  guarantee	  that	  “nobody’s	  gonna	  read	  it,”	  as	  Wallace	  suggests?	  I	  am	  told	  to	  
limit	  my	  citations,	  so	  my	  argument	  surfaces	  and	  stays	  afloat.	  But	  my	  sources	  reflect	  obligations	  
beneath	  the	  desire	  for	  novel	  insight.	  Citations	  are	  shoulders	  I	  stand	  on	  and	  signs	  of	  gratitude	  for	  
them.19	  Then	  again,	  I	  do	  not	  want	  my	  account	  of	  violence	  to	  suffocate	  under	  its	  effort	  at	  clarity.	  
So,	   if	  you	  begin	  to	  drown	  in	  Milton’s	  “paroxysm	  of	  citations”20,	  forego	  the	  notes	  for	  the	  ideas	  




















In	   a	   constellation	   that	   poses	   the	   threat	   of	   total	   annihilation	   through	   war	  
against	  the	  hope	  for	  emancipation	  of	  all	  mankind	  through	  revolution	  –	  leading	  
one	  people	  after	  the	  other	  in	  swift	  succession	  ‘to	  assume	  among	  the	  powers	  
of	  the	  earth	  the	  separate	  and	  equal	  station	  to	  which	  the	  Laws	  of	  Nature	  and	  
of	  Nature’s	  God	  entitle	  them’	  –	  no	  cause	  is	  left	  but	  the	  most	  ancient	  of	  all,	  the	  
one,	   in	   fact,	   that	   from	  the	  beginning	  of	  our	  history	  has	  determined	   the	  very	  
existence	  of	  politics,	  the	  cause	  of	  freedom	  versus	  tyranny.	  
        Hannah Arendt1 
	   	  
	  
	  
	   If	  “the	  cause	  of	  freedom	  versus	  tyranny	  [is]	  the	  most	  ancient	  of	  all,”	  violence	  and	  peace	  
are	  arguably	  the	  central	  categories	  in	  assessing	  freedom	  and	  tyranny	  in	  political-­‐philosophy	  and	  
social	  science	  alike.	  We	  often	  conceive	  freedom	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  systemic	  peace	  and	  tyranny	  
as	  the	  presence	  of	  systemic	  violence.	   If	  violence	  and	  peace	  index	  these	  two	  essential	  political	  
conditions,	  freedom	  and	  tyranny,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  that	  they	  have	  also	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  
related	  to	  them	  in	  consistent	  ways.	  Tyranny	  and	  violence	  are	  accordingly	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  natural	  
fit,	  as	  are	  freedom	  and	  peace.	  Moreover,	  these	  pairings	  are	  not	  formed	  by	  elective	  affinity,	  as	  in	  
Weber’s	  capitalism-­‐Calvinism	  nexus;	  that	  is,	  tyranny-­‐and-­‐violence	  or	  freedom-­‐and-­‐peace	  do	  not	  
just	  happen	  to	  click	  together	  as	  compatible	  but	  autonomous	  phenomena.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  seen	  
as	  co-­‐constituted	  –	  co-­‐extensive	  in	  reciprocal	  causal	   logics.	  The	  phrases	  peaceful	  freedom	  and	  
violent	  tyranny	  therefore	  sound	  pleonastic,	  as	  our	  normative	  and	  scientific	  political	  conventions	  
causally	  identify	  freedom	  with	  peace,	  tyranny	  with	  violence	  –	  as	  foundations	  of	  our	  thought.2	  	  
	   This	  conceptual	  map	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  philosophically	  inclined	  comparative	  politics	  
of	  peaceful	  and	  violent	  social	  phenomena	  by	  raising	  persistent	  dilemmas	  of	  social	  explanation.	  
2 
 
    
 
One	  dilemma	  concerns	  reliable	  knowledge	  about	  agents	  who,	  as	  objects	  or	  subjects	  of	  political	  
regimes,	  interpret	  their	  own	  conditions,	  experiences,	  and	  actions	  in	  particular	  ways.	  I	  will	  posit	  
this	  dilemma	  –	  generally:	  that	  between	  universal-­‐objective	  and	  particular-­‐subjective	  aspects	  of	  
social	  analysis	  –	  as	  soluble	  but	  still	  vexing.	  These	  aspects	  of	  explanation	  are	  coeval;	  I	  separate	  
them	  heuristically	  to	  convey	  the	  dialogue	  between	  social	  actions	  and	  theories	  that	  emerged	  in	  
my	  research	  and	  writing.	  	  
	   Exploring	   why	   Algerian	   but	   not	   Polish	   activists	   resisted	   brutal	   states	   of	   emergency	  
violently,	   I	   discerned	   that	   historical	   and	   subjective	   evaluations	   of	   material-­‐political	   suffering	  
bore	  greater	  explanatory	  weight	  than	  immediate	  and	  objective	  conditions.	  Specifically,	  despite	  
similar	  systemic	  deprivation,	  I	  detected	  that	  Poles	  constituted	  as	  worker-­‐citizens	  retained	  their	  
historically	  effective	  social	  resource	  –	  the	  strike	  –	  to	  compel	  policy	  concessions	  and	  bind	  state	  to	  
subject;	  but	  Algerians	  constituted	  as	  client-­‐citizens	   lost	  their	  social	  resource	  –	  shifted	   loyalty	  –	  
and	  capacity	  to	  compel	  ruling	  elites	  without	  violently	  alienating	  state	  and	  citizen-­‐subject.3	  This	  
disparity	  generated	  two	  symbiotic	  arguments.	  First,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  social	  resource,	  withdrawn	  
labor,	  that	  formed	  worker-­‐citizenship	  endured	  state	  fiscal	  and	  political	  crises,	  sustaining	  Poles’	  
experience	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  and	  minimizing	  incentives	  to	  violence;	  in	  contrast,	  the	  social	  
resource,	   removed	   fealty,	   that	   structured	   client-­‐citizenship	   perished,	   eradicating	   Algerians’	  
systemic	  subjectivity.	  In	  addition	  to	  structurally	  linking	  citizenship	  regimes	  to	  protest	  strategies,	  
I	  argue,	  second,	  that	  the	  social	  resources	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  reiterate	  practices	  of	  effective	  
systemic	  membership	  that	  form	  subjects	  who	  evaluate	  their	  present	  conditions	  historically	  and	  
experientially.	  Reacting	  to	  similar	   initial	  assaults	  under	  martial	   law	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  citizen-­‐
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subjects	  acted	  on	  distinct	  historical	  experiences,	  yielding	  divergent	   readings	  of	   state	  coercion	  
and	  evaluations	  of	  agitation	  strategies,	  depending	  on	  the	  potential	  recovery	  of	  social	  resources.	  	  
	   I	  will	  explore	  in	  this	  work,	  then,	  two	  kinds	  of	  claim,	  concerning	  objective	  and	  subjective	  
conditions	  of	  violent	  or	  non-­‐violent	  strategies.	  First	   is	  an	   inference	   from	  objective	  conditions:	  
under	  martial	  law	  Poles	  remained	  non-­‐violent	  as	  their	  labor	  resource	  afforded	  them	  immanent	  
power	  within	  the	  regime	  whereas	  Algerians	  turned	  to	  violence	  because	  their	   loyalty	  resource	  
gave	  them	  power	  only	  outside	  the	  regime.	  Second	  is	  an	  inference	  about	  subjective	  conditions:	  
Poles	  experienced	  and	  intuited	  immanent	  potency,	  despite	  objective	  dispossession,	  subjectively	  
as	  worker-­‐citizens	  who	  had	  repeatedly	  used	  strikes	  to	  reverse	  state	  decisions.	  Even	  as	  the	  ruling	  
class	  banned	  strikes,	  labor	  power	  remained	  visible,	  virtual,	  immanent	  –	  a	  potent	  weapon	  in	  the	  
experiential	  subjectivity	  of	  Polish	  dissidents,	  rendering	  the	  state	  a	  deluded	  colossus.	  In	  contrast,	  
Algerians	  experienced	  systemic	  suffocation	  under	  state	  absolutism,	  unmediated	  by	  dormant	  or	  
suspended	   social	   resources,	   as	   client-­‐citizens	   and	   voter-­‐citizens	   rendered	   abject	   by	   the	   state	  
consolidation	  of	  material	  and	  social	  sovereignty,	  obliterating	  actual	  and	  virtual	  citizenship	  alike.	  
When	  Algerian	  rulers	  canceled	  the	  experiment	  with	  elections,	  refusing	  Islamists	  a	  hard-­‐earned	  
electoral	  victory,	  Algerians	  were	  systemically	  expelled,	  denied	  effective	  membership	  conferred	  
by	  reliable	  social	  resources,	  securing	  state	  prerogative	  and	  casting	  citizens	  as	  political	  objects.	  
	   The	  first	  argument	  about	  divergent	  objective	  conditions	  –	  that	  the	  observable	  retention	  
or	  eradication	  of	  the	  resources	  that	  constitute	  citizen-­‐subjects	  produces	  non-­‐violent	  or	  violent	  
protest	  –	  stands	  alone	  as	  a	  structural	  or	   institutional	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect.	  A	  spare	  version	  of	  this	  
argument	  says:	  if	  the	  tools	  of	  social	  protest	  available	  before	  martial	  law	  are	  removed	  (and	  not	  
replaced),	  violence	  will	  be	  more	   likely.	  Or,	  more	   tersely:	  effective	  social	   resources	  discourage	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violence.	  In	  a	  sense	  this	  is	  the	  primary,	  core	  claim	  of	  my	  project.	  But	  this	  argument	  entails	  that	  
habituated	  social	  resources	  were,	  indeed,	  differently	  effective	  under	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  martial	  
law,	  translating	  directly	  into	  divergent	  protest	  formations.	  The	  similarity	  of	  state	  violence	  in	  the	  
two	  cases	  means,	  though,	  that	  the	  structural	  disparity	  in	  antecedent	  systemic	  subjectivity	  does	  
not	  explain	  the	  discrete	  outcomes.	  The	  second	  claim	  thus	  explains	  the	  first	  by	  showing	  how	  the	  
citizenship	  regimes	  continued	  to	  shape	  outcomes	  when,	   in	  the	  volatile	  early	  period	  of	  martial	  
law,	  neither	  provided	  Poles	  nor	  Algerians	  with	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  The	  second	  argument	  thus	  
addresses	   the	  discrepancy	  arising	   from	  the	   first,	  between	  objective	  conditions	  and	  subjective	  
evaluations	  of	  social	  suffering	  and	  political	  exclusion,	  given	  martial	  law	  appears	  in	  both	  Poland	  
and	   Algeria	   to	   have	   eliminated	   all	   previously	   salient	   opposition	   strategies.	   This	   second	   claim	  
emphasizes	  experiential	  evaluation	  or	  historical	  interpretation	  of	  state	  coercion	  with	  respect	  to	  
its	  effects	  on	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  not	  only	  on	  grievances.	  So,	  emphasis	  on	  historical	  patterns	  
of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  provides	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  structural	  model:	  how	  materially	  credible	  
and	  institutionally	  legible,	  but	  immediately	  ineffective,	  social	  resources	  may	  still	  seem	  present	  if	  
inoperable	  to	  Polish	  activists,	  dissuading	  them	  from	  violent	  resistance.	  A	  streamlined	  structural	  
account	  of	  exclusion-­‐versus-­‐inclusion	  needs	  a	  supporting	  account	  of	  the	  subjective	  evaluations	  
of	  enduring-­‐versus-­‐eliminated	  social	  resources	  that	  determine	  the	  political	  content	  of	  objective	  
suffering	  or	  disenfranchisement.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   These	  objective	  conditions	  and	  subjective	  evaluations	  are	  co-­‐extensive	  variables	   in	  the	  
theoretical	  model	  (see	  §1.b),	  so	  I	  confront	  structural-­‐without-­‐subjective	  explanations	  of	  violent	  
or	   non-­‐violent	   social	   agitation	   strategies,	   while	   questioning	   the	   common	   inference	   that	   the	  
causal	   component	  of	  experiential	   or	   subjective	  evaluation	   precludes	   comparative	  explanatory	  
5 
 
    
 
inferences.	  I	  should	  clarify	  here	  that	  while	  I	  extrapolate	  theoretical	  insights	  from	  my	  account	  of	  
Polish	  non-­‐violence	  and	  Algerian	  violence,	  I	  apply	  the	  theory	  and	  explanation	  narrowly	  to	  these	  
cases,	  and	  offer	  them	  as	  only	  potentially	  applicable	  to	  other	  social	  situations	  and	  movements.	  
In	  summarizing	  the	  findings	  in	  broader	  terms,	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  a	  universal	  theory	  of	  systemic	  
subjectivity,	  citizenship	  structures,	  or	  social	  action,	  but	  one	  that	  makes	  sense	  of	  the	  choices	  of	  
Poland’s	  Solidarity	  and	  Algeria’s	  Islamists,	  if	  not	  social	  agitations	  elsewhere.4	  Invoking	  Arendt’s	  
concepts	  of	  tyranny	  and	  freedom	  through	  immediate	  and	  experiential	  aspects	  of	  social	  action	  
in	  reading	  my	  case	  studies,	  I	  affirm	  but	  refine	  the	  polarity	  of	  dehumanized	  and	  subjective	  states	  
in	   social	   explanation;	   propose	   that	   in	   their	   evolving	   strategies	   dissidents	   act	   on	   historically	  
formulated	  evaluations	  of	  present	   citizenship	   status,	   or	   social	   resources;	   and	   connect	   violent	  
and	  non-­‐violent	  protest	  decisions	  to	  patterns	  of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  and	  experiential	  evaluation	  
that	  invite	  causal	  explanation.	  These	  are	  the	  explanatory	  and	  theoretical	  hypotheses	  elaborated	  
and,	  I	  hope,	  justified	  in	  this	  project,	  which	  I	  will	  now	  introduce	  in	  analytical	  detail,	  sketching	  the	  
premises	   questioned	   and	   advanced	   in	   the	   following	   chapters	   to	   transcend	   the	   dilemmas	   of	  
explaining	  self-­‐sacrificial	  violence.	  
	   The	   identities	   freedom-­‐peace	   and	   tyranny-­‐violence	   adduced	   above	   offer	   a	   promising	  
framework	  for	  comparative	  research.	  Inasmuch	  as	  they	  conceptually	  and	  causally	  bind	  tyranny	  
to	  violence	  and	   freedom	  to	  peace,	   these	   two	  dyads	   furthermore	   form	  our	  concept	  of	  human	  
being	  itself,	  as	  Arendt	  suggests.	  Freedom	  and	  peace	  become	  the	  necessary,	  defining	  conditions	  
for	   realizing	  human	  potential5,	  which	   tyranny	  and	  violence	  absolutely	  prevent.6	  One	  concrete	  
derivative	  of	  these	  pretty	  abstract	  equations	  is	  the	  premise	  that	  peaceful	  freedom	  and	  violent	  
tyranny	  create	  feedback	  loops	  between	  regimes	  and	  societies.	  The	  characteristics	  of	  tyrannical	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and	  free	  systems	  diffuse	  to	  their	  inhabitants	  who	  absorb,	  embody,	  and	  replicate	  their	  regimes’	  
coercive	  or	  liberal	  tendencies.	  On	  this	  view	  regimes	  and	  citizens	  grow	  into	  each	  other	  over	  time	  
as	  mirror	  images,	  echoed	  in	  adages	  about	  states	  and	  societies	  deserving	  each	  other.	  Tyrannical	  
regimes	  and	  their	  citizens	  are	  thus	  warlike,	  free	  regimes	  and	  citizens	  peaceful.	  Ultimately,	  each	  
description	  morphs	   into	   its	   own	   explanation.	   Both	   images	   envisage	   humanity	   as	   structured,	  
contextually	   and	  mimetically,	   on	   dichotomous	   axes	   of	   tyranny/freedom	   and	   peace/violence.	  
For	  a	  social	  science	  that	  needs	  a	  causal	  mechanism	  but	  admits	  the	  locality	  of	  choice	  or	  value	  as	  
consequential	   in	  producing	  violence,	  the	  key	  provision	  here	  is	  a	  human	  ontology	  –	  a	  universal	  
property	  that	  encompasses	  all	  social	  activities	  under	  foundational	  concepts	  and	  distinctions	  that	  
can	  support	  explanatory	  schemas.	  That	  implied	  human	  ontology	  is	  the	  desire	  for	  freedom	  and	  
the	  practical	  result	  is	  imitative	  adaptation	  in	  compulsory	  political	  systems	  or	  social	  contexts.7	  	  
	   One	  codicil	  that	  reiterates	  this	  logic	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  state-­‐society	  mimesis	  posits	  that	  if	  
regime	  and	  citizen	  do	  not	  become	  fused,	  one	  or	  both	  have	  retained	  an	  identity	  external	  to	  their	  
relationship.	  Mismatches	  between	  state	  and	  society	  thus	  must	  testify	  to	  outside	  influence,	  such	  
as	  some	  previous	  cultural	  commitment	  or	  foreign	  ideology	  that	  has	  corrupted	  the	  presumptive	  
identification	  of	  regime	  and	  citizen.8	  This	  interpretation	  surfaces	  in	  both	  analytical	  and	  political	  
practice.	  Analysts	  conflate	  social	  actors	  and	  institutional	  configurations,	  at	  least	  in	  much	  social	  
movement	  theory,	  much	  the	  way	  states	  and	  citizens	  accuse	  each	  other	  of	  infidelity	  when	  failing	  
to	  align.	  In	  each	  case	  the	  belief	  persists	  that	  regime	  and	  citizen	  ought	  to	  be	  co-­‐constituted.	  The	  
expectation	   from	  our	  conceptual	  map	  is	  that	  freedom	  and	  peace	  constitute	  each	  other,	  as	  do	  
tyranny	  and	  violence.	  In	  more	  prosaic	  terms,	  we	  expect	  the	  pairings	  inclusion-­‐peace,	  exclusion-­‐	  
violence.	  As	  basic	  ensemble	  variables,	  freedom-­‐peace	  and	  tyranny-­‐violence	  are	  responsible	  for	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the	  presumption	  of	  “authoritarian	  persistence	  and	  stability”9	  from	  Latin	  American	  bureaucratic	  
authoritarianism	  to	  West	  Asian10	  distributive	  police	  states	  –	  until	  they	  crumble	  or	  reform	  under	  
cross-­‐ideological	  or	  multi-­‐class	  oppositions.	  This	  perception	  of	  authoritarianism	  as	  stable-­‐until-­‐
unstable	  exposes	  fault	  lines	  in	  the	  analyzed	  and	  experienced	  dictatorial	  edifice;	  but	  it	  sustains	  
the	  either/or	  framing	  of	  violent	  tyranny	  and	  peaceful	  freedom	  as	  our	  archetypal	  political	  forms.	  	  
	   This	  discussion	  leads	  to	  the	  predicate	  that	  grievances	  are	  an	  expression	  of	  human	  being.	  
A	  regime	  indexed	  tyrannical-­‐violent	  is	  said	  to	  violate	  the	  conditions	  of	  human	  flourishing,	  to	  be	  
inhumane;	  a	  regime	  indexed	  free-­‐peaceful	  fulfills	  those	  criteria	  and	  is	  humane.	  Turning	  to	  the	  
inhumane	  authoritarian	  states	  of	  exception	  in	  my	  cases,	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  we	  may	  infer	  that	  
Solidarity	  and	  Islamist	  activists	  resisted	  a	  similar	  condition:	  dehumanization.	  If	  so,	  invoking	  our	  
conceptual	  map,	  we	  would	  say	  that	  in	  autocratic	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  humanity	  rose	  up	  against	  
inhumanity,	  albeit	   in	  distinct	  expressions	  of	   recuperated	  humanity.	  By	  extension,	   tyranny	   is	  a	  
necropolis	  in	  which	  survivors	  –	  sustained	  by	  values,	  ideals,	  or	  hopes	  from	  beyond	  their	  regime	  
or	   society	  –	  emerge,	   coalesce,	  and	   revolt	   in	  defense	  of	   their	  humanity.11	  The	  uprising	  proves	  
the	  failure	  of	  thanatopolitical	  despotism	  to	  eradicate	  life.12	  This	  city	  of	  the	  dead	  coming	  to	  life	  
articulates	   the	  dehumanization	   thesis,	  which	   recommends	   a	   compelling	   if	   problematic	   causal	  
mechanism13	   behind	   social	   violence	   and	   peace.	   My	   project	   affirms	   the	   logic	   of	   this	   thesis,	  
centrally	   the	  salience	  of	  dehumanization	   in	  producing	  violence.	  But	   I	  will	  explain	   the	  discrete	  
outcomes	  by	  retreating	  from	  immediate	  to	  historical	  experiences	  and	  evaluations	  of	  inhumane	  
conditions,	  re-­‐inscribing	  social	  agents	  as	  subjects,	  not	  objects,	  of	  coercive	  regimes.	  To	  support	  
these	  ideas,	  it	  helps	  to	  take	  up	  the	  analytical	  leverage	  gained	  from	  revising	  the	  dehumanization	  
thesis,	  still	  the	  governing	  premise	  in	  leading	  explanations	  of	  violence.	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   Dehumanization	  refers	  to	  political	  disenfranchisement,	  material	  dispossession,	  or	  social	  
expulsion	  that	  erodes	  collective	  or	  individual	  abilities	  to	  achieve	  consciously	  defined	  objectives	  
willfully	  and	  reliably	  in	  a	  compulsory	  social	  system.	  It	  denotes	  diminished	  agency	  or	  subjectivity,	  
conceived	  apart	  from	  liberal	  notions	  of	  freedom	  predicated	  on	  a	  universal	  potential	  for	  rational-­‐
detachment.	   In	   sophisticated	   dehumanization	   theses,	   agency	   or	   subjectivity	   –	   the	   latter	   is	   a	  
quasi-­‐technical	   term	   in	  my	   project	   –	   comprise	   two	   components	   of	   a	   successful	   and	   reliable	  
exertion	   of	   will	   to	   realize	   self-­‐articulated	   demands:	  material	   provisions	   that	   permit	   physical	  
endurance	  and	  political	  resources	  that	  guarantee	  efficacious	  expression	  of	  grievances.	  Denial	  of	  
these	  biological	  and	  expressive	  needs	  dehumanizes	  people.	  The	  causal	  argument	  built	  up	  from	  
these	  concepts	  is	  that	  sustained	  social	  violence	  is	  a	  double	  movement	  of	  repression	  and	  revolt,	  
of	  suffocation	  and	  gasping	  for	  air.14	  It	  occurs	  when	  people	  have	  been	  dehumanized	  by	  a	  system	  
that	  must	  therefore	  be	  broken	  to	  reverse	  this	  process	  and	  re-­‐humanize	  their	  lives.	  Put	  another	  
way,	  people	  resort	  to	  violence	  when	  reduced	  from	  acting	  subjects	  to	  acted-­‐upon	  objects,	  when	  
as	  humans-­‐into-­‐things	  they	  cannot	  improve	  their	  welfare	  using	  only	  the	  means	  established	  and	  
accredited	  in	  hegemonic	  political	  arrangements.15	  	  
	   Frantz	  Fanon	  gives	  us	  a	  lucid,	  stirring	  vision	  of	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  in	  his	  dramatic	  
deathbed	  recitation,	  The	  Wretched	  of	  the	  Earth:	  	  
	  
A	   world	   compartmentalized,	   Manichean	   and	   petrified,	   a	   world	   of	   statues:	   the	   statue	   of	   the	  
general	  who	  led	  the	  conquest,	  the	  statue	  of	  the	  engineer	  who	  built	  the	  bridge.	  A	  world	  cocksure	  
of	   itself,	   crushing	  with	   its	   stoniness	   the	   backbones	   of	   those	   scarred	   by	   the	  whip.	   That	   is	   the	  
colonial	   world.	   The	   colonial	   subject	   is	   a	   man	   penned	   in;	   apartheid	   is	   but	   one	   method	   of	  
compartmentalizing	  the	  colonial	  world.	  The	  first	  thing	  the	  colonial	  subject	  learns	  is	  to	  remain	  in	  
his	  place	  and	  not	  overstep	  his	   limits…The	  dreams	  of	  the	  colonial	  subject	  are	  muscular	  dreams,	  
dreams	  of	  action,	  dreams	  of	  aggressive	  vitality.	   I	  dream	  I	  am	  jumping,	  swimming,	  running,	  and	  
climbing.	  I	  dream	  I	  burst	  out	  laughing,	  I	  am	  leaping	  across	  a	  river	  and	  chased	  by	  a	  pack	  of	  cars	  
that	  never	  catches	  up	  with	  me.	  During	  the	  colonization	  the	  colonized	  subject	  frees	  himself	  night	  
after	  night	  between	  nine	  in	  the	  evening	  and	  six	  in	  the	  morning.16	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This	  passage	  bristles	  with	  poetic	   images	  of	  eruptive	  resistance	  to	  strangulation.	   It	  describes	  a	  
violently	  enforced,	  class-­‐defined	  institutional	  racism	  –	  apartheid	  is	  a	  term	  too	  kind,	  he	  stresses,	  
for	   France’s	  Algerian	   colony	  –	  whose	   inhumanity	   typified	   the	   indifference	  and	  prerogative	  of	  
one	  people	  to	  another.17	  When	  Algerian	  demands	  for	  civic,	  racial,	  and	  economic	  equality	  after	  
WWII	   had	   yielded	   only	   more	   brutal	   expressions	   of	   these	   inequities,	   the	   colonized	   attacked.	  
Fanon’s	  rendering	  contains	  a	  social-­‐psychological	  explanation	  of	  the	  refusal	  of	  dehumanization.	  
Cobbling	  together	  observations	  from	  his	  clinical	  and	  anti-­‐imperial	  activities,	  Fanon	  claims	  that	  
inhumane	   circumstances	   cause	   their	   victims	   neuroses	   when	   internalized	   and	   violence	   when	  
externalized.	  Echoing	  his	  earlier	  analysis	  of	  racism	  in	  Black	  Skins,	  White	  Masks,	  written	  before	  
the	  revolution,	  he	  provides	  a	  sort	  of	  hydraulic	  theory	  of	  personhood.	  A	  social	  system,	  he	  says,	  
can	  compress	  but	  not	  extinguish	  our	  identity	  and	  will,	  our	  capacity	  to	  realize	  our	  personal	  and	  
social	  desires.18	   If	   social	   arrangements	   stop	  us	   from	  being	  who	  we	  are,	  who-­‐we-­‐are	  will	   take	  
refuge	  in	  our	  unconscious	  –	  sustaining	  itself	  in	  muscular	  dreams	  of	  running,	  jumping,	  climbing,	  
outpacing	  colons’	  cars	  –	  until	  survival	  forces	  who-­‐we-­‐are	  out	  of	  hiding	  to	  fight	  back.	  Militancy	  
marks	  the	  symptomatic	  shift	  from	  internalized	  to	  externalized	  effects	  of	  dehumanization,	  that	  
is,	  a	  qualitative	  change	  in	  the	  symptom	  itself.	  At	  some	  pressure	  point,	  re-­‐humanization	  occurs	  
through	  the	  transformation	  from	  internal	  dream	  to	  external	  war	  –	  a	  “new	  man”	  arises.19	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   The	  analysis	  here	  concerns	  Fanon’s	  contribution	  to	  a	  human	  ontology	  that,	  I	  have	  been	  
proposing,	  grounds	  our	  general	  model	  of	  social	  and	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  desire	  for	  freedom	  
from	  dehumanization.	  So	  it	  seems	  worthwhile	  to	  round	  out	  his	  account	  of	  dehumanization.	  In	  
simple	  terms,	  Fanon	  reports	  that	  dehumanization	  first	  represses	  and	  then	  radicalizes	  its	  victims.	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The	   repression	  phase	  manifests	   symptoms	  on	   the	   couch	  –	   anxiety,	   frustration,	   fury,	   or	  more	  
broadly	  estrangement,	  dislocation,	  and	  melancholia.	  The	  radicalization	  phase	  manifests	  on	  the	  
battlefield	  –	  certainty,	  satisfaction,	  discipline,	  but	  also	  integrity,	  wholeness,	  mourning.	  So	  Fanon	  
portrays	  two	  phases	  of	  dehumanization,	  each	  with	  a	  distinct	  person.	  Re-­‐humanization	  converts	  
the	  subordinated,	  neurotic	  object	  into	  the	  radicalized,	  willful	  subject.	  I	  will	  ask	  what	  explains	  this	  
abrupt,	  disjunctive	  reversal	  in	  which	  repression20	  becomes	  rebellion,	  object	  subject;	  or	  rather,	  I	  
will	  need	  to	  scrutinize	  Fanon’s	  implicit	  explanation	  that	  the	  gradual	  suffocation	  of	  identity	  and	  
subjectivity	   reach	   a	   tipping	   point	   on	   the	   line	   between	   subject	   and	   object	  where	   the	   subject	  
recoils	  from	  reification.	  	  
	   To	  critique	  this	  account,	  I	  have	  to	  pause	  over	  some	  details.	  Fanon	  perceives	  a	  qualitative	  
asymmetry	  in	  the	  two	  symptoms	  of	  inhumanity.	  He	  thinks	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  repression	  and	  
rebellion	  are	  similar	  but	  sequential	  effects	  of	  dehumanization,	  since	  it	   is	  not	  the	  same	  person	  
whose	  fantasies	  become	  realities	  of	  power	  and	  prowess.	  Fanon	  rejects	  the	  scenario	  where	  the	  
dreamer-­‐turned-­‐fighter	   is	  one	  continuous	  agent	  stretching	  from	  repression	  to	  revolution.	  This	  
seamless	  progression	   is	   just	  the	   image	  Fanon	  dismisses	  on	  the	   imperishable	  premise	  that	   it	   is	  
through	   our	   actions	   that	  we	   become	   subjects	   –	   in	   essence,	   that	  we	   as	   beings21	   do	   not	   exist	  
before	  we	   as	   doings.22	   Fanon	   implies	   here	   that	   revolutionary	   liberation	   is	   not	   the	   result	   of	  
reflective	  decisions	  by	  objects	  (things	  do	  not	  make	  decisions)	  or	  subjects	  (agents	  do	  not	  decide	  
their	  agency23).	  His	   revolutionary	  psychoanalysis	   sees	  Algerian	  de/re-­‐humanization,	   rather,	   as	  
an	  instinctive,	  physical	  rejection	  by	  the	  human	  will	  of	  an	  animal,	  objectified	  existence	  deprived	  
of	  will.	  Fanon	  thinks	  that,	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  extinction,	  subjectivity	  protects	  itself	  and	  that	  this	  is	  a	  
universal	  mechanism	  of	  human	  life.24	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   Fanon	  offers	  an	  explanation:	  compression	  is	  not	  only	  the	  context	  of	  escape	  but	  its	  cause.	  
Dehumanization	  causes	  re-­‐humanization.25	  “Decolonization…transforms	  the	  spectator	  crushed	  
to	  a	  non-­‐essential	  state	  into	  a	  privileged	  actor,”	  he	  says.	  “It	  infuses	  a	  new	  rhythm	  specific	  to	  a	  
new	   generation	   of	   men,	   with	   a	   new	   language	   and	   a	   new	   humanity…The	   ‘thing’	   colonized	  
becomes	   a	   man	   through	   the	   very	   process	   of	   liberation.”26	   Czesław	   Miłosz	   echoes	   Fanon’s	  
reverie	  when	  he	  rejoices	  at	  “the	  moment	  when	  [Polish]	  society	   learned	  to	  consider	   itself	  as	  a	  
subject,	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  object	  manipulated	  by	  those	  who	  govern.”27	  Here	  Fanon	  adds	  to	  the	  
human	   ontology	   delineated	   above	   in	   two	  ways.	   First,	   his	   dehumanization	   thesis	   extends	   our	  
inherited	  conceptual	  landscape	  to	  tyranny-­‐violence-­‐object	  versus	  freedom-­‐peace-­‐subject.	  In	  the	  
process	  of	  re-­‐humanization	  violence	  and	  liberation	  are	  symbiotic	  but	  this	  is	  a	  median	  stage	  on	  
the	  way	  to	  post-­‐colonial	  freedom.	  Second,	  more	  significantly,	  he	  insists	  that	  people	  respond	  to	  
tyranny	   and	   freedom	   not	   as	   violent	   or	   peaceful	   mimes	   but	   as	  willful	   (not	   “intentional”28	   or	  
“free”)	   subjects.	   For	   Fanon,	   people	   do	  not	   reproduce	   hegemonic	   social	   orders	   as	   if	   distillate	  
mimetic	   instances	   of	   them;	   they	   follow	   their	   irrefragable	   drive	   to	   reclaim	   their	   humanity.	   In	  
conceiving	  a	  primal	  desire	  for	  liberation	  from	  tyranny,	  Fanon	  explains	  revolutionary	  violence	  as	  
part	  of	  his	  proof	  that	  subjectivity	  arises	  from	  the	  elemental,	  universal	  need	  to	  be	  human.29	  
	   Fanon’s	  dehumanization	  thesis	  is	  a	  good	  place	  to	  begin	  discussing	  explanations	  of	  social	  
violence/non-­‐violence,	  less	  for	  the	  specific	  theses	  about	  racism,	  empire,	  and	  revolution	  than	  for	  
the	  crystalline,	  if	  all-­‐too-­‐casual,	  conceptual	  architecture.	  My	  sense	  is	  that	  the	  research	  on	  social	  
violence	  and	  collective	  action	  has	  rejected	  or	  complicated	  Fanon’s	  argument	  while	  retaining	  its	  
structure	  and	  principles.	  The	  literature	  invokes	  resource	  mobilization,	  repertoires,	  framing,	  and	  
political	  access	  as	  variables	  that	  intervene	  between	  grievance	  and	  deprivation,	  as	  institutions	  or	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practices	   that	   mediate	   political	   reactions	   to	   inhumane	   conditions.	   There	   is	   no	   direct	   causal	  
connection	  between	  dehumanization	  and	  violence	  or	  recuperation	  of	  subjectivity,	  pace	  Fanon’s	  
thesis,	  as	  these	  variables	  are	  defined,	  animated,	  ameliorated,	  and	  resisted	  in	  myriad	  ways.	  My	  
project	   explores	   how	   institutional	   histories	   differentiate	   subjective	   evaluations	   of	   objective	  
dehumanization,	  so	   it	  follows	  this	  corrective	  agenda.	  For	  that	  reason	  I	  want	  to	  ask	   if	  we	  have	  
refined	  and	  qualified	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  but	  accepted	  its	  logic	  and	  whether	  that	  logic	  is	  
itself	  valid.	  So	  my	  project	  makes	  several	  linked	  arguments.	  	  
	   First,	   retaining	  the	  scaffolding	  of	   the	  dehumanization	  thesis	   likely	  reveals	  a	  significant,	  
valuable	  truth	  about	  social	  explanation:	  it	  requires	  a	  human	  ontology	  of	  the	  kind	  under	  severe	  
and	  crippling	  attack	  for	  decades	  within	  and	  beyond	  “the	  field.”	  The	  content	  of	  this	  scaffolding	  is	  
equally	  revealing.	  Fanon	  depicts	  a	  confrontation	  between	   internal	  and	  external	  conditions;	  his	  
idea	  is	  that	  this	  “inessential	  thing”	  –	  the	  colonized	  object	  –	  results	  when	  subjective	  identity	  and	  
will	  are	  snuffed	  out	  by	  material	  and	  social	  deprivation.	  But	  this	  relationship	  between	  subjective	  
and	  objective	  conditions	  opens	  up	  a	  gap,	  as	  activists	  like	  Gandhi	  insisted	  and	  social	  movement	  
theorists	  have	  affirmed.	  My	   internal-­‐subjective	  wellbeing	  and	  external-­‐objective	  wellbeing	  do	  
not	  make	  direct	  and	  causal	  contact,	  short	  of	  outright	  eradication	  of	  my	  person;	  they	  reach	  each	  
other	  only	  through	  highly	  particular	  interpretive	  and	  normative	  prisms.	  But	  for	  a	  crucial	  reason	  
this	  is	  not	  Fanon’s	  perspective,	  which	  is	  that	  violence	  is	  a	  purely	  physical	  phenomenon	  in	  cause	  
and	  effect.	  Physical	  deprivation	  suffocates	  the	  inextricable	  human	  need	  for	  willful	  subjectivity,	  
which	  is	  also	  physical.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  surmise	  that	  Fanon	  feels	  we	  be	  reduced	  to	  mere	  physicality	  
only	  when	  we	  are	  objectified,	  but	  this	  is	  what	  he	  rejects	  in	  explaining	  the	  liberating	  violence	  of	  
the	  “new	  man.”30	  We	  are	  always	  physically	  willful,	  that	  is,	  so	  dehumanization	  does	  not	  reduce	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one	  to	  but	  denies	  one’s	  physical	  state.	  Repression	  and	  violence	  are	  intensities	  at	  the	  vanishing	  
point	  between	  subject	  and	  object,	  between	  internal	  and	  external	  energies.	  The	  point	  of	  this	  is	  
Fanon’s	  candor	  about	  what	  social	  scientists	  believe	  but	  do	  not	  say:	  that	  reliable	  explanation	  of	  
social	  violence	  entails	  a	  human	  ontology	  rooted	  in	  our	  physical	  needs	  for	  subjective	  integrity.31	  
	   The	  second	  linked	  argument	  my	  project	  addresses	  is	  that	  this	  tension	  in	  social	  scientific	  
practice	  –	   crudely,	  between	  difference	  and	  explanation	  –	   should	  be	  disinterred	  and	  analyzed	  
explicitly,	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  social	  explanation	  itself.	  Writing	  within	  and	  not	  about	  a	  method,	  
Fanon	  was	  insouciant	  about	  the	  philosophical	  precision	  and	  methodological	  status	  of	  his	  many	  
theses.	  This	  lack	  of	  self-­‐conscious	  hesitation	  permitted	  him	  to	  foreground	  the	  claims	  to	  physical	  
human	  ontology	  that	  social	  science	  needs	  but	  rarely	  speaks.	  This	  eerie	  silence	  raises	  two	  more	  
items	   in	   the	   series.	   Third,	   dehumanization	   remains	   the	   muted	   substrate	   in	   explanations	   of	  
social	   violence	   because	   of,	   not	   despite,	   its	   political	   rarity	   and	   social	   extremity.	   To	   locate	   a	  
necessary	  universal	  basis	   for	  comparative	  political	  analysis,	  so	  the	   logic	  goes,	  we	  should	  build	  
up	  from	  physical	  duress	  to	  more	  mentally	  mediated	  offenses	  to,	  say,	  cultural	  dignity.	  This	  order	  
of	   things	   mirrors	   the	   effort	   to	   define	   a	   “minimal”	   conception	   of	   human	   rights32	   or	   human	  
security33	   for	   intuitive	   reasons.	   It	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   think	   that	   if	   there	   is	  a	  general	  human	  
characteristic,	  a	  universal	  baseline	  useful	  for	  causal	  explanation,	   it	  must	  be	  our	  repulsion	  over	  
physical	   brutality;	  we	  absolutely	  ban	   torture,	   rape,	   and	  genocide	   in	  our	  political	   imagination,	  
but	  not	  profound	  threats	  to	  traditional	  or	  personal	  integrity.	  Putting	  it	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  if	  
denied	   dignity	   as	   a	   variable	   can	   support	   a	   causal	   explanation	   of	   violence,	   it	   would	   seem	   to	  
entail	   that	  physical	   degradation	   is	   causal	   as	   it	   denies	   dignity.	   Following	   from	   this,	   the	   fourth	  
view	  I	  hold	  is	  that	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis,	  based	  on	  a	  physical	  human	  ontology,	  is	  necessary	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but	   insufficient	  as	  a	   credible	  explanation	  of	   violence	  and	  non-­‐violence,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   cases	   I	  
have	   discussed	   (§3,	   §4,	   §5).	   It	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   Fanon’s	   explicit,	   and	   our	   leading	   theories’	  
implicit,	  reliance	  on	  the	  dehumanization	  nexus	  needs	  to	  be	  illuminated	  specifically	  to	  shift	  the	  
site	  of	  human	  ontology	  from	  physicality	  to	  subjectivity.	  
	   There	  are	  evident	  flaws	  in	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  that	  recommend	  its	  logical	  edifice	  
be	  relocated	  to	  a	  new	  terrain	  –	  specifically,	  that	  its	  universal	  or	  ontological	  category	  be	  moved	  
from	  general	  human	  needs	  and	  desires	  (physical	  and	  cultural)	  to	  processes	  of	  subject	  formation.	  
To	  put	   this	  provocatively,	  a	  critique	  of	   the	  dehumanization	   thesis	   forces	  us	  either	   to	  develop	  
subjectivity	   rather	   than	   injury	   as	   our	   explanatory	   variable	   or	   to	   surrender	   the	   explanation	   of	  
violence	  altogether.	  The	  reason	  for	  these	  stark	  alternatives	  is	  likely	  obvious.	  If	  dehumanization	  
refers	  to	  severe	  wounds	  to	  body	  or	  dignity,	  it	  fails	  as	  a	  causal	  variable	  because	  even	  as	  physical	  
injury	   inhumanity	  varies	  hermeneutically	  across	  settings.	  But	  if	  the	  concept	  dehumanization	  is	  
recalibrated	  to	  accommodate	  diverse	  interpretations	  of	  inhumanity	  for	  greater	  social	  accuracy	  
and	   explanatory	   force,	   it	   leads	   to	   Babel	   –	   to	   particular	   reactions	   to	   specific	   experiences	   of	  
multifarious	  deprivations.	  As	  a	  universal,	  dehumanization	  cannot	  explain;	  as	  an	  explanation,	  it	  
cannot	   be	   universal.	   If	   some	   social	   ontology	   is	   needed	   for	   causal	   explanation	   –	   for	   a	   social	  
science34	  –	  of	  political	  violence,	  and	  if	  dehumanization	  is	  the	  strongest	  candidate	  we	  have,	  then	  
we	  must	  examine	  alternatives	  between	  heaven	  and	  Babel.	  Critiquing	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  
clears	  a	  path	  to	  other	  options	  and,	  I	  speculate,	  promotes	  processes	  of	  subject-­‐formation	  as	  the	  
optimal	  mechanism	  for	  explaining	  violence.	  
	   Three	  objections	   to	   the	   repressionðrevolution	   thesis	  arise	  on	  analytical	  and	  empirical	  
grounds,	  which	   I	  will	  discuss	  succinctly.	  The	  main	  analytical	  vulnerability	  concerns	  the	  volatile	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line	   between	   subject	   and	   object	   under	   dehumanizing	   conditions.	   Fanon’s	  model	   has	   obvious	  
contradictions,	  but	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  examine	  the	  most	  generous	  reading	  of	  his	  text,	  and	  of	  the	  
thesis	  in	  general.	  The	  glaring	  weakness	  in	  “On	  Violence”	  is	  that	  Fanon	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  a	  
“thing”	  or	  “beast”	  reclaims	  its	  own,	  presumably	  lost,	  subjective	  will.	  If	  imperialism	  renders	  the	  
colonized	  subject	  an	  object,	  presumably	  its	  subjectivity	  is	  destroyed,	  leaving	  it	  inert,	  an	  object	  
acted	  upon	  but	  not	  acting	  in	  any	  subjective	  sense.	  Fanon	  seems	  to	  say	  that	  objects	  bereft	  of	  will	  
can	  miraculously	  will	  their	  own	  will	  back	  into	  being,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  theological	  recourse	  
external	  to	  his	  method	  and	  model.	  But	  I	  will	  raise	  a	  more	  probing	  issue	  by	  dismissing	  that	  one	  
to	   emphasize	   an	   intuitive	   sense	   of	   Fanon’s	   idea.	  He	   evidently	  means	   that	   dehumanization	   is	  
approached	  but	  not	  achieved,	  that	  people	  are	  never	  dehumanized	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  process.	  
Note	   that	  dehumanization	   can	   refer	   to	   either	   process	   or	   outcome,	  which	   is	  more	   significant	  
than	   it	  may	  appear.35	  The	   thesis	   turns	  on	   the	  difference	  between	  “I	   am	  being	   dehumanized”	  
and	  “I	  am	  dehumanized.”	  Fanon	  thinks	  people	  revolt	  when	  almost,	  not	  fully,	  dehumanized.	  That	  
makes	  more	   logical	   sense	  but	   exacerbates	   the	   analytical	   impasse.	   If	   revolt	   signals	   impending	  
rather	  than	  achieved	  dehumanization	   (assuming	  Fanon	  thinks	  rebels	  react	  to	  dehumanization,	  
not	  merely	  to	  suffering	  or	  sadness),	  then	  rebellious	  subjects	  must	  link	  immediate	  to	  imminent	  
conditions.	  Resistance	  expresses,	  in	  his	  view,	  an	  interpretation	  of	  ominous	  dehumanization,	  but	  
such	  an	  interpretation	  would	  surely	  depend	  on	  myriad	  non-­‐universal	  social	  or	  cultural	  factors.	  
In	   sum,	   the	   dehumanization	   thesis	   must	   refer	   to:	   a	   subject	   protecting	   itself,	   not	   an	   object	  
transcending	  itself;	  an	  approach	  to	  “thingness”;	  and	  a	  situated	  interpretation	  of	  the	  future,	  not	  
a	  universal	  condition	  of	  the	  present	  reduction	  of	  subject	  to	  object.	  The	  dehumanization	  thesis	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must	  explain	  how	  objectified	  humans	  will	  their	  own	  subjectivity	  or	  how	  particular	  perceptions	  
of	  inhumanity	  can	  be	  generalized	  in	  line	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  physical	  and	  moral	  dehumanization.	  	  
	   Because	  the	  subjectðobjectðsubject	  sequence	  is	  logically	  excluded,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  
relatively	  flimsy	  dehumanization	  thesis:	  that	  people	  revolt	  when	  they	  suffer.	  This	  version	  of	  the	  
thesis	  depends	  on	  interpretations	  of	  suffering,	  for	  instance,	  its	  meaning,	  progression,	  prospects,	  
causes,	  and	  solutions.36	  Once	  we	  resituate	  dehumanization	  from	  objective	  injury	  to	  subjective	  
evaluation	  (§1.b.3.b),	  we	  surmise	  that	  dehumanization	  per	  se	  cannot	  provide	  the	  ontology	  that	  
social	  explanation	  requires.	  We	  ascend	  to	  this	  general	  claim	  from	  extreme	  cases	  of	  starvation	  
and	   indignity.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   hunger	   strikers,	   torture	   victims,	   prisoners	   of	   conscience,	  
casualties	  of	  war,	  or	  self-­‐immolators	  as,	  in	  any	  axiomatic	  or	  objective	  sense,	  less	  or	  more	  free	  or	  
humanized	   on	   a	   spectrum	   of	   suffering.	  We	   detect	   in	   such	   cases	   an	   “exogenous	   bias”	   in	   the	  
dehumanization	  thesis	  that	  emphasizes	  conditions	  over	  perceptions	  of	  deprivation	  but	  even	  in	  
situations	  of	  horrid	   injury	  we	   should	   “give	  an	  enhanced	   role	   to	  people’s	   critical	   appraisals	  of	  
their	  own	  experiences	  and	  choices	  as	  important	  determinants	  of	  new	  and	  different	  choices.”37	  
This	   gap,	   filled	   by	   value-­‐plural38	   appraisals,	   between	   objects	   and	   subjects	   of	   suffering	   may	  
account	  for	  a	  vexing	  truth	  about	  brutality:	  it	  may	  mobilize	  or	  silence,	  as	  in	  the	  Warsaw	  uprising	  
or	  in	  post-­‐genocide	  Guatemala.39	  There	  are	  two	  inversions	  in	  this	  second	  objection	  that	  impair	  
the	  dehumanization	  thesis.	  Re-­‐humanization	  can	  occur	  through	  willful	  submission	  to	  inhumane	  
or	  even	  fatal	  treatment.	  Conversely,	  recalling	  that	  the	  thesis	  is	  about	  the	  near	  extermination	  of	  
subjects,	  we	  see	  that	  dehumanization	  destroys	  people	  as	  often	  as	  it	  inspires	  them	  to	  resist.	  This	  
reality	  does	  not	  refute	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  but	  it	  cautions	  us	  against	  trivializing	  brutality	  
and	  domination	  or	  celebrating	  it	  as	  a	  new	  beginning.	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   The	  third	  objection,	  pertinent	  to	  the	  first	  two,	  derives	  from	  my	  comparative	  reading	  of	  
modern	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  political	  history.	  As	  I	  have	  mentioned,	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  activists	  
suffered	  similarly	  before	  and	  during	  martial	  law	  but	  responded	  differently	  to	  dehumanization.	  I	  
will	  examine	  below	  broader	  commonalities	  that	  make	  this	  comparison	  instructive	  (§3.b),	  as	  well	  
as	  various	  cultural,	  economic,	  and	  political	  differences	  that	  may	  have	  shaped	  these	  discrepant	  
outcomes.	  (§3.c).	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  hope	  to	  make	  room	  for	  an	  argument	  about	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  
social	  resources,	  and	  experiential	  evaluation	  (§1.b)	  that	  retains	  in	  refined	  form	  the	  strengths	  of	  
the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  while	  suturing	  its	  failings.	  The	  strengths,	  to	  repeat,	  are	  its	  views	  that	  
social	  explanation	   requires	  a	  human	  ontology;	   social	   violence	   reflects	   the	   reduction	  of	  willful	  
subjects	  into	  objects;	  and	  social	  action	  involves	  historically	  defined	  subjectivities.	  The	  weakness	  
is	  the	  paradoxical	  nexus	  of	  object	  and	  subject	  that	  throws	  us	  back	  into	  relativistic	  judgments	  of	  
suffering	  that	  betray	  the	  substrates	  humanity/inhumanity.	  My	  project	  expects	  to	  sustain	  these	  
strengths	  and	  compensate	  the	  weaknesses	  by	  claiming	  that	  political	  evaluations	  that	  motivate	  
opposition	  strategies	  can	  be	  explained	  as	  the	  bi-­‐products	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  that	  structure	  
citizens	  as	  subjects	  by	  endowing	  them	  with	  distinct	  social	  recourses.	  The	  differential	  effects	  of	  
fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law	  on	  these	  social	  resources,	  and	  thus	  on	  what	  I	  call	  citizen-­‐subjectivity,	  
determines	  whether	   activists	   experience	   systemic	   life	  or	  death	  –	  whether	   crisis	   and	   coercion	  
sustain	  or	  eradicate	  their	  subjectivity,	  reducing	  them	  to	  objects.	  I	  claim,	  then,	  that	  the	  resort	  to	  
violence	  expresses	  the	  interruption	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity;	  that	  the	  end	  of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  
reflects	  a	  judgment	  by	  citizens	  based	  on	  their	  experience	  using	  state-­‐provided	  social	  resources;	  
and	  that	  the	  interplay	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  experiential	  evaluations	  explains	  violence.	  In	  a	  
simpler	  language,	  even	  if	  people	  rise	  up	  for	  the	  same	  reasons,	  how	  they	  rise	  up	  depends	  less	  on	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what	  they	  want	  from	  a	  system	  than	  who	  they	  are	  in	  that	  system;	  and	  less	  on	  deprived	  subjects	  
than	  on	  disruptive	  subjectivities.	  	  	  	  	  
	   I	  especially	  hope,	  but	  am	  not	  certain,	  that	  my	  analysis	  usefully	  address	  the	  conundrums	  
of	  explaining	  violence.	  I	  conclude	  this	  work	  with	  a	  lengthy	  defense,	  extrapolated	  from	  my	  case	  
studies,	  of	  subject	  formation	  as	  the	  apt	  mechanism	  in	  a	  reliable	  social	  explanation	  of	  collective	  
violence.	  I	  take	  seriously	  the	  dilemma	  that	  has	  inspired	  the	  conceptual	  map	  of	  freedom/tyranny	  
and	  its	  conjugate	  dehumanization	  idea.	  That	  is,	  we	  seek	  causal	  accounts	  of	  phenomena	  such	  as	  
violence	  that	  we	  know	  must	  come	  from	  specific,	  local,	  or	  even	  personal	  emotions,	  values,	  and	  
provocations.	  Our	  practical	  or	  intuitive	  awareness	  abhors	  the	  universal	  theory	  and	  mechanism	  
needed	  to	  explain	  collective	  violence.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  realize	  humanization	  differs	  across	  
societies	  and	  polities,	   so	  we	   rightly	   suppose	   that	  dehumanization	  differs	  accordingly.	  Pleased	  
with	  this,	  the	  relativist	  will	  hasten	  to	  insist	  that	  we	  are	  never	  directly	  offended	  qua	  humans,	  but	  
rather	  that	  our	  desires	  or	  grievances	  are	  offended	  and	  these	  hardly	  belong	  to	  all	  of	  humanity.	  
	   Disputing	  the	  relativist	  view,	  Wieviorka	  nonetheless	  describes,	  justly,	  
	  
a	  great	  tension	  that	  is	  itself	  never	  anything	  more	  than	  one	  of	  the	  modalities	  of	  the	  great	  divide	  
between	  universalism	  and	  relativism	  that	  characterizes	  our	  modern	  era.	  The	  more	  we	  take	  the	  
view	  that	  violence	  is	  what	  we	  perceive	  to	  be	  violence	  thanks	  to	  [various]	  mediations,	  the	  more	  
we	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  our	  perception	  is	  subject	  to	  temporal	  and	  spatial	  variations,	  and	  that	  it	  
varies	  from	  individual	  to	  individual,	  from	  group	  to	  group,	  and	  from	  period	  to	  period.	  We	  must,	  
that	   is,	  take	  into	  account	  both	  individual	  subjectivity	  and	  national	  particularities.	  We	  therefore	  
tend	  to	  take	  a	  relativist	  view.40	  
	  
That	   “our	  perception	   is	   subject	   to	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   variations”	  underlying	   social	   violence	  
seems	  to	  militate	  against	  causal	  explanations	  grounded	  in	  generalizations	  about	  human	  life.	  In	  
this	  respect	  it	  is	  curious	  and	  revealing	  that	  we	  still	  invoke	  violated	  human	  features	  or	  demands	  
as	  the	  provenance	  of	  violence.	  But	  statements	  that	  do	  convey	  universal	  human	  traits	  –	  “we	  all	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want	  to	  be	  treated	  like	  humans,”	  “we	  are	  all	  hungry,”	  “we	  all	  demand	  dignity”	  –	  do	  not	  tell	  us	  
what	  people	  will	  do	  if	  they	  don’t	  get	  what	  they	  want;	  do	  not	  tell	  us	  the	  content	  of	  these	  formal	  
desires;	   i.e.,	   do	   not	   give	   us	   a	   mechanism.41	   Referring	   to	   what	   distinct	   people	   see	   as	   a	   fully	  
human	  life,	  dehumanization	  cannot	  be	  conceived	  in	  the	  image	  of	  a	  universal	  injury	  to	  pride	  or	  
taste	  or	  body.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  reactions	  to	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  affirm,	  for	  instance,	  that	  
cruelty,	  exclusion	  and	  poverty	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  resort	  to	  violence	  or	  success	  of	  non-­‐violence.	  
The	  explanation	  seems	  to	  lie	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  distinct	  experiences	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life.	  
	   Violence	  may	  be	  the	  ideal	  test	  case	  for	  causal	  social	  explanation	  since	  it	  evokes	  feelings,	  
sensations,	   memories,	   references,	   attachments,	   symbols	   narratives,	   sensibilities,	   and	   values	  
that	  are	  full-­‐blooded	  anthropological	  qualities.	  Such	  motivations	  specify	  in	  particular	  places	  and	  
peoples	  so-­‐called	  universal	  human	  demands;	  the	  dignity	  we	  all	  seek	  will	  not	  be	  a	  single	  set	  of	  
meanings,	   practices,	   and	   affects,	   all	   of	  which	   are	   surely	   the	   beating	   heart	   of	   social	   sacrifice,	  
struggle,	  and	  risk.	  Violence	  raises,	  then,	  notoriously	  acute,	  albeit	  productive,	  tensions	  between	  
particularity	  and	  universality,	  or,	   if	  one	   likes,	  between	  ethnography	  and	  explanation.	   I	   should	  
hope	  that	  we	  are	  now	  a	  sufficient	  distance	  from	  the	  static	  conceptual	  map	  of	  freedom-­‐peace-­‐
subjectivity	   and	   tyranny-­‐violence-­‐objectification	   to	   locate	   our	   social	   ontology	   elsewhere.	   But	  
where	  and	  how	  do	  we	  get	  there?	  I	  conclude	  this	  introduction	  by	  inverting	  the	  paradox	  alleged	  
to	  hamper	  social	  explanations	  of	  violence	   that	   recognizes	  human	  plurality.	   I	  want	   to	   suggest,	  
against	  a	  prevalent	  view,	  that	  the	  further	  we	  move	  back	  in	  time	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  violence,	  
tracking	  outcome	  to	  cause,	  the	  closer	  we	  get	  to	  its	  explanation.	  	  	  
	   One	  approach	  to	  explaining	  violence	  anxiously	  views	  the	  causal	  backtrack	  from	  violence	  
to	  grievance	  to	  conditions	  to	  values	  as	  a	  plunge	  into	  anthropological	  objections	  to	  universality.	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That	  is,	  the	  further	  one	  gets	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  violence,	  the	  further	  one	  gets	  into	  particular	  
cultural	  attributes	  and	  therefore	  the	  further	  from	  explanation.	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  track	  from	  
outcome	  to	  antecedent	  is	  the	  trajectory	  from	  causal	  explanation	  to	  anthropological	  description.	  
This	  bias,	  stemming	  from	  ethnographic	  anxieties,	  toward	  the	  moment	  of	  violence	  as	  the	  site	  of	  
the	  universal	  encourages	  theories	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  immediate	  conditions	  of	  violence.	  In	  turn,	  
taking	  the	  cause	  of	  violence	  as	  concurrent	  with	  the	  violence	  itself,	  researchers	  look	  for	  common	  
elements	   across	   scenes	  of	   violence,	   bracketing	  historical	   or	   cultural	   preconditions	   that	  might	  
immure	  them	  in	  idiosyncratic	  commitments	  that	  vitiate	  explanation.	  Violent	  incidents	  naturally	  
tend	  to	  concern	  resentment	  about	  material,	  political,	  or	  spiritual	  deprivation,	  so	  it	  only	  follows	  
that	  those	  deprivations	  cause	  the	  violence.	  This	  method	  concludes,	  for	  instance,	  that	  indignity	  
causes	  violence	  since	  at	  every	  violent	  occasion	  people	  felt	  their	  dignity	  violated.	  Where	  social	  
movement	   research	   advances	   causal	   connections	  between	   violence	  and	   immediate	  exclusion	  
from	   the	   regime,	   the	   same	   assumptions	   and	   conflations	   occur.	   If	   we	  were	   to	   venture	  more	  
deeply	  into	  indignity	  or	  exclusion	  hypotheses,	  notably	  by	  asking	  how	  different	  people	  conceive	  
of	  dignity	  or	  exclusion,	  the	  explanations	  would	  collapse	  because	  desires	  for	  dignity	  or	  inclusion	  
are	  hollow	  universals,	  not	  causal	  mechanisms.	  But	  anxiety	  about	  cultural	  specificity	  or	  historical	  
experience	  need	  not	  confine	  social	  explanations	  to	  cobbling	  together	  elements	  from	  immediate	  
conditions	  into	  a	  universal	  desire	  for	  dignity	  whose	  violation	  triggers	  resistance.	  	  	  
	   Causal	  explanations	  of	  violence	  nonetheless	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  moment	  of	  violence,	  
then,	  sensing	  tension	  between	  particular	  conditions	  and	  general	  theories.	  They	  are	  not	  alone	  in	  
this	   anxiety,	   though	   it	   is	   usually	   submitted	   as	   evidence	  against	   social	   explanation	   or	   human	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ontology.	  Weber,	  whose	  belief	  in	  objective	  social	  science	  did	  not	  extend	  to	  causal	  explanations,	  
thus	  remarked:	  	  	  
	  
[A]s	  soon	  as	  we	  attempt	  to	  reflect	  [on	  how]	  life	  confronts	  us	  in	  immediate	  concrete	  situations,	  it	  
presents	  an	   infinite	  multiplicity	  of	   successively	  and	   [coextensively]	  emerging	  and	  disappearing	  
events,	  both	  “within”	  and	  “outside”	  ourselves.	  The	  absolute	  infinity	  of	  this	  multiplicity	  is	  seen	  to	  
remain	   undiminished	   even	  when	   our	   attention	   is	   focused	   on	   a	   single	   “object,”	   for	   instance	   a	  
concrete	  act	  of	  exchange,	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  seriously	  attempt	  an	  exhaustive	  description	  of	  all	   the	  
individual	   components	   of	   this	   “individual	   phenomenon,”	   to	   say	   nothing	   of	   explaining	   it	  
causally.42	  	  	  	  
	  
As	  often,	  Weber	  echoes	  Nietzsche:	  “[T]he	  entire	  history	  of	  a	  ‘thing,’	  an	  organ,	  a	  practice	  can	  be	  
a	  continuous	  sign-­‐chain	  of	  ever	  new	  interpretations	  and	  arrangements,	  whose	  causes	  need	  not	  
be	  connected	  even	  among	  themselves	  –	  on	  the	  contrary,	  in	  some	  cases	  only	  accidentally	  follow	  
and	  replace	  one	  another…Only	   that	  which	  has	  no	  history	   is	  definable.”43	  The	  shared	   image	   is	  
not	  a	  static	  mosaic	  of	  infinitely	  multiple	  values,	  but	  a	  dynamic	  wave	  of	  proliferating	  forces	  and	  
energies	  forever	  growing,	  contracting,	  modifying,	  and	  improvising	  in	  its	  own	  singular	  entelechy.	  
	   All	  this	  is	  a	  conundrum	  for	  an	  explanatory	  account:	  the	  more	  rigorously	  we	  explore	  the	  
discrete	  causal	  or	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  violence/peace	  to	  explain	  divergent	  outcomes,	  the	  
further	  we	  get	  from	  a	  general	  explanation.	  The	  closer	  we	  get	  to	  causes,	  the	  further	  we	  get	  from	  
causal	  theories.	   If	  we	  value	  reliable	  social	  science,	  we	  must	  ask	  how	  to	  combine	  ethnographic	  
particularity	   and	   explanatory	   universality	   in	   the	   causal	   analysis	   of	   violence/non-­‐violence.	  My	  
research	  design,	  case	  studies,	  and	  empirical	  findings	  reverse	  the	  worry	  about	  losing	  explanatory	  
traction	  as	  we	  traverse	  back	  from	  the	  event	  of	  violence	   into	  discrete	  conditions,	  experiences,	  
and	  subjects.	  Adopting	  a	  revised	  dehumanization	  concept,	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  further	  we	  trace	  
back	  from	  the	  common	  conditions	  of	  social	  violence	  (political	  and	  material	  lack),	  the	  closer	  we	  
get	  to	  an	  explanation	  of	  violence.	  To	  move	  back	  through	  the	  causal	  pathway	  to	  the	  origins	  of	  
22 
 
    
 
violence	   looks	   like	  this:	  outcomes	  ð	  evaluations	  ð	  experiences	  ð	   {citizenship	  ó	   resources}.	  
Reversing	  the	  causal	  flow	  into	  its	  temporal	  sequence,	  here	  is	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  my	  thesis:	  
	  
	   {citizenship	  regime	  ó	  social	  resources}	  ð	  experiences	  ð	  evaluations	  ð	  outcomes	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  “citizen-­‐subjectivity”	   	   	  	  	  	  w/	  regime	   	  	  	  of	  regime	   	  V/non-­‐V	  
	  
	   I	  will	  elaborate	  the	  puzzle,	  concepts,	  and	  model	  in	  the	  theoretical	  chapter	  (§1.a,	  §1.b.2,	  
§1.b.3)	  but	  here	  I	  merely	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  to	  move	  back	  from	  violence/non-­‐violence	  to	  the	  
formation	  of	  subjects	  within	  regimes	  constituted	  by	  social	  resources	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  the	  design	  of	  
citizenship	  regimes	  –	  is	  to	  move	  from	  evacuated	  universal	  humans	  to	  robust	  situated	  subjects	  
as	  the	  kernel	  of	  our	  socio-­‐political	  ontology.	  The	   insight	  that	  our	  subjectivities	  rise	  up	  against	  
their	   foreclosure	  suggests	  that	  past	  experiences	  define	  evaluations	  of	  even	  the	  most	  coercive	  
state	  actions.	  We	  see	  that	  these	  evaluations	  are	  carried	  not	  only	  by	  memories	  of	  wrangling	  with	  
the	  state,	  but	  by	   the	   fate	  of	   the	  social	   resources	  used	  against	   the	  state;	  whether	  effective	  or	  
immanent	  in	  the	  period	  of	  martial	  law,	  their	  potential	  recuperation	  as	  weapons	  to	  compel	  state	  
concessions,	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  citizen-­‐subjectivity,	   is	  paramount.	  Finally,	  we	  perceive	  that	  as	  
experiential	  evaluations	  of	  martial	   law	  –	  based	  on	  the	  persistence	  or	  elimination	  of	  the	  social	  
resources	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  –	  produce	  violence/non-­‐violence,	  the	  citizen-­‐subject	  emerges	  
as	  an	  ideal-­‐material	  agent.	  If	  evaluations	  of	  objective	  dehumanization	  are	  subjective	  (based	  on	  
past	  experiences	  deploying	  resources),	  then	  these	  subjective	  evaluations	  of	  dehumanization	  are	  
also	  objective	   (based	  on	  the	  present	  credibility	  of	   those	  social	   resources).	   I	  will	  urge	  that	  this	  
amalgam	  embodies	   the	  process	  of	   subject	   formation,	   the	   tendency	   among	  humans	   to	  orient	  
themselves	  as	  willful	  agents	  of	  intensifying	  historical	  events.	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 
 
    
 
	   The	  primary	  goal	  of	  this	  project	  is	  empirical:	  to	  explain	  why	  similar	  conditions	  produced	  
violent	  upheaval	   in	  Algeria	  but	  peaceful	   transition	   in	  Poland.	  My	  hope	   is	   to	  persuade	  readers	  
that	   citizenship	   regimes	  based	  on	  distinctive	   social	   resources	  were	   the	   institutional	   source	  of	  
violence	  in	  Algeria	  and	  non-­‐violence	  in	  Poland.	  If	  I	  interpret	  the	  histories	  acceptably,	  my	  project	  
could	   contribute	   to	   our	   sense	   of	   how	   specific	   institutional	   forms	   and	   ideational	   dynamics	  
interacted	  in	  forging	  opposition	  strategies	  under	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  and	  perhaps	  beyond.	  I	  
suspect	  other	  regime-­‐types	  would	  register	  similar	  patterns;	  among	  democracies	  we	  might	  test	  
for	  links	  between	  effective	  citizenship	  and	  social	  violence,	  for	  instance,	  by	  comparing	  peak-­‐level	  
bargaining	  or	  party-­‐electoral	  procedures	  in	  providing	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  More	  ambitiously,	  I	  
suspect	  Algerians’	  experience	  of	  systemic	  reification	  and	  expulsion	  under	  martial	  law,	  of	  being	  
the	  object	  of	  unmediated	  authoritarian	  force,	  are	  replicated	  in	  otherwise	  contrasting	  contexts	  
evidently	   proliferating	   in	   the	   current	   period:	   rather	   than	   imposed	   by	   the	   autarkic	   command	  
economies	  of	  centralized	  states,	  this	  experience	  of	  subordination	  to	  uncontained	  social	  power	  
may	   dominate	   the	   inhabitants	   of	   neo-­‐liberal	   markets	   or	   collapsed	   states.	   In	   other	   words,	   if	  
systemic	   subjectivity	   is	   at	   the	   root	   of	   consequential	   differences	   in	   protest	   movements	   in	  
authoritarian	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  a	  generation	  ago,	  it	  may	  be	  a	  helpful	  model	  or	  idea	  to	  apply	  to	  
conflicts	  outside	  that	  regime-­‐type,	  such	  as	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  populated	  by	  combatants	  drawn	  
















Where	  wind	  carries	  the	  smell	  of	  the	  crematorium	  
And	  a	  bell	  in	  the	  village	  tolls	  the	  Angelus1,	  
The	  Spirit	  of	  History	  is	  out	  walking.	  
He	  whistles,	  he	  likes	  these	  countries	  washed	  
By	  a	  deluge,	  deprived	  of	  shape	  and	  now	  ready.	  
A	  worm-­‐fence,	  a	  homespun	  skirt	  is	  pleasant	  to	  him,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  same	  in	  Poland,	  in	  India,	  Arabia.	  




§1.a	   Puzzle:	  Algerian	  violence/Polish	  non-­‐violence	  under	  martial	  law	  
	  
Political	  and	  economic	  deprivation	  under	  authoritarian	  socialist	  rule	  inspired	  Polish	  and	  
Algerian	  activists	  in	  to	  demand	  greater	  welfare	  and	  rights.	  State	  reforms	  intended	  to	  divide	  or	  
distract	  dissidents	  only	  unified	  and	  concentrated	  them	  in	  a	  Polish	  labor	  union	  and	  an	  Algerian	  
political	  party.	  Confronting	  peaceful,	  disciplined	  mass	  oppositions	  under	  state	  fiscal	  crises,	  both	  
regimes	   imposed	  martial	   law.	  Poland	  then	  transitioned	  peacefully	   to	  democracy	   (1981-­‐1989)3	  
but	  Algeria	  collapsed	  in	  vicious	  factional	  violence	  (1992-­‐1997).4	  Why	  did	  sustained	  and	  radical	  
collective	  opposition	  movements	  under	  equally	  corrupt	  and	  coercive	  dictatorships	  remain	  non-­‐
violent	  in	  Poland	  but	  turn	  violent	  in	  Algeria,	  killing	  tens	  of	  thousands?	  	  
Vexed	  by	  this	  disparity	  during	  Algeria’s	  brutal	  and	  escalating	  conflict,	  one	  scholar	  wrote:	  	  
	  
The	  seizure	  of	  power	  by	  General	  Jaruzelski	  in	  1981	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  transition	  
to	  democracy,	  a	  decade…in	  which	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  the	  police	  were	  pitted	  against	  Solidarity	  
and	  large	  segments	  of	  Polish	  society	  were	  ‘mobilized’,	  and	  civil	  society	  began	  to	  create	  political	  
space	  for	  itself.	  Could	  the	  aborted	  elections	  in	  Algeria	  and	  the	  seizure	  of	  power	  by	  the	  military	  
and	   technocrats	   signal	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   similar	   transition?	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   answer	   is	   no,	  
because	  the	  FIS,	  aside	  from	  its	  popularity,	  in	  no	  way	  resembles	  Solidarity.5	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This	  answer	  raises	  the	  question	  driving	  my	  project:	  especially	  given	  similar	  legacies	  of	  religious-­‐
nationalist	  militancy	  against	  states	  denounced	  as	  unjust,	  why	  didn’t	  the	  FIS	  (Front	  Islamique	  du	  
Salut)	  resemble	  Solidarity	  (Solidarność)?	  Waterbury	  credits	  Poland’s	  expansive	  civil	  society	  with	  
the	  country’s	  democratic	   transition;	  but	  why	  didn’t	  FIS’s	  “popularity”	  represent	  “civil	   society”	  
or	  generate	  “political	  space”?	  He	  seems	  to	  blame	  Algeria’s	  Islamist	  agitators	  rather	  than	  ruling	  
elites	   for	   the	   country’s	   failure	   to	   replicate	   Central	   Europe’s	   glasnost.	   The	   implication	   is	   that	  
Algeria	  lacked	  the	  activists	  it	  deserved.	  But	  should	  a	  state’s	  opponents	  be	  analytically	  separated	  
from	   the	   institutions	   and	   ruling	   elites	   that	   shaped	   them,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   become	   an	  
explanation	  but	  not	  explained?	  Polish	  Solidarity	   continued	   to	  oppose	   the	   state	  under	  martial	  
law	  with	  “self-­‐limiting”	  non-­‐violence	  but	  Algerian	  Islamists	  turned	  to	  unlimited	  violence.	  Given	  
evidently	  similar	  conditions	  and	   initial	  commitments	  to	  non-­‐violent	  means,	  what	  explains	  this	  
divergence	  in	  dissident	  strategies:	  religious	  values,	  informal	  practices,	  state	  structures,	  imperial	  
contexts,	  economic	  resources,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  these?	  	  
	   That	   similar	   social	   grievances	   and	   state	   reprisals	   under	   a	   single	   regime-­‐type	   yielded	   a	  
liberal-­‐democratic	  polity	   in	  Poland	  but	  a	  blood-­‐brimmed	  necropolis	   in	  Algeria	   implies	  that	  the	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  states	  of	  exception	  declared	  war	  on	  different	  kinds	  of	  subjects.	  I	  will	  argue	  
that	  these	  responses	  to	  martial	  law	  reflect	  discrete	  citizenship	  regimes	  organized	  by	  Polish	  and	  
Algerian	   ruling	   elites.	   The	   social	   resources	   afforded	   to	   Poles	   incorporated	   as	  workers	   and	   to	  
Algerians	  integrated	  first	  as	  clients	  and	  then	  briefly	  as	  voters	  cultivated	  distinct	  citizen-­‐subjects.	  
In	  short,	  the	  endurance	  of	  Polish	  worker-­‐citizen-­‐subjectivity	  and	  evaporation	  of	  Algerian	  client-­‐	  
and	  voter-­‐citizen-­‐subjectivity	  meant	  that	  Poles	  retained	  the	  experience	  of	  effective	  citizenship	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but	  Algerians	  experienced	  political	  eradication	  or	  expulsion	  under	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law.	  It	  
is	  the	  enduring	  versus	  eliminated	  citizen-­‐subjectivities	  –	  sustained	  through	  social	  resources	  that	  
allow	  non-­‐state	  agitators	  to	  compel	  state	  concessions	  –	  that	  forges	  incentives	  to	  intra-­‐systemic	  
versus	  anti-­‐systemic	  resistance	  strategies.	  I	  will	  supplement	  this	  overarching	  argument	  with	  the	  
claim	  that	  this	  distinction	  between	  sustained	  Polish	  and	  eliminated	  Algerian	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  
reflects	  activists’	  subjective	  assessments	  of	  the	  potential	  utility	  of	  temporarily	  suspended	  social	  	  	  
resources,	  based	  on	  the	  objective	  persistence	  of	  historically	  effective	  and	  credibly	  recuperated	  
tools	   to	   compel	   state	   concessions.	   Violence	   and	   non-­‐violence	   express	   activists’	   experiential-­‐
systemic	  evaluations	  of	  state	  coercion,	  derived	  from	  distinct	  historical	  state-­‐citizen	  interactions	  
rather	  than	  from	  similar	  immediate	  social	  suffering	  and	  political	  exclusion	  under	  martial	  law.	  	  
	   I	  should	  establish	  the	  salience	  of	  this	  thesis	  before	  detailing	  it	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  
Academic	  research	  is	  emerging	  from	  a	  period	  after	  1989	  that	  produced	  abundant	  theories	  that	  
derived	  specific	  social	  outcomes	  (e.g.,	  violence)	  from	  abstract,	  totalizing	  concepts	   like	  culture,	  
dignity,	   democracy,	   or	   globalization.6	   Scholars	   and	   practitioners	   now	   realize	   that	   such	   broad	  
phenomena	   cannot	   explain	   discrepant	   outcomes	   such	   as	   violence/non-­‐violence	   or	   elucidate	  
concepts	  like	  agency	  and	  grievance.	  In	  response,	  works	  on	  institutions,	  subjectivity,	  values,	  and	  
violence	   have	   turned	   from	   global	   theories	   to	   local	   explanatory	   logics7	   to	   illuminate	   political	  
processes	   beneath	   and	   within	   formal	   regime-­‐types.8	   Recent	   research	   complicates	   received	  
impressions	  of	  homogeneous	  totalitarian	  policy-­‐making	  and	  citizen	  subordination	  as	  against	  the	  
putatively	  greater	  complexity	  of	  democratic	  governance.9	  Amid	  research	  on	  intra-­‐authoritarian	  
institutional	   variation,	  Algerian	   violence	  and	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	   reveal	   an	  overlooked	  axis	  of	  
iterated	   ruler-­‐dissident	   strategic	   interaction.	   Complicating	   these	   academic	   refinements,	   post-­‐
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authoritarian	  empirical	  political	  discrepancies	  have	  grown	  only	  more	   striking	  over	   time.	  Post-­‐
communist	  Central	  Europe	  has	  developed	  advanced	  capitalist-­‐democratic	  systems	  with	  vibrant	  
civil	   societies	  while	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	  North	   Africa	   remain	   autocratic,	   besieged	   by	   violent	  
rebellions,	  or	  mired	  in	  fragile	  and	  halting	  transitions.10	  
	   My	  study	  examines	  events	  that	  occurred	  decades	  ago	  under	  authoritarian	  regimes	  that	  
have	  either	  passed	  away	  or	   reformed,	  but	   the	  divergent	   long-­‐term	  outcomes	  matter	  beyond	  
the	   non-­‐violent	   and	   violent	   short-­‐term.	   Algeria’s	   social-­‐political	   violence	   has	   retained	   the	  
illiberal	   corporatist	   political	   economy11	   under	   a	   regime	   that	   holds	   referendums,	   stages	  
uncompetitive	   elections,	   and	   grants	   amnesties	   while	   battling	   dwindling	   bands	   of	   Islamist	  
militants.	  The	  Algerian	  state	  remains	  a	  distributive	  apparatus	  thriving	  on	  crony	  capitalism	  and	  
trabendist	   networks	   run	   by	   bosses	   who	   control	   oil-­‐economy	   derivative	   markets	   like	   import-­‐
export	   trades.	  Wary	   of	   uprisings	   since	   the	   consuming	   violence	   ceased	   in	   1999,	   the	   Algerian	  
state	   has	   gestured	   toward	   curtailing	  military	   perquisites	   and	   influence	  while	   tactically	   allying	  
with	   the	   US	   against	   AQIM,	   the	   local	   al-­‐Qa’ida	   affiliate.	   Algeria’s	   regime	   has	   remained	  
structurally	  continuous	  since	  1965.12	  In	  contrast,	  Poland	  abandoned	  communist	  dictatorship	  in	  
round	  table	  talks	  immediately	  succeeded	  by	  Solidarity’s	  permitted	  electoral	  victory.	  Poland	  has	  
developed	   a	   bustling	   liberal	   democratic	   political	   economy,	   peacefully	   if	   heatedly	   debating	  
issues	  like	  social	  inequity	  and	  the	  place	  of	  Catholic	  values	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  
	   Following	  brutal	  state	  violence	  against	  non-­‐violent	  citizen	  mobilizations	  under	  different	  
citizenship	  regimes,	  these	  disparate	  long-­‐term	  trajectories	  put	  Algeria	  and	  Poland	  on	  opposite	  
ends	  of	  a	  poignant	  peace-­‐violence	  spectrum.	  Algeria	  has	  long	  offered	  eager	  recipients13	  images,	  
icons14,	  and	  victims	  of	  the	  “supposed	  ubiquity	  of	  [its]	  violence”15;	  but	  the	  state-­‐Islamist	  war	  of	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the	  1990s	  justified	  Algeria’s	  descent	  into	  a	  global	  symbol	  of	  savagery.	  The	  apparent	  struggle	  of	  
the	  secular	  state	  against	  Muslim	  militancy	   inspired	  even	  rigorous	  analysts	  to	  depict	  Algeria	  as	  
an	  instance	  of	  the	  “theocratic	  impasse”16	  between	  secular	  conservative	  reactionaries	  in	  power	  
and	  Islamist	  reactionaries	  seeking	  power.	  Against	  these	  fatalistic	  tendencies,	  Poland’s	  secular,	  
cosmopolitan	  civic	  order17,	  the	   legatee	  of	  celebrated	  shipyard	  strikes	  and	  charismatic	  modern	  
liberators,	  has	  offered	  a	  breath	  of	  fresh	  air	  that	  keeps	  returning	  us	  to	  the	  same	  question:	  
	  
Where	   is	   the	  Muslim	  Solidarnosc?…The	   ideal	  of	  pro-­‐democracy	  activism	  arising	  spontaneously	  
from	   the	   shipyards	   of	   Gdansk	   stands	   for	   the	   hope	   that	   in	   every	   society,	   no	   matter	   how	  
totalitarian	   or	   repressive,	   there	   are	   freedom-­‐loving	   people	  who	   see	   clearly	   that	   democracy	   is	  
the	   solution	   to	   what	   ails	   their	   country.	   Yet	   such	   popular	   democracy	  movements	   are	   hard	   to	  
come	  by	  in	  the	  contemporary	  Muslim	  world.18	  
	  
The	  “Arab	  uprisings”	  of	  2011	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  answered	  or	  overridden	  this	  question	  
but	  wrestling	  with	  it,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  period	  in	  question,	  may	  prove	  valuable	  in	  how	  we	  interpret	  
the	  revolts.	  The	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  justify	  this	  speculation	  by	  exposing	  
contrasting	  dynamics	  within	  the	  authoritarian	  regime-­‐type.	  In	  my	  explanation,	  the	  independent	  
variable	  (citizenship	  regimes	  that	  deploy	  social	  resources	  to	  generate	  systemic-­‐subjectivity)	  and	  
dependent	  variable	  (Algerian	  violence	  and	  Polish	  non-­‐violence)	  are	  connected	  through	  a	  critical	  
exploration	  of	  similarities	  and	  differences	  that	  deepen	  and	  defend	  the	  puzzle’s	  significance	  and	  
the	  causal	  importance	  of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  in	  violent	  outcomes.	  A	  robust	  literature	  correlating	  
participatory	  inclusion	  and	  decreased	  political	  violence	  within	  Arab-­‐Muslim	  countries	  confirms	  
my	  framework,19	  but	  to	  complement	  the	  democratic-­‐inclusive	  pacification	  thesis,	  I	  utilize	  cross-­‐
regional	  research	  to	  reveal	  how	  social	  resources	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  operate	  within	  a	  single	  
regime-­‐type	  –	  such	  as	  horizontal	  labor	  sites	  or	  vertical	  client	  networks.	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An	   ancillary	   benefit	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   to	   clarify	   alternative	   or	   interstitial	   modes	   of	  
state-­‐citizen	  cooperation	  common	  to	  authoritarian-­‐command	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  forms.	  As	  
a	   prescriptive	   aside,	   transitional	   modes	   of	   citizen-­‐subjectivity	   could	   break	   the	   democratic-­‐
theocratic	   impasse	   in	  countries	   like	  Algeria.	   Indeed,	   recent	  MENA	  mobilizations	  and	  uprisings	  
have	  explored	  this	  possibility	  by	  working	  through	  labor,	  feminist,	  and	  student	  organizations	  to	  
create	   experiences	   of	   effective	   citizenship	   under,	   and	  maybe	   out	   of,	   authoritarian	   rule.	   The	  
benefits	   of	   effective	   citizenship	   in	   meliorating	   social	   tension	   may	   apply	   also	   to	   neo-­‐liberal	  
political-­‐economic	   arrangements,	   such	   as	   in	   contemporary	   Poland,	   in	   which	   citizens	   may	  
experience	  a	  different	  form	  of	  abandonment	  or	  objectification	  amid	  arbitrary	  market	  and	  police	  
forces	  beyond	  their	  control.	  In	  short,	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  social	  resources	  may	  be	  variables	  
whose	   operations	   on	   systemic	   subjectivity	   under	   authoritarian	   variation	   might	   inform	   our	  
thinking	  about	  multiple	  historical	  situations	  that	  have	  fostered	  social	  violence.	  	  
In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  briefly	  sketch	  the	  similar	  conditions	  that	  I	  detail	  later	  (§3.b)	  
and	  that	  permit	  this	  comparison	  to	  generate	  a	  worthy	  puzzle	  and	  theoretical	  model.	  A	  research	  
design	  to	  pursue	  this	  puzzle	  and	  test	  this	  explanation	  must	  “control	  for”	  other	  differences	  in	  the	  
two	  cases.	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  differed	  in	  several	  ways	  often	  invoked	  to	  explain	  Poland’s	  peace	  
and	  Algeria’s	  violence.	  Algeria	  had	  fought	  a	  war	  to	  end	  its	  colonial	  subordination	  to	  France,	  but	  
Poland	   toiled	   under	   the	   yoke	   of	   the	   Soviet	   empire	   whose	   potential	   intervention	   may	   have	  
intimidated	  Solidarity	  into	  sustained	  peaceful	  commitments.	  Or	  perhaps	  Algerian	  Muslims	  and	  
Polish	  Catholics	  adhered	  to	  distinct	  sanctions	  concerning	  violence.	  Alternatively,	  the	  countries’	  
different	   sources	   of	  wealth	   nurtured	   distinct	   political	   economies	   that	  may	   have	   effected	   the	  
contrasting	  social	  movements.	  Algeria,	  rich	  in	  oil	  and	  natural	  gas,	  industrialized	  through	  capital-­‐
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intensive	  and	  labor-­‐minimizing	  mono-­‐cultural	  exports	  but	  Poland	  industrialized	  through	  a	  labor-­‐
intensive	  production	  regime.	   I	  will	  assess	  these	  alternative	  explanations	  below	  (§3.c)	  but	  now	  
will	  summarize	  similarities	  in	  my	  two	  cases	  to	  reinforce	  the	  value	  of	  the	  explanandum.	  	  
Many	  similarities	   in	   the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  political	  economies,	   state	   institutions,	  and	  
social	  values	  lead	  me	  to	  consider	  the	  causal	  effects	  of	  worker-­‐	  and	  client-­‐citizenship	  regimes	  on	  
protest	  formation,	  while	  enriching	  the	  puzzle.	  Algeria	  and	  Poland	  had	  been	  colonized	  for	  over	  a	  
century	  and	  then	  decimated	  during	  religious-­‐nationalist	  independence	  struggles.	  Both	  countries	  
rapidly	   industrialized	  via	  command-­‐economic	  planning,	   including	  public	  outlays	  to	  incorporate	  
an	  urbanizing	  citizenry,	  while	  growing	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  commercial	  banks	  and	  Soviet	  aid.	  
Algeria	   and	   Poland	   developed	   bureaucratic	   police	   states,	   indenturing	   citizens	   to	   single-­‐party	  
recruitment	   for	   political,	   professional,	   or	   social	   advancement.	   Discrete	   reversals	   of	   socialist	  
planning	  were	  made	  in	  land	  reform,	  pricing,	  import-­‐export	  conditions,	  and	  so	  on	  in	  response	  to	  
government	  crises	  and	  activist	   critics.	   In	  addition,	   the	   states	  permitted	  a	   small	  percentage	  of	  
entrepreneurial	  activity	  in	  the	  overall	  socialist	  economy,	  leading	  to	  comparable	  reliance	  on	  the	  
informal	  economy.	  In	  each	  case,	  as	  opposition	  mounted	  with	  new	  discipline	  and	  organization,	  
ruling	  elites	  adjusted	  their	  citizenship	  regime	  in	  order	  to	  divide	  dissident	  opponents,	  attempting	  
conservative	  mini-­‐regime-­‐changes	  roughly	  four	  years	  before	  brutal	  martial	  law	  was	  imposed.	  	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   developmental	   similarities,	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	   had	   analogous	   religion-­‐
state	  relations.	  Polish	  Catholic	  and	  Algerian	  Muslim	  institutions	  predated	  the	  modern	  state	  and	  
retained	  either	  an	  effective	  veto	  power	  or	  restraining	  effect	  over	  secular	  sovereign	  prerogative.	  
Algerian	  and	  Polish	  rulers	  negotiated	  and	  compromised	  with	  religious	  constituents	  throughout	  
authoritarian	  rule	  and	  popular	  agitations.	  They	  also	  tried	  to	  “co-­‐opt	  religion”	  by	  creating	  official	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religious	  authorities	  to	  approve	  priests	  or	   imams	  and	  sanction	  sermons,	  often	  in	  state-­‐funded	  
religious	  centers	  and	  places	  of	  worship.	  But	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  religious	  organizations	  retained	  
the	  autonomy	  and	  popular	   support	   to	  mediate	  between	  secular	   state	  programs	  and	  religious	  
citizen	  demands.20	  In	  a	  sense,	  churches	  and	  mosques	  buttressed	  the	  state	  by	  competing	  with	  it	  
for	  popular	  allegiance	  while	  soothing	  regime-­‐citizen	  conflicts.	  By	  providing	  social	  services	  and	  
refuge	  for	  faithful	  and	  secular	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  churches	  and	  mosques	  cushioned	  the	  blows	  of	  
failed	  government	  policies.	  Church	  and	  mosque	  thus	  bridged	  religion	  and	  state	  while	  insulating	  
adherents	  from	  the	  regime.	  Finally,	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  religionists	  had	  equally	  strong	  ties,	  if	  not	  
divided	  loyalties,	  to	  religious	  influences	  outside	  their	  countries.21	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  dictators	  
contended	  and	  bargained	  with	  large,	  powerful,	  and	  relatively	  autonomous	  religious	  institutions	  
and	  movements	  over	  the	  terms	  of	  popular	  sentiment	  and	  commitment.	  	  
Poles	   and	  Algerians	   also	   had	   comparable	   ethical	   conceptions	   grounded	   in	   community	  
obligation,	  private	  property,	  autonomous	  faith-­‐based	  institutions,	  and	  distributive	  justice.	  With	  
comparable	  struggles	  with	  imperial	  occupation	  and	  coercive	  centralization,	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  
activists	   and	   ordinary	   citizens	   were	   nationalistic,	   jealous	   of	   self-­‐determination.	   Conservative	  
and	   rural	   in	  background,	   they	  desired	  “traditional”	  education	  and	   family	  planning.	  Polish	  and	  
Algerian	   moral	   revulsion	   at	   elitism,	   corruption,	   and	   income	   disparities	   evinced	   a	   spiritual,	  
principled	   contempt	   for	   material	   opportunism	   and	   political	   obscenity	   that	   fueled	   growing	  
antagonism	   toward	   ruling	   elites.	   Churches	   and	   mosques	   exercised	   ideological	   and	   cultural	  
authority	   in	  each	  country	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  Polish	  communists	  and	  Algerian	  socialists	  had	   to	  
demonstrate	   public	   support	   for	   the	   church	   and	   mosques.	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   religious	  
landowners’	   defeated	   land	   collectivization	   that	   threatened	   religious	   endowments	   and	   urban	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Catholic	   and	   Muslim	   activists	   compelled	   the	   states	   to	   expand	   church	   and	   mosque	  
construction.22	  Churches	  and	  mosques	  offered	  education,	  social	  support,	  spiritual	  counsel,	  and	  
community	  relationships	  to	  poor	  adherents,	  constituting	  a	  virtual	  parallel	  welfare	  state.	  At	  the	  
same	   time,	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  pressed	   for	  access	   to	   the	  commons,	  believing	   that	   the	  public	  
sphere	   must	   accommodate	   normative	   values.	   In	   Poland	   and	   Algeria,	   similar	   traditions	   were	  
inseparable	  from	  public	  policy	  deliberations.	  Political	  venality,	  military	  violence,	  police	  brutality,	  
and	  economic	  suffering	  prompted	   institutional	  and	  personal	   religious	   resistance	  by	  Poles	  and	  
Algerians.	   Finally,	   despite	   eventual	   Polish	   non-­‐violence	   and	   Algerian	   violence,	   Poland’s	   pre-­‐
martial	   law	   instability	   was	   systemically	   more	   revolutionary	   than	   Algeria’s.	   While	   denying	   its	  
radical	   ends,	   Solidarity’s	   demands	   in	   1980	   for	   autonomous	   unions	   would	   have	   effectively	  
dismantled	   the	   structure	   of	   communist	   rule;	   Algerian	   Islamists	   wanted	   less	   to	   change	   the	  
regime	  than	  to	  usurp	  it.	  Minimally,	  the	  Polish	  uprising	  was	  as	  stringent	  and	  militant	  as	  Algeria’s,	  
so	  a	  distinction	  in	  systemic	  threat	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  outcomes.23	  	  
Deepening	   the	   puzzle	   further,	   peaceful	   Algerian	   and	   Polish	   dissidents	   suffered	   similar	  
state	  coercion.	  The	  states	  had	  wagered	  that	  Polish	  unions	  and	  Algerian	  parties	  would	  stabilize	  
ruling	  class	  domination	  by	  dividing	  the	  oppositions	  and	  isolating	  extremists,	  but	  when	  Solidarity	  
and	  FIS	  dissidents	   further	  undermined,	   rather	   than	  bolstering,	   their	  discredited	  governments,	  
increasingly	  invasive,	  efficient	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  forces	  arrested,	  tortured,	  killed,	  and	  interned	  
thousands	  political	  opponents.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  activists	  invoked	  centuries	  of	  colonization	  or	  
partition,	   uprisings	   for	   national	   emancipation,	   assaults	   by	   “secular”	   European	   governments,	  
and	   atrocities	   against	   their	   populations.	  Martial	   law	   compounded	   popular	   contempt	   for	   the	  
avarice,	  inequality,	  and	  aggression	  of	  military-­‐backed	  state	  socialism-­‐cum-­‐capitalism.	  Moreover,	  
33 
 
    
 
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  agitators	  had	  struggled	  peacefully	  and	  violently	  for	  freedom	  or	  recognition	  
for	  generations.	  Roman	  Catholic	  and	  Sunni	   Islamic	  doctrines	  or	  cultural	  mores	  do	  not	  explain	  
Polish	  non-­‐violence	  or	  Algerian	  violence,	  evidently;	  both	  peoples	  have	  been	  renowned	  for	  their	  
traditions	   of	  militant	   resistance.	   Similarly,	   state	   retaliation	   at	   home	   or	   from	   abroad	   had	   not	  
prevented	  radical	  or	  violent	  protests	  in	  the	  past.	  
Before	  martial	  law,	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  had	  militated	  for	  similar	  conceptions	  of	  physical,	  
juridical,	  and	  subjective	  security	  and	  confronted	  comparable	  attempts	  to	  deny	  them.	  The	  Polish	  
peace	  and	  Algerian	  violence	  after	  martial	  law	  remain	  perplexing.	  As	  Poland’s	  pacific	  revolution	  
still	  lifts	  the	  spirit,	  Algeria’s	  bloodbath	  still	  shocks	  the	  conscience:	  villages	  slaughtered,	  women	  
raped,	   children	  bayoneted.	  Out	   of	   relatively	   similar	   social,	   economic,	   and	  political	   conditions	  
and	  popular	  criteria	  of	  welfare	  and	  piety,	  Poland’s	  non-­‐violent	  activists	  and	  Algeria’s	  militarist	  
factions	  adopted	  binary	  modes	  of	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  agitation.	  The	  variable	  analyses	  and	  case	  
studies	   below	   examine	   these	   divergent	   campaigns	   for	   reforms,	   concluding	   that	   contrasting	  
structures	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  separated	  Poland’s	  peace	  from	  Algeria’s	  war.	  	  
	  
§1.b	   Explanation:	  	  Citizen-­‐subjectivity	  ðevaluation	  ð	  violence/non-­‐violence	  
	  
	   The	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  explains	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  and	  Algerian	  violence	  in	  response	  
to	  authoritarianism	  and	  martial	  law.	  First,	  I	  will	  summarize	  the	  claims	  in	  prose	  and	  in	  a	  narrative	  
chart.	  Second,	  I	  will	  present	  the	  explanation’s	  concepts	  and	  causal	  pathway.	  Third,	  I	  will	  specify,	  
given	   these	   concepts,	   how	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	   diverged	   in	   the	   causal	   pathway.	   Fourth,	   I	  will	  
characterize	  this	  project’s	  constraints	  and	  ambitions	  with	  stipulations	  about	  the	  text.	  This	   is	  a	  
relatively	  short	  and	  lightly	  documented	  chapter	  because	  it	  focuses	  on	  my	  argument.	  The	  broad	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significance	   and	   problematic	   of	   the	   project	   are	   addressed	   in	   the	   introduction,	   while	   critical	  
reviews	  of	   the	   literature	  emerge	   in	  discussions	  of	   the	  variables	   (chapters	   two	  and	   three)	  and	  
historical	  narratives	  (chapters	  four	  and	  five).	  
	  
	   §1.b.1	   Summary	  of	  claims	  
	  
	   My	  explanation	  for	  the	  distinct	  responses	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  activists	  to	  martial	  law	  
presents	  a	  causal	   sequence	   from	  citizenship	   regime,	  or	  citizen-­‐subjectivity,	   grounded	   in	  social	  
resources	   (Ind	   V)	   through	   experiential	   evaluation	   (Int	   V)	   to	  opposition	   strategies	   (DV).	   These	  
variables	   substantiate	   two	  propositions	   about	   political	   action	   and	   social	   agitation:	   citizenship	  
regimes	   constitute	   systemic	   subjectivities	   (universal)	   and	   citizens	   desire	   systemic	   subjectivity	  
(mechanism24).	  Adding	  values	  to	  the	  variables,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  Poland’s	  worker-­‐citizenship	  
regime	   constituted	   Polish	   subjects	   as	   potential	   strikers	   in	   labor-­‐intensive	   production	   sites,	   a	  
differentiated	  social	  resource	  that	  endured	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law,	  thus	  sustaining	  citizens’	  
systemic	  subjectivity	  and	  incentives	  for	  non-­‐violence;	  but	  Algeria’s	  client-­‐citizenship	  regime,	  in	  
contrast,	   constituted	   Algerian	   subjects	   as	   clients	   in	   patronage	   networks,	   an	   undifferentiated	  
social	  resource	  that	  evaporated	  under	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law,	  forcing	  Algerians	  to	  reclaim	  
their	  subjectivity	  against	  state	  institutions.	  Confronting	  equally	  harsh	  material	  deprivation	  and	  
state	  coercion,	  Poles	  retained	  the	  strike-­‐based	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  that	  had	  long	  enabled	  them	  
to	   compel	   state	   compromises,	   but	   Algerians’	   client-­‐citizenship	   dissolved,	   expelling	   them	   as	  
meaningful	  or	  willful	  members	  of	  their	  polity.	  In	  sum,	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law	  eliminated	  the	  
citizenship	  regime	  and	  systemic	  subjectivity	  of	  Algerians	  but	  sustained	  that	  of	  Poles,	  providing	  
motives	  in	  Algeria	  but	  not	  in	  Poland	  to	  oppose	  state	  prerogative	  through	  violence.	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   Here	  is	  the	  simplified	  graph	  of	  my	  explanation,	  introduced	  in	  the	  preface	  and	  elaborated	  
in	  the	  following	  section	  of	  this	  chapter:	  
	  
	   	   Independent	  variable	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Interv	  var	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Interv	  var	  II	   Dep	  var.	  
[{citizenship	  regime	  ó 	  social	  resources}	  ð 	  experiences]	  ð	  evaluations	  ð	  	  outcomes	  
	   	   “citizen-­‐subjectivity”	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  regime	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  regime	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  V/non-­‐V	  
	  
In	  the	  cases	  I	  have	  studied,	  state	  formation	  includes	  provision	  of	  social	  resources	  that	  connect	  
ruling	  classes	  to	  citizens	  in	  practical	  channels	  of	  communication	  and	  coercion	  that	  often	  parallel	  
“formal”	  regime-­‐type	  institutions.	  Reiterated	  use	  of	  these	  social	  resources	  to	  express	  demands	  
or	  compel	  state	  concessions	  creates	  a	  regime	  of	  effective	  citizenship,	  a	  reliable	  mode	  of	  state-­‐
society	  interaction:	  claim	  making,	  problem	  solving,	  manipulative	  extraction.	  Formal	  citizenship	  
has	  two	  main	  components,	  in	  most	  cases:	  the	  juridical	  order	  (symbolized	  by	  the	  passport)	  and	  
official	  means	  of	  recruitment	  (typically	  political	  parties).	  Effective	  or	  practical	  citizenship,	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  this	  work,	  is	  not	  formal	  in	  a	  juridical	  or	  official	  sense,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  more	  than	  informal;	  
effective	  or	  practical	   citizenship	   indicates	  a	   recognized,	   repetitive,	   and	  dominant	  pattern25	  of	  
exchanging	  or	  distributing	  social	  power	  that	  becomes	  the	  primary	  system	  that	  active	  individual	  
or	  collective	  citizens	  deploy	  to	  pursue	  or	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  Because	  this	  quasi-­‐formal	  system	  
creates	  incentives	  that	  fundamentally	  orient	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  situating	  their	  agency	  in	  the	  state	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  specific	  social	  resources,	  I	  call	  this	  whole	  complex	  the	  citizenship	  regime,	  the	  
reiterated	   and	   predictable	   but	   unofficial	   patterns	   of	   state-­‐nonstate	   exchange	   that	   situate	  
citizens	  as	  subjects	   in	  a	  political	   system,	   i.e.,	   form	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  When	   formal	  citizens	  
interact	  practically	  and	  repeatedly	  with	  states	   through	  a	  principle	  mechanism	  or	  process	   that	  
enables	  their	  systemic	  will,	  they	  act	  as	  citizen-­‐subjects.	  For	  this	  reason,	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  is	  an	  
ensemble	  of	  resources	  and	  experiences	  –	  the	  subject-­‐forming	  experience	  of	  using	  resources.	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  I	  will	   take	   in	  turn	  three	  key	  concepts:	  systemic	  subjectivity;	  subjects	  and	  subjectivities	  
as	  social	  agents;	  variation	  in	  citizenship-­‐regime	  components.	  First,	  sustained	  collective	  action	  by	  
citizens	   to	   influence	   state	   policies	   can	   occur	   within	   (intra-­‐)	   or	   against	   (anti-­‐)	   the	   routinized,	  
predictable,	   and	   non-­‐injurious	   political	   system,	   including	   formal	   and	   informal	   sate-­‐citizen	  
interactions.	  When	  citizens	  act	  within	  the	  legible,	  regular,	  effective	  political	  arrangements	  that	  
constitute	   the	   process	   of	   state-­‐formation,	   they	   enjoy	   systemic	   subjectivity	   –	   that	   is,	   they	  
become	   subjects,	   citizens	   who	   can	   pursue	   their	   wants	   or	   needs	   effectively	   within	   the	  
recognized	   political	   system.	   Again,	   the	   political	   system,	   or	   citizenship	   regime,	   constitutes	  
citizens-­‐as-­‐subjects	   by	   providing	   them	   social	   resources	   that	   situates	   or	   orients	   their	   effective	  
agency	   in	   state	   operations,	   that	   is,	   by	   centralizing	   or	   politicizing	   citizen-­‐subjects	   through	  
actionable	   political	   and	   social	   incentives.	   Citizens	   lack	   systemic	   subjectivity	   if	   they	   cannot	  
pursue	  or	  achieve	  their	  ends	  through	  resources	  linking	  their	  willful	  actions	  to	  state	  policies,	  i.e.,	  
if	   they	   do	   not	   inhabit	   a	   citizenship	   regime	   that	   affords	   them	   the	   regular	   capacity	   to	   compel	  
policy	  concessions.	  The	  authoritarian	  Polish	  regime	  devised	  a	  worker-­‐based	  citizenship	  regime	  
by	  concentrating	  and	  politicizing	  Poles	  in	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  facilities,	  such	  as	  factories,	  
shipyards,	  mines,	  and	  railways.	  Polish	  worker-­‐citizen-­‐subjects	  enjoyed	  the	  state-­‐provided	  social	  
resources	  of	  the	  strike;	  labor-­‐activism	  thus	  became	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Polish	  citizenship	  regime	  or	  
systemic	  subjectivity.	  Poles	  repeatedly	  went	  on	  strike	  to	  protest	  price	  increases	  successfully	  as	  
worker-­‐citizens;	   they	   were	   meaningful,	   effective	   citizen-­‐subjects	   if	   they	   used	   the	   strike	  
resource.	   Hence,	   to	   act	   as	   willful	   subjects	   within	   the	   political	   system	   of	   effective	   citizenship	  
they	   had	   to	   use	   the	   strike	   as	   a	   social	   resource;	   in	   this	   sense,	   the	   strike	   constituted	   effective	  
Polish	  citizens.	  Systemic	  or	  citizen-­‐subjects	  are	  effects	  of	  dominant	  political	  arrangements.	  This	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does	  not	  mean	   a	   political	   system	   determines	   the	   citizens’	   subjective	   lives	   –	   their	   emotional,	  
material,	  aesthetic,	  or	  political	  makeup.	  It	  means	  only	  that	  a	  political	  system	  defines	  the	  modes	  
of	  action	  to	  which	  it	  will	  respond.	  If	  Polish	  citizens	  wished	  to	  protest	  price	  hikes,	  they	  did	  so	  as	  
systemic	   or	   citizen-­‐subjects	   –	  meaning,	   as	   workers.	   Politically	   or	   systemically	   relevant	   Polish	  
agents	  were	   subjects	   qua	  workers.	   But	  Algerians	  who	  protested	   as	   clients	   of	   entrepreneurial	  
patrons	   or	   supporters	   of	   bureaucratic	   officials	   were	   systemic	   subjects	   qua	   clients.	   A	   duality	  
appears	   between	   desires	   for	   particular	   items	   to	   satisfy	   tastes,	   and	   desires	   for	   systemic	  
subjectivity	  to	  satisfy	  one’s	  will.26	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Second,	  we	  must	  make	  two	  distinctions	  of	  consistent	  relevance	  to	  social	  movement	  and	  
protest	   strategies.	  First,	  we	  should	  distinguish	  between	  securing	  particular	  material	   items	  we	  
desire	  and	  securing	  a	  desirable	  environment	  in	  which	  to	  state	  and	  resolve	  grievances.	  Second,	  
we	  have	  to	  differentiate	  between	  securing	  material	  items	  or	  opportune	  environments	  as	  things	  
we	  want	  from	  seeking	  a	  world	  that	  protects	  or	  cultivates	  who	  we	  are.	  If	  the	  social	  resource	  of	  
elections	  has	  constituted	  me	  in	  a	  voter-­‐citizenship	  regime	  that	  gives	  me	  systemic	  subjectivity	  as	  
a	  voter,	  and	  wish	  to	  guarantee	  my	  daughter	  an	  inhabitable	  planet,	  I	  will	  act	  as	  a	  voter-­‐citizen	  to	  
help	  elect	  an	  environmentalist.	  If	  my	  candidate	  loses,	  the	  political	  effect	  on	  me	  will	  differ	  from	  
a	   second	   scenario	   in	  which	   the	   state	   rescinds	  my	   right	   to	   vote	   or	   annuls	   the	   election	   of	  my	  
candidate.	  If	  my	  candidate	  loses	  the	  election	  I	  remain	  a	  voter-­‐citizen,	  a	  subject	  in	  a	  system;	  if	  I	  
lose	  my	  right	  to	  vote	  I	  lose	  my	  status	  as	  a	  voter-­‐citizen	  and	  become	  an	  object	  of	  a	  system	  that	  
has	  expelled	  me.	  On	  this	  principle,	  I	  am	  usually	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  securing	  the	  objects	  
I	  want	  and	  securing	  the	  systemic	  subjectivity	  that	  constitutes	  my	  meaningful	  membership,	  not	  
to	  mention	  the	  promise	  of	  successfully	  guaranteeing	  my	  daughter	  a	  healthy	  future.	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   A	  difficult	  distinction	  emerges	  here	  between	  a	  subject	  who	  acts	  and	  a	  subjectivity	  that	  
acts.	  We	  posit	  subjects	  as	  autonomous	  persons	  who	  define	  their	  desires	  and	  pursue	  them	  with	  
a	  plan.	   In	   this	   image,	   subjects	  enjoy	   some	  capacity	   to	  detach	   from	   their	  desires	  and	  plans,	   if	  
only	  tactically,	  to	  pursue	  others	  they	  choose.	  We	  typically	  revise	  this	  image	  when	  threats	  to	  the	  
subjects	  become	  more	  grave;	  perhaps,	  in	  the	  example	  above,	  as	  I	  shift	  from	  losing	  the	  election	  
to	  losing	  the	  right	  to	  vote,	  I	  am	  less	  capable	  of	  detaching	  myself	  from	  my	  stated	  desires	  –	  this	  is	  
because	  if	  I	  lose	  my	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  I	  lose	  my	  meaningful	  personhood,	  rather	  than	  losing	  a	  
desired	  object.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  systemic	  subjectivity	  is	  the	  necessary	  condition	  for	  securing	  
other	  desires.	  As	  I	  turn	  from	  securing	  my	  desired	  objects	  to	  securing	  my	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  I	  
experience	  a	  change	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  my	  security.	  I	  am	  now	  protecting	  myself	  as	  a	  subject	  –	  or,	  
more	  accurately,	  my	  subjectivity	  is	  defending	  itself.	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  erect	  the	  image	  of	  subjectivity	  
itself	  acting,	  not	  only	  subjects	  acting,	  at	  the	  point	  of	  violence/non-­‐violence.	  Denial	  of	  effective	  
systemic	  willing	  is	  the	  circumstance	  where	  subjectivity	  will	  rear	  up	  to	  defend	  its	  existence,	  even	  
risking	  the	  subject	  –	  thus,	  self-­‐risking	  violence	  reclaims	  subjectivity	  against	  or	  outside	  a	  system.	  	  
	   Third,	  social	  resources	  that	  form	  citizenship	  regimes	  vary	  in	  their	  internal	  systemic	  logics	  
and	  thus	  in	  the	  citizen-­‐subjectivities	  they	  forge.	  Different	  citizenship	  regimes	  cultivate	  different	  
political	  subjects	  with	  qualitative	  and	  consequential	  distinctions.	  The	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  cases	  
have	  prompted	  me	  to	  emphasize	  three	  variations	  in	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  so	  the	  experiences	  
of	   citizen-­‐subjects.	   Citizenship	   regimes	   vary	   in	   social	   ties,	   political	   space,	   and	   regime	   status,	  
variations	  that	  affect	  how	  activists	  cooperate,	  congregate,	  and	  evaluate	  under	  systemic	  duress.	  
Polish	  worker-­‐citizens	  were	   constituted	  as	   cooperative	   (horizontal	   labor),	   segmented	   (factory	  
space),	  and	  differentiated	   (enduring)	  subjects;	  Algerians	  were	   formed	  as	  competitive	   (vertical	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clients),	  seamless	  (public	  space),	  undifferentiated	  (eradicated)	  subjects-­‐into-­‐objects.	  I	  expatiate	  
on	  these	  categories	  below;	  here,	  I	  will	  address	  differentiated	  and	  undifferentiated	  regimes,	  the	  
central	   explanatory	   property	   in	   the	   independent	   variable	   of	  my	   explanation.	  Differentiated27	  
citizenship	  regimes	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  state’s	   fiscal	  solvency	  and	  will	   still	  provide	  activists	  
(the	  credible	  promise	  of)	   social	   resources	  and	  systemic	   subjectivity	  even	  under	   fiscal	   crisis	  or	  
martial	   law.	  Undifferentiated	   citizenship	   regimes	  are	  parasitic	  on	   the	   state’s	  economic	  health	  
and	  cease	  to	  provide	  activists	  social	  resources	  in	  hard	  times.	  Differentiated	  citizenship	  regimes	  
endure	  and	  undifferentiated	  regimes	  expire	  under	  state	  crisis,	  retaining	  or	  eradicating	  systemic	  
subjectivity	  and	  supporting/discrediting	  non-­‐violence,	  respectively.	  The	  other	  intra-­‐citizenship-­‐	  
regime	  variations	  determine	  the	  social	  ties	  and	  spatial	  relations	  of	  sustained	  collective	  action,	  
and	  distinguish	  the	  constituencies,	  associations,	   loyalties,	  and	  expectations	  of	  Polish	  Solidarity	  
and	   Algerian	   Islamists,	   but	   the	   endurance	   of	   social	   resources	   decides	   the	   status	   of	   systemic	  
subjectivity	  and	  hence	  the	  probability	  of	   intra-­‐systemic	  versus	  anti-­‐systemic	  means	  to	  compel	  
policy	  changes	  or	  even	  state	  reforms,	  all	  other	  things	  equal.	  
	   The	  final	  piece	  of	  the	  explanation	  expands	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  experience	  in	  evaluations	  
given	  the	  correct	  observation	  that	  martial	  law	  eradicated	  both	  Poles’	  and	  Algerians’	  immediate	  
subjectivity.	  Objectively	  the	  conditions	   in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  were	  similar	  –	  activists	  arrested,	  
tortured,	  and	  detained	  indefinitely;	  continuation	  of	  the	  material	  deprivation	  that	  had	  sparked	  
the	   initial	   uprisings;	   and	  both	   citizenship	   regimes	   rendered	   ineffective	   and	  explicitly	   targeted	  
for	  destruction.	  My	  analytical	  response	  to	  this	  commonality	  is	  to	  propose	  that	  similar	  material	  
and	  political	  conditions	  do	  not	  overwhelm	  distinct	  historical	  and	  experiential	  interpretations	  of	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those	  conditions	  by	  citizens,	  and	  that	  in	  these	  “readings”	  of	  regime	  actions,	  citizens	  are	  shaped	  
by	  past	  interactions	  with	  the	  state	  through	  the	  social	  resources	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime.	  	  
	   First,	   activists	   responding	   to	   state	  coercion	  ask	   if	   they	   retain	   the	   social	   resources	   that	  
rendered	  them	  systemic	  subjects.	  They	  ask	  why	  they	  are	  suffering,	   if	   the	  regime	   is	   just,	  what	  
allies	   they	   should	   seek,	   of	   course,	   but	   they	   also	   ask	   if	   they	   still	   exist	   as	   citizens	   with	   a	  
relationship	   to	   the	   state,	   as	   subjects	   who	   can	   effectively	   connect	   their	   willful	   actions	   to	  
improvements	   in	   their	   condition	  by	  engaging	   the	   social	   system.	  Their	   subjectivity	   itself	  poses	  
this	  question	  and	  then	  reacts	  to	  the	  situated	  response.	  Second,	  evaluations	  of	  subjectivity	  are	  
experiential,	   historical,	   systemic	   –	   not	   restricted	   to	   immediate	   institutional	   opportunity	   or	  
social	  misery.28	   I	   call	   this	   the	  subjective	   interpretation	  of	  objective	  conditions,	  or	  experiential	  
evaluation,	   an	  objective/subjective	   gap	  opens	  by	   the	  perceived	  availability	   of	   enduring	   social	  
resources	  when	  they	  are	  held	  in	  abeyance	  but	  credibly	  potent.	  Citizens	  who	  ask	  if	  they	  are	  still	  
subjects,	  in-­‐forming	  their	  response	  to	  state	  coercion,	  answer	  by	  assessing	  whether	  their	  social	  
resources	  still	  exist,	  either	  actually	  or	  immanently.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  dissidents	  were	  crippled,	  
embittered,	  and	  paralyzed	  by	  the	  declarations	  of	  martial	  law,	  before	  diverging	  into	  non-­‐violent	  
and	  violent	  reactions.	  But	  when	  Poles	  searched	  their	  desolate	  political	  landscape	  in	  1981	  they	  
felt	  they	  might	  reanimate	  a	  suspended	  but	  enduring	  social	  resource	  that	  in	  the	  past	  had	  been	  
and	  in	  the	  future	  could	  be	  wielded	  against	  the	  state.	  Where	  Poles	  could	  “read”	  martial	  law	  as	  a	  
desperate	   last	   gasp	  effort	   to	   suppress	  mass	   social	   agitation,	  Algerians	   could	  draw	   inspiration	  
from	  no	  systemic	  social	  resources	  or	  experiences	  that	  suggested	  a	  potential	  to	  affect	  much	  less	  
threaten	  ruling	  elites.	  Activist	  evaluations	  of	  objective	  social	  and	  political-­‐economic	  conditions	  
are	  referenda	  on	  systemic-­‐subjectivity	  and	  refer	  to	  reiterated	  mobilizations	  of	  social	  resources.	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Subjective	  evaluations	  are	  objective,	  however,	  referring	  to	  the	  material	  persistence	  of	  powerful	  
elements	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime,	  however	  apparently	  dismantled	  or	  weakened	  by	  the	  state.	  
	   Having	  summarized	  the	  conceptual	  and	  causal	  architecture	  of	  my	  explanation,	  I	  will	  now	  
offer	  the	  declension	  of	  subjectivity	  deployed	  in	  my	  argument.	  People	  ask	  or	  embody	  two	  modal	  
questions	  about	  their	  demands	  and	  citizenship	  status:	  
	  
	   w	  	  	   Do	  we	  get	  what	  we	  want:	  what	  are	  our	  demands?	  
	   w	  	   Can	  we	  affect	  what	  we	  get:	  are	  we	  citizen-­‐subjects?	  
	  
Citizen-­‐subjects	  inquire	  about	  their	  social	  resources,	  not	  only	  about	  satisfied	  tastes	  or	  desires;	  
they	  ask	  multiple	  questions	  when	  evaluating	  their	  subjective	  status,	  i.e.,	  when	  asking	  whether	  
they	  still	  have	  social	  resources	  under	  this	  political-­‐economic	  state?	  Inter	  alia,	  they	  ask:	  
	  
	   w	  	  	  	   Are	  the	  social	  resources	  that	  made	  us	  who	  we	  are	  extant?	  
	   w	  	   Are	  the	  social	  resources	  that	  made	  us	  who	  we	  are	  operable?	  
	   w	   Are	  the	  social	  resources	  that	  made	  us	  who	  we	  are	  immanent?	  
	   w	  	   Have	  we	  been	  eliminated	  as	  subjects?	  Does	  our	  subjectivity	  endure?	  
	   	   	  
People	  do	  not,	  then,	  ask	  only	  if	  they	  are	  getting	  their	  “material”	  desires	  met,	  nor	  whether	  ruling	  
elites	  or	  formal	  institutions	  are	  just,	  but	  whether	  they	  have	  the	  elements	  of	  their	  subjectivity	  –	  
however	  actionable	  in	  the	  moment.	  Again,	  we	  can	  also	  say	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  subjects	  who	  ask	  
but	  also	  subjectivities	  that	  react	  when	  confronting	  compressed	  social	  or	  material	  conditions.	  	  
	   Experiential	  evaluation	  is	  a	  judgment	  by	  citizens	  of	  their	  effective	  or	  meaningful	  citizen-­‐
subjective	  status.	  This	  evaluation	  redounds	  to	  operable	  or	  immanent	  social	  resources.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  
a	  historical	  or	  pedagogical	  reading	  of	  circumstances.	  Thus,	  experiential	  evaluation	  ramifies	  into	  
two	  relations	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  variables:	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   w	  	   Divided.	  Subjective	  evaluation	  of	  objective	  conditions;	  citizens	  assess	  immediate	  	  
	   	   	   circumstances	  as	  historical	  systemic	  subjects	  embodied	  in	  the	  citizenship	  	  
	   	   	   regime’s	  social	  resources.	  	  
	   	   	   ð	  Objective,	  immediate	  suffering	  underdetermine	  evaluations.	   	   	  
	  
	   w	   Unified.	  	  Subjective	  evaluation	  of	  objective	  conditions;	  citizens	  explore	  potential	  	  
	   	   	   (immanent)	  re-­‐mobilization	  of	  suspended	  but	  materially	  enduring	  social	  	  
	   	   	   resources,	  not	  free-­‐floating,	  ideational	  artifact	  “life	  of	  its	  own”29	  
	   	   	   ð	  Objective,	  immanent	  resources	  determine	  evaluations	  	  
	  
	   §1.b.2	   Conceptual	  model	  
	  
	   In	  this	  section	  I	  explicate	  the	  conceptual	  grid	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  explanation,	  mapped	  
here	  over	  the	  temporal-­‐causal	  pathway:	  
	   	  
	   Regime	   	   Subject	   	   Resource	   Crisis	  (similar)	   Evaluation	   	   Decision	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   fiscal	  collapse	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   martial	  law	  
Poland	   labor-­‐citizen	   worker	   	   strike	   	   	   	   resources	  intact	   	   non-­‐
violence	  
	   	  	  	  social	  	   	   	  	  	  w	  	  cooperative	   	   	   	   	   horizontal/universal	  
	   	  	  	  spatial	  	   	  	  	  w	  	  segmented	   	   	   	   	   negotiation	   	   	  	  
	   	  	  	  regime	  	   	  	  	  w	  	  differentiated	   	   	   	   citizen-­‐subject	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   state	  vulnerable	  
	   	   	  
Algeria	   client-­‐citizen	   client	   	   switch	   	   	   	   resources	  gone	   	   violence	  
	   	  	  	  social	   	   	  	  	  w	  	  competitive	   	   	   	   	   systemic	  object	  
	   	  	  	  spatial	  	   	  	  	  w	  	  unified	   	   	   	   	   zero-­‐sum	   	   	   	  
	   	  	  	  regime	  	   	  	  	  w	  	  undifferentiated	   	   	   	   citizen-­‐object	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   state	  invulnerable	  
	  
The	   independent	   variable	   in	   my	   explanation	   is	   the	   citizenship	   regime	   formed	   by	   social	  
resources;	   the	   intervening	   variable	   is	   experiential	   evaluation;	   and	   the	   dependent	   variable	   is	  
violence/non-­‐violence.	   I	   elaborate	   and	   defend	   a	   conventional	   concept	   of	   the	   dependent	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variable	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   (§2.b).	   I	   will	   take	   the	   independent	   and	   intervening	   variables	   in	  
turn.30	  	  	  
	  
	   Citizen-­‐subjectivity:	  citizenship	  regime	  and	  social	  resources	  
	   	   	  
One	  pivotal	  feature	  of	  any	  state	  with	  even	  minimal	  infrastructural	  or	  disciplinary	  power	  
is	  the	  provision	  of	  citizen-­‐held	  social	  resources,	  the	  dominant	  institutional	  means	  of	  compulsion	  
and	  communication	  between	  government	  and	  non-­‐state	  agents.	  It	  may	  seem	  paradoxical	  that	  a	  
state	  would	  deliberately	  offer	  citizens	  means	  to	  oppose	  the	  state,	  but	  the	  means	  are	  reciprocal:	  
as	   the	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   cases	   show,	   the	   absence	   of	   quasi-­‐formal	   links	   between	   state	   and	  
citizen	  can	  be	  destabilizing,	  of	  not	  perilous,	  to	  the	  regime	  (C).	  Paradoxically,	  the	  optimal	  path	  to	  
securing	  incumbency	  may	  be	  to	  ensure	  that	  citizens	  enjoy	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  that	  they	  have	  
reliably	  effective	  social	  resources	  to	  compel	  reforms	  or	  concessions	  from	  the	  state	  and	  do	  not	  
experience	  systemic	  expulsion.	  	  	  
Social	  resources	  are	  the	  tools	  that	  can	  be	  used	  as	  leverage	  against	  the	  state,	  something	  
that	   can	   be	   withdrawn	   or	   withheld.	   In	   Poland	   the	   social	   resource	   was	   labor	   power,	   and	   in	  
Algeria	  the	  power	  of	   loyalty	  or	  support.	  Poles	  could	  and	  did	  withdraw	  their	   labor	  power	  from	  
the	  state,	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  regime,	  to	  reverse	  unfavorable	  policy	  decisions.	  Repeatedly	  the	  
workers	  mobilized	  this	  weapon	  by	  striking	  or	  carrying	  out	  work	  stoppages;	  in	  1956,	  1970,	  1976,	  
and	   1980	   these	   tactics	   changed	   policies	   and	   removed	   high-­‐level	   ruling	   personnel.	   In	   Algeria,	  
citizens	  had	  weaker	  tools	  to	  compel	  ruling	  party	  elites,	  though	  if	  they	  concentrated	  their	  forces,	  
they	  could	  create	  bargaining	  conditions	  on	  a	  discretionary	  and	  temporary	  basis,	  as	  Muslims	  did	  
in	  trading	  land	  reform	  and	  the	  1984	  Family	  Code	  for	  Islamist	  assimilation	  to	  the	  regime.	  Social	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resources	  are,	  then,	  incentive	  systems	  that	  create	  regular	  patterns	  of	  state-­‐society	  interaction	  
that	  develop	  a	  level	  of	  mutual	  “infrastructural	  power”	  between	  ruling	  elites	  and	  civil	  society	  or	  
individual	  citizens.	  The	  continual	  and	  cumulative	  use	  of	  social	  resources	  between	  the	  state	  and	  
citizens	  generates	  a	  practical	  regime	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  generally	  beneath	  or	  beside	  formal	  
elements	  of	  the	  political	  regime.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Examining	  common-­‐pool	   resources,	  Ostrom	  remarks,	   “To	  understand	   the	  processes	  of	  
organizing	  and	  governing	  CPRs,	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	   essential	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   resource	   system	   and	   the	   flow	   of	   resource	   units	  
produced	   by	   the	   system,	   while	   still	   recognizing	   the	   dependence	   of	   the	   one	   on	   the	   other.	  
Resource	   systems	   are	   best	   thought	   of	   as	   stock	   variables	   that	   are	   capable,	   under	   favorable	  
conditions,	  of	  producing	  a	  maximum	  quantity	  of	  a	   flow	  variable	  without	  harming	   the	   stock	  or	  
the	   resource	   system	   itself…Resource	   units	   are	   what	   individuals	   appropriate	   or	   use	   from	  
resource	   systems.	   Resource	   units	   are	   typified	   by	   the	   tons	   of	   fish	   harvested	   from	   a	   fishing	  
ground…The	  distinction	  between	  the	  resource	  as	  a	  stock	  and	  the	  harvest	  of	  use	  units	  as	  a	  flow	  is	  
especially	   useful	   in	   connection	   with	   renewable	   resources,	   where	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   define	   a	  
replenishment	  rate.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  average	  rate	  of	  withdrawal	  does	  not	  exceed	  the	  average	  rate	  
of	  replenishment,	  a	  renewable	  resource	  is	  sustained	  over	  time…I	  call	  the	  process	  of	  withdrawing	  
resource	   units	   from	   a	   resource	   system	   “appropriation.”	   Those	   who	   withdraw	   such	   units	   are	  
called	  “appropriators”…The	  term	  I	  use	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  who	  arrange	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  CPR	  is	  
“providers.”31	  
	  
In	  these	  terms,	  social	  resources	  are	  the	  resource	  units	  that	  activist	  appropriators	  extract	  from	  
the	   resource	   systems	  or	   citizenship	   regimes	  designed	  by	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  providers.	   If	   the	  
flow	  between	  state	  and	  citizen	  of	  the	  social	  resource	  is	  steady	  and	  replenished	  the	  regime	  will	  
consolidate	  eventually	  as	  a	  resource	  system.	  My	  stress	  is	  on	  how	  that	  system	  will	  re-­‐define	  its	  
participants	  in	  the	  practices	  of	  that	  system.	  The	  discrepant	  ways	  that	  social	  resources	  structure	  
citizen-­‐subjects	   helps	   us	   “escape	   from	   the	   pluralist-­‐corporatist	   dichotomy	   [by	   showing]	   that	  
these	  categories	  suggest	  less	  variety	  in	  politics	  than	  citizens	  experience.”32	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   In	  this	  project,	  then,	  the	  concept	  citizenship	  regime	  is	  caught	  up	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  
state	  formation	  and	  ruling	  class	  consolidation.	  In	  both	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  and	  this	  may	  typify	  
late	  developers,	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  became	  a	  negotiating	  tool	  that	  afforded	  providers	  and	  
appropriators	   leeway	   to	   improvise	  policy	   through	   informal	   channels	  without	   accountability.33	  	  	  
Given	  the	  postwar	  conditions	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  citizenship	  formation,	  Tilly’s	  comment	  on	  
revolutionary	  dynamics	   is	  apposite:	  “effects	  of	   large-­‐scale	  change	  on	  conflict	   run	   through	  the	  
structure	  of	  power,	  especially	  by	  shaping	  the	  organizational	  means	  and	  resources	  available	  to	  
different	  contenders	  for	  power.”34	  I	  interpret	  “organizational	  means	  and	  resources”	  as	  a	  subtle	  
distinction	  between	  elements	  of	  an	  organization,	  as	  means	  and	  resources	  differ.	  The	  latter	  are,	  
it	  would	  seem,	  malleable	  tools	  for	  adjusting	  policies	  and	  policymakers,	  inviting	  us	  to	  conceive	  of	  
citizenship	  in	  practical	  terms,	  as	  the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  interaction	  between	  regime	  and	  citizen,	  
however	  informal	  or	  improvised.	  As	  Thompson	  says,	  citizenship	  should	  be	  “defined	  not	  only	  by	  
the	  political	  language	  of	  constitutions,”	  but	  also	  by	  “all	  of	  the	  points	  at	  which	  
	  
people	   come	   into	   contact	  with	   the	   state	   inevitably	   shape	   their	   citizenship.	   Citizens’	   rights	   (or	  
lack	  thereof)	  are	  established	  in	  the	  daily	  practices	  of	  government,	  when	  a	  tax	  collector	  appears	  
at	  the	  door,	  when	  a	  police	  officer	  stops	  a	  car,	  or	  when	  a	  public	  works	  engineer	  designs	  a	  new	  
street	   or	   water	   system.	   For	   a	   large	   number	   of	   citizens,	   contact	   with	   the	   state	   comes	  mainly	  
through	  its	  social	  policies.	  Their	  relative	  status	  as	  citizens	  is	  defined	  when	  a	  school	  admits	  their	  
children	   (or	   does	   not),	   when	   a	   government	   clinic	   vaccinates	   a	   child	   (or	   does	   not)	   against	   a	  
disease,	  or	  when	  the	  state	  intervenes	  to	  stop	  employer	  abuses	  (or	  does	  not).35	  
	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  defining	  citizenship	  as	  the	  multiple	  practical	  interactions	  of	  individuals	  and	  
groups	  with	  the	  state	  in	  a	  given	  polity,	  I	  would	  stress	  that	  however	  improvised	  or	  pragmatic	  the	  
interactions,	   states	   integrate	   citizens	   by	   structuring	   them	  as	   subjects,	   orienting	   them	   toward	  
certain	  tools,	  spaces,	  discourses,	  associates,	  activities,	  affects,	  references,	  memories,	  and	  so	  on,	  
rather	  than	  others.36	  This	  idea	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  as	  both	  structural	  and	  improvised	  tries	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to	  bridge	  aleatory	   “social	   constructionism”37	  and	  path-­‐dependent	   institutionalism.38	   In	   recent	  
years	  structural	  and	  institutional	  arguments	  have	  fallen	  on	  hard	  times.	  Tilly	  and	  his	  co-­‐authors	  
endorse	  a	   “dynamic	  mobilization	  model”	   that	   recasts	  opportunity,	  mobilization,	   framing,	   and	  
repertoires	  as	  elastic,	  agential,	  creative,	  and	  subjective	  processes;	  protest,	  they	  say,	  is	  “socially	  
constructed”	  and	  not	  strategically	  given	  by	  contextual	  incentives.39	  Likewise,	  Schwedler	  argues	  
that	  the	  Yemeni	  and	  Jordanian	  states	  had	  little	  institutional	  capacity	  to	  manipulate	  opponents’	  
ideological	   demands.40	  Motyl	   claims	   that	  because	   structures	   “promote	  only	   tendencies”	   they	  
“have	  a	  probabilistic	   effect	  on	   concrete	  outcomes	  but	  not	   a	  determinative	  one.”41	   These	  are	  
instructive	  reminders	  to	  include	  decision,	  reflection,	  affectivity,	  and	  commitment	  in	  explaining	  
movement	  outcomes	  or	  social	  action	  more	  broadly.	  
	   	  Still,	  the	  use	  of	  citizenship	  structures	  to	  consolidate	  state	  power	  by	  incorporating	  non-­‐
state	  actors	   through	  “productive	  power,”	  as	  Foucault	   called	   it,	   can	  complicate	   the	  polarity	  of	  
structure/agency	  or	  causality/contingency	  found	  in	  some	  studies.	  The	  citizenship	  regimes	  I	  have	  
described	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  channeled	  citizens	  into	  specific	  speech	  or	  action,	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  other	  alternatives,	  but	   this	  does	  not	   imply	   the	  absence	  of	  willful	  activity	  –	   indeed,	   I	  would	  
argue,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  that	  citizenship	  regimes	  constitute	  subjects	  by	  building	  their	  allegiance	  
through	  their	  agentive	  participation.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  contradiction	  to	  claim	  that	  subjectivity	  must	  be	  
founded	  on	  a	  ban,	   a	  decision,	   a	   rule,	  or	   a	  prohibition	  –	   some	   limitation	   that	  enables	   axes	  of	  
restrictive-­‐productive	   power.42	   In	   the	   first	   instance	   subjects	   belong,	   for	   example,	   to	   a	   class,	  
culture,	  ideology,	  religion,	  ethnicity,	  and	  spatial-­‐temporal	  order	  that	  motivates	  their	  action	  and	  
situates	  their	  subjectivity.43	  In	  a	  passage	  critical	  to	  my	  formulation,	  Burawoy	  introduces	  his	  idea	  
of	  a	  “regime	  of	  production,”	  partly	  derived	  from	  research	  in	  Central	  Europe:	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Because	   these	   apparatuses	   of	   production	   vary	   independently	   of	   production,	   and	   because	  
production	   in	   turn	  varies	   independently	  of	   class	   structure,	   there	   is	  no	  one-­‐to-­‐one	   relationship	  
between	  class	  position	  and	  class	  formation.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  link	  between	  class	  in	  itself	  and	  
class	   for	   itself	   depends	   on	   the	   lived	   experience	   in	   production,	   that	   is,	   on	   the	   organization	   of	  
work	  and	  its	  regulation,	  that	  is,	  on	  what	  I	  call	  the	  regime	  of	  production.	  The	  link	  between	  class	  in	  
itself	  and	  class	  for	  itself	  depends	  on	  the	  character	  of	  the	  regime	  of	  production.	  Under	  advanced	  
capitalism,	   hegemonic	   regimes	   engender	   consent	   to	   capitalism	   by	   constituting	   workers	   as	  
individuals	   and	   by	   coordinating	   their	   interests	   with	   those	   of	   managers	   and	   owners.	   This	  
organization	   of	   consent	   takes	   place	   independently	   of	   the	   identities	   and	   consciousness	   forged	  
outside	  work…	   [T]he	  production	   regimes	  of	   state	  socialism	  engender	  dissent.	   Like	   the	  consent	  
organized	  under	  capitalism,	  dissent	  toward	  state	  socialism	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  mental	  orientation	  but	  
is	   embedded	   in	   distinctive	   and	   compulsory	   rituals	   of	   everyday	   life.	   Moreover,	   under	   certain	  
conditions,	  dissent	  leads	  workers	  to	  struggle	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  state	  socialism	  toward	  a	  
democratic	  socialism.	  This	  negative	  class	  consciousness	  produced	  by	  the	  state	  socialist	  regime	  of	  
production	  provides	  the	  raw	  material	  for	  a	  positive	  class	  consciousness,	  a	  vision	  of	  an	  alternative	  
order	  which	  can	  only	  be	  forged	  in	  class	  mobilization.44	  
	  
This	  passage	  brings	  together	  several	   themes	   I	  have	  been	  emphasizing	   in	  this	  discussion.	  First,	  
subjects	  form	  in	  contexts,	  sites,	  projects,	  and	  regimes	  that	  shape	  but	  do	  not	  “determine”	  them,	  
creating	   citizens	  whose	   agency	   is	   heightened	  within	   the	   centralized	   system	  of	   incorporation.	  
Second,	  even	  as	  regimes	  constitute	  their	  constituents	  “by	  coordinating	  their	  interest	  with	  those	  
of	  managers	  and	  owners,”	  they	  do	  not	  foreclose	  alternative	  sources	  of	  consciousness	  but	  divide	  
them	  from	  those	  that	  forge	  subjects	  as	  meaningful	  members	  of	  a	  system	  or	  regime.	  But,	  third,	  
through	  granular	  mechanisms	  and	  macro-­‐sociological	  dynamics,	  a	  regime	  that	  produced,	  in	  this	  
specific	  case,	  socialist	  subjects	  in	  Central	  Europe	  mobilized	  “compulsory	  rituals	  of	  everyday	  life”	  
that	  eventually	  led	  to	  a	  “positive	  class	  consciousness”	  culminating	  in	  Solidarity.	  	  
	   Shifting	  from	  a	  descriptive	  to	  an	  explanatory	  account,	  I	  focus	  on	  variations	  in	  citizenship	  
regimes,	  which	  manifest	  diachronically	  or	  synchronically.	  It	  is	  key	  to	  reiterate	  that	  a	  citizenship	  
regime	   is	   the	  predominant,	   not	  necessarily	  only,	  mode	  of	   state-­‐society	   interaction	  outside	  of	  
recruitment	  agencies.	  Indeed,	  a	  positive	  correlation	  could	  be	  hypothesized	  between	  an	  increase	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in	  the	  number	  or	  efficacy	  of	  state-­‐society	  resources	  and	  a	  decrease	  in	  social	  violence.	  Northern	  
European	   social	   democracies	   constructed	   overlapping	   citizenship	   regimes	   operating	   through	  
capital-­‐state-­‐labor	  bargaining	  and	  electoral	  processes	  with	  relatively	  low	  levels	  of	  individual	  or	  
collective	  violence.	  Similarly,	  citizenship	  regimes	  can	  layer	  their	  modes	  of	  state	  integration	  and	  
delineation	  to	  limit	  or	  calibrate	  the	  efficacy	  of	  citizen	  access	  to	  ruling	  elites,	  as	  Mamdani	  shows	  
regarding	  decentralized	  despotism.45	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  purview	  of	  my	  study	  to	  explore	  this	  fully,	  
but	   late-­‐developers	   appear	   to	   form	   citizen	   regimes	   predominantly	   by	   incorporating	   voters,	  
clients,	  or	  workers.	  The	  salience	  of	  this	  variation	  for	  explanatory	  analysis	  is	  its	  disparate	  effects	  
on	  constituted	  subjects.	  Here,	  for	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  these	  effects	  are	  sociality,	  spatiality,	  and	  
longevity	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  I	  will	  specify	  these	  effects	  for	  my	  two	  cases	  in	  the	  following	  
section,	  but	  here	  will	  lay	  out	  general	  dynamics	  that	  may	  apply	  elsewhere	  as	  well.	  The	  point	  to	  
emphasize	   is	   that	   the	   form	  of	   citizen-­‐subjectivity	  will	  determine	  how	  social	  actors	   “read”	   the	  
actions	  of	  the	  coercive	  state	  as	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  systemic	  existence.	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  all	  three	  
effects	  matter	   in	  defining	  opposition	   strategies	  because	   they	   form	  opposition	   subjectivities	  –	  
but	  the	  central	  variation	  is	  the	  endurance	  of	  the	  regime,	  derived	  from	  its	  differentiation.	  
	   The	   first	  variation	   in	  citizenship	   regime	   is	   its	   social	   force	  –	   the	  qualities	  or	  patterns	  or	  
identities	  encouraged	  among	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  potential	  agitators.	  Specific	  to	  my	  cases,	  the	  
distinction	   is	   between	   horizontal	   or	   cooperative	   social	   ties	   and	   vertical	   and	   competitive	   ties,	  
with	  potential	   influence	  on	  how	   the	   social	  movement	   comes	   to	  define	   “the	  we”	  of	   the	  mass	  
mobilization	  as	  a	  collectively	  reclaimed	  subjectivity.	  The	  second	  variation	   is	   its	  spatial	  effect	  –	  
what	  physical	  places	  are	  available	   to	  citizens	   to	  gather	   for	  discussions,	  protests,	  negotiations,	  
and	  sustained	  mutual	  visibility	  and	  audibility.	  In	  my	  cases	  this	  category	  divides	  into	  segmented	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and	  seamless	  social	  spaces,	  which	  either	  permit	  or	  preclude	   incremental	  or	  gradual	  modes	  of	  
self-­‐assertion	  and	  mutual	  state-­‐society	  recognition.	  The	  third	  variation	  within	  citizen	  regimes	  is	  
whether	  their	  social	  resources	  endure	  state	  insolvency	  and	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  –	  what	  sense	  
of	  continued	  systemic	  subjectivity	  is	  materially	  credible	  in	  citizens’	  evaluations	  of	  state	  action.	  
Again,	  I	  propose	  this	  as	  the	  pivotal	  explanatory	  variation	  in	  the	  independent	  variable:	  whether	  
the	  social	  resources	  that	  establish	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  endure	  or	  evaporate,	  thus	  retaining	  or	  
eliminating	  agitators’	   systemic	   subjectivity,	  determines	   the	  non-­‐violent	  and	  violent	   responses	  
to	  state	  coercion,	  notably	  in	  the	  defining	  early	  weeks	  and	  months	  of	  martial	  law.	  
	   The	  intervening	  variable,	  experiential	  evaluation,	  addresses	  how	  activists	  see	  or	  “read”	  
the	  actions	  of	  states	  on	  their	  effective	  citizenship.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  above,	  this	  category	  adds	  a	  
“materialist”	  component	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  framing,	  but	  also	  an	  “idealist”	  or	  ideational	  component	  
to	  the	  idea	  of	  opportunity	  structure.	  Moreover,	  I	  would	  urge	  that	  the	  salience	  of	  experiential	  or	  
historical	   or	   subjective	   evaluation	  does	  not	   collapse	   into	   “mere”	  ethnographic	  or	   ideographic	  
narratives,	  as	  opposed	  to	  reliable	  social	  explanation.	  Rather,	  the	  hope	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  as	  
we	  track	  the	  outcomes	  to	  their	  institutional-­‐material	  and	  experiential-­‐ideational	  sources	  in	  the	  
iterated	   practices	   of	   the	   citizenship	   regime,	  we	   approach	   rather	   than	   abandon	   discretionary	  
and	  explanatory	  variables.	  At	  the	  risk	  of	  repetition,	  then,	  experiential	  evaluation	  suggests	  that	  
as	  social	  actors	  responding	  to	  or	  generating	  policy	  changes,	  we	  begin	  not	  only	  with	  desires	  and	  
expectations	  and	  tastes	  and	  preferences,	  but	  also	  with	  subjectivities	  that	  are	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  
of	  the	  very	  relevance	  of	  advocating	  for	  these	  various	  demands	  or	  expressing	  our	  grievances.	  In	  
the	  evolution	  of	  dissident	  strategies	  under	  martial	  law	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  coercion	  this	  category	  
is	  critical	  because	  activists’	  primary	  motivation	  or	  orientation	  concerns	  the	  protection	  of	  their	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very	  existence.	  In	  the	  moment	  of	  existential	  threats,	  dissidents	  evaluate	  state	  actions	  as	  effects	  
on	  their	  systemic	  subjectivity	  –	  that	  is,	  they	  evaluate	  the	  citizenship	  regime.	  I	  have	  claimed	  that	  
the	  endurance	  or	  eradication	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  is	  the	  explanatory	  variable	  behind	  violence	  
and	  non-­‐violence,	  but	  also	  recognized	  that	  this	  endurance	  or	  eradication	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  
is,	  by	  necessity,	  a	  matter	  of	  perception,	  a	  judgment	  or	  evaluation	  that	  does	  not	  simply	  express	  
or	   translate	   objective	   conditions.	   So	   I	  wish	   to	   address	   briefly	   the	   viability	   of	   this	   intervening	  
variable	  in	  claiming	  particularly	  that	  Polish	  activists	  perceived	  themselves	  as	  effective	  citizens	  as	  
the	  state	  arrested	  their	  leaders	  and	  appeared	  to	  eradicate	  the	  systemic	  relevance	  of	  Solidarity.	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  problems	  in	  deploying	  evaluation	  as	  a	  mediating	  or	  intervening	  variable	  with	  
a	  defining	  effect	  on	  the	  outcomes	  is	  that	  it	  falls	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  consciousness	  or	  meaning,	  
often	  seen	  as	  problematic	   in	  social	  explanation	  and	  reliable	  political	  knowledge.	  My	  approach	  
begins	  with	  a	  distinction	  that	  deliberately	  challenges	  my	  argument.	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  claim	  only	  
that	  when	  subjects	   in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	   took	  a	  hard	   look	  at	   their	   immediate	  situation	  Poles	  
still	  felt	  like	  members	  of	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  and	  Algerians	  did	  not.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  problem	  of	  
evaluation	  would	   dissolve	   under	   proper	   anthropological	   techniques;	   we	   could	   just	   ask	   Poles	  
and	  Algerians	  whether	  they	  experienced	  martial	  law	  as	  radically	  dehumanizing.	  I	  do	  say	  that	  the	  
sense	   of	   expulsion	   differed	   between	   Solidarity	   members	   and	   Islamists,	   but	   also	   I	   want	   to	  
attribute	   this	   difference	   to	   the	   subjectivities	   of	   workers	   and	   clients.	   As	   workers,	   Poles	   were	  
objectively	  still	  members	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship,	  even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  subjectively	  experience	  this	  
efficacy	   at	   a	   given	  moment.	   People	   experience	   at	   a	   deeper	   level	   of	   identity	   and	   activity	   the	  
endurance	  or	  eradication	  of	  their	  systemic	  subjectivity;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  cognitive	  operation	  or	  explicit	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discussion	  one	  has	  with	  oneself.	  This	  idea	  makes	  evaluation	  harder	  to	  deploy	  than	  “thinking”	  or	  
“reflexivity”	  because	  it	  links	  the	  experiential	  aspect	  to	  subjectivity.	  	  
	   An	  analogy	  for	  subjectivity’s	  operating	  at	  the	  level	  of	  experience	  may	  help.	  It	  is	  akin	  to	  
being	  kidnapped	  or	  detained	  in	  a	  war-­‐torn	  country	  and	  “knowing”	  that	  one’s	  passport	  provides	  
immanent	  protection,	  one’s	  nationality	  grants	   immunity,	  although	   in	  the	  moment	  one	  cannot	  
establish	  this.	  I	  had	  this	  experience	  while	  detained	  in	  Egypt,	  Algeria,	  Uganda,	  and	  Turkey.	  I	  had	  
no	  objective	  way	  to	  know	  that	  I	  was	  safe	  but	  I	  believed	  I	  was	  and	  acted	  on	  that	  belief	  given	  my	  
subjective	  experience	  of	  my	  citizenship	  regime	  of	  national	  membership	  and	  global	  prerogative.	  
It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  I	  was	  wrong,	  that	  my	  subjective	  evaluation	  was	  irrelevant	  to	  my	  objective	  
condition	  and	  just	  some	  projection	  into	  the	  present	  of	  past	  experience.	  Experiential	  evaluations	  
of	  the	  endurance	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  operate	  this	  way,	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  pivot	  between	  historical	  
knowledge	  and	  current	  uncertainty.	  First,	  the	  regime	  structures	  me	  as	  a	  subject	  who	  evaluates	  
my	  present	  conditions	  given	  my	  recent	  experiences	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  Second,	  evaluation	  
must	  be	  based	  on	  the	  continuous	  visibility,	  the	  material	  signs,	  of	  social	  resources	  that	  defined	  
those	  past	  experiences,	  even	  as	  they	  remain	  inoperable	  or	  repressed.	  That	  is,	  the	  passport	  must	  
be	  in	  my	  pocket	  and	  my	  consulate	  functioning	  in	  the	  capital,	  just	  as	  the	  factories	  and	  the	  state’s	  
vulnerability	   to	  withdrawn	   labor	   power	  must	   persist	   in	   order	   to	   sustain	   the	   confidence	   that	  
immediate	  conditions	  have	  not	  reduced	  workers	  from	  subjects	  to	  objects	  of	  the	  social	  system.	  
	   Nonetheless,	  evaluation	  is	  especially	  hard	  to	  include	  in	  an	  explanation	  because	  it	  holds	  
this	  connotation	  of	  awareness,	  consciousness,	  meaning,	  and	  experience	  that	  may	  not	  be	  visible.	  




    
 
There	   is,	   of	   course,	   no	   way	   we	   can	   know,	   except	   perhaps	   through	   an	   empathetic	   leap,	   how	  
[social]	   symbols	   are	   appreciated	  within	   the	   conscious	   life	   of	   another	   individual.	  We	  can	   learn	  
how	  an	  individual	  uses	  the	  symbols	   in	  his	  portrayal	  of	  reality.	  This	  distinction	  is	   important.	  We	  
can	  know,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  symbols,	  but	  we	  cannot	  know,	  except	  hypothetically,	  
how	  symbols	  are	  experienced.46	  
	  
This	  suggests	  that	  we	  cannot	  directly	  access	  the	  experiences,	  but	  can	  read	  the	  evaluations	  that	  
include	  them	  in	  rhetorical	   fields	  or	  symbolic	  schemata.	  Note	  the	  “common	  scientific	  dilemma	  
[that]	  when	   some	  of	   an	   explanation’s	   premises	   are	   unobservable,	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   provide	  
direct	  evidence	  that	  all	  of	   them	  are	  suitable	  representations	  of	  the	  situation	  about	  which	  the	  
explanation	  is	  directed.”47	   In	  this	  sense,	   I	  treat	  experiential	  evaluation	  roughly	  as	  Fields	  treats	  
ideology,	  as	  an	  objective	  discursive	  manifestation	  of	  material	  inequality	  and	  dispossession:	  
	  
Such	   is	   the	   weight	   of	   things	   that	  must	   be	   true	   ideologically	   that	   no	   amount	   of	   experimental	  
observation	   can	   disprove	   them…Ideology	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   the	   descriptive	   vocabulary	   of	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	  existence,	  through	  which	  people	  make	  rough	  sense	  of	  the	  social	  reality	  that	  they	  live	  
and	  create	  every	  day.	  It	  is	  the	  language	  of	  consciousness	  that	  suits	  the	  particular	  way	  in	  which	  
people	  deal	  with	  their	  fellows.	  It	  is	  the	  interpretation	  in	  thought	  of	  the	  social	  relations	  through	  
which	   they	   constantly	   create	   and	   recreate	   their	   collective	   being,	   in	   all	   the	   varied	   forms	   their	  
collective	  being	  may	  assume:	  family,	  clan,	  tribe,	  nation,	  class,	  party,	  business	  enterprise,	  church,	  
army,	   club...As	   such,	   ideologies	   are	   not	   delusions	   but	   real,	   as	   real	   as	   the	   social	   relations	   for	  
which	   they	   stand…Ideologies	   do	   not	   need	   to	   be	   plausible,	   let	   alone	   persuasive,	   to	   outsiders.	  
They	  do	  their	   job	  when	  they	  help	   insiders	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  things	  they	  do	  and	  see	  –	  ritually,	  
repetitively	  –	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.48	  
	  
	   Fields	  emphasizes	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  my	  project	  and	  this	  variable,	  that	  people	  cannot	  leap	  
away	  from	  their	  activities	  and	  identities	  in	  their	  ideas:	  “Ideology	  is	  a	  distillate	  of	  experience.”49	  
Does	  this	  observation	  evade	  by	  re-­‐describing	  the	  problem	  of	  measurement;	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  
to	  treat	  evaluation	  as	  ideology	  in	  Fields’s	  sense?	  I	  suspect	  we	  can	  work	  from	  the	  co-­‐extension	  of	  
subjective	   experience	   and	  objective	   conditions	   to	   justify	   interpreting	   evaluation	   as	   a	   form	  of	  
structural	  expression.	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  we	  can	  test	  for	  the	  reflection	  of	  objectively	  available	  
social	   resources	   in	  subjective	  responses	   to	  social	  duress.	  This	  may	  allow	  social	  explanation	  to	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include	  objective	  and	   subjective	   characteristics	  of	   self-­‐sacrifice	  or	   self-­‐endangerment	  without	  
compromising	  causal	  analyses.	  “Although	  the	  manufacture	  of	  things	  is	  also	  the	  manufacture	  of	  
relations,”	  as	  Burawoy	  says,	  “it	  is	  also	  the	  manufacture	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  those	  relations.”50	  
Minimally	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  continuous	  patterns	  in	  thinking,	  acting,	  and	  perceiving	  avail	  us	  of	  
some	  capacity	  to	  incorporate	  experience	  and	  subjectivity	  into	  social	  explanation.51	  	  	  
	   §1.b.3	   Causal	  model	  
	  
	   In	  this	  section	   I	   track	  the	  variables	  of	  my	  explanation	  through	  the	  causal	  pathway	  and	  
describe	   the	   salient	   effects	   in	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	   of	   variations	   in	   the	   citizenship-­‐regimes	   on	  
systemic	  subjectivity.	  
	  
	   Conditions	  
	   Similar	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Crisis	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Martial	  Law	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  	  ö	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ø	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ö	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ø	  
	   Diff.	   Ind.	  Var.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Int.	  Var	   	   	   Int.	  Var	   	   Int.	  Var.	   	   Dev.	  
Var.	  
	   	   Resources	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ó	   Evaluation	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Resources/	  	  	  ð	  	   Evaluation	  II	  	  ð	   Decision	  
	   	   	   	   	   Subjectivity	   	   	   	   Subjectivity	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cases	  
Poland	   	   strike	   	   	   worker	   ü	   	   worker	   ü 	   extant	   	   Peace	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   immanent	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Algeria	  (-­‐1989)	   switch	  patron	   	   client	   ü	   	   client	  	   û 	   eliminated	   Violence	  
Algeria	  (1989-­‐)	   vote	   	   	   voter	   ü	   	   voter	  	   û 	   eliminated	   	  
	  
	   It	  remains	  to	  draw	  the	  variables	  conceptualized	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  into	  the	  causal-­‐
temporal	  pathway	  of	  my	  explanation.	  I	  have	  already	  given	  my	  explanation	  in	  a	  few	  forms	  to	  get	  
clear	  about	  its	  fundamental	  mechanism	  and	  variables,	  so	  I	  will	  not	  repeat	  or	  belabor	  the	  overall	  
argument	  for	  the	  centrality	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  social	  resources	  in	  the	  puzzling	  outcomes	  
in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria.	  Here	  I	  wish	  only	  to	  specify	  the	  discrete	  effects	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship	  and	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client-­‐citizenship	  as	  they	  shape	  these	  outcomes	  by	  constructing	  different	  subjectivities.	  I	  depict	  
the	  three	  variations	  in	  citizenship	  regimes	  that	  I	  have	  conceptualized,	  culminating	  in	  the	  one	  I	  
identify	  as	  the	  causal	  variable	  in	  violent	  or	  non-­‐violent	  strategies.	  I	  should	  emphasize	  that	  these	  
are	  all	  potentially	  primary	  explanatory	  variables,	  so	  it	  is	  of	  some	  consequence	  to	  include	  in	  this	  
section	  discretionary	  assessments	  as	  to	  causal	  effect	  on	  the	  outcomes.	  
	   	  
	   §1.b.3.a	  	  	  Social	  resources	  and	  citizen-­‐subjects	  
	   	   	   	  
	   The	  citizenship	  regimes	  of	  authoritarian	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  differed	  in	  social	  structures,	  
what	  might	  be	  called	  their	  sociological	  subjectivity.	  Worker-­‐citizenship	  fostered	  horizontal	  and	  
cooperative	   social	   ties	   by	   creating	   a	   mass	   working	   class	   based	   in	   complementary	   factories,	  
shipyards,	  and	  civic	  infrastructure.	  This	  countrywide	  working	  class	  experienced	  state	  policies	  in	  
similar	  ways	   and	   as	   an	   increasingly	   conscious	   singular	   class,	   especially	   under	   the	  pressure	   of	  
repeated	  state	  efforts	  to	  manipulate	  commodity	  prices	  and	  effective	  wages	  to	  avoid	  economic	  
restructuring.	  Signs	  of	  this	  social	  reciprocity	  recur	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  Polish	  class	  
activism,	  notably	  in	  the	  immediate	  responsiveness	  across	  areas	  and	  regions	  of	  state	  investment	  
and	   social	   production	   of	  workers	   connected	   not	   personally	   but	   in	   producing	  worker-­‐citizens.	  
Under	  tyrannical	  prerogative	  and	  martial	  law,	  Poles	  mobilized	  as	  worker-­‐citizens	  collectivized	  as	  
a	  self-­‐conscious,	  mutually	  identified	  class	  horizontally	  linked	  by	  a	  unified	  subjective	  experience.	  	  
	   Algeria’s	  client-­‐citizenship	  created	  vertical	  and	  competitive	  social	  ties,	  linking	  individuals	  
or	  groups	  to	  the	  state	  via	  exclusionary	  channels,	  encouraging	  social	  antagonism.	  In	  the	  absence	  
of	  a	   large-­‐scale	  working	  class,	   achieved	   through	  capital-­‐intensive	  monoculture	  extraction	  and	  
oil-­‐receipt	  distribution,	  Algerians	  were	  integrated	  into	  the	  state	  through	  discretionary	  rewards	  
offered	  by	  official,	  ministerial,	  or	  crony-­‐capitalist	  state-­‐embedded	  entrepreneurs.	  The	  Algerians	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became	  discrepantly	  situated	  and	  striated	  state	  clients,	  whom	  the	  military	  government	  briefly	  
re-­‐inscribed	  as	  voters	  in	  doomed	  elections.	  Under	  duress,	  the	  Islamists	  were	  able	  to	  coordinate	  
a	  temporary	  umbrella	  opposition	  organization.	  This	  horizontal	  versus	  vertical	  direction	  of	  social	  
resources	  was	  a	  significant	  distinction	  throughout	  the	  histories	  and	  seems	  to	  explain	  modes	  of	  
activist	  social	  ties	  but	  not	  the	  strategies	  they	  adopted.	  	  
	  	  	   The	  regimes	  differed	  as	  well	   in	  spatial	  subjectivity.	  Worker-­‐citizens	  were	  constituted	  in	  
production	  sites	  that	  gathered	  laborers	  in	  permanent	  places	  that	  enabled	  and	  represented	  their	  
shared	  experience.	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  confluence	  in	  the	  actions	  and	  spaces	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship	  
that	  emerged	  in	  using	  their	  social	  resource,	  strikes.	  Factories	  and	  shipyards	  provided	  endemic	  
places	  of	  protest,	   such	   that	   just	  by	  not	  appearing	   there	  one	  expressed	  a	  political	   stance.	  The	  
widespread	  feeling	  about	  the	  factories,	  especially	  in	  accounts	  of	  clashes	  between	  workers	  and	  
various	  state	  security	  personnel,	  is	  that	  they	  belong	  legitimately	  to	  class	  members,	  almost	  as	  an	  
element	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  that	  founds	  the	  citizenship	  regime.	  At	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  agitation,	  
the	   factories	   themselves	   became	   not	   only	   secure	   fortresses	   for	   workers,	   but	   also	   weapons.	  
During	  a	  strike,	  factories	  inverted	  radically,	  from	  places	  at	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  a	  hierarchy	  from	  
the	  state’s	  party-­‐union	  officials	   to	   regional	  and	   factory	   level	  management	   to	  places	   the	   state	  
has	   to	   infiltrate,	   creating	   an	   instant	   sense	   of	   illegitimate	   political-­‐normative	   violation.	   In	   the	  
Gdansk	  negotiations	  of	  1980	  this	  spatialized	  politics	  is	  clear,	  but	  ran	  in	  two	  directions,	  perfectly	  
exemplifying	  citizenship	  regime	  dialectics.	  Factories	  were	  the	  provenance	  and	  site	  of	  opposition	  
politics	  but	  also	  a	  physical	  place	  state	  representatives	  had	  to	  visit	  and	  be	  received.	  Workers	  had	  
increasingly	  formed	  mini-­‐states	  that	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  without	  this	  established	  and	  
sanctioned	  and	  indispensable	  spatial	  resource.	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   But	  Algerians	  lacked	  any	  sanctioned	  or	  informal	  space	  that	  could	  be	  a	  secure	  material	  or	  
symbolic	  site	  of	  identification	  or	  resistance.	  Algerians	  existed	  in	  seamless	  public	  spaces	  in	  which	  
opposition	  activities	  instantly	  challenged	  the	  state’s	  authority	  over	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Whereas	  
the	   segmented	   social	   spaces	   of	   Poland’s	   population	   centers	   allowed	   workers	   to	   gather	   and	  
even	   protest	   without	   a	   direct	   symbolic	   confrontation	   with	   the	   state,	   Algerians	   lacked	   any	  
similarly	   consecrated	   space	   of	   visibility	   in	  which	   to	   create	   ambiguous	   signs	   of	   intra-­‐systemic	  
mobilization.	   Algerian	   client-­‐citizens	   could	   not	   protest,	   as	   in	   1988,	  without	   communicating	   a	  
zero-­‐sum	  contest	  over	  the	  meaning	  and	  possession	  of	  public	  areas.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  mosque	  and	  
other	  religious	  sites	  became	  this	  political	  space.	  Even	  as	  this	  location	  favored	  Islamist	  activists,	  
it	   retained	   a	   sense	   of	   challenging	   or	   usurping	   state	   sovereignty,	   as	   the	   FLN	   and	   constitution	  
claimed	  Islamic	  credentials.	  Here	  a	  parallel	  in	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  state	  ideologies	  brings	  out	  this	  
contrast	  more	  sharply.	  Just	  as	  the	  Polish	  communists	  claimed	  to	  represent	  the	  working	  class	  in	  
official	  unions,	   the	  Algerian	  socialists	  claimed	  to	   represent	  Muslim	  values	   in	  official	  mosques.	  
But	  this	  is	  also	  an	  asymmetry;	  Polish	  production	  sites	  were	  the	  center	  of	  the	  informal	  regime	  of	  
worker-­‐integration,	  whereas	  Algerian	  mosques	  represented	  the	   lack	  of	  effective	  citizenship,	  a	  
kind	  of	   fallback	  position	   that	  merely	   relocated	  state-­‐citizen	  disputes	  over	  political	   space.	  This	  
distinction	  between	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  political	  spaces	  is,	  again,	  an	  example,	  mechanism,	  and	  
artifact	   of	   worker-­‐	   versus	   client-­‐citizenship	   regime,	   but	   not	   the	   causal	   variation	   of	   the	  
outcomes.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  worker-­‐	  and	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  differ	   in	  regime	  status,	  meaning	  the	  endurance	  
or	  eradication	  of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  under	  fiscal	  crisis	  or	  martial	  law.	  Because	  workers	  and	  work	  
were	  critical	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Polish	  regime,	  the	  working	  class	  had	  correspondingly	  greater	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power	  in	  forcing	  state	  responsiveness	  to	  popular	  grievances	  than	  Algerians	  whose	  client	  status	  
depended	  on	   top-­‐down	  material	  distribution.	  Because	  of	   its	  dependence	  on	   labor,	   the	  Polish	  
state	  created	  a	  differentiated	  citizenship	  regime,	  meaning	  that	  the	  social	  resources	  of	  worker-­‐
citizens	  were	  independent	  of	  the	  state’s	  financial	  status	  and	  even	  coercive	  exertions.	  Algeria’s	  
client-­‐citizenship	  regime	  was	  undifferentiated	  –	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  state’s	  coffers	  directly	  decided	  
that	   of	   ordinary	   and	   activist	   Algerians’	   meaningful	   political	   existence.	   It	   is	   pivotal	   that	   both	  
citizenship	   regimes	   rooted	   the	   destinies	   of	   their	   oppositions	   in	   the	   state,	   creating	   reciprocal	  
identifications	  that	  bound	  even	  the	  radical	  opposition	  strategies	  to	  previous	  state	  decisions.	  	  
	  
	   §1.b.3.b	  	  	  Experiential	  evaluation	  
	  
	   This	  central	  variation	  becomes	  clearer	  still	   if	   the	  causal	  pathway	   is	  elaborated.	  As	  one	  
can	  see	  in	  the	  basic	  chart	  above,	  the	  emergence	  of	  Solidarity	  and	  FIS/GIA	  occurred	  through	  two	  
stages,	  which	  is	  typical	  of	  widespread	  mobilizations	  to	  demand	  changes	  to	  existing	  citizenship	  
regimes.	   First,	   each	   state	   experienced	   crippling	   fiscal	   crises	   that	   compelled	   ruling	   elites	   to	  
retrench	   and	   dissidents	   to	   protest.	   Here	   citizens	   made	   a	   first	   evaluation	   of	   how	   the	   state	  
responded	   to	   their	   grievances.	   This	   first	   evaluation	   concerns	   both	   the	   restoration	   of	   desired	  
material	  goods	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  governors.	  In	  this	  first	  evaluation,	  dissidents	  criticize,	  
first,	   policies	   as	   undesirable	   and,	   second,	   policy-­‐makers	   as	   unsustainable	   or	   corrupt;	   it	   is	   a	  
moment	  of	  public	  moralization	  and	  consolidation	  of	  dissent.	  A	  second	  evaluation	  occurs	  in	  the	  
wake	  of	   the	   state’s	  declaration	  of	  martial	   law.	   In	   this	  evaluation	  dissidents	  ask	  whether	   they	  
remain	  willful	  subjects	  or,	  better	  still,	  they	  respond	  as	  citizen-­‐subjectivities	  to	  the	  state’s	  attack.	  
This	   marks	   the	   trajectory	   from	   citizens’	   evaluating	   provisions	   and	   ruling	   elites	   in	   light	   of	  
popular,	   itemized,	  material	   and	   ethical	   desires	   to	   evaluating	   their	   own	   subjective	   existences	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based	  on	  a	   reading	  of	  enduring	  or	  eradicated	  social	   resources.	   In	   this	  moment	  of	   the	  second	  
evaluation,	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  read	  their	  social	  resources	  accurately	  and	  objectively,	  given	  the	  
material	  continuity	  of	  their	  means	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  for	  decades.	  	  	  
	   Trouillot	  gets	  at	  this	  concept	  of	  experiential	  evaluation	  incisively:	  
	  
Workers	   work	   much	   more	   often	   than	   they	   strike,	   but	   the	   capacity	   to	   strike	   is	   never	   fully	  
removed	   from	   the	   condition	   of	   workers.	   In	   other	   words,	   peoples	   are	   not	   always	   subjects	  
constantly	  confronting	  history	  as	  some	  academics	  would	  wish,	  but	  the	  capacity	  upon	  which	  they	  
act	   to	   become	   subjects	   is	   always	   part	   of	   their	   condition.	   This	   subjective	   capacity	   ensures	  
confusion	  because	  it	  makes	  human	  beings	  doubly	  historical	  or,	  more	  properly,	  fully	  historical.	  	  It	  
engages	   them	   simultaneously	   in	   the	   socio-­‐historical	   process	   and	   in	   narrative	   constructions	  
about	  that	  process.52	  
	  
This	  second	  evaluation	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  entailing	  “perceived	  opportunity”53,	  differed	  in	  
Poland	  from	  Algeria	  because	  the	  strike	  option	  –	  the	  social	   resource	  that	  established	  effective	  
citizenship	  for	  workers	  for	  thirty	  years	  –	  endured	  fiscal	  crisis.	  Even	  as	  Poles	  resolved	  that	  they	  
were	  suffering	  both	  material	  deprivation	  and	  corrupt	  rule	  in	  the	  first	  evaluation,	  in	  their	  second	  
evaluation	  of	   their	  social	   resources	   they	  remained	  strong.	  The	  “capacity	   to	  strike	   [was]	  never	  
fully	  removed,”	  as	  Trouillot	  says,	  and	  thus	  the	  fundamental	  sense	  of	  workers	  and	  others	  in	  the	  
KOR	   or	   the	   Church	   in	   and	   surrounding	   their	   movement	   as	   willful	   subjects	   remained	   and	  
encouraged	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  state,	  and	  not	  they,	  was	  imperiled.	  Martial	   law	  looked	  entirely	  
different	  to	  Algerian	  dissidents	  –	  the	  final	  blow	  to	  their	  meaningful,	  relevant	  place	  in	  the	  polity	  
and	   the	   final	   consolidation	   of	   unmediated	   state	   power.	   Their	   temporary	   experience	   of	  
differentiated	   voter-­‐citizenship,	   now	   revoked	   after	   an	   effortful	   and	   successful	   campaign,	  
returned	   them	   to	   the	   undifferentiated	   social	   resources	   of	   the	   client.	   Martial	   law	   expelled	  
Algerians	  altogether	  from	  meaningful	  political	  membership	  –	  cast	  them	  out	  as	  systemic	  objects	  
that	  could	  assert	  political	  subjectivity	  only	  in	  violent	  actions	  to	  obstruct	  state	  sovereignty.	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   §1.b.3.c	  	  	  Logic	  and	  evidence	  
	  
	   The	  model’s	  logic	  applies	  citizens’	  observed	  need	  to	  experience	  subjective	  willfulness	  in	  
improving	  their	  lives	  by	  satisfying	  desires	  and	  resolving	  grievances.	  Existing	  political	  movements	  
or	  social	  agitations	  demand	  effective	  regime	  responses	  to	  protest	  actions,	  mainly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
systemic	  subjectivity.	  If	  they	  are	  refused	  a	  citizen-­‐regime	  that	  affords	  non-­‐state	  activists	  social	  
resources,	  they	  will	  re-­‐direct	  their	  demand	  for	  subjectivity	  outside	  the	  given	  political	  system.	  In	  
short,	  the	  fundamental	  ontology	  of	  this	  project	  maintains	  that	  a	  will-­‐to-­‐subjectivity	  drives	  social	  
agitators	   first	   to	  act	   intra-­‐systemically,	  but	   if	  need	  be	  anti-­‐systemically,	   to	   impose	  constraints	  
on	  state	  opponents.	  At	  least	  among	  highly	  motivated	  political	  dissidents,	  subjectivity	  will	  out,	  as	  
it	  were,	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  to	  compel	  state	  concessions	  or	  to	  disrupt	  sovereign	  operations.	  	  
	   This	  logic	  connects	  the	  structural	  classifications	  above	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  to	  practical	  
strategic	  outcomes	  –	  to	  why	  Poland’s	  worker-­‐citizenship	  and	  Algeria’s	  client-­‐	  and	  subsequently	  
voter-­‐citizenship	  explain	  non-­‐violent	  and	  violent	  strategies	  under	  cruel	  state	  retrenchment	  and	  
repression.	  	  The	  materially	  viable	  anticipation	  of	  the	  resuscitated	  social	  resources	  of	  a	  worker-­‐
citizen-­‐regime	  avoided	  incentives	  to	  anti-­‐systemic	  violence	  among	  Solidarity	  activists	  while	  the	  
comprehensive	  destruction	  of	  all	  semblances	  of	  once	  and	  future	  systemic	  subjectivity	  confined	  
Algerian-­‐activist	  disruptions	  of	  the	  state	  to	  anti-­‐systemic	  (or	  non-­‐systemic)	  resistance.	  To	  state	  
the	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  model	  as	  modestly	  as	  it	  is	  intended,	  as	  long	  as	  an	  opposition	  is	  motivated	  
to	  assert	  its	  subjectivity,	  as	  most	  sustained	  collective	  protest	  actions	  are,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  intra-­‐
systemic	  strategies	  like	  non-­‐violence	  increases	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  immanently	  
or	   immediately	  effective	  social	  resources.	  Two	  analytical	  challenges	  to	  this	  explanatory	  model	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have	  surfaced,	  one	  about	  the	  relative	  statuses	  of	  subjective	  and	  objective	  aspects	  of	  the	  theory	  
and	  the	  other	  concerning	  evidence	  and	  inference.	  	  
	   The	  claim	  that	  experiential	  evaluations	  of	  subjective	  standing	  explain	  why	  equally	  harsh	  
state	  violence	  produced	  distinct	  strategic	  responses	  seems	  empirically	  justified	  and	  analytically	  
necessary.	  Poles	  made	  ambivalent	  but	  consistent	  statements	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  martial	  law	  had	  
shown	  the	  success	  and	  promise	  of	  Solidarity	  even	  as	  it	  appeared	  decimated	  and	  dormant.	  Such	  
declarations,	  often	  penned	   in	   jail,	   found	  eventual	  confirmation	   in	  resurgent	  strikes	  to	   impede	  
state	  planning	  and	  compel	  concessions	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  parallel	  efforts	  of	  
non-­‐violent	  Algerians	  activists	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  state	  and	  of	  violent	  dissidents	  to	  destroy	  it	  
constituted	  a	   sort	  of	   test,	  begun	   in	  1992,	  of	   the	  generals’	   relative	   responses	   to	  anti-­‐systemic	  
and	  intra-­‐systemic	  approaches,	  confirming	  the	  effective	  systemic	  expulsion	  of	  state	  opponents.	  
Thus,	  empirically	  despite	  similar	  social	  suffering	  and	  political	  exclusion,	  the	  credible	  restoration	  
of	  the	  Polish	  worker-­‐citizenship	  regime	  sustained	  incentives	  to	  non-­‐violent	  opposition	  but	  the	  
explicit	   repudiation	   of	   non-­‐state	   agency	   in	   created	   incentives	   to	   anti-­‐systemic	   re-­‐
subjectivization	  among	  Algerian	  agitators.	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  Polish	  dissidents	  had	  sufficient	  
incentives	  to	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	  if	  their	  labor	  power	  might	  be	  re-­‐weaponized	  after	  the	  early	  frenzy	  of	  
the	   state	   of	   exception,	   while	   Algerians	   learned	   with	   increasing	   clarity	   that	   state	   repression	  
would	   intensify	   directly	   in	   correspondence	   with	   continue	   protest	   actions.	   Indeed,	   against	  
several	  doubtable	  alternative	  hypotheses	  (§3.c),	  it	  seems	  that	  distinct	  subjective	  evaluations	  of	  
similar	  objective	  conditions	  were,	  at	   the	  very	   least,	   critical	   contributors	   to	  activists’	  decisions	  
under	  martial	  law.	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   Analytically,	  the	  relative	  status	  of	  objective	  and	  subjective	  inputs	  to	  opposition	  tactics	  or	  
strategies	  can	  be	  complicated	  and	  enriched	  with	  a	  simplified	  chart	  derived	  from	  the	  one	  above.	  
The	  theoretical	  argument	  can	  be	  charted	  as	  a	  temporal	  flow	  to	  raise	  one	  of	  the	  analytical	  issues	  
that	  intrigues	  me	  and	  motivates	  this	  project:	  
	  
	   	   Pre-­‐marital	  law	  (T)	   Martial	  law	  (T`):	  Conditions	   	   Evaluations	  
Poland:	  	  	   worker-­‐citizens	   	   	   	   suffering/exclusion	  	   immanent	  resources	  
Algeria:	  	   client/voter-­‐citizens	   	   	   suffering/exclusion	   eradicated	  resources	  
	  
The	  claim	  that	  experiential	  evaluations	  of	  the	  potential	  to	  recuperate	  previous	  citizen-­‐regime-­‐	  
based	  social	  resources	  when	  they	  are	  visible	  but	  incapacitated	  entails	  that	  political	  activists	  at	  
time	  T`	  are	  still	  defined	  by	  their	  experiences	  at	  time	  T,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  latter	  override	  the	  
former.	  That	  is,	  Poles	  suffering	  and	  excluded	  under	  martial	   law	  at	  time	  T`	  were	  so	  profoundly	  
shaped	  by	  their	  pre-­‐martial	  subjective	  experiences	  at	  time	  T	  that	  their	  evaluations	  of	  the	  state	  
of	  emergency	  seem	  to	  prefer	  past	  to	  present	  conditions.	  Put	  another	  way,	  in	  rather	  stark	  terms	  
analytically,	  there	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  simply	  no	  rational	  reason	  for	  a	  Pole	  at	  time	  T`	  to	  believe	  
in	  the	  relevance	  of	  his	  experience	  in	  the	  previous	  time	  T	  as	  against	  his	  objective	  assessment	  of	  
his	  actual	  condition	  at	  time	  T`.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  have	  preferred	  the	  “thick”	  concept	  of	  subjectivity	  as	  
the	  agent	  of	  social	  agitation	  rather	  than	  the	  “thin”	  concept	  of	  the	  “rational	  actor”.	  	  
	   But	  this	  then	  raises	  the	  grave	  challenge	  to	  my	  evidentiary	  inferences	  in	  seeming	  to	  read	  
back	  from	  the	  effects	  to	  the	  causes.	  The	  objection	  here	  could	  be	  that	  I	  appear	  to	  be	  translating	  
agents’	  decisions	  into	  causes,	  that	  is,	  asserting	  that	  what	  they	  decided	  to	  do	  is	  what	  they	  were	  
caused	  to	  decide	  by	  available	  resources.	  A	  harsh	  way	  to	  phrase	  this	  is	  that	  I	  seem	  to	  be	  telling	  
stories	   about	   non-­‐violent	   Poles	   calculating	   that	   they	   might	   still	   have	   options	   based	   on	   past	  
experiences	  and	  violent	  Algerians	  calculating	  otherwise,	  and	   for	   some	  reason	  abruptly	   calling	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this	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  Have	  I	  not	  assumed	  Poles	  must	  have	  sensed	  intra-­‐systemic	  potential	  
precisely	   because	   they	   sustained	   non-­‐violence?	   In	   short,	   how	   do	   the	   concepts	   and	   research	  
design	  permit	  confirmation/falsification,	  minimally	  for	  a	  test	  of	  the	  link	  between	  non-­‐violence	  
and	  the	  perception	  of	  immanent	  social	  resources?	  While	  I	  am	  not	  confident	  that	  I	  can	  dismiss	  
this	  objection	  persuasively,	  my	  replies	  are	  several.	  First,	  this	  is	  a	  dilemma	  for	  all	  “functionalist”	  
explanations,	   however	   irksome	   especially	   to	   social	  movements’	   theorists	   deriving	   aggression	  
from	  the	  absence	  of	  structural	  opportunities.	   It	   is	  possible,	   if	  not	  a	  wholly	  satisfactory	   retort,	  
that	  we	  must	  consider	   this	  problem	  of	   falsificationism	  a	  standing	   impasse	   for	  explanations	  of	  
protest	  strategies.	  Another	  way	  of	  saying	  this	   is	  that	  until	  we	  have	  demonstrable	  proof	  that	  a	  
theory	  of	  social	  violence	  that	  can	  be	  dispositively	  falsifiable	  is	  available,	  this	  critique	  loses	  some	  
credibility	   for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	   it	  may	  be	  demanding	  what	  cannot	  be	  provided.	  Second,	  
while	  it	  may	  seem	  evasive,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  combine	  a	  critical	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  to	  establish	  
more	  or	  less	  likely	  contributors	  to	  the	  non-­‐violence	  and	  violence	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  rather	  
than	   the	   final	   causal	   provenance	   of	   all	   opposition	   strategies.	   This	   is	   why	   I	   have	   “over-­‐
structured”	  the	  research	  design	  and	  model,	  not	  as	  a	  gesture	  of	  positivist	  piety	  but	  to	  examine	  
rather	   than	   presume	   the	   limitations	   and	   possibilities	   of	   such	   explanations.	   As	   I	   noted	   in	   the	  
introduction,	  only	  a	  rigorous	  act	  of	  faith	  can	  expose	  its	  insubstantiality;	  that	  is,	  only	  by	  trying	  to	  
“explain”	   violence	   carefully	   can	   we	   open	   up	   the	   broader	   possibility	   that	   it	   cannot	   be	   done	  
satisfactorily.	  On	  this	  argument,	  it	  may	  simply	  be	  one	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  to	  examine	  such	  
a	  work	  only	  to	  accuse	  it	  of	  this	  very	  failure.	  Apart	  from	  these	  perhaps	  programmatic	  rejoinders,	  
third,	  I	  do	  feel	  anxious	  that	  I	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  saying	  that	  how	  dissidents	  acted	  is	  how	  they	  had	  
to	  act,	  since	  this	  would	  be	  circular	   to	  a	   fault.	   I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  read	  back	   from	  how	  Poles	  and	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Algerians	   reacted	   to	   martial	   law	   to	   impose	   their	   perceptions,	   yet	   I	   understand	   how	   my	  
argument	  might	   appear	   to	   do	   just	   that.	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   avoid	   this	   problem	   by	   assessing	   the	  
literature,	  providing	  lengthy	  narratives	  that	  expose	  the	  organizing	  power	  of	  citizenship	  regimes,	  
and	   reporting	   actors’	   impressions	   from	   the	   period.	   I	   have	   done	   this	   exactly	   because	   of	   the	  
drawbacks	  of	  presuming	  that	  what	  activists	  used	  in	  their	  struggles	  speaks	  directly	  to	  what	  was	  
available	  for	  use.	  First,	  as	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  (§2.d,	  §2.e),	  there	  is	  rarely	  if	  ever	  
a	   direct	   correspondence	   between	   what	   we	   believe	   is	   available	   and	   what	   is	   “objectively”	  
available.	   Second,	   often	   our	   actions	   are	   geared	   to	   create	   new	   social	   recourses,	   rather	   than	  
simply	   generated	  by	   already-­‐existing	   resources.	   These	   are	   the	   objections	   that	   spurred	  me	   to	  
imagine	   teasing	   out	   an	   explanation	   of	   political	   violence	   by	   conceiving	   of	   activists,	   initially	   in	  
direct	   response	   to	   them	   in	   the	  Middle	   East,	   as	   conducting	   what	   might	   be	   called	   structured	  
experiments	   in	  subjectivity.	  By	  seeing	  activists	   in	  the	  throes	  of	  their	  own	  practical	  testing	  and	  
falsifying	  hypotheses,	  we	  may	   infer	  a	   synthesis	  between	  social	  movement	  and	  explanation	   in	  
promoting	  practical	  over	  positivist	  causality.	  	  
	  
	   §1.c	   Stipulations	   	  
	  
	   One	  burden	  of	  my	  project	   is	   to	  assess	   the	  causal	  weight	  of	  variables	   in	  explaining	   the	  
outcomes	   in	  the	  two	  cases.	  To	  clarify	  the	  concepts	  and	  theories	  of	  violence	   in	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  and	  theoretical	  model,	  chapter	  two	  discusses	  the	  relevance	  in	  my	  historical	  narratives	  
of	   a	   conventional	   definition	   of	   violence.	   Analyses	   of	   the	   concepts,	   subjects,	   objects,	   and	  
evaluations	  of	   violence	   supplement	   the	  project’s	  designation	  of	   violence	  and	  non-­‐violence	  as	  
the	   differential	   outcomes	   in	   Poland	   and	   Algeria.	   To	   examine	   or	   test	   potential	   independent	  
variables,	  chapter	  two	  analyses	  alternative	  social	  models	  often	  adduced	  to	  explain	  social	  peace	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of	  violence,	  either	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  or	  in	  general.	  Potential	  explanatory	  factors	  outside	  my	  
model	   of	   citizen-­‐subjectivity	   are	   influential	   and	   plausible	   and	   thus	   merit	   separate,	   detailed	  
consideration.	   Divergent	   citizenship	   structures	   are	   not	   the	   only	   differences	   in	   authoritarian	  
regimes	  that	  might	  explain	  various	  dissident	  responses	  to	  martial	  law;	  so	  it	  is	  pivotal	  to	  address	  
significant	  differences	  that	  parallel,	  and	  could	  effect,	  Polish	  peace	  and	  Algerian	  violence.	  These	  
alternative	  variables	   include:	  production-­‐accumulation-­‐developmental	  “deepening”	  shaped	  by	  
contrasting	  access	  to	  state-­‐monopoly	  oil-­‐revenues;	  ethical	  commitments	  rooted	  in	  Catholic	  and	  
Muslim	   values;	   state	   sovereignty	   given	   distinct	   imperial	   legacies,	   especially	   disproportionate	  
Soviet	   intimidation;	   and	   tactical	   parameters	   enforced	  by	   cosmopolitan	   sensibilities	   or	   liberal-­‐
democratic	   civil	   commitments.	   Such	   economic,	   religious,	   political,	   and	   ideological	   variables,	  
often	  invoked	  to	  explain	  social	  protest	  decisions,	  are	  compelling	  and	  discussed	  at	  some	  length.	  
	   To	  isolate	  and	  compare	  these	  candidate	  tributaries	  to	  Poland’s	  “self-­‐limiting	  revolution”	  
and	  Algeria’s	  “civil	  war,”	  the	  chapter	  on	  other	  variables	  and	  accounts	  first	  presents	  similarities	  
in	   the	   two	   cases.	   Indicating	   commonalities	   does	   more	   than	   simply	   remove	   items	   from	   the	  
causal	  pathway;	   it	   also	   informs	  our	   sense	  of	   those	   removed	   items.	  Knowing	  authoritarianism	  
proves	  a	  poor	  predictor	  of	   the	  Polish/Algerian	   trajectories	  encourages	  us	  not	   to	   trivialize	   the	  
regime-­‐type	  but	  to	  revisit	  and	  refine	  our	  perception	  of	  its	  internal	  configurations.	  In	  this	  vein,	  a	  
stand-­‐alone	  assessment	  of	  convergent	  and	  divergent	  variables	  provides	  space	  for	  the	  historical-­‐
analytical	  texture	  my	  project	  supports.	  First,	  by	  comparing	  diverse	  factors,	  including	  similarities	  
that	  manifestly	  do	  not	  explain	  disparate	  outcomes,	  we	  can	  abrade	  the	  hard	  edge	  of	  variable-­‐
analytical	  model	  building.	  Rather	  than	  rule	  out	  “religious	  ethics”	  as	  causally	  irrelevant	  because	  
Polish-­‐Catholics	  and	  Algerian-­‐Muslims	  have	  been	  equally	  militant	  in	  past	  uprisings,	  we	  welcome	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thinking	  about	  immanent	  Catholic	  and	  Muslim	  convictions	  that	  may	  vary	  over	  time	  in	  discrete	  
contexts	  such	  as	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Similarly,	  if	  we	  impeach	  the	  reasonably	  appealing	  postulate	  that	  
external	  domination	  pacified	  Poles	  but	  not	  Algerians,	  this	  difference	  in	  context	  may	  contribute	  
to,	  for	  instance,	  theories	  of	  imperial	  versus	  hegemonic	  coercion	  and	  resistance.	  	   	  
	   Second,	  delineating	  similar	  and	  different	  variables	  in	  comparative	  ethnography	  can	  raise	  
questions,	  propose	  hypotheses,	  counter	  received	  wisdom,	  or	  animate	  counterfactuals	   in	  ways	  
single-­‐case	  or	  regional	  studies	  cannot.	  Poland	  scholars	  debate	  whether	  workers	  or	  intellectuals	  
predominated	  in	  defining	  Solidarity,	  a	  controversy	  absent	  from	  Algeria	  studies.	  Algeria	  scholars	  
instead	  debate	  the	  causal	  force	  of	  oil	  versus	  Islam	  in	  discouraging	  a	  moderate	  civil	  society.	  But	  
comparative	  variable	  analysis	  may	  propose	  background	  conditions	  for	  these	  distinct	  debates	  to	  
arise	  and	  dominate	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  academic	  discourses	  that	  would	  not	  otherwise	  arise.	  A	  
political	  economist	  or	  social	  historian	  working	  on	  Algeria	  might	  ask	  his	  Polish	  counterpart	  how	  
the	  strike	  option	  shaped	  dissident	   reformist	  gradualism;	  but	  Poland	  scholars	   stress	   ideational	  
contests	  among	  workers,	  academics,	  professionals,	  and	  religionists	  to	  explain	  Solidarity’s	  non-­‐
violence,	  often	  without	  considering	  that	  the	  material	  position	  of	  strikers	  might	  frame	  the	  ideal	  
potential	   of	   cross-­‐class	   solidarity.	   Inversely,	   Algeria	   specialists	   rarely	   ponder	   the	   absence	   of	  
labor-­‐intensive	   production	  or	   forward	   and	  backward	   economic	   linkages	   in	   explaining	   Islamist	  
violence.	  Chapter	  two	  seeks,	  then,	  to	  yield	  the	  theoretical	  model	  inferred	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  
by	  arguing	  that	  similarities	   in	  modern	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  politics	   inflect	  dissident	  movements	  
and	  warrant	   the	  puzzle;	   and	   that	  notable	  differences	  between	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	   religiosity,	  
economic	  resources,	  and	  sovereignty	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  Solidarity	  and	  Islamist	  uprisings.	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   A	  second	  burden	  of	  my	  project	  concerns	  method.	  As	  these	  remarks	  on	  variable	  analysis	  
intimate,	  and	  as	  chapter	  two	  clarifies,	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  small-­‐N,	  process-­‐traced,	  Mill’s-­‐method	  
comparative	  study	  are	  limited	  in	  scope	  and	  certainty.	  More	  suggestive	  than	  conclusive	  or	  more	  
probing	  than	  probative,	  this	  research	  design	  proffers	  only	  tentative	  causal	  inferences,	  even	  as	  it	  
meticulously	  “controls	  for	  variables”	  or	  identifies	  initial	  and	  ceteris	  paribus	  conditions.	  No	  two-­‐
N	  comparison	  can	  produce	  a	  dispositive	  or	  general	  theory	  of	  institutional	  structure	  and	  protest	  
decisions.	   Indeed,	  my	   agenda	   is	   not	   to	   conjure	   up	   a	   universal	   theory	   of	   collective	   protest	   or	  
strategic	  choice	  but	  to	  provide	  a	  persuasive	  qualitative	  account	  of	  dissidence	  under	  Polish	  and	  
Algerian	  authoritarianism.	  Rigorous	  arguments,	   logical	   interpretations,	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  
are	  paramount,	   to	  be	  sure;	  even	  relatively	  “humanist”	   social	   science	  must	  meet	  standards	  of	  
reliable	  knowledge.	  But	  my	  goal	  is	  to	  discern	  and	  explicate,	  in	  a	  qualitative	  research	  design,	  the	  
intricate,	   incremental	  processes	  of	  protest	   rationales,	   including	  non-­‐quantifiable,	   intercalated	  
effects	  of	  immanent	  social	  resources	  on	  dissident	  decisions.	  	  
	   With	  this	  qualitative	  caution,	  I	  have	  examined	  historical,	  sociological,	  political-­‐scientific,	  
anthropological,	  and	  literary	  sources,	  as	  well	  as	  memoirs,	  interviews,	  and	  eyewitness	  accounts.	  
In	  addition,	  I	  have	  incorporated,	  albeit	  minimally,	  interviews	  that	  inspired	  my	  project,	  with	  this	  
apologia.	  Between	  1986	  and	  1992	  I	  did	  fieldwork,	  often	  residential,	  in	  Europe,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  
and	   North	   Africa,	   including	   Algeria,	   Egypt,	   Jordan,	   Sudan,	   Yemen,	   Lebanon,	   Palestine,	   Israel,	  
Turkey,	  Syria,	  France,	  England,	  Austria,	  and	  Poland.	  I	  conducted	  formal	  interviews	  with	  militant,	  
peaceful,	  secular,	  and	  religious	  Muslims	  in	  Arabic,	  French,	  English,	  and	  even	  Spanish;	  but	  spoke	  
with	  far	  fewer	  Poles	  and	  with	  them	  in	  English.	  I	  expect	  the	  much	  more	  available	  translations	  of	  
Polish	  memoirs,	   letters,	  and	   interviews	  compensate	  for	  this	   imbalance.	  Also	   in	  the	   interest	  of	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suasion,	   the	   project	   is	   structured	   to	   avoid	   a	   typical	   pitfall	   of	   qualitative	   research:	   evading	  
criteria	  of	  falsification	  by	  conflating	  evidence	  and	  advocacy.	  While	  natural	  scientific	  procedures	  
are	   not	   apposite	   here,	   obviating	   “hard”	   positivist	   claims,	   I	   believe	  my	   analytical	   slalom	   from	  
model	  to	  variables	  to	  narratives	  offers	  reasonable	  grounds	  for	  assent	  or	  refutation.	  
	   But	  rather	  than	  just	  minimizing	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  this	  approach,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  affirm	  its	  
benefits.	  Narrative	  analyses	  of	  the	  subjectivities	  and	  evaluations	  that	  determine	  the	  strategies	  
of	  social	  agitations54	  can	  select	  out	  likely	  explanatory	  factors	  in	  causal	  pathways	  while	  texturing	  
the	  cases’	  common	  variables,	  as	  I	  have	  discussed.	  But,	  in	  addition,	  tracing	  social	  movement	  and	  
state	  agencies,	  resources,	  perceptions,	  and	  interactions	  can	  detect	  subtle	  processes	  of	  political	  
subject-­‐formation	   that	   may	   supplement	   larger-­‐N	   research	   projects.	   My	   approach	   does	   not	  
contest	   quantitative	   or	   statistical	   studies	   of	   collective	   action	   outcomes,	   then,	   but	   provides	  
parallel	  accounts	  of	  the	  “mediating	  political	  and	   ideological	  apparatuses	  of	  production”55	  that	  
correlative	   discoveries	   or	   relatively	   abstract	   variable	   coding	   may	   overlook.	   For	   example,	  
Poland’s	   Solidarity	   and	   Algeria’s	   Islamic	   Salvation	   Front	   may	   both	   be	   considered	   social	  
movements	  that	  burst	  on	  the	  national	  political	  scene	  abruptly	  after	  achieving	  cross-­‐class,	  multi-­‐
sector	   alliances;	   articulating	   cohesive,	   popular,	   radical	   positions;	   and	   forming	   organized,	  
deliberative,	  and	  tenacious	  organizations.	  Roughly	  four	  years	  separated	  the	  absence	  and	  then	  
dominance	  of	  Solidarity	  (1976-­‐1980)	  and	  FIS	  (1988-­‐1992)	  as	  they	  arose	  under	  the	  ambivalently	  
repressive	   and	   reforming	   apparatuses	   of	   authoritarian	   rule.	  Only	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s	  did	   Polish	  
activists	   overcome	   “social	   division…among	   dissidents;	   [until	   then],	   there	   was	   little	   contact	  
between	  dissidents…from	  various	  social	  classes,	  for	  instance,	  between	  the	  intelligentsia	  and	  the	  
workers	  and	  the	  peasants.”56	  Similarly,	  FIS	  thrived	  on	  “the	  ability	  of	  its	  leaders	  to	  draw	  several	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trends	  of	  thought	  and	  activism	  together	  under	  [the]	  single,	  mobilizing,	  populist	  umbrella…of	  a	  
new	   vision	  of	   Islamist	   social	   and	  political	  morality.”57	   Assuming	   the	  necessity	   of	   comparative	  
explanation,	  one	  could	  code	  these	  as	  similarities	  or	  as	  differences,	  among	  which	  the	  centrality	  
of	  religious	  activism,	  institutional	  space,	  and	  role	  of	  the	  intellectuals	  are	  but	  a	  few.	  Qualitative	  
and	  quantitative	  approaches	  optimally	  could	  complement	  each	  other	  here,	  perhaps	  teasing	  out	  
macro	  patterns	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases	  and	  then	  providing	  micro-­‐foundations	  of	  patterns	  in	  
comparative	  studies	  of	  sub-­‐set	  cases.	  Reconciling	  contrasting	  methods	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  a	  way	  
to	  insulate	  either	  from	  criteria	  of	  falsification.	  A	  statistical	  result	  showing	  that	  labor-­‐	  and	  client-­‐
citizenship	  regimes	  do	  not	  correlate	  with	  peaceful	  and	  violent	  tactical	  choices	  would	  trouble	  my	  
qualitative	  research	  findings	  and	  force	  a	  re-­‐examination	  of	  variables.	  
	   	  Having	  introduced	  the	  project’s	  analytical	  architecture,	  notably	  its	  methodological	  and	  
conceptual	  commitments,	  I	  should	  say	  that	  its	  unfolding	  reflects	  both	  its	  ambition	  and	  modesty.	  
Chapters	  three,	  four,	  and	  five	  are	  meant	  to	  work	  as	  the	  empirical	  core	  of	  the	  project	  in	  concert	  
or	  conversation	  with	   the	  analyses	  of	  dehumanization,	   subjectivity,	  violence,	  citizenship	   in	   the	  
introduction,	  and	  chapters	  one	  and	  two.	  That	  is,	  the	  empirical	  puzzle	  and	  explanatory	  model	  –	  
bolstered	  by	  conceptual	  analyses	  –	  are	  the	  center	  in	  this	  thesis.	  As	  to	  its	  ambition	  or	  success,	  I	  
hope	   the	  arguments	   are	  persuasive	  or	   at	   least	  provocative	   in	   linking	  opposition	   strategies	   to	  
citizen-­‐subjectivity	  and	  deriving	   lessons	  from	  this	  derivation	  about	  the	  dilemmas	  and	  promise	  
of	  social	  explanation.	   I	  hope	  to	  have	  clarified	  the	  puzzle	   if	   I	  have	  not	  solved	  it,	  as	   it	  can	  be	  as	  










[Placing]	  “adaptation”	  in	  the	  foreground…one	  mistakes	  the	  essence	  of	  life,	  its	  will	  
to	   power;	   overlooks	   the	   essential	   pre-­‐eminence	   of	   the	   spontaneous,	   attacking,	  
infringing,	  reinterpreting,	  reordering,	  and	  formative	  forces,	  upon	  whose	  effect	  the	  
“adaptation”	  first	  follows;	  [and]	  denies	  the	  lordly	  role	  of	  the	  highest	  functionaries	  
in	  the	  organism	  itself,	  in	  which	  the	  will	  of	  life	  appears	  active	  and	  form-­‐giving.	  




§2.a	   Producing	  violence	  
	  
This	  chapter	  supplements	  the	  puzzle	  and	  model	  of	  this	  project	  by	  analyzing	  its	  principal	  
concept	   and	  dependent	   variable:	   violence.	  After	  developing	   the	   concept(s)	   of	   violence	   (§2.b)	  
broached	   in	   the	   introduction,	   this	   chapter	  will	   address	   three	  analytical-­‐empirical	   referents	  of	  
social	   violence:	   its	   subjects,	  objects,	  and	  evaluations.	   For	   simplicity,	  violence	  will	   refer	   to	   the	  
dependent	   variable	   violence/non-­‐violence.	   Each	   concept	   advances	   our	   awareness	   of	   the	  
elements	   and	   dynamics	   of	   violence	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   puzzle.	   The	   insights	   and	   oversights	   of	   these	  
concepts	   cumulatively	   build	   the	   conceptual	   apparatus	   of	  my	   arguments.	   In	   other	  words,	  my	  
explanation	   reflects	   a	   progression	   in	  which	   each	   concept	   –	   subject,	   object,	   and	   evaluation	   –	  
resolves	   an	   analytical	   problem	   only	   to	   raise	   another	   to	   be	   resolved.	   This	   progression	   from	  
subject	   to	   object	   to	   evaluation	   is	   heuristic,	   not	   theoretic;	   it	   is	   a	   lexical	   ordering	   of	   insights	  
arranged	   in	   the	   logical	   steps	   that	   have	   informed	   my	   thinking,	   not	   a	   statement	   about	   how	  
subjects,	  objects,	  and	  evaluations	  interact	  as	  a	  rule.	  Finally,	  while	  sequentially	  doubting	  regnant	  




do	   not	   replace	   one	   another	   but	   converge,	   revised	   or	   refined,	   in	   my	   explanation	   of	  
violence/non-­‐violence.	  	  
Subjects	  of	   violence	   (§2.c)	   stresses	   that	  decisions	   to	  use	  physical	   force	  are	   contextual,	  
rational,	  and	  affective	  –	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  stressing	  immediate	  over	  historical	  conditions	  of	  subject-­‐
formation.	  Objects	  of	  violence	  (§2.d),	  too,	  expediently	  emphasizes	  present	  suffering	  as	  a	  trigger	  
to	  violence	  but	  helpfully	  parses	  biological	  and	  social	  extinction,	  a	  dichotomy	  that	  clarifies	   the	  
gap	  between	  subjective	  evaluations	  and	  objective	  conditions.	  The	  risks	  here	  are	   in	  prioritizing	  
extreme	  situations	  of	  biological	  life	  and	  organic	  theories	  of	  unreflective	  violence.	  Evaluations	  of	  
violence	  (§2.e),	  in	  contrast,	  inserts	  historical,	  experiential,	  and	  cognitive	  mediations	  of	  biological	  
and	  social,	  or	  objective	  and	  subjective,	  “dehumanization”	  processes.	  Strategic	  decisions	  about	  
perceived	  injustice	  express	  the	  cumulative	  perceptions	  of	  reflective	  subjects	  constituted	  by	  past	  
events.	  This	  view	  underwrites	  my	  view	  that	  violence	  expresses	  citizen-­‐subjectivity,	  how	  subjects	  
evaluate	  the	  actual	  or	  potential	  political	  salience	  of	  their	  social	  resources	  given	  their	  historical	  
experience.	  Here	  the	  risk	   is	   in	  privileging	   ideational	  frames	  by	  excluding	  the	  material	  bases	  of	  
actor	  assessments	  –	  in	  short,	  over-­‐correcting	  by	  moving	  from	  objective	  to	  exclusively	  subjective	  
interpretations.	   Subjects,	   objects,	   and	   evaluations	   of	   violence	   braid	   together	   the	   cruces	   of	  
systemic	  subjectivity,	  comprising	  experiential	  evaluations	  of	  material	  social	  resources.	  
These	  three	  concepts,	  then,	  present	  the	  elements	  of	  situated	  political	  agents	  prominent	  
in	   my	   case	   studies	   –	   reflective-­‐affective	   persons	   who	   evaluate	   objective	   dehumanization	   as	  
experientially	  constituted	  citizens	  whose	  systemic	  efficacy	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  enduring	  (including	  
immanent)	  public	  power	  of	  historically	  deployed	  social	  resources.	  The	  analyses	  in	  the	  following	  




or	  violence	  express	  subjects’	  historical	  appraisals	  of	  their	  extant	  social	  resources	  –	  i.e.,	  of	  their	  
status	  as	  materially	  significant,	  effective	  citizens.	  More	  forcibly	  stated,	  dissent	  expresses	  more	  
than	   ideological	   rejections	  of	  offensive	  circumstances	  or	   calculating	  assessments	  of	   “outside”	  
events	  from	  “inside”	  subjects’	  personal	  sensibility,	  private	  perception,	  or	  collective	  ethics.	  They	  
express	  the	  material,	  ideational,	  historical	  substance	  of	  subjectivity	  itself,	  in	  ways	  susceptible	  to	  
conditional	  explanation.	  Paths	  to	  peace	  or	  violence	  reflect	  not	  detached	  voices	  of	  subjects	  but	  
attached	  valences	  of	  subjectivities	  –	  not	  only	  what	  people	  want	  from	  a	  system,	  but	  who	  they	  
are	  through	  that	  system.	  As	  violence	  is	  often	  conceived	  and	  explained	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  a	  system	  
from	  without,	  not	  emergent	  from	  within,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  concept	  of	  violence	  first	  and	  then	  its	  






§2.b	   Concepts	  of	  Violence	  
	  
	   My	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  emergence	  of	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  activist	  responses	  
to	  authoritarian	  coercion.	  Some	  qualifications	  about	  this	  dependent	  variable	  might	  be	  helpful	  at	  
this	  point.	  As	  I	  mentioned	  earlier,	  this	  work	  is	  not	  focused	  on	  questions	  of	  political	  ethics	  and	  
social	  theory,	  but	  does	  closely	  consider	  certain	  philosophical	  features	  of	  empirical	  comparative	  
explanation.	  To	  assay	  analytical	  rigor	  in	  tracing	  how	  citizenship	  regimes	  shape	  the	  evaluations	  
that	  forge	  opposition	  strategies,	  I	  focus	  on	  those	  variables	  while	  recognizing	  their	  complexities.	  
This	  need	  entails	  replying	  to	  conceptual	  or	  explanatory	  objections	  from	  outside	  the	  parameters	  
of	   the	  project.	  One	   tactical	   reply	   is	   to	   create	   a	   research	  design	   that	  brackets	  difficulties	   that	  




institutional	  dynamics,	  I	  study	  cases	  of	  conventionally	  conceived	  violence	  and	  peace	  to	  bracket	  
endless	  disputes	  about	  violence	  per	  se.	  Still,	  it	  is	  apposite	  to	  address	  concepts	  of	  violence/non-­‐
violence	  that	  complement	  and	  inform	  my	  explanatory	  model.	  Remarks	  in	  this	  section	  are	  meant	  
to	  bridge	  my	  review	  of	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  (§I)	  and	  the	  elaboration	  of	  its	  salience	  in	  my	  
project	  in	  this	  chapter	  (§2.c,	  §2.d,	  §2.e)	  by	  sharpening	  the	  concepts	  in	  the	  puzzle	  and	  theory.	  
	   Violence	  is	  a	  tenuous	  concept	  and	  outcome	  because	  its	  very	  presence	  and	  absence	  are	  
contested	   conceptually;	   violence	  presents	  measurement	  and	  existential	   problems.	   Relative	   to	  
war,	   inflation,	  migration,	  or	  climate	  change,	  violence	  creates	  especially	   intractable	  conceptual	  
tensions	  due	  to	  its	  ontological	  status.	  All	  concepts	  are	  problematic,	  so	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  press	  its	  
distinct	  features	  beyond	  proposing	  that	  violence	  is	  one	  of	  those	  unusual	  concepts	  that	  cannot	  
even	  heuristically	  hold	   in	  abeyance	   its	  ontological	   status	  because	   it	   is	  defined	   in	  and	  through	  
that	  status.	  Before	  we	  can	  value	  or	  measure	  violence,	  we	  must	  posit	  a	  tendentious	  analytical	  
concept	  of	  it.	  There	  is	  a	  related,	  perhaps	  unique,	  paradox	  –	  the	  concept	  of	  violence	  necessarily	  
contains	  a	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  relationship	  that	  conflates	  cause	  and	  effect	   in	  describing	  violence	  
but	  must	  separate	  cause	  and	  effect	  in	  explaining	  it.	  The	  descriptive	  conflation	  and	  explanatory	  
separation	  of	  violence	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  violence.	  Because	  
my	  project	  explores	  phenomena	  coded	  violent/non-­‐violent,	  it	  engage	  this	  paradox,	  which	  bears	  
on	  critiques	  of	  conventional	  definitions	  and	  explanations	  of	  violence,	  power,	  and	  subjectivity.	  	  	  
	   Consider	  the	  conventional	  concept	  of	  violence:	  intended	  physical	  harm	  due	  to	  a	  clash	  of	  
discrete	  entities.	  If	  we	  define	  violence	  as	  “X	  injures	  Y,”2	  we	  posit	  a	  cause-­‐effect	  relationship	  as	  
our	  concept	  of	  violence;	  X	  causes	  injury	  to	  Y.	  The	  embedded	  causal	  claim	  may	  seem	  confusing	  




(“X	   injures	  Y”	  happened),	  or	  a	   theory	   (in	  general	   “X	   injures	  Y”).	  With	  no	  general	   causal	   claim	  
relating	  X	  and	  Y,	  we	  may	  assume	  “X	  injures	  Y”	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  does	  not	  smuggle	  in	  a	  theory.	  As	  
the	  most	   straightforward,	   intuitive	  definition	  of	  violence,	   “X	   injures	  Y”	  offers	  a	  good	  baseline	  
for	   grasping	   the	   concept.	  Without	   getting	   too	   bogged	   down	  we	  may	   begin	   by	   assigning	   the	  
location	  and	  mechanism	  of	  the	  violence	  in	  “X	  injures	  Y.”	  It	  seems	  obvious	  that	  the	  action	  that	  
resulted	  in	   injury	   is	  the	  violence,	  rather	  than	  the	  injury.	  We	  would	  certainly	  not	  conceptualize	  
violence	  as	  any	  injury	  to	  Y,	  but	  rather	  as	  one	  resulting	  from	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  action.	  That	  would	  
imply	  at	  least	  a	  priority	  placed	  on	  the	  action	  itself,	  indifferent	  to	  the	  injury,	  viz.	  any	  action	  “that	  
would	  inflict	  physical	  pain	  or	  injury	  on	  others,	  if	  they	  happen	  to	  be	  in	  the	  path	  of	  the	  action	  in	  
question.”3	  This	  caveat	   registers	  unless	  we	  wish	   to	  exclude	   from	  violence	  coercive	   threats4	  or	  
potentially	  harmful	  actions	  that	  cause	  no	  physical	  injury.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  trivial	  ethical	  exercise	  in	  
weighing	  intended	  versus	  actual	  consequences	  –	  “was	  it	  violent	  when	  the	  bomb	  I	  angrily	  threw	  
at	  my	  parents’	  farm	  landed	  harmlessly	  in	  a	  field?”	  –	  but	  a	  consequential	  analytical	  matter.	  Alain	  
Badiou’s	  denial	  that	  worker	  strikes	  in	  Poland	  were	  non-­‐violent,	  as	  they	  were	  coercive	  or	  could	  
have	  harmed	  bystanders,5	  would	  force	  me	  to	  recalibrate	  my	  concept	  of	  violence.	  In	  short,	  it	  is	  
plausible	  to	  conceive	  violence	  as	  a	  form	  of	  minatory	  action	  independent	  of	  its	  injurious	  results,	  
and	  it	  is	  because	  “violence”	  is	  so	  elastic	  and	  polysemous	  a	  term	  that	  I	  will	  retain	  its	  component	  
of	  injury	  in	  order	  to	  delineate	  heuristically	  the	  outcomes	  to	  be	  explained.	  	  	  	  	  
	   The	  problem	  arises	  when	  we	  equate	  violence	  with	  bloodshed	  or	  invoke	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  
graveyard.	  Totalitarian	  confinement	  may	  appear	  to	  meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  peace	  implied	  in	  the	  “X	  
injures	  Y”	  concept	  of	  violence,	  for	  any	  period	  of	  time	  in	  which	  no	  one	  is	  overtly	  being	  injured.	  




violence	  just	  because	  it	  has	  established	  routine	  behaviors	  among	  the	  prisoners.	  Or,	  returning	  to	  
my	  cases,	  it	  seems	  wrong	  to	  decide	  that	  martial	   law	  was	  less	  violent	  in	  Poland	  than	  in	  Algeria	  
just	  because	  fewer	  physical	  injuries	  resulted,	  in	  part	  since	  the	  resistance	  remained	  non-­‐violent.	  
By	  the	  same	  token,	  however,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  odd	  not	  to	  distinguish	  the	  violence	  between	  two	  
internment	   camps	   if	   only	   one	   tortured	   its	   inmates.	   Along	   lines	   of	   devil’s	   advocacy,	   why	   not	  
intuit	  that	  martial	  law	  in	  Poland	  was	  less	  violent	  if	  it	  produced	  fewer	  physical	  injuries?	  My	  reply	  
would	  be	  that	  martial	  law	  was	  equally	  violent	  physically	  or	  objectively	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  but	  
not	  cognitively	  or	  subjectively.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  victims	  experienced	  martial	  law	  as	  distinctly	  
endowed	  institutional	  citizen-­‐subjects	  for	  whom	  the	  interpretive	  impact	  of	  equal	  state	  coercion	  
diverged.	  But	  this	  specific	  reply	  raises	  a	  second	  difficulty	  with	  the	  standard	  concept	  of	  violence,	  
“X	  injures	  Y.”	  The	  first	  was	  that	  physical	  injury	  is	  not,	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  a	  required	  element	  of	  
a	   strong	   concept	   of	   violence,	   although	   certain	  actions	   are.	   But	   now	   it	   seems	   that	   instead	   of	  
actions,	   it	   is	  evaluations	  of	  actions	  that	  determine	  their	  violence.	  It	  seems	  that	  under	  scrutiny	  
the	  conceptual	  site	  of	  violence	  moves	  from	  injury	  to	  action	  to	  interpretation.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  
mean	  that	  the	  revised	  concept	  of	  violence	  becomes	  more	  subjective	  and	  less	  objective,	  or	  more	  
ethnographic	  and	  less	  structural;	  it	  implies	  that	  those	  binaries	  may	  be	  confusing	  distractions.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Taken	  together,	  these	  difficulties	  with	  the	  “X	  injures	  Y”	  formulation	  raise	  the	  ontological	  
paradox	  I	  referred	  to	  above,	  one	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  project:	  that	  injury	  is	  not	  a	  component	  of	  an	  
effective	  general	  concept	  of	  violence.	  Narrowly	  put,	  the	  ontological	  paradox	  in	  conceptualizing	  
violence	  is	  that	   it	  cannot	  be	  defined	  in	   itself,	  but	  only	  through	  other	  concepts	  surrounding	  its	  
intuitive	  elements.	  Situated	  evaluation,	   rather	   than	  physical	  harm	  nor	  scary	  behavior,	  defines	  




whose	  telos	  is	  pacification.	  More	  broadly	  put,	  this	  paradox	  –	  that	  the	  more	  rigorously	  violence	  
is	  conceptualized	  the	  less	  it	  can	  itself	  be	  identified	  –	  resonates	  with	  criticisms	  developed	  within	  
counter-­‐Enlightenment	  skepticism	  of	  the	  increasing	  tendency	  of	  modern	  institutions	  to	  produce	  
subjects,	  overriding	  dualistic	  assessments	  of	  power,	  agency,	  consciousness,	  and	  violence.	  Those	  
views	  oppose	   the	  concept	  of	  violence	   I	  adopt	   in	   thinking	   through	   the	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  
ramifications	  of	  martial	  law	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  so	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  start	  with	  that	  concept.	  	   	  
	   This	  conventional	  or	  even	  orthodox	  concept	  is	  roughly	  that	  offered	  by	  Charles	  Tilly:	  
	  
Collective	   violence…refers	   to	   episodic	   social	   interaction	   that	   (a)	   immediately	   inflicts	   physical	  
damage	   on	   persons	   and/or	   objects	   (‘damage’	   includes	   forcible	   seizure	   over	   restraint	   or	  
resistance)	  and	   (b)	   results	  at	   least	   in	  part	   from	  coordination	  among	  persons	  who	  perform	  the	  
damaging	  acts.	  At	  one	  edge	  such	  a	  definition	  excludes	  specifically	  individual,	  private,	  impulsive,	  
and/or	  accidental	  damage	  to	  persons	  or	  objects.	  At	  the	  other	  it	  excludes	  long-­‐term,	  incremental	  
damage	   such	   as	   communication	   of	   infectious	   disease,	   cumulative	  wear	   and	   tear,	   exposure	   to	  
toxic	  substances,	  and	  death	  hastened	  by	  neglect	  or	  social	  pressure.7	  
	  
With	  some	  adjustment8,	  this	  is	  a	  strong	  conventional	  definition	  since	  it	  invokes	  the	  intuitive	  and	  
traditional	   notion	   of	   sovereign	   power	   –	   the	   exertion	   of	   physical	   force	   by	   one	   self-­‐identical	  
individual	  or	  collective	  agent	  against	  another.	  In	  essence,	  Tilly	  uses	  the	  “X	  injures	  or	  damages	  Y”	  
definition	  that,	  I	  think,	  cannot	  be	  a	  general	  concept	  of	  violence	  but	  suits	  research	  projects	  like	  
mine.	  This	  qualification	  yields	  my	  first	  apologia	  for	  adopting	  a	  conventional	  concept	  of	  violence;	  
under	  dictatorial	  Weberian	  statism,	  coercive	  power	  was	  the	  relatively	  abundant	  mode	  of	  force	  
projection	  in	  response	  to	  widespread	  and	  sustained	  social	  agitation.	  But	  these	  regimes	  differed	  
in	   designing	   parallel	  modes	   of	   contact	   with	   citizens;	   they	   structured	   subjects’	   evaluations	   of	  
state	  violence	  on	  distinct	  social	  and	  institutional	  foundations.	  This	  variation	  implies	  that	  social	  
explanation	  shapes	  our	  concept	  of	  violence	  by	  clarifying	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  violence	  depends	  




clashes)	  will	  underdetermine	  subjective	  evaluations	  of	  violence	  if	  complementary	  institutions	  of	  
effective	  citizenship	  provide	  multiple	  expectations.	  Identical	  state	  coercion	  may	  vary	  receptions	  
of	  violence	  given	  distinct	  support	  systems,	  exit	  options,	  durations	  of	  physical	  force,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Tilly’s	  concept	  of	  collective	  violence	  also	  helps	  me	  distinguish	  the	  effects	  of	  martial	  law	  
in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  while	  providing	   lucid	  terms	  for	   further	  clarifications.	  The	  designation	  of	  
Polish	  dissent	  as	  “non-­‐violent”	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	  whether	  activist	  workers	  damaged	  persons	  
and	  property	  or	  social	  welfare.	  In	  1956	  and	  1970	  but	  not	  1980	  Polish	  protests	  made	  “episodic	  
social	   interaction[s]	   that	   immediately	   inflict[ed]	  physical	  damage	  on	  persons	  and/or	  objects,”	  
principally	  attacks	  on	  state	  offices.	  By	  this	  subtler	  instrument,	  Poles	  appear	  decreasingly	  violent	  
over	  time,	  because	  they	  gradually	  ceased	  causing	  damage	  and	  risking	  injury.	  By	  a	  more	  abstract	  
definition	  of	  violence	  as,	  e.g.,	  actions	  that	  threaten	  public	  wellbeing	  by	  hindering	  production	  or	  
incurring	  state	  coercion,	  Polish	  protesters	  could	  be	  considered	  consistently	  violent.	  Conversely,	  
if	   we	   conceive	   violence	   as	   deliberate	   injury	   to	   persons,	   then	   Poles	   were	   consistently	   non-­‐
violent,	   as	   agitators	   did	   not	   directly	   target	   individuals	   in	   1956,	   1970,	   or	   1980.	   Adopting	   the	  
conventional	  concept	  of	  violence,	  intentional	  property	  damage	  or	  personal	  injury,	  I	  can	  narrow	  
the	  outcome	  while	  also	  accessing	  compelling	  transformations	  on	  the	  path	  to	  the	  “self-­‐limiting”	  
Solidarity	  campaign	  of	  1980-­‐.	  Since	  it	  is	  key	  to	  my	  argument	  that	  iterated	  deployments	  of	  social	  
resources	  establish	  effective	  citizenship	  regimes,	  so	  is	  the	  gradual	  desire	  and	  capacity	  to	  refuse	  
to	  damage	  or	  injure.	  Over	  a	  generation	  of	  lived	  experience	  using	  the	  social	  resources	  of	  worker-­‐
citizenship,	   Polish	   dissidents	   grew	   increasingly	   habituated	   to	   their	   efficacy	   in	   pressing	   the	  
regime	  for	  policy	  and	  personnel	  changes.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  increased	  their	  non-­‐violence	  even	  as	  




law	   suffered	   less	   overall,	   and	   surely	   less	   cyclical,	   state-­‐citizen	   violence	   than	   Poland	   because	  
client-­‐citizenship	   in	   vertically	   integrated	   distributive	   networks	   has	   lower	   startup	   costs	   and	  
acculturation	  periods	  than	  worker-­‐citizenship	  in	  horizontally	  integrated	  productive	  networks.	  	  	  
	   A	  concept	  of	  violence	  stressing	  injury	  or	  damage	  could,	  analogically,	  obscure	  distinctions	  
indispensable	   to	   the	   study	   of	   social	   agitation,	   such	   as	   the	   differences	   between	   violence	   and	  
militancy	  and	  between	  pacifism	  and	  non-­‐violence.9	  Unlike	  violence	  and	  pacifism,	  militancy	  and	  
non-­‐violence	  refer	  to	  deliberate,	  disciplined	  strategies	  that	  articulate	  the	  means	  and	  ends	  of	  a	  
declared	   political	   project.	   It	   is	  more	   an	   addendum	   than	   a	   corrective	   to	   Tilly’s	   definition,	   but	  
militant	   or	   violent	   agents	   can	   injure	   state	   agents	   or	   damage	   their	   holdings	   identically	   but	   as	  
distinct	   subjects	   in	   disparate	   political	   campaigns.10	   Scholars	   and	   activists	   such	   as	  Gandhi	   and	  
Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  connote	  the	  terms	  militancy	  and	  non-­‐violence	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  general	  
terms	  violence	  and	  peace	  to	  suggest	  the	  conscious	  disruption	  of	  reigning	  political	  arrangements	  
(militancy)	  and	  the	  sustained,	  sacrificial	  commitment	  to	  a	  disruptive	  social	  cause	  that	  eschews	  
physical	   or	  material	   destruction	   (non-­‐violence).	   In	   this	   lexicon,	   Solidarity	  was	  non-­‐violent	  and	  
militant	  and	  not	  merely	  peaceful;	  pre-­‐197011	  Polish	  activists,	  disorganized	  and	  impulsive,	  were	  
peaceful	  and	  non-­‐militant	  even	  though	  they	  attacked	  buildings	  and	  damage	  occurred.	  Likewise,	  
within	  Algeria,	  we	  might	  distinguish	  between	  the	  militant,	  peaceful	  FIS	  and	  the	  violent	  but	  non-­‐
militant	  GIA.	  The	  specific	  designations	  are	  not	  of	  concern	  except	  in	  illustrating	  how	  sub-­‐dividing	  
intuitive	  notions	  or	  conventional	  concepts	  of	  violence	  and	  peace	  helps	  differentiate	  categories	  
of	  action	  relative	  to	  “physical	  injury	  or	  damage.”	  Careful	  disaggregation	  of	  necessarily	  heuristic	  




	   Finally,	  violence	  thought	  of	  as	  “episodic	  social	   interaction”	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  absence	  
of	  quotidian,	  pervasive,	  or	  continual	  structural	  or	  disciplinary	  violence.	  Restricted	  to	  punctuated	  
disruptions,	   this	  concept	  of	  violence	  could	  reiterate	  the	  counter-­‐intuitive	   idea	  that	  violence	   is	  
unusual	  or	  unnatural,	  while	  peace	  is	  natural,	  or	  a	  naturally	  desired	  condition	  –	  as	  in	  Rousseau’s	  
remark	   that	   “it	   is	   less	   the	   force	   of	   arms	   than	   the	   moderation	   of	   hearts	   that	   renders	   men	  
independent	  and	  free.”12	  But	  Tilly’s	  concept	  specifying	  “collective	  action”	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  
to	  mean	  that	  violence	  alone	  merits	  explanation;	  non-­‐violent	  social	  movements	  are	  as	  significant	  
and	  curious	  as	  violent	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  perceived	  injustice.	  This	  aside	  is	  to	  affirm	  that	  “too	  
often	   the	  non-­‐violence	  of	   social	  movements	   is	   treated	  as	  simply	   rational,	  or	  an	  expression	  of	  
some	  popular	  will,	  rather	  than	  a	  reasoned	  and	  reflexive	  recognition	  of	  a	  movement’s	  relation	  to	  
power.”13	  With	  these	  caveats	  in	  mind,	  the	  conventional	  idea	  of	  violence	  not	  only	  applies	  to	  but	  
also	  illuminates	  my	  cases.	  	  	  
	   A	  second,	  related	  reason	  for	  applying	  this	  definition	  to	  my	  project	  is	  that	  the	  Polish	  and	  
Algerian	  oppositions	  demonstrate	  that	  coercive	  or	  invasive	  states	  can	  fail	  to	  “subjectivize”	  their	  
populations	  into	  seamlessly	  identifying	  with	  overarching	  state	  ideologies	  and	  discourses.	  This	  in	  
itself	  means	  that	  comparing	  authoritarian	  citizenship	  regimes,	  however	  antiquarian	  they	  seem	  
in	  our	  rear-­‐view	  mirrors,	  may	  inform	  our	  models	  of	  modernity,	  violence,	  and	  social	  action	  more	  
broadly.	   Societies	   have	   long	   defined	   themselves	   as	   overcoming	   physical	   violence	   or,	   more	  
precisely,	  expelling	  conflict	  by	  establishing	  consensual	  values	  and	  institutions	  over	  a	  delimited	  
population.	  In	  our	  refined	  or	  complicated	  concept	  of	  violence,	  where	  “Y	  feels	  injured	  by	  X,”	  we	  
expect	   any	   social	   system	  “Y”	   to	  experience	  as	   injurious	   all	   activities	  outside	  but	   infringing	   its	  




not	  only	  explicitly	  anti-­‐systemic	  but	  also	  non-­‐systemic	  actions	  that	  may	  threaten	  shared	  norms.	  
Social	  systems	  therefore	  tend	  toward	  expansive,	  quasi-­‐paranoid	  regulations,	  perceiving	  injuries	  
or	  threats	  as	  residues	  of	  violence	  conduced	  by	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  system	  to	  expel.	  Social	  systems	  
correct	  this	  failure	  by	  further	  expanding	  and	  enforcing	  norms.	  Believing	  that	  this	  logic	  inheres	  in	  
society	  or	  “civilization”14,	  many	  critics	  and	  agitators	  view	  social	  systems	  as	  endemically	  violent	  
because	  they	  perpetually	  expel	  resistance.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  peace	  is	  the	  surface	  effect	  of	  the	  
social	  system’s	  resistance	  to	  resistance,	  its	  “lesser”15	  violence	  against	  violence.16	  
	   One	  implication	  of	  this	  logic	  is	  that	  violence	  is	  inevitable	  in	  any	  social	  system	  inhabited	  
by	  willful	  citizen-­‐subjects	  who	  by	  definition	  are	  under-­‐determined	  by	  their	  social	  system.	  There	  
is,	  in	  this	  sense,	  an	  ineluctable	  contradiction	  between	  society	  and	  subjectivity,	  a	  view	  identified	  
with	  anarchism	  but	  arguably	  immanent	  in	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  political	  theories.	  In	  a	  discussion	  of	  
the	   concept	   of	   violence	   in	   social	   explanation	   the	   society-­‐subjectivity	   tension	   redounds	   to	   an	  
ordinary-­‐language	   distinction	   between	   “being”	   and	   “acting”	   violent.	   A	   person	  who	   is	   violent	  
differs	  from	  one	  who	  acts	  violent	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  a	  social	  system	  or	  political	  regime	  
either	  is	  or	  acts	  violent.	  An	  agent	  who	  acts	  violent	  is,	  strictu	  sensu,	  the	  opposite	  of	  an	  agent	  who	  
is	  violent.	  In	  order	  to	  act	  violent,	  I	  cannot	  be	  violent,	  just	  as	  I	  cannot	  act	  happy	  and	  be	  happy	  at	  
once.	   This	  matters	   because	   acting,	   not	   being,	   grounds	   reliable	   social	   explanation,	   yielding	   a	  
paradox:	   in	  order	  to	  be	  explained	  political	  “actors”	  must	  be	  able	  to	  make	  decisions	  instead	  of	  
only	   adhering	   to	   “systems.”17	   An	   account	   of	   systemically	   adherent	   behavior	   describes	   rather	  
than	  explains,	  collapsing	  cause	  and	  effect.	  In	  studying	  violence,	  this	  entails	  a	  caesura	  between	  
system	  and	  subject,	  between	  social	  regulation	  and	  citizen	  response.	  To	  explain	  violence	  seems	  




encounter	  an	  analytical	  challenge	  in	  reconciling	  two	  claims.	  Social	  systems	  generate	  resistance	  
only	   if	   citizens	   are	   willful	   subjects;	   but	   as	   willful	   subjects	   their	   resistance	   cannot	   be	   directly	  
derived	  from	  or	  causally	  conflated	  with	  their	  social	  system.19	  
	   There	  are	  two	  paradigmatic	  replies	  to	  the	  paradox	  of	  system	  and	  subject,	  the	  liberal	  and	  
anti-­‐liberal	  frameworks.	  In	  general,	  liberal	  theory	  sees	  agents	  as	  acting,	  anti-­‐liberal	  theory	  sees	  
them	  as	  being.	  So	  as	  not	  to	  stray	  too	  far	  from	  the	  matter	  of	  empirical	  violence,	  I	  will	  pursue	  this	  
distinction	  briefly.	  Liberal	  theory	  presupposes,	  at	  some	  level,	  an	  under-­‐determined	  subjectivity	  
conceived	  as	  an	  autonomous	  will,	  desire,	  or	  idea	  that	  cannot	  be	  eradicated	  short	  of	  biological	  
death.	  In	  this	  view,	  one’s	  actions	  reflect	  decisions	  in	  finite	  or	  constraining	  environments	  that	  do	  
not	   explain	   those	   decisions.	   The	   impediment	   for	   social	   explanation	   in	   a	   liberal	   position	   on	  
subjectivity	   is	  contingency,	   the	  problem	  of	   indeterminacy.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   skeptics	   I	   adduced	  
earlier	  hold	  that	  modern	  social	  systems	  are	  historically	  distinctive	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  structure	  
our	  subjectivity,	  to	  produce	  or	  “subjectivize”	  people	  through	  various	  internalized	  languages	  and	  
identities	  without	  which	  they	  would	  be	  devoid	  of	  meaning	  or	  drive.	  Indeed,	  for	  these	  skeptics,	  
liberalism	  itself	  is	  the	  best	  example	  of	  this	  process,	  as	  it	  instills	  a	  naturalized	  belief	  about	  human	  
agency	  as	  self-­‐determined	  and	  self-­‐willed	  choice,	  perfectly	  delighting	  the	  bourgeois	  master.	  The	  
skeptics	  believe	  modernity	  replaces	  sovereign	  violence	  with	  subjective	  normalization,	  a	  subject-­‐
making-­‐system	   that	   has	   gone	   by	   many	   names:	   the	   civilizing	   process;	   ideological	   hegemony;	  
biopolitical	   governmentality;	   symbolic	   order;	   society	   of	   control;	   disciplinary	   docility;	   or	   social	  
performativity.	  In	  a	  passage	  worth	  quoting	  in	  full,	  Norbert	  Elias	  provided	  an	  adequate	  summary	  





whole	   reorganization	   of	   human	   relationships	   [that]	   went	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   corresponding	  
changes	   in	  men’s	  manners,	   in	  their	  personality	  structure,	  the	  provisional	  result	  of	  which	   is	  our	  
form	  of	   “civilized”	   conduct	   and	   sentiment.	   The	   connection	   between	   these	   specific	   changes	   in	  
the	  structure	  of	  human	  relations	  and	  the	  corresponding	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  personality…	  
in	  [the]	  human	  mentality,	  in	  the	  patterning	  of	  the	  malleable	  psychological	  apparatus,	  which	  can	  
be	  observed	  over	  and	  again	   in	  human	  history	   from	  the	  earliest	   times	  to	  the	  present…As	  more	  
and	   more	   people	   must	   attune	   their	   conduct	   to	   that	   of	   others,	   the	   web	   of	   actions	   must	   be	  
organized	  more	  and	  more	   strictly	  and	  accurately,	   if	  each	   individual	  action	   is	   to	   fulfill	   its	   social	  
function.	   The	   individual	   is	   compelled	   to	   regulate	  his	   conduct	   in	   an	   increasingly	   differentiated,	  
more	  even,	  and	  more	  stable	  manner.	  That	  this	  involves	  not	  only	  a	  conscious	  regulation	  has	  been	  
established.	  Precisely	  this	  [characterizes]	  the	  psychological	  changes	  in	  the	  course	  of	  civilization:	  
the	  more	  complex	  and	  stable	  control	  of	  conduct	  is	  increasingly	  instilled	  in	  the	  individual	  from	  his	  
earliest	  years	  as	  an	  automatism,	  a	  self-­‐compulsion	  that	  that	  he	  cannot	  resist	  even	  if	  consciously	  
wishes	   to.	  The	  web	  of	  actions	  grows	  so	  complex	  and	  extensive,	   the	  effort	   required	   to	  behave	  
“correctly	  within	   it	   becomes	   so	   great,	   that	   besides	   the	   individual’s	   conscious	   self-­‐control	   and	  
automatic,	  blindly	  functioning	  apparatus	  of	  self-­‐control	  is	  firmly	  established…When	  a	  monopoly	  
of	   force	   is	   formed,	   pacified	   social	   spaces	   are	   created	   which	   are	   normally	   free	   from	   acts	   of	  
violence.	  The	  pressures	  acting	  on	  individual	  people	  within	  them	  are	  of	  a	  different	  kind	  [from	  the	  
pressures]	  previously.	  Forms	  of	  non-­‐physical	  violence	  that	  always	  existed,	  but	  hitherto	  had	  been	  
mingled	  or	  fused	  with	  physical	  force,	  are	  now	  separated	  from	  the	  latter;	  they	  persist	  in	  changed	  
form	  internally	  within	  the	  more	  pacified	  societies.20	  
	  
The	  impediment	  for	  social	  explanation	  in	  a	  post-­‐dualistic	  concept	  of	  subjectivity	  is	  particularity,	  
the	  problem	  of	  non-­‐generalizability.	  These	  systems	  of	  subjectivization	  radically	  differ.	  
	   These	   debates	   help	   frame	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   authoritarian	   “high	  modernist”21	   state-­‐	  
formations,	  whose	  reliance	  on	  sovereign	  power	  seems	  to	  reflect	  an	  inability	  to	  subjectivize	  their	  
citizens.	  An	  incisive	  application	  of	  the	  system/subject	  tension	  to	  effective	  political	  institutions	  is	  
in	  the	  work	  of	  Michel	  Foucault,	  a	  theorist	  affected	  by	  the	  Islamist	  and	  Polish	  uprisings,	  whose	  
account	   of	   sovereign	   power	   coincides	  with	  Michael	  Mann’s	   of	   despotic	   power.	   Sovereign	   or	  
despotic	  power	  denotes	   the	  use	  of	  physical	   force	   to	  secure	   the	  stability	  of	  king	  and	  kingdom	  
alike	  against	  the	  minatory	  whims	  of	  rogues	  such	  as	  regicides	  and	  pirates.	  Sovereign	  or	  despotic	  
power	  entails	  corrective	  and	  preservative	  physical	  force,	  violence	  that	  erupts	  briefly	  to	  defend	  
social	  power	  or	  reclaim	  political	  order	  by	  eradicating	  enemies	  and	  punishing	  infractions.	  There	  




which	   a	   subject	   (prince,	   state,	   general,	   officer,	   parent)	   exercises	   coercive	   force	   over	   persons	  
(peasant,	  citizen,	  enemy,	  criminal,	  child),	  rendering	  them	  objects	  of	  violence.	  An	  affiliation	  also	  
appears	   between	   sovereign	   power	   and	   liberal	   commitments	   that	   emerged	   to	   oppose	   it	   –	   a	  
shared	   or	   reciprocal	   prioritization	   of	   unfettered	   social	   agency.	   That	   aside,	   for	   Foucault	  
sovereign	  violence	  negates,	  represses,	  punishes;	  for	  these	  reasons	  Mann	  sees	  despotic	  power	  
as	  limited,	  reactive,	  and	  ineffective	  in	  securing	  state	  power.22	  	  
	   Foucault	  studies	  decentralized	  discourses	  and	  Mann	  centralized	  state	  apparatuses,	  but	  
they	   concur	   that	   power	   gradually	   stabilizes	   via	   interventionist,	   productive23,	   non-­‐sovereign	  
means.	   Foucault	   calls	   these	  means	  disciplinary	   power,	   roughly	  Mann’s	   infrastructural	   power.	  
These	   phrases	   name	   processes	   that	   produce	   social	   subjectivities	   through	   interactions	   in	  
previously	  antinomian	  sites	  of	  sovereign	  power,	  such	  as	  manager	  and	  worker	  or	  state	  and	  civil	  
society.	  The	  invention	  of	  psychoanalysis,	  a	  system	  of	  self-­‐examination	  and	  sexual	  normalization	  
thus	   invents	  a	  discourse	  of	   therapy	   that	  produces	  and	  disciplines	   the	   figures	  of	   therapist	   and	  
patient	  in	  renovated	  sites	  of	  the	  religious	  confessional.	  In	  sovereign	  or	  despotic	  power,	  the	  king	  
or	   priest	   would	   issue	   orders	   or	   extend	   “pastoral	   care”	   in	   a	   hierarchic,	   top-­‐down	   fashion;	   in	  
disciplinary	  power	  the	  rules,	  terms,	  codes,	  and	  symbols	  to	  which	  the	  subjects	  must	  respond	  are	  
those	   that	   they	   participate	   in	   generating.24	   Likewise,	   Mann	   says	   that	   the	   state-­‐society	  
interactions	   form	  a	  dialectical	  process	   in	  which	   ruling	  elites	  and	  non-­‐state	  agents	  unwittingly	  
exchange	  knowledge	  and	  resources,	  eventually	  coming	  to	  join	  rather	  than	  oppose	  each	  other	  in	  
a	  cooperative	  civil-­‐societal	   infrastructure.	  Foucault	  and	  Mann	  insist	  that	  sovereign	  or	  despotic	  
power	  may	  enforce	  disciplinary	  or	   infrastructural	  power	   through	   coercion25,	   but	   this	   furthers	  




and	  Mann’s	  dialectical	   state-­‐society	   coordination	  overwhelm	  sovereign-­‐despotic	   state/society	  
antinomies.	   Ron	   thus	  warns	   against	  Whiggish	   celebrations	   of	   the	   ascendance	   of	   disciplinary/	  
infrastructural	  power	  over	  the	  antithetical	  identities	  and	  practices	  in	  which	  civil	  societies	  might	  
oppose	  states,	  in	  both	  modern	  political	  thought	  and	  revolt:	  “despotism	  is	  explicit,	  dramatic,	  and	  
awful	  but	   is	  often	   irregular	  and	  fleeting.	   Infrastructural	  power	   is	   less	  blatant,	  by	  contrast,	  but	  
often	  penetrates	  social	  life	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent.”27	  
	   This	  divagation	  into	  theories	  of	  power	  highlights	  a	  striking	  and	  counterintuitive	  aspect	  of	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  state	  formations.	  Although	  they	  consolidated	  centralized	  state	  institutions	  
in	  education,	  media,	  intelligence,	  security,	  a	  political	  party,	  routinized	  citizenship	  practices,	  and	  
social	  welfare	  provision,	  neither	  state	  supplemented	  the	  sovereign	  or	  despotic	  power	  it	  used	  to	  
dominate	  citizens	  with	  disciplinary	  or	  infrastructural	  capacity	  to	  persuade,	  influence,	  or	  “know”	  
them.	  Despite	  state	  propaganda	  and	  incorporation	  of	  citizens	  in	  muscular	  party	  organizations,	  
Polish	   and	   Algerian	   ruling	   elites	   failed	   to	   define	   or	   constitute	   citizens	   as	   compliant	   secular	  
socialist	   subjects.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  elites	  and	  officials	   failed	   to	  discipline	  docile	  bodies	  and	  
inculcate	  ideological	  minds.	  This	  confirms	  the	  common	  impression	  that	  authoritarian	  states	  are	  
inept	  at	  penetrating	  society	  –	  either	  to	  determine	  or	  ascertain	  citizens’	  subjective	  experiences.	  
But	   this	   state-­‐citizen	   or	   system-­‐subject	   fissure	   also	   suggests	   that	   while	   the	   regimes	   did	   not	  
determine	   citizens’	   perceptions,	   interpretations,	   or	   desires	   –	   as	   objects	   or	   subjects	   –	   their	  
efforts	  to	  do	  so	  through	  carefully	  designed	  citizenship	  structures	  nonetheless	  generated	  distinct	  
subjectivities	  among	  Poles	  and	  Algerians.	   Furthermore,	   the	  combined	  effects	  of	  authoritarian	  
state-­‐citizen	  proximity	  (surveillance	  and	  coercion)	  and	  citizen-­‐subjective	  distance	  (practical	  and	  




	   Neither	  Polish	  nor	  Algerian	   rulers	   formed	  co-­‐constitutive	   identities	  or	  allegiances	  with	  
citizens,	   but	   they	   failed	   differently,	   attaching	   citizens’	   systemic	   subjectivity	   to	   distinct	   state-­‐
provided	  social	  resources.	  Authoritarian	  state	  structures	  differed,	  at	  least	  in	  these	  cases,	  not	  in	  
inculcating	   internalized	   senses	   of	   loyalty	   to	   states,	   but	   in	   affixing	   an	   iterated	   experience	   of	  
subjectivity	  within	  the	  state	  system.	  The	  disciplinary,	  infrastructural,	  pedagogical,	  or	  ideological	  
apparatus	  that	  Foucault,	  Mann,	  Scott,	  and	  others	  describe	  were	  evidently	  absent	  or	  ineffective	  
in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  where	  citizen	  and	  state	  did	  not	   form	  together	  a	  disciplinary	  subject	  or	  
dialectical	   state-­‐in-­‐civil-­‐society.	   Disciplinary	   and	   dialectical	   state-­‐citizen	   mechanisms	   seemed	  
though,	   present	   in	   grounding	   citizen-­‐subjectivity	   in	   state	   institutions	   with	   or	   without	   state-­‐
citizen	   identification	   or	   legitimacy.	   Political	   orders	   and	   citizen-­‐subjects	   created	   a	   disjunctive	  
regime	  whose	  disciplinary	  apparatus	  constituted	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  via	  social	  resources	  bereft	  
of	  loyalty,	  identity,	  or	  reciprocity.28	  Ultimately,	  the	  practical	  construction	  and	  normative	  rule	  of	  
these	  regimes	  has	  an	  ambiguous	  relationship	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  violence	  and	  power	  discussed	  
so	  far.	  Leading	  up	  to	  the	  mass	  protests	  and	  uprisings,	  the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  regimes	  deployed	  
a	  sovereign	  and	  disciplinary	  power	  that	  neither	  dominated	  nor	  defined	  their	  populations	  with	  
lasting	  effect,	  and	  yet	  seems	  to	  have	  structured	  them	  as	  citizens	  and	  subjects.	  	  
	   This	  authoritarian	  tendency	  –	  in	  which	  sovereign	  power	  and	  citizenship	  regime	  seem	  to	  
outstrip	  state	  disciplinary	  or	  infrastructural	  power	  –	  returns	  us	  to	  concepts	  and	  explanations	  of	  
violence.	   In	   these	  bureaucratic	  police	   states,	  effective	   sovereignty	  and	   ineffective	  disciplinary	  
power	  operated	  without	  their	  intended	  or	  theorized	  effects,	  integrating	  citizens	  through	  state-­‐
provided	   social	   resources	   adequately	   to	   shape	   their	   dissident	   subjectivity	   but	   not	   to	   secure	  




would	  take,	  not	  whether	  it	  would	  take	  form.	  This	  political	  paradox,	  the	  authoritarian	  regime’s	  
capacity	   to	   structure	   citizen-­‐subjectivity	   but	   not	   citizen-­‐fidelity,	   complicates	   the	   conventional	  
concept	  of	  violence	  and	  the	  criticisms	  of	  it	  alike.	  The	  compromised	  prerogative	  of	  even	  “strong”	  
states	  to	  structure	  inhabitants	  to	  their	  own	  benefit	  –	  or	  to	  integrate	  citizens	  without	  providing	  
them	  resources	  to	  oppose	  those	  states	  –	  appears	  to	  qualify	  the	  views	  of	  power	  and	  violence	  I	  
have	  addressed.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  state	  performances	  only	  partially	   support	  post-­‐structural	  
assertions	  that	  modernizing	  social	  systems	  produce	  citizen	  identities,	  assimilating	  subjects	  to	  a	  
monistic	  regime	  and	  a	  smooth	  space	  of	  political	  consensus.29	  	  
	   Both	  states	  did	  design	  citizenship	  regimes	  that	  created	  exclusive	  means	  for	   interacting	  
meaningfully	  with	  the	  state,	  generating	  a	  dominant	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  But	  these	  citizenship	  
regimes	   enabled	   resistance	   to	   state	   directives	   and	   authority,	   proving	   not	  merely	   that	   rulers	  
failed	  to	  dictate	  the	  fate	  of	  their	  systems,	  but	  also	  that	  citizens	  as	  subjects	  retained	  sufficient	  
autonomy	  of	   judgment	   in	  those	  systems	  to	  define	  and	  harness	  them	  to	  their	  own	   interests.30	  
This	  ambivalent	  success	  and	  failure	  of	  the	  regimes	  to	  constitute	  their	  inhabitants	  for	  their	  own	  
ends	  in	  institutions	  of	  their	  own	  design	  impugns,	  for	  similar	  reasons,	  the	  conventional	  concept	  
of	   violence	  and,	   therefore,	   the	   conceptual	  map	   of	   tyranny	   as	   either	   hostile	   to	   its	   citizens	  or	  
creating	  them	  in	  their	   image.	  The	  mixed	  dynamics	   in	  these	  regimes’	  capacities	   to	  subjectivize	  
citizens	   in	  either	  dualistic	  or	  monistic	  systems	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	  designate	  either	   regime	  or	  
uprising	   as	   unambiguously	   peaceful	   or	   violent.	   If	   violence	   entails	   a	   radical	   challenge	   to	   the	  
norms	  of	  a	   regime,	   then	  citizen-­‐subjects	  who	  oppose	   regimes	   that	  partially	   constituted	   them	  




non-­‐violent	  clash	  with	   the	  Polish	   regime	  may	  be	  “reminiscent	  of	  a	  civil	  war”31	  while	  Algeria’s	  
terrible	  state-­‐Islamist	  violence	  may	  not.32	  	  
	   My	  purpose	  in	  analyzing	  the	  conceptual	  map	  of	  peaceful	  freedom	  and	  violent	  tyranny,	  
concepts	  of	  violence,	  and	  debates	  about	  power	  is	  not	  to	  indulge	  in	  semantics	  but	  to	  defend	  a	  
qualified	  concept	  of	  violence	  associated	  with	  physical	  and	  dangerous	  militancy	   that	  need	  not	  
imply	   subjective	   sources	   of	   resistance	   wholly	   external	   to	   state	   institutions.	   Only	   with	   such	  
qualifications	  does	   it	  work,	  at	   least	   in	  my	  case	  studies,	   to	  re-­‐identify	  violence	   in	  conventional	  
terms	  with	  physical	  injury	  and	  material	  damage.	  In	  this	  respect,	  I	  wish	  to	  conclude	  this	  section	  
with	  a	  word	  about	  explanatory	  accounts	  of	  violence,	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  an	  abrupt	  lateral	  move.	  One	  
policy	   recommendation	   stemming	   from	  my	   explanation	  might	   be	   that	   if	   ruling	   elites	  wish	   to	  
prevent	  violent	  opposition	  movements,	  they	  may	  want	  to	  provide	  effective	  social	  resources	  to	  
regime	   opponents	   –	   that	   is,	   by	   affording	   citizens	   institutional	   means	   to	   lodge	   meaningful	  
challenges	   to	   state	   prerogative.	   While	   I	   do	   not	   aim	   for	   policy	   relevance,	   the	   concepts	   and	  
arguments	   in	  my	  explanation	  could	  be	   invoked	  to	  diminish	  violence	  by	  guaranteeing	  effective	  
citizen	  regimes.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  am	  cautious	  about	  such	  mechanistic	  reasoning	  about	  violence.	  
	   In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  Islamists	  attacked	  Algerian	  villages,	  slaughtering,	  raping,	  burning,	  and	  
mutilating	  non-­‐combatants	  en	  masse,	  while	  the	  state	  arrested,	  killed,	  and	  tortured	  thousands	  
of	  civilians.	  These	  atrocities	   followed	  the	  declaration	  of	  martial	   law,	  yet	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  
alone	  does	  not	  seem	  sufficient	  to	  prompt	  such	  violence.	  It	  seems	  martial	  law	  is	  itself	  mediated	  
by	   social	   resources	   that	   define	   the	   political	   meaning	   and	   experience	   of	   dehumanization	   for	  
besieged	  citizen-­‐subjects.	  But	  even	   if	   true,	  does	  this	   really	  explain	   such	  monstrous	  acts?	   I	  am	  




unthinkable,	  which	  suggests	  it	  may	  be	  inexplicable	  in	  a	  sense,	  somehow	  always	  exceeding	  the	  
language	  and	  modalities	  of	  causal	  inscription.	  Perhaps	  the	  gap	  between	  states	  and	  subjects	  that	  
I	  have	  attributed	  to	  despotic	  citizenship	  applies	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  dehumanization.	  There	  may	  be	  
a	  remainder	  in	  translating	  inhumane	  conditions	  into	  physical	  resistance	  –	  some	  excess	  beyond	  
the	  mirror	  image,	  where	  violence	  transcends	  the	  logics	  of	  regime	  and	  social	  explanation	  alike.	  	  
	   This	  would	  make	  sense	   if	   re-­‐humanization	  were	  true	  resistance,	  that	   is,	  an	   instance	  of	  
self-­‐authorship	  that	  must	  exceed	  rather	  than	  replicate-­‐by-­‐negation	  the	  conditions	  that	  inspired	  
it.	  If	  violence	  is	  a	  generative	  surplus	  of	  the	  uncontainable	  subject,	  to	  explain	  atrocities	  like	  those	  
in	  Algeria	  would	  require	  some	  explanation	  of	  that	  excess	   itself,	  arguably	  a	  sort	  of	  arrogant	  or	  
delusional	  claim	  of	  authority	  over	  the	  core	  nature	  of	  humanity.	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  lurking	  in	  this	  
ambition	  that	   inhibits	  a	  project	   like	  mine.	   If	  we	  presume	  an	  explanation	  of	  horrific	  violence	  is	  
awaiting	  our	  most	  sensitive	  instruments,	  we	  may	  by	  fiat	  exclude	  intangible	  or	  excessive	  human	  
mechanisms,	  inadvertently	  trivializing	  its	  mystery	  and	  thus	  its	  horror.	  In	  his	  story,	  “My	  Cousin,	  
Dikran,	   the	  Orator,”	  William	  Saroyan	  describes	  a	  cousin’s	  speech	  as	  “flawless:	  dramatic,	  well-­‐
uttered,	  intelligent,	  and	  terribly	  convincing	  –	  the	  conclusion	  being	  that	  the	  World	  War	  had	  not	  
been	  fought	  in	  vain,	  that	  Democracy	  had	  saved	  the	  world.”	  In	  turn,	  his	  grandfather	  intones:	  
	  
I	   listened	   to	  your	  speech.	   I	  understand	  you	  spoke	  of	  a	  war	   in	  which	  several	  million	  men	  were	  
killed.	  I	  understand	  you	  proved	  the	  war	  was	  not	  fought	  in	  vain.	  I	  must	  tell	  you	  that	  I	  am	  rather	  
pleased.	  A	  statement	  as	  large	  and	  as	  beautiful	  as	  that	  deserves	  to	  come	  only	  from	  the	  lips	  of	  a	  
boy	  of	  eleven	  –	  from	  one	  who	  believes	  what	  he	  is	  saying.	  From	  a	  grown	  man,	  I	  must	  tell	  you,	  the	  
horror	   of	   that	   remark	   would	   be	   just	   a	   little	   too	   much	   for	   me	   to	   endure.	   Continue	   your	  
investigation	  of	  the	  world	  from	  books,	  and	  I	  am	  sure,	  if	  you	  are	  diligent	  and	  your	  eyes	  hold	  out,	  
that	   by	   the	   time	   you	   are	   sixty-­‐seven	   you	  will	   know	   the	   awful	   foolishness	   of	   that	   remark	  –	   so	  
innocently	  uttered	  by	  yourself	  tonight,	  in	  such	  a	  pure	  flow	  of	  soprano	  English.	  In	  a	  way	  I	  am	  as	  
proud	  of	  you	  as	  of	  any	  other	  member	  of	  this	  tribe.	  You	  may	  all	  go	  away	  now.	  I	  want	  to	  sleep.	  I	  





Primo	  Levi	  identifies	  this	  potential	  ethical	  trivialization	  with	  both	  justification	  and	  explanation:	  
“one	  cannot,	  what	  is	  more	  one	  must	  not,	  understand	  [because]	  one	  cannot	  reduce	  the	  human	  
spirit	  to	  the	  genes,	  which	  is	  why	  one	  should	  not	  do	  it…We	  cannot	  understand	  it,	  but	  we	  can	  and	  
must	  understand	  from	  where	  it	  springs…If	  understanding	  is	  impossible,	  knowing	  is	  imperative,	  
because	  what	  happened	  could	  happen	  again.”34	  To	  “understand”	  violence	  itself,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
its	  “sources,”	  offends	  because	  it	  evinces	  the	  kind	  of	  mastery	  over	  humanity	  he	  associates	  with	  
violence	  itself.	  Even	  more	  compellingly,	  he	  cautions	  against	  naturalizing	  or	  normalizing	  violence	  
in	  some	  de-­‐mystifying	  causal	  or	  taxonomic	  understanding.	  We	  should	  not	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  
unspeakable	  human	  cruelty,	  lest	  we	  overlook	  or	  will	  away	  its	  irreducible	  or	  unknowable	  kernel.	  
In	  the	  spirit	  of	  Levi’s	  distinction	  between	  violence	  and	   its	  sources,	  between	   its	  understanding	  
and	  explanation,	  I	  would	  emphasize	  that	  this	  division	  encourages	  us	  to	  seek	  those	  sources	  with	  
redoubled	  rigor	  while	  conceding	  that	  we	  may	  no	  sooner	  explain	  than	  define	  violence.	  	  	  
	  
§2.c	   Subjects	  of	  Violence	  
	  
	   In	  his	  curiously	  ignored	  novel,	  In	  Dubious	  Battle,	  Steinbeck	  stages	  a	  burst	  of	  violence	  at	  a	  
strike	   scene.35	   Strikers	   gather	   to	   face	   down	   “scabs”	   arriving	   at	   a	   railway	   station.	   The	   police	  
stand	  by,	  armed	  but	  timorous.	  Strike	  leaders	  London,	  Mac,	  and	  Jim,	  hoping	  to	  guide	  the	  protest	  
between	   steadfastness	   and	  belligerence,	   glimpse	   the	   trigger-­‐tapping	   snipers	   above	   in	   nearby	  
apartments.	  Scabs	  appear	  and	  strikers	  stiffen,	  the	  police	  “nervously	  trying	  to	  watch	  both	  sides	  
at	  once.”	  Shots	   ring	  out	  and	   Joy,	  a	   frail	  but	  brave	  worker,	   jolts	   from	  a	  bullet	  and	   falls,	  blood	  
running	   down	   his	   chin.	   Joy	   bleeds	   to	   death	   between	   the	   two	   sides,	   scabs	   and	   strikers,	   a	  
“claw[ing	   and]	   squirming	   figure	   in	   the	   dirt…The	   quietness	   [falls]	   on	   the	  men	   like	   a	   wave	   of	  




refuses,	   the	   sheriff	   again	   insists,	   and	   London,	   his	   “eyes	   glow[ing]	   redly,”	   speaks	   the	   limit	   of	  
tolerable	  offense	  –	  the	  line	  of	  violence.	  It	  is	  a	  literary	  scene	  worth	  reconstructing	  at	  length:	  
	  
“All	  right,	  then.	  We’ll	  march	  in.	  Keep	  your	  guys	  in	  hand.	  Keep	  ’em	  quiet	  and	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  
road.”	  He	   grinned	   coldly.	   “If	   any	   of	   ’em	  wants	   to	   pick	   up	   a	   few	   rocks	   and	   shove	   ’em	   in	   their	  
pockets,	  I	  can’t	  see	  no	  harm	  in	  that.”	  The	  men	  laughed	  appreciatively	  …	  
Burke	  said,	  “I’m	  for	  startin’	  a	  mix	  soon’s	  the	  scabs	  get	  off	  the	  train.	  Scare	  hell	  out	  of	  ’em.”	  
“Better	   talk	   first,”	  Mac	   said.	   “I	   seen	  half	   a	   trainload	  of	   scabs	  go	  over	   to	   the	   strike	   if	   they	  was	  
talked	  to	  first.	  You	  jump	  on	  ’em	  and	  you’ll	  scare	  some,	  and	  make	  some	  mad.”…	  
Singing	  broke	  out,	  the	  tuneless,	  uneven	  singing	  of	  untrained	  men…They	  had	  hardly	  started	  when	  
ten	  motorcycle	  policemen	  rode	  up	  and	  spaced	  themselves	  along	  the	  line	  of	  the	  march…	  
“They	  got	  a	   reception	  committee	   for	  us.	  Ain’t	   that	  kind	  of	   ’em?”	  The	  men	  about	  him	  tittered.	  
Mac	  continued,	  “They	  say	  ‘you	  got	  a	  right	  to	  strike,	  but	  you	  can’t	  picket,’	  an’	  they	  know	  a	  strike	  
won’t	  work	  without	  picketin’.”	  There	  was	  no	  laughter	  this	  time.	  The	  men	  growled,	  but	  there	  was	  
little	  anger	  in	  the	  tone.	  Mac	  glanced	  nervously	  at	  Jim.	  “I	  don’t	  like	  it,”	  he	  said	  softly.	  	  “This	  bunch	  
of	   bums	   isn’t	   keyed	   up.	   I	   hope	   to	   Christ	   something	   happens	   to	   make	   ’em	  mad	   before	   long.	  	  
This’s	  going	  to	  fizzle	  out	  if	  something	  don’t	  happen.”…	  
Dakin	  and	  London	  walked	  up	  and	  down	  the	  dense	  front,	  giving	  instructions.	  The	  men	  must	  not	  
start	  any	  trouble	  with	  the	  cops	  if	  they	  could	  help	  it…	  “They	  figure	  they	  can	  scare	  us	  off.	  Jesus,	  I	  
wish	  the	  train’d	  come.	  Waiting	  raises	  hell	  with	  guys	  like	  ours.	  They	  get	  scared	  when	  they	  have	  to	  
wait	  around.”…	  
Across	  the	  street	  stood	  a	  line	  of	  dilapidated	  stores	  and	  restaurants	  with	  furnished	  rooms	  in	  their	  
upper	   storeys.	  Mac	   glanced	   over	   his	   shoulder.	   The	  windows	   of	   the	   rooms	  were	   full	   of	  men’s	  
heads	   looking	   out.	  Mac	   said,	   “I	   don’t	   like	   the	   looks	   of	   those	   guys.”	   “Why	   not?”	   Jim	   asked.	   “I	  
don’t	  know.	  There	  ought	  to	  be	  some	  women	  there.	  There	  aren’t	  any	  women	  at	  all.”…	  
In	  the	  doorway	  of	  one	  of	  the	  boxcars	  a	  commotion	  started,	  a	  kind	  of	  a	  boiling	  of	  the	  men.	  A	  man	  
squirmed	  through	  the	  seated	  scabs	  and	  dropped	  to	  the	  ground.	  Mac	  shouted	  in	  Jim’s	  ear,	  “My	  
God!	   It’s	   Joy!”	   The	  misshapen,	   gnome-­‐like	   figure	   faced	   the	   doorway.	   The	   arms	  waved	   jerkily.	  	  
Still	  the	  steam	  screeched.	  The	  men	  in	  the	  doorway	  dropped	  to	  the	  ground	  and	  stood	  in	  front	  of	  
the	  frantic,	  jerking	  Joy.	  He	  turned	  and	  waved	  his	  arms	  toward	  the	  strikers.	  His	  beaten	  face	  was	  
contorted.	  Five	  or	  six	  of	  them	  fell	  in	  behind	  him,	  and	  the	  whole	  group	  moved	  toward	  the	  line	  of	  
strikers.	  The	  guards	  turned	  sideways,	  nervously	  trying	  to	  watch	  both	  sides	  at	  once	  …	  	  	  
And	   then	   –	   above	   the	   steam	   –	   three	   sharp,	   cracking	   sounds.	  Mac	   looked	   back	   at	   the	   stores.	  	  
Heads	   and	   rifles	  were	  withdrawn	  quickly	   from	   the	   room	  windows	   and	   the	  windows	  dropped.	  	  
Joy	  had	  stopped,	  his	  eyes	  wide.	  His	  mouth	  flew	  open	  and	  a	  jet	  of	  blood	  rolled	  down	  his	  chin,	  and	  
down	  his	   shirt.	  His	   eyes	   ranged	  wildly	  over	   the	   crowd	  of	  men.	  He	   fell	   on	  his	   face	  and	   clawed	  
outward	  with	  his	  fingers.	  The	  guards	  stared	  unbelievingly	  at	  the	  squirming	  figure	  on	  the	  ground.	  
Suddenly	  the	  steam	  stopped;	  and	  the	  quietness	  fell	  on	  the	  men	  like	  a	  wave	  of	  sound.	  The	  line	  of	  
strikers	  stood	  still,	  with	  strange,	  dreaming	  faces.	  Joy	  lifted	  himself	  up	  with	  his	  arms,	  like	  a	  lizard,	  





A	  strange,	  heavy	  movement	  started	  among	  the	  men.	  London	  moved	  forward	  woodenly,	  and	  the	  
men	  moved	  forward.	  They	  were	  stiff.	  The	  guards	  aimed	  with	  their	  guns,	  but	  the	  line	  moved	  on,	  
unheeding,	  unseeing…	  
The	  guards	  were	  frightened,	  riots	  they	  could	  stop,	  fighting	  they	  could	  stop;	  but	  this	  slow,	  silent	  
movement	   of	  men	  with	   the	  wide	   eyes	   of	   sleepwalkers	   terrified	   them…London	   lifted	   the	   little	  
man	  in	  his	  arms.	  Joy	  looked	  very	  small	  against	  London’s	  big	  chest.	  A	  path	  opened	  for	  them	  easily	  
this	  time.	  London	  marched	  along,	  and	  the	  men	  arranged	  themselves	   into	  a	  crude	  column,	  and	  
followed…	  
“I	  want	   that	   body,”	   the	   sheriff	   said.	   “No,	   you	   can’t	   have	   it.”	   “You	  men	   shot	   a	   strike-­‐breaker.	  	  
We’ll	  bring	  the	  charge.	  I	  want	  that	  body	  for	  the	  coroner.”	  London’s	  eyes	  glowed	  redly.	  He	  said	  
simply,	  “Mister,	  you	  know	  the	  guys	  that	  killed	  this	  little	  man.	  You	  know	  who	  did	  it.	  You	  got	  laws	  
and	  you	  don’t	  keep	   ’em.”	  The	  mob	  was	  silent,	   listening.	  “I	   tell	  you,	   I	  want	  that	  body.”	  London	  
said	  plaintively,	  “Can’t	  you	  see,	  mister?	   If	  you	  guys	  don’t	  get	  the	  hell	  out	  of	  here,	  you’re	  goin’	  
get	  killed.	  Can’t	  you	  see	  that,	  mister?	  Don’t	  you	  know	  when	  you	  can’t	  go	  no	  further?”36	  
	  
	   Steinbeck	  presents	  a	  regime	  of	  state,	  capital,	  and	  labor	  (workers	  and	  replacements),	  all	  
intensified	  by	  the	  “cracking	  sounds”	  of	  rogue	  elements.	  Workers	  and	  scabs,	  police	  and	  snipers:	  
the	  inside/outside	  of	  labor	  and	  law	  under	  capital	  and	  state	  –	  all	  clumsily	  monitored	  by	  “guards”	  
glancing	  back	  and	   forth,	   staring	  “unbelievingly,”	  aimlessly	  pointing	  guns.	  When	   Joy	   is	  gunned	  
down,	   tittering-­‐then-­‐boiling	   strikers	   become	  a	   “slow,	   silent	  movement	  of	  men	  with	   the	  wide	  
eyes	  of	  sleepwalkers.”	  It	  is	  an	  unfolding	  from	  work	  to	  strike,	  speech	  to	  march,	  protest	  to	  blood-­‐
flow,	  tittering	  and	  boiling	  to	  silence	  –	  a	  series	  of	  shifts	  from	  inside	  to	  outside	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  
network.	   Workers	   speaking,	   speakers	   striking,	   strikers	   marching,	   marchers	   dying,	   mourners	  
teetering	  on	  violence	  represent	  an	  upward	  movement	  across	  places	  and	  actions,	  a	  trajectory	  of	  
refusals	  that	  break	  out	  of	  each	  sub-­‐unit	  of	  the	  regime.	  So	  the	  shifts	  (work	  to	  talk,	  talk	  to	  strike,	  
strike	  to	  march,	  etc.)	  form	  a	  sequence	  of	  escalating	  failures	  to	  resolve	  and	  recognize	  demands.	  
The	  movement	  of	  grievance	  from	  speech	  to	  march	  evinces	  a	  qualitative	  change,	  from	  material	  
to	  social	  demand.	  	  This	  escalation	  of	  inside-­‐to-­‐outside	  violations	  is	  qualitative,	  in	  both	  Steinbeck	  




action.	  Specifically,	  workers	  whose	  speech,	  strikes,	  and	  finally	  marches	  are	  ignored	  experience	  
greater	  qualitative	  injustice	  at	  each	  stage;	  the	  moral	  content	  of	  their	  grievances	  is	  amplified.	  	   	  
	   Such	  serialized	  insults	  form	  our	  common	  definition	  of	  dehumanization	  –	  the	  systematic	  
denial	  of	  persons’	  capacity	  to	  connect	  their	  activity	  to	  desired	  improvements	  in	  their	  wellbeing.	  
I	  intimated	  this	  sequential	  aspect	  to	  dehumanization	  in	  these	  terms	  in	  the	  introduction	  but	  it	  is	  
crucial	  to	  foreground	  now	  the	  sense	  of	  movement	  across	  experiences	  of	  deprivation,	  expulsion,	  
and	   injustice,	  as	  Steinbeck	   illustrates.	  Empirical	  studies	  of	  violence	  reveal	  a	  pivot	  point	  where	  
the	  composition	  of	  an	  opposition	  alters,	  when	  subjects	  begin	  to	  question	  not	  the	  justification	  of	  
policies	  only	  but	  of	  policymakers.	  At	  least	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  quality	  of	  agitation	  changes	  when	  
the	  legitimacy	  rather	  than	  actions	  of	  authority	  figures	  comes	  under	  scrutiny.	  Here	  moralization	  
is	  a	  useful	  concept,	  one	  apposite	  in	  the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  cases.	  For	  good	  reason	  we	  expect	  
that,	  under	  normal	  circumstances,	  my	  experience	  protesting	   jaywalking	  ordnances	  or	  the	  Iraq	  
war	  will	  differ	  from	  my	  protesting	  against	  the	  right	  of	  the	  local	  council	  or	  the	  President	  to	  draft	  
and	  implement	  these	  policies.	  I	  may	  be	  more	  emotional	  about	  the	  war	  than	  about	  jaywalking,	  
and	   I	  may	   think	   a	  war	   has	   graver	  moral	   implications	   than	  where	  we	   cross	   the	   street,	   but	   in	  
neither	  case	  would	  I	  say	  the	  policymaker	  is	  corrupt.	  I	  may	  claim	  these	  policymakers	  are	  making	  
immoral	  policies,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  separate	  matter	  –	  a	  distinct	  experience	  –	  to	  claim	  that	  their	  making	  
those	  policies	  is	  immoral.	  The	  progression	  from	  intra-­‐systemic	  to	  anti-­‐systemic	  agitation	  is	  the	  
moment	  of	  moralization,	  of	  conceiving	  social	  arrangements	  themselves	  to	  be	  compromised.	  	  
	   Note,	  in	  this	  light,	  the	  timing	  and	  substance	  of	  the	  two	  key	  events	  in	  Steinbeck’s	  scene.	  	  
First,	  Joy’s	  murder	  converts	  a	  fragmented,	  confused,	  anxious	  protest	  into	  a	  willful	  movement	  –	  




the	  moral	  impulse	  has	  been	  aggravated,	  and	  the	  response	  is	  incredulity	  and	  stunned	  silence.	  It	  
makes	  sense	  that	  the	  strikers	  remain	  “stiff”	  and	  “wooden,”	  a	  “heavy	  movement”	  right	  after	  this	  
murder.	  The	  air	  fills	  with	  uncertainty	  and,	  pace	  the	  guards’	  heads’	  swiveling	  frantically,	   is	  still.	  
After	  all	  the	  anxiety	  about	  the	  men	  getting	  antsy	  or	  bored	  or	  aggressive	  with	  “the	  waiting,”	  now	  
that	  the	  rulers’	  violence	  has	  killed	  one	  of	  them,	  they	  become	  one.	  What	  will	  they	  do?	  “The	  first	  
blood,	  the	  blood	  of	  the	  first	  victim	  once	  spilled,	   infects	  the	  entire	  community,	  pulling	   it	  down	  
into	   reciprocal	   violence,”	   as	   Esposito	   says.37	   But	   it	   is	   the	   sheriff’s	   demand	   for	   the	   body	   that	  
moralizes	  opposition.	  London	  stares	  at	  him	  and	  says,	  “You	  got	   laws	  and	  you	  don’t	  keep	  ‘em.”	  
Note	  that	  London	  says,	  “you	  got	  laws,”	  not	  we,	  and	  that	  this	  reproach	  indicates	  that	  it	  is	  not	  law	  
but	   the	   sheriff	  who	   is	   impugned.	  The	   law	  will	  become	  a	   credible	   resource	   to	  use	  against	   the	  
sheriff;	  the	  sheriff’s	   lawlessness	  will	  not	  discredit	  the	   law.38	  Moral	  outrage	  at	  dehumanization	  
suffuses	   London’s	  bewildered	  warning	   to	   the	   sheriff:	   “Don’t	   you	  know	  when	  you	  can’t	   go	  no	  
further?”	  This	  moment	  marks	   the	  acceleration	  and	   intensification	  usually	  associated	  with	   the	  
violence	  London	  now	  threatens:	  “you’re	  goin’	  get	  killed.”	  
	   In	  a	  study	  of	  lawlessness	  in	  Colombia,	  Taussig	  says	  such	  scenes	  recall	  Nietzsche’s	  sense	  
“that	  criminals	  become	  hardened	  by	  observing	  that	  they	  and	  the	  police	  use	  the	  same	  methods,	  
except	  with	  the	  police,	   the	  methods	  are	  worse	  because	  the	  police	  excuse	  their	  actions	   in	  the	  
name	  of	  justice.”	  He	  quotes	  Nietzsche:	  “Spying,	  duping,	  bribing,	  setting	  traps…intricate	  and	  wily	  
skills	   of	   the	   policeman	   and	   the	   prosecutor,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  most	   thorough	   robbery,	   violence,	  
slander,	   imprisonment,	   torture,	   and	  murder,	   carried	   out	  without	   even	   having	   emotion	   as	   an	  
excuse.”39	  This	  explains	  why	  the	  murder	  of	  Joy	  is	  not	  yet	  the	  moment	  of	  moralization,	  at	  least	  in	  




representative	  of	  the	  law,	  to	  decide	  the	  moment	  and	  tenor	  of	  moralization.	  London	  even	  pleads	  
with	  him	  not,	  in	  Taussig’s	  phrase,	  to	  excuse	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  name	  of	  justice	  –	  he	  begs	  him	  to	  
avert	  violence	  by	  protecting	  the	  credibility	  of	  law,	  and	  thus	  the	  meaning	  of	  justice	  itself.	  What	  is	  
crucial	  in	  this	  scene	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  violence	  is	  Steinbeck’s	  portrayal	  of	  moralization	  as	  
a	  ladder-­‐climb	  in	  a	  trajectory	  toward	  anti-­‐systemic	  violence.	  Each	  rung	  concentrates	  the	  forces	  
of	  emotion	  and	  reason,	  physicality	  and	  reflection,	  hope	  and	  anxiety,	  even	  as	  we	  see	  the	  clear	  
direction	  of	  these	  combinations.	  Steinbeck	  shows	  us	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  violence	   in	  this	  scene.	  
His	  strikers,	  workers	  who	  turn	  to	  the	  law	  under	  duress	  and	  cruelty,	  are	  the	  subjects	  of	  a	  liberal	  
democratic	  regime	  that	  provided	  thin	  legal	  protections40	  against	  capitalist	  suzerainty	  especially	  
among	  agricultural	  workers.	  In	  their	  posture,	  energy,	  and	  speech,	  they	  express	  not	  only	  what	  is	  
happening	   to	   them	   or	   what	   they	   want	   but	   also	   who	   they	   are	   as	   the	   subjects	   of	   a	   regime.	  
Steinbeck	  may,	  in	  this	  respect,	  overstate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  immediate	  decisions	  rather	  than	  
historically	   informed	   evaluations	   provoke	   violence,	   but	   I	   suspect	   this	   was	   not	   the	   first	   time	  
London	  cried	  out,	  “Don’t	  you	  know	  when	  you	  can’t	  go	  no	  further?”	  –	  but	  the	  last.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
§2.d	   Objects	  of	  Violence	  
	   	  	  
	   In	   his	   novelization	   of	   “real	   events”	   in	  Moroccan	   prisons,	   Tahar	   Ben	   Jelloun	   records	   a	  
statement	  about	  human	  dignity	  that	  strikes	  the	  core	  of	  objectification:	  
	  
Faith	  is	  not	  fear,	  I	  told	  myself.	  Suicide	  is	  not	  a	  solution.	  An	  ordeal	  is	  a	  challenge.	  Resistance	  is	  a	  
duty,	  not	  an	  obligation.	  Keeping	  one’s	  dignity	  is	  an	  absolute	  necessity.	  That’s	  it:	  dignity	  is	  what	  I	  
–	  what	  we	  –	  have	  left.	  Each	  of	  us	  does	  what	  he	  can	  to	  preserve	  his	  dignity.	  That	  is	  my	  mission.	  
To	  remain	  on	  my	  feet,	  be	  a	  man,	  never	  a	  wretch,	  a	  dishrag,	  a	  mistake.	  I	  would	  never	  condemn	  
those	  who	  cannot	  bear	  what	  is	  inflicted	  on	  them,	  who	  end	  by	  breaking	  under	  torture	  and	  letting	  
themselves	  die.	  I	  have	  learned	  never	  to	  judge	  people.	  What	  right	  would	  I	  have	  to	  do	  that?	  I	  am	  






This	   passage	   conveys	   the	   extreme	   conditions	   of	   suffering	   and	   objectification,	   torture	   and	  
confinement;	   the	   individuality	   of	   “a	   will	   that	   is	   firm”;	   and	   the	   aperture	   between	   living	   and	  
breaking-­‐unto-­‐death.	  If	  citizens	  act	  as	  subjects	  of	  regimes,	  who	  are	  apt	  to	  resist	  violently	  when	  
trapped,	  how	  do	  we	  address	  mixed	  accounts	  like	  Ben	  Jelloun’s	  of	  maximal	  objectification?	  How	  
do	  we	  broach	  the	  distinct	  subject/object-­‐positions	  that	  haunt	  Jean	  Améry’s	  recollections	  of	  his	  
internment	  and	  survival?:	  
	  
The	  so-­‐called	  Mussulman,	  as	  the	  camp	  language	  termed	  the	  prisoner	  who	  was	  giving	  up	  and	  was	  
given	  up	  by	  his	   comrades,	  no	   longer	  had	   room	   in	  his	   consciousness	   for	   the	   contrasts	   good	  or	  
bad,	   noble	   or	   base,	   intellectual	   or	   unintellectual.	   He	   was	   a	   staggering	   corpse,	   a	   bundle	   of	  
physical	  functions	  in	  its	  last	  convulsions.	  As	  hard	  as	  it	  may	  be	  for	  us	  to	  do	  so,	  we	  must	  exclude	  
him	   from	   our	   considerations.	   I	   can	   proceed	   only	   from	  my	   own	   situation,	   the	   situation	   of	   an	  
inmate	   who	   went	   hungry,	   but	   did	   not	   starve	   to	   death,	   who	   was	   beaten,	   but	   not	   totally	  
destroyed,	   who	   had	   wounds,	   but	   not	   deadly	   ones,	   who	   thus	   objectively	   still	   possessed	   that	  
substratum	  on	  which,	  in	  principle,	  the	  human	  spirit	  can	  stand	  and	  exist.42	  
	  
	   An	  explanation	   that	   connects	  denied	   systemic	   subjectivity	   to	   violence	  has	   to	   confront	  
empirically	  reached	  theories	  about	  the	  objects	  of	  violence	  before	  proceeding.	  Hence	  this	  will	  be	  
the	  most	  detailed	  conceptual	  discussion.	  Simply	  posed,	  this	  section	  asks	  if	  dehumanization	  can	  
suffocate	  re-­‐subjectivization,	  and	  with	  it	  the	  repression-­‐resistance	  hypothesis,43	  by	  pure	  force;	  
or	   if,	   at	   worst,	   it	   “divides”	   people	   “into	   a	   body	   and	   an	   interrupted	   whisper.	   Into	   body	   and	  
poetry.”44	  After	  all,	   it	   seems	   intuitively	  and	  empirically	   true	  that	  even	   if	   repression	   in	  general	  
produces	  resistance,	  forming	  an	  upward	  line	  on	  a	  graph	  plotting	  coercion	  against	  retaliation,	  at	  
some	  point	  an	  added	  unit	  of	  state	  repression	  will	  subtract,	  not	  add,	  a	  unit	  of	  social	  resistance.	  
At	   some	   point,	   presumably	   specified	   by	   cultural	   and	   other	   contextual	   factors,	   resistance	   is	  
defeated	  at	  least	  momentarily.45	  This	  might	  imply	  an	  objective	  “dehumanization	  point”	  fruitful	  




subjectivities	  evidently	  implied	  by	  discrete	  outcomes	  of	  martial	  law.	  Although	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  
think	  dehumanization	  as	  a	  kind	  of	   suffering	  unmediated	  by	  experiential	  evaluation,	  however,	  
even	  brutal	  conditions	  of	  reification	  vary	  in	  how	  social	  actors	  conceive	  and	  react	  to	  them.46	  
For	  this	  discussion	  it	  may	  help	  to	  work	  from	  the	  opposite	  condition,	  “freedom,”	  through	  
diverse	  treatments	  of	  humiliation	  and	  dignity	  toward	  thoughts	  on	  subjectivity	  and	  confinement.	  
For	  clarity,	  I	  should	  repeat	  that	  this	  section	  is	  intended	  to	  sharpen	  the	  concept	  of	  inhumanity	  or	  
dehumanization	  by	  probing	  how	  the	  differences	  between	  social	  and	  biological	  life/death	  might	  
inform	  distinctions	  between	  subjective	  and	  objective	  conditions.	  The	  studies	  of	   incarceration,	  
brutality,	  and	  isolation	  adduced	  here	  reinforce	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  reduction	  
of	  the	  human	  from	  social	  life	  to	  social	  death	  to	  biological	  death.47	  This	  multiplicity	  may	  speak	  to	  
the	   indestructible	  nature	  of	   the	  human	  will	   short	  of	  biological	  eradication,	  even	  as	   individual	  
wills	  vary.	  However	  inspiring	  or	  persuasive	  it	  may	  be	  to	  maintain	  that	  human	  vitality,	  spirit,	  or	  
will	  always	  escapes	  capture	  and	  domination,	  that	  something	  in	  us	  always	  escapes	  or	  resists48,	  I	  
set	  aside	  philosophical	  ruminations.	  They	  are	  central	  to	  my	  argument	  but	  stand	  as	  summaries	  
or	  conclusions	  of	  the	  works	  I	  foreground.	  The	  human	  will	  does	  not	  express	  its	  multiple	  energies	  
in	  any	  one	  way,	  and	  this	  seems	  to	  support	  the	  view	  that	  even	  the	  most	  menacing	  circumstances	  
occasion	  the	  expression	  of	  historical	  experiences	  and	  mobilization	  of	  discrete	  subjectivities.	  	  
To	  address	  a	  condition	  of	  inhumanity,	  then,	  we	  may	  begin	  with	  efforts	  to	  elaborate	  the	  
conditions	  of	  humanization,	  often	  described	  as	  the	  criteria	  of	  freedom	  and	  dignity.	  For	  instance,	  
consider	  Ignatieff’s	  reflections	  on	  freedom	  with	  respect	  to	  choice,	  happiness,	  and	  rightness:	  
	  
How	  can	  we	  create	  a	  world	  in	  which	  most	  people	  will	  not	  only	  be	  free	  to	  choose	  but	  will	  know	  




that	  they	  have	  used	  their	  freedom	  rightly…But	  then	  what	  is	  left	  of	  freedom	  if	  choice	  is	  invariably	  
guided	  by	  the	  collective	  wisdom	  of	  the	  brothers,	  the	  citizens,	  the	  comrades?49	  
	  
Here	  freedom	  is	  conditioned	  on	  the	  capacity	  for	  competent	  choice	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  constraints	  
to	   their	   formulation	   and	   implementation,	   including	   the	   “collective	  wisdom”	  of	   fellow	   citizen-­‐
subjects.	  Similarly,	  Kuran	  writes:	  
	  
Experimental	   social	   psychology…suggests	   that	   social	   pressures,	   though	   very	   powerful,	   are	   not	  
necessarily	  decisive.	  As	  individuals,	  we	  are	  evidently	  prepared	  to	  endure	  some	  social	  conflict	  to	  
say	  or	  do	  what	  we	  really	  want.	  Our	  choices	  must	  be	  satisfying	  a	  need	  other	  than	  social	  approval	  
and	   respect.	  This	  other	  need…is	   for	   individuality,	   autonomy,	  dignity,	   and	   integrity.	   I	   [propose]	  
that	  we	  value	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose;	  that	  we	  derive	  self-­‐esteem	  from	  resisting	  social	  pressures	  
and	   establishing	   ourselves	   as	   people	   to	   be	   reckoned	   with;	   and	   that	   we	   find	   satisfaction	   in	  
speaking	  our	  minds,	  opening	  up	  our	  hearts,	  acting	  ourselves.	  In	  short,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  there	  
is	  an	  ever-­‐present	  voice	  in	  each	  of	  us	  that	  says,	  “To	  thine	  own	  self	  be	  true.”50	  
	  
Such	  passages	  equate	  freedom,	  choice,	  individualism,	  happiness,	  and	  self-­‐esteem,	  and	  notably	  
“self”	  as	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  a	  full	  human	  life.	   Ignatieff’s	  and	  Kuran’s	  statements	  seem	  
consonant	  with	  Todorov’s	  view	  of	  “dignity	  [as]	  the	  first	  ordinary	  virtue,	   [which]	  simply	  means	  
the	  capacity	  of	   the	   individual	   to	  remain	  a	  subject	  with	  a	  will;	   that	   fact,	  by	   itself,	   is	  enough	  to	  
ensure	  membership	  in	  the	  human	  race.”51	  Concerned	  with	  conceptual	  and	  analytical	  problems,	  
I	  will	  bracket	  sub-­‐debates	  –	  such	  as	  this	  fusion	  of	  “individual”	  and	  “human	  race”	  –	  as	  features	  of	  
a	  general	  constellation.	  What	  matters	  instead	  is	  to	  derive	  the	  antinomian	  concepts	  to	  present	  
an	  image	  of	  objectification	  that	  might	  support	  a	  causal	  dehumanization	  thesis.	  More	  simply,	  to	  
get	  at	  the	  criteria	  of	  a	  hypothetically	  dehumanized	  condition,	  it	  may	  help	  or	  even	  be	  necessary	  
to	  work	  our	  way	  from	  discourses	  of	  dignified	  freedom	  to	  those	  of	  suffocating	  inhumanity.	  	  
	  	   If	  choices	  made	  by	  a	  self	  provide	  dignity	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  free	  human	  life,	  the	  self	  without	  
choice	  presumably	  is	  not	  free	  and	  suffers	  indignity.	  The	  identities	  and	  effects	  of	  indignity	  would	  




degrading	  humiliation	  and	  whether	  that	  experience,	  in	  turn,	  provokes	  reactions.52	  Note	  here	  a	  
danger	  of	   treating	  as	  synonymous	   two	  absences:	  of	   freedom	  and	  of	  dignity.	  Dignity	   is	  one	  of	  
those	  slippery	  terms	   in	   the	  political-­‐philosophical	   lexicon	  that	   refers	   to	  subjective	  experiences	  
and	  objective	   conditions	  without	   recognizing	   this	   as	   a	   foundational	   conundrum.	  We	   consider	  
torture	   a	   universal	   offense	   against	   human	   dignity	   while	   failing	   to	   delimit	   our	   equally	   strong	  
intuition	   that	  one	  key	  aspect	  of	  dignity	   is	  never	   surrendering	  our	   capacity	   to	  define	   it.53	  Two	  
issues	  overlap	  here:	  (1)	  the	  gap	  between	  freedom	  and	  dignity,	  assuming	  dignity	  means	  freedom	  
to	  define	  one’s	  dignity;	  (2)	  the	  gap	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  states	  of	  (in/non-­‐)dignity	  
in	  practice	   and	  principle,	   assuming	   conditions	  under-­‐determine	  experience.	  Often	   these	  gaps	  
are	  thought	  to	  hedge	  against	  a	  universal	  or	  causal	  link,	  as	  I	  have	  noted,	  between	  repression	  and	  
resistance	  except	  under	  unambiguous	  dehumanization.	  The	  premise	  is	  that	  dehumanization	  is	  a	  
causal	  mechanism	  as	  it	  alone	  closes	  these	  gaps;	  abjection	  conflates	  indignity	  and	  unfreedom	  by	  
reducing	   subjective	   to	   objective	   conditions,	   i.e.,	   objectively	   eliminating	   the	   dignity	   of	   human	  
freedom.	  If	  true,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  find	  uniform	  reactions	  to	  systemic	  objectification	  under	  
the	  most	  severe	  biological	  or	  social	  near-­‐death	  experiences.	  
	   For	  analytical	  and	  deductive	  reasons	  the	  repression-­‐resistance	  or	  dehumanization	  thesis	  
has	  not	  fulfilled	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  causal	  theory	  of	  social	  violence.	  In	  part,	  as	  I	  have	  labored	  to	  
show,	  it	  appears	  that	  along	  the	  precipice	  of	  even	  biological	  death,	  humans	  continue	  to	  respond	  
to	  their	  historical	  experiences	  in	  responding	  to	  suffering.	  This	  logic	  applies	  all	  the	  more	  wholly	  
to	  social	  death,	  of	  course.	  But,	  as	  stressed	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  repressionðresistance	  thesis	  
is	  also	  paradoxical	  since	  the	  “objective	  conditions”	   for	  causal	  explanation	  entail	   that	  systemic	  




further	  elaboration	  the	  besieged	  and	  dying	  beast’s	  uprising	  cannot	  reclaim	  subjectivity;	  it	  is	  the	  
instinctive	  reaction	  of	  the	  animal	  or	  thing	  already	  in	  the	  condition	  of	  animality	  or	  thing-­‐ness.54	  
Radical	  humiliation,	  by	  contrast,	  implies	  that	  subjective	  dignity,	  if	  degraded,	  is	  residual,	  extant:	  
not	  absent.	  We	  would	  likely	  suspect	  that	  subjective	  humiliation	  and	  objective	  dehumanization	  
would,	  on	  these	  grounds,	  provoke	  distinct	  resistances	  to	  systemic	  violence	  or	  exclusion.55	  So,	  if	  
Margalit	   is	   correct	   that	   humiliation	   is	   “an	   insult	   to	   human	   dignity”56	   that	  marks	   an	   indecent	  
society	  (or	  sub-­‐system,	  like	  a	  prison),	  then	  humiliating	  indignity	  may	  be	  said	  to	  lie	  between	  the	  
poles	  of	  subjective	  dignity	  and	  objective	  non-­‐dignity	  –	  the	  site	  of	  an	  approaching	  reification	  but	  
an	  intact	  historical	  reflexivity	  that	  retains	  the	  tensions	  between	  freedom/dignity	  and	  objective/	  
subjective	  explanation.57	  That	  this	  humiliation	  may	  be	  an	  indispensable	  condition	  of	  our	  willful	  
subjectivity58	  merely	  adds	  another	  “paradox”	  to	  the	  beleaguered	  dehumanization	  thesis.59	  
	   As	  we	  have	  encountered	  similar	  difficulties	  conceptualizing	  violence	  in	  terms	  of	  injury	  to	  
dignity	  or	  body,	  we	  must	  carefully	  invoke	  the	  idea,	  seemingly	  opposite	  to	  dignified	  freedom,	  of	  
coercive	  constraint.	  The	  question	  is	  not,	  again,	  whether	  we	  can	  define	  these	  terms	  in	  general,	  
but	  whether	  we	  can	  generate	  concepts	  helpful	   to	   the	  study	  of	  violence.	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   it	  
may	  be	  optimal	  to	  adopt	  this	  method	  of	  concept	  formation	  in	  reverse,	  permitting	  the	  paradigm	  
instance	  of	  coercive	  constraint,	  posited	  in	  ordinary	  language,	  to	  lead	  us	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  
the	  objects	  of	  violence.	  Rather	  than	  formulate	  abstract	  concepts	  of	  freedom	  and	  dignity	  as	  the	  
basis	  of	  assessing	  (de)humanization,	  given	  the	  vulnerabilities	  we	  have	  found	  in	  those	  concepts,	  
perhaps	  we	  can	  pursue	  “absolute”	  or	  “objective”	  violation/violence	  against	  human	  subjectivity	  
from	  empirical	  studies.	  For	  example,	  a	  selection	  of	  testimonials	  and	  research	  findings	  suggests	  




subjective	  wills	   into	  disciplinary	  processes.	   It	   seems	  the	  highest	   form	  of	   systemic	  assimilation	  
mobilizes	  rather	  than	  eradicates	  subjective	  wills,	  sustaining	  a	  liminal,	  remaining	  agency	  to	  enlist	  
it	  in	  social	  stabilization.	  The	  parallel	  with	  the	  above	  depiction	  of	  biopower	  is	  intentional;	  there,	  
too,	  reification	  forces	  people	  to	  become	  subjects	  of	  their	  own	  objectification	  (or	  objects	  of	  their	  
own	   subjective	   repression60).	   In	   this	   light	   I	  wish	   to	   cobble	   together	  eyewitness	  accounts	   that	  
together	  form	  this	  image	  and	  idea	  of	  objects	  of	  violence	  as	  partial,	  fragmented,	  socially	  sutured.	  
To	  lend	  focus	  to	  the	  procedure	  I	  will	  work	  my	  way	  from	  resistance	  to	  subordination	  to	  absolute	  
domination,	  a	  sort	  of	  analytical	  tour	  of	  the	  horizon	  and	  problem	  of	  radical	  objectification.	  	  
	   The	  quintessential	  assault	  on	  personal	  integrity	  is	  torture	  and	  on	  social	  integrity	  solitary	  
confinement.	  In	  passing,	  there	  may	  be	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  these	  two,	  e.g.,	  if	  all	  affronts	  are	  
personal	  but	  only	  some	  are	  social,	  but	  this	  seems	  peripheral	  to	  my	  goal.	  The	  contradictory	  pulls	  
in	  C.	  L.	  R.	  James’s	  account	  of	  slavery	  in	  Saint	  Domingue	  are	  a	  helpful	  place	  to	  begin	  to	  decipher	  
dehumanization.	  Describing	  French	  exploitation	  and	  sovereignty	  as	  suffocating,	  he	  writes:	  	  
	  
Suicide	  was	  a	  common	  habit,	  and	  such	  was	  [the	  slaves’]	  disregard	  for	  life	  that	  they	  often	  killed	  
themselves,	   not	   for	   personal	   reasons,	   but	   in	   order	   to	   spite	   their	   owners.	   Life	   was	   hard	   and	  
death,	  they	  believed,	  meant	  not	  only	  release	  but	  a	  return	  to	  Africa.	  Those	  who	  wished	  to	  believe	  
and	   to	   convince	   the	   world	   that	   the	   slaves	   were	   half-­‐human	   brutes,	   fit	   for	   nothing	   else	   but	  
slavery,	   could	   find	   ample	   evidence	   for	   their	   faith,	   and	   nothing	   so	   much	   as	   in	   this	   homicidal	  
mania	  of	  the	  slaves.61	  	  
	  
There	  is	  will,	  pride,	  and	  strategy62	  in	  these	  suicides,	  in	  this	  “[choice]	  between	  life	  and	  death	  [as]	  
the	   last	   chance	   to	   hold	   onto	   one’s	   dignity.”63	   James	   emphasizes	   the	   indignation	   of	   the	  
indigenous	  and	  transplanted	  slaves.	  One	  way	  they	  expressed	  their	  outrage	  was	  by	  laughing	  at	  
imperial	  hypocrisies	  such	  as	  altruistic	  domination	  and	  coercive	  universalism.64	  The	  point	  of	  this	  




be	  re-­‐formed	  as	  subjects	  is	  critical	  –	  but	  that	  their	  social	  bonds	  decided	  the	  character	  of	  their	  
subordination,	  or	  one	  might	  say	  mediated	  the	  effects	  of	  its	  personal	  violations.65	  	  
	   Koestler’s	  testimony	  about	  pure	  solitude	  is	  a	  pertinent	  contrast	  in	  this	  respect:	  	  
	  
I	   was	   in	   a	   Spanish	   prison	   before	   [being	   interned	   in	   a	   French	   concentration	   camp	   for	   four	  
months],	  in	  a	  death	  cell	  where	  I	  didn’t	  know	  when	  my	  turn	  to	  be	  shot	  was	  coming.	  Afterwards	  
the	  French	  camp	  was	  easy	  to	  bear.	   It	  taught	  me	  among	  other	  things	  the	  relativity	  of	  freedom.	  
Solitary	  confinement	  is	  rock	  bottom,	  it’s	  absolute	  unfreedom.66	  	  
	  
Evidently	  one	  can	  be	  tormented	  to	  the	  point	  of	  reacting	  as	  the	  tormenter	  desires	  –	  that	  is,	  as	  
the	  object	  of	  the	  torturer67	  –	  by	  radical	  isolation	  from	  one’s	  accustomed	  sensory	  universe	  and	  
alienation	  from	  one’s	  orienting	  “moral	  world.”68	  Conditions	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  de-­‐centering	  
can	  apparently	  either	  destroy	  subjectivity	  or	  refine	  its	  weapons,	  i.e.,	  produce	  variegated	  results	  
in	   formally	   dehumanizing	   circumstances.	   As	  we	   have	   seen,	   Fanon	   believes	   rebellious	   people	  
reclaim	  an	  endangered	  subjectivity	  through	  a	  sobering	  revolutionary	  business.69	  Penned	  in,	  the	  
subject	  may	  instead	  resort	  to	  less	  militant	  forms	  of	  invention,	  such	  as	  subterfuge;	  as	  Dalrymple	  
reports:	  “Although	  I	  worked	  in	  a	  prison	  for	  14	  years,	  I	  never	  came	  to	  understand	  the	  language	  
that	  prisoners	  used	  as	   they	   shouted	   to	  one	  another	  across	   landing	  and	  between	  buildings.	   It	  
was	   their	  means	  of	   resisting	  domination.”70	  Failing	   this,	  under	  extreme	  carceral	  compression,	  
subjectivity	  may	   turn	   in	  on	   itself,	   reaffirming	   itself	   as	   still	   a	  will.	   Rhodes	  notes	   that	  prisoners	  
approaching	   total,	   objective	   absence	  of	   agency	  will	   construe	   their	   conditions	   as	   chosen	   –	   an	  
assertion	  of	  personal	  control.71	  
	   The	  difference	  in	  these	  outcomes	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  
attacks	  on	  the	  subject.	  Instead	  of	  resisting	  via	  revolutionary	  upheaval,	  new	  language	  games,	  or	  




choleric	  resentment	  or	  disaffection.72	  Likewise,	  the	  subject	  does	  not	  always	  find	  a	  way	  to	  rebel	  
or	  even	  act	  out.	  As	  an	  ex-­‐prisoner	  of	  Guantánamo	  said,	  “I	  cannot	  describe	  in	  just	  a	  few	  lines	  the	  
suffering	   and	   the	   torture;	   but	   the	   worst	   aspect	   of	   being	   at	   the	   camp	   was	   the	   despair,	   the	  
feeling	  that	  whatever	  you	  say,	  it	  will	  never	  make	  a	  difference.”73	  This	  testimonial	  is	  a	  clue	  to	  the	  
central	   paradox	   of	   the	   attack	   on	   the	   subject:	   the	   implication	   of	   that	   subjectivity	   in	   its	   own	  
suffering.	  When	  Benchellali	  remarks,	  “whatever	  you	  say,	  it	  will	  never	  make	  a	  difference,”	  he	  is	  
venturing	  onto	  this	  terrain	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  made	  object	  only	  by	  being	  forced	  to	  act	  
against,	  even	  to	  kill,	  itself	  –	  not	  its	  corporeal	  carrier	  but	  its	  will.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  violence,	  Geuss	  
draws	  attention	  to	  this	  ideational	  determination	  of	  confinement,	  the	  work	  of	  subjectivity:	  	  
	  
Although	   “to	   coerce”	  means	   “to	   leave	  with	   no	   alternative	   but	   X,”	  what	   counts	   as	   having	   “no	  
alternative”	   is	   highly	   context	   dependent.	   “No	   alternative”	   usually	   means	   “no	   reasonable	  
alternative,”	   for	   example	   the	   choice	   between	   wage-­‐labor	   and	   starvation.	   Short	   of	   such	   dire	  
circumstances,	   in	  which	   death	   is	   one	   of	   two	   “alternatives,”	   “what	  will	   count	   as	   “reasonable”	  
depends	  very	  much	  on	  circumstances,	  and	  in	  particular	  on	  people’s	  beliefs	  and	  preferences.74	  
	  
	   The	  optimal	  mode	  of	  subordinating	  an	  agent	  appears	  indirectly	  in	  this	  passage,	  where	  a	  
captive	  is	  given	  a	  part	   in	  shaping	  or	  performing	  captivity.	   It	   is	  roughly	  the	  difference	  between	  
punishing	  a	  child	  and	  asking	  him	  to	  decide	  her	  punishment.75	  Subjectivity’s	  assault	  on	  itself,	  its	  
coercive	  turning	  of	  the	  will	  against	  itself,	  is	  a	  source	  of	  violence	  against	  oneself	  (e.g.,	  suicide	  or	  
self-­‐hatred)	  or	  against	  others	  (homicide	  or	  revolt).	  The	  dominant	  experience	  of	  a	  subject’s	  will’s	  
participation	   in	   its	  own	  annihilation	   is	  shame.	  Summarizing	  decades	  of	   research	   in	  settings	  of	  
humiliating	   social-­‐carceral	   confinement,	  Gilligan	   reports,	   “it	   is	  not	  poverty,	   racism,	   sexism,	  or	  
age-­‐discrimination,	  as	  such,	  that	  actually	  causes	  violence…	  
	  
It	  is,	  rather,	  that	  each	  correlates	  with	  violence	  because	  each	  increases	  the	  statistical	  probability	  




self-­‐destroying	  intensities	  of	  shame,	  from	  which	  they	  do	  not	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  having	  any	  
means	  of	   rescuing	   themselves	   except	   by	   violence	   –	  preferably	   toward	  others,	   as	   in	   homicide,	  
but	  also	  toward	  themselves,	  as	  in	  suicide,	  when	  homicide	  is	  not	  perceived	  as	  being	  possible,	  or	  
likely	  to	  succeed	  in	  reducing	  the	  shame	  to	  tolerable	  levels.76	  
	  
This	  insight	  has	  driven	  the	  CIA’s	  postwar	  research	  on	  torture:	  that	  the	  most	  powerful	  means	  to	  
compliant	  objectification	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  will	  or	  eviscerate	  subjectivity	  by	  forcing	  it	  to	  destroy	  
itself.	  According	  to	  McCoy,	  the	  breakthrough	  in	  torture	  techniques	  among	  researchers	  since	  the	  
1950s	  has	  been	  to	  remove	  the	  subject-­‐object	  relationship	  that	  prompts	  an	  immediate	  contest	  
between	   victims	   and	   torturers	   and	  even	  bolsters	   their	   resolve,	   sense	  of	   injustice,	   and	   so	  on.	  
Instead,	  the	  key	  to	  interrogation	  became	  the	  extraction	  of	  the	  enemy	  object	  and	  creation	  of	  a	  
subject-­‐object	  opposition	  within	  the	  inmate,	  crucially	  without	  opportunities	  for	  sublimation:	  	  	  	  
	  
[T]he	  CIA’s	  psychological	  paradigm	  fused	  two	  new	  methods,	  “sensory	  disorientation”	  and	  “self-­‐
inflicted	  pain,”	  whose	  combination	  causes	  victims	  to	  feel	  responsible	  for	  their	  suffering	  and	  thus	  
capitulate	  more	  readily	  to	  their	  torturers…Through	  relentless	  probing	   into	  the	  essential	  nature	  
of	   the	  human	  organism	   to	   identify	   its	  physiological	   and	  psychological	   vulnerabilities,	   the	  CIA’s	  
“sensory	  deprivation”	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  total	  assault	  on	  all	  senses	  and	  sensibilities	  –	  auditory,	  
visual,	   tactile,	   temporal,	   temperature,	   survival,	   sexual,	   and	   cultural…The	   fusion	   of	   these	   two	  
techniques	  creates	  a	  synergy	  of	  physical	  and	  psychological	  trauma	  whose	  sum	  is	  a	  hammer-­‐blow	  
to	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  personal	  identity.77	  
	  
To	  compel	  subjectivity	  to	  target	  or	  eradicate	  itself	  entails	  absolute	  and	  unmediated	  sovereignty	  
over	  a	  subject.	  This	  control,	  apotheosized	  in	  the	  concentration	  camp,	  has	  generated	  a	  literature	  
on	  biological	  and	  social	  death	  that	  concerns	  the	  death-­‐in-­‐life	  agent	  (an	  exemplary	  candidate	  for	  
Fanon’s	  dehumanization	  thesis).	  	  
Analyzing	  the	  concentration	  camp,	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  seizes	  on	  “the	  threshold	  between	  
the	  human	  and	  the	  inhuman.”78	  The	  camp	  is	  the	  singular	  spectral	  site	  of	  this	  continuum	  from	  
living	  to	  non-­‐living,	  proximate	  in	  its	  morphology	  and	  “mechanisms	  of	  power”79	  –	  its	  processes,	  




vulnerability,	  and	  degradation	  –	  govern	  many	  sites	  of	  domination:	  colonial	  conquest,	  apartheid,	  
partition,	   slavery,	  occupation,	  and	  martial	   law.	  These	  political	  orders	  and	  processes	  are	  often	  
condemned	  for	  separating	  human	  from	  inhuman,	  but	  only	  “the	  camp”	  is	  consistently	  viewed	  as	  
a	  torture	  room	  writ	   large.	  Torture	   is	  the	  governing	  technology	  in	  organizing	  and	  manipulating	  
this	  “threshold	  between	  the	  human	  and	  inhuman.”	  This	  discussion	  pertains	  directly	  to	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria,	  of	  course,	  because	  martial	  law	  in	  both	  countries	  exhibited	  the	  double	  logic	  of	  the	  
state	  of	  exception.	  In	  that	  logic	  individual	  and	  collective	  –	  the	  political	  body	  and	  body	  politic	  –	  
are	  attacked	  at	  once,	  reducing	  citizens	  and	  citizenry	  to	  objects	  of	  sovereign	  prerogative.	  
The	   humanóinhuman80	   spectrum	   specifies	   the	   social	   content	   of	   the	   biological	   form	  
alive/dead.	  Between	  creation	  and	  cessation	  of	  life,	  that	  is,	  lies	  a	  shorter	  continuum	  from	  human	  
to	  inhuman	  that	  differentiates	  life	  from	  human,	  death	  from	  inhuman.	  Imagine	  a	  spectrum	  from	  
biological	  to	  social	  life	  and	  social	  to	  biological	  death:	  	  
biological	  lifeóhuman-­‐lifeóhuman-­‐deathóbiological	  death	  
The	  objective	  of	  this	  schema	  is	  to	  show	  that	  human	  life	  and	  death	  lie	  between	  biological	  life	  and	  
death	  lie.	  We	  are	  born	  and	  we	  die	  biologically	  before	  and	  after	  we	  are	  socially	  born	  and	  die;	  our	  
biological	  birth/death	  contain	  our	  human	  birth/death.	  At	  some	  vanishing	  point,	  Agamben	  says,	  
the	  human	  qua	  social	   self	  goes	  away	  and	   leaves	  a	  still-­‐living	  body,	  but	  not	  a	  person.	  Here	  an	  
apparent	  asymmetry	  may	  bear	  on	  our	  thinking	  about	  subjects	  and	  objects	  of	  violence.	  It	  seems,	  
intuitively,	  that	  human	  life	  is	  more	  animated	  than	  biological	  life,	  but	  relatively	  counter-­‐intuitive	  
to	  view	  human	  death	  as	  more	  murdered	   than	  biological	  death.	  Ordinary	   language	  carries	   the	  
asymmetry;	  a	  living	  person	  becomes	  more	  enlivened	  but	  a	  dead	  person	  does	  not	  become	  more	  




sensibilities	  and	  social	  connotations.	  We	  add	  liveliness	  to	  life	  (becoming	  excited,	  energized)	  but	  
not	  deathliness	  to	  death	  (beginning	  to	  decompose).	  Moreover,	  we	  say	  that	  between	  birth	  and	  
death	  we	  live,	  we	  do	  not	  say	  we	  die.	  This	  is	  the	  orientation	  of	  subjectivity,	  which	  speaks	  its	  will	  
in	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  life	  and	  death.81	  
Agamben	   calls	   camp	   inhabitants	   “moving	   skeletons,”	   “walking	   corpses,”	   and	   “faceless	  
presences”	  who	  “inhabit	  ‘the	  limit	  between	  life	  and	  death.’”82	  He	  adduces	  Sofsky’s	  description	  
of	   “the	  ones	  who	   lie	   stretched	  out,	  unable	   to	  move,	  but	   still	  breathing	   slightly”83	   to	   show	  “a	  
point	  at	  which	  human	  beings,	  while	  apparently	  remaining	  human	  beings,	  cease	  to	  be	  human…	  
But	  what	   does	   it	  mean	   for	   a	   human	   to	   become	   non-­‐human?	   Is	   there	   a	   humanity	   of	   human	  
beings	   that	   can	   be	   distinguished	   and	   separated	   from	   human	   beings’	   biological	   humanity?”	  	  
Agamben	  separates	  life/death	  from	  human/non-­‐human	  here.	  Mobilizing	  Bettelheim’s	  memoirs,	  
he	  places	  the	  instant	  of	  transformation	  between	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  within	  the	  movement	  
or	  on	  the	  spectrum	  from	  life	  to	  death	  –	  between	  life	  and	  death.	  Somewhere	  between	  living	  and	  
dying,	  or	  after	  life	  and	  before	  death,	  prisoners	  become	  non-­‐human.84	  For	  Agamben	  “alive”	  and	  
“dead”	  are	  mechanically	  separable,	  but	  “human”	  and	  “inhuman”	  are	  “indistinguishable.”85	  	  
	   This	  moment	  of	  non-­‐humanity	  between	  human	  life	  and	  biological	  death	  is,	  I	  suspect,	  the	  
invisible	  and	  unsayable	  moment	  of	  objectification.	  We	  cannot	  know	  the	  instant	  of	  suffocation,	  
the	  final	  elimination	  of	  subjectivity,	  even	  as	  we	  ground	  empirical	  and	  normative	  projects	  in	  this	  
moment	  as	  the	  obverse	  of	   freedom.	  Asserted	   instants	  of	  dehumanization86	  proliferate	  among	  
für	   sich	   and	  an	   sich,	   action	   and	   activity,	   choosing	   and	   picking,	   drive	   and	   demand,	   agent	   and	  
structure,	   intention	  and	   interpellation,	  revolution	  and	   institution.	  Agamben	  complicates	  these	  




prisoners	  are	  spatially	  “captured	  outside”	  sovereign	  order	  and	  temporally	  “inscribed”	  between	  
birth	   (nudity)	   and	   state	   (nationality).87	  Agamben’s	  monistic	   abstraction	  of	  modernity	   posits	   a	  
camp	  that	  overwhelms,	  reduces,	  and	  eliminates	  human	  life.88	  He	  is,	  then,	  one	  of	  the	  skeptics	  I	  
adduced	  in	  discussing	  the	  concept	  of	  violence	  who	  claims	  subjectivity	  is	  decided	  in	  advance	  by	  
social	  systems.	  As	  this	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  cases	  of	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  a	  depiction	  of	  either	  
society	  as	   inherently	  a	  necropolis	  blurs	   the	  distinction	  between	  martial	   law	  and	  “normal”	   life	  
under	  and	  after	  authoritarian	   rule.	  Agamben	  has	  been	   too	   roundly	  attacked	   for	  his	   apparent	  
conflation	  of	  all	  modernity	  and	  the	  camp,	  but	  here	  that	  criticism	  applies.89	  	  	  	  
	   This	  moment	   of	   non-­‐humanity	   comes	  with	  many	   losses;	   responsibility,	   self,	  meaning,	  
ethics,	  love,	  guilt,	  desire,	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  ordinary	  life	  are	  said	  to	  fall	  away,	  skin	  flaking	  off	  
a	   desiccated	   being	   to	   reveal	   “the	   abstract	   nakedness	   of	   being	   nothing	   but	   human.”90	   In	   her	  
harrowing	  and	  surreal	  account	  of	  Aztec	  ritual	  murders,	  Clendinnen	  reports	  “a	  strange	  docility	  in	  
the	  behavior	  of	  the	  non-­‐warrior	  victims	  of	  the	  mass	  killings	  which	  suggests	  the	  depths	  of	  their	  
social	  and	  psychological	  dislocation.”91	  These	  automatons	  resemble	  the	  subjects-­‐into-­‐objects	  of	  
torture	  chambers	  and	   indefinite	  detention	  centers:	  “The	  prisoner	   is	  de-­‐subjectified	  –	   in	  every	  
sense	  of	   the	  word	   ‘subject'	  –	  political,	  psychological,	  and	  philosophical.	  She	   is	  denied	  agency,	  
stripped	   of	   her	   individuality,	   subjected	   to	   cruel	   and	   inhumane	   treatment,	   and	   quite	   literally	  
objectified.”92	  Arendt’s	  effort	  to	  name	  those	  humans	  “forced	  out	  of	  all	  political	  communities,”	  
equally	  palpable,	  replays	  lengthy	  quotation:	  	  	  
	  
[A]	  man	  who	   is	  nothing	  but	  a	  man	  has	   lost	   the	  very	  qualities	  which	  make	   it	  possible	   for	  other	  
people	   to	   treat	   him	   as	   a	   fellow	   man…Regardless	   of	   treatment,	   independent	   of	   liberties	   or	  
oppression,	  justice	  or	  injustice,	  they	  have	  lost	  all	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  and	  all	  those	  aspects	  
of	   human	   existence	   which	   are	   the	   result	   of	   our	   common	   labor,	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   human	  




cannot	  master,	   yet	   upon	  whose	   abundance	   or	   frugality	   they	   depend	   for	   their	   livelihood,	   that	  
they	  live	  and	  die	  without	   leaving	  any	  trace,	  without	  having	  contributed	  anything	  to	  a	  common	  
world,	   then	   these	   rightless	   people	   are	   indeed	   thrown	   back	   into	   a	   peculiar	   state	   of	  
nature…[T]hey	   appear	   as	   the	   first	   signs	   of	   a	   possible	   regression	   from	   civilization…Those	   who	  
have	   lost	   all	   distinctive	   political	   qualities	   and	   have	   become	   human	   beings	   and	   nothing	  
else…become	  some	  specimen	  of	  an	  animal	  species,	  called	  man.93	  
	  
	  	  One	  aspect	  of	  this	  mere	  human	  is	  the	  evacuation	  of	  outrage	  that	  a	  victim	  might	  hold	  
against	  a	  perpetrator,	  a	  moral	  blankness	  easily	  mistaken	  for	  a	  robust	  ethical	  theory	  of	  fatalism	  
or	  cynicism.	  Marcus	  contrasts	  reactions	  to	  the	  Black	  Plague,	  with	  its	  self-­‐flagellating	  theodicy,	  to	  
the	  Irish	  potato	  famine,	  “the	  first	  disaster	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  history	  which	  was	  widely	  responded	  to,	  
and	   continues	   to	   be	   thought	   of,	   as	   a	  moral	   outrage.”94	   By	   1845,	   an	   exculpatory	   theodicy	   or	  
“religious	  argument”	  would	  “serve	  a	  classic	  ideological	  function…to	  screen	  other	  interests	  and	  
motives,”	   viz.	   British	   exploitation.	   As	   Marcus	   notes,	   “death	   itself	   is	   relative	   and	   historical,”	  
however	  “absolute…as	  a	  fact.”95	  But	  “ideological”	  or	  “justificatory”	  supports	  for	  modern	  mass	  
atrocity	   are	   rooted	   in	   deeper	   paradigmatic	   or	   epistemic	   conditions	   of	   possibility.	   Describing	  
“total	  domination,”	  Arendt	  conveys	  similar	  means	  of	  the	  carceral	  state:	  “The	  camps	  are	  meant	  
not	   only	   to	   exterminate	   people	   and	   degrade	   human	   beings,	   but	   also	   to	   serve	   the	   ghastly	  
experiment	   of	   eliminating,	   under	   scientifically	   controlled	   conditions,	   spontaneity	   itself	   as	   an	  
expression	  of	  human	  behavior	  and	  of	  transforming	  the	  human	  personality	  into	  a	  mere	  thing.”96	  	  
Arendt	  depicts	  totalitarianism	  as	  an	  objectification	  process,	  the	  reduction	  of	  subjective	  
to	  biological	  life,	  or	  even	  to	  death,	  accomplished	  with	  the	  strangulating	  combination	  of	  coercive	  
force	  and	  diminution	  of	  persons’	  sense	  of	  self.	  Having	  made	  some	  sense	  of	  a	  real	  condition	  of	  
objectification,	  noting	   that	  even	  extreme	  conditions	  of	   captivity,	  brutality,	  and	  destitution	  do	  
not	  dictate	   the	   subjectivity	   of	   its	   victims,	   perhaps	  we	   can	   reverse	   course,	  with	  Arendt’s	   own	  




two	  things	  for	  my	  broader	  argument.	  First,	  her	  melancholic	  and	  optimistic	  views	  of	  a	  valuable	  
life	   defiantly	   derived	   from	  her	   relentless	   account	  of	   the	   camp,	  map	  over	   Polish	   and	  Algerian	  
responses	  to	  authoritarianism.	  Second,	  her	  normative	  commentary	  on	  modern	  power	  and	  the	  
subject	  of	  the	  camp	  help	  me	  reinforce	  the	  significance	  of	  objectification	  in	  my	  account	  broadly.	  
In	   tracing	   the	  concentration	  camp	   to	  bourgeois-­‐imperial	  expansion	  and	   the	  Minorities	  
Treaties,	  Arendt	  detects	  a	  core	  struggle	  over	  the	  public	  sphere	  between	  national(ist)	  and	  legal	  
orientations.	  Her	  accounts	  of	  these	  alternatives	  inflect	  by	  extending	  my	  characterizations	  of	  the	  
similarities	   of	   Polish	   to	  Algerian	   activism	   to	   the	  mobilizations	  per	   se.	   First,	   then,	  Arendt	   held	  
conflicted	  views	  of	  national	  identity.	  It	  troubles	  her	  that	  between	  the	  world	  wars	  international	  
politics	  were	  “organized”	  around	  nationalist	  states.	  Her	  concern	   is	  “the	  transformation	  of	  the	  
state	  from	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  law	  into	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  nation,”	  in	  which	  “the	  nation	  has	  
conquered	  the	  state”	  and	  “national	  interest	  had	  priority	  over	  the	  law.”97	  However,	  Arendt	  also	  
recognizes	  that	  national	  identification	  may	  be	  needed	  for	  the	  linguistic	  competence	  to	  support	  
public	  rationality,	  and	  could	  be	  supported	  as	  an	  “ethical	  substance”	  of	  a	  people	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did	  
not	  cross	  the	  line	  into	  reactionary	  and	  chauvinistic	  nationalism.	  Especially	  given	  her	  attraction	  
to	   Burke,	   Arendt’s	   distinction	   between	   a	  worthy	   national	   public	   and	   a	   detestable	   nationalist	  
sentiment	  records	  a	   tension	  that	   troubled	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  activists	   in	  a	  similar	  way.	  Poles	  
and	  Algerians	  opposed	  allegedly	  secular-­‐socialist	  regimes	  with	  national	  and	  religious	  discourses	  
by	  which	  they	  protected,	  sustained,	  or	  re-­‐constituted	  their	  subjectivity.	  It	  is	  easily	  overlooked,	  
given	   working	   class	   and	   religious	   codings	   of	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   dissent	   but	   those	   manifest	  
expressions	  of	  identity	  were	  mobilized	  and	  couched	  in	  national	  themes	  that	  greatly	  assisted	  the	  




necessary	  for	  social	  cohesion,	  rights,	  and	  law	  to	  survive	  against	  totalitarian	  logics	  figured	  in	  the	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  efforts	  to	  reclaim	  their	  citizenship	  against	  tyrannical	  states.98	  
National	  or	  cultural	  identity	  provided	  a	  public	  language	  necessary	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  an	  
argument	  Arendt	  illustrates	  by	  comparing	  universal	  assimilation	  under	  Roman	  law	  to	  particular,	  
discretionary	  exclusions	  typical	  of	  European	  imperial	  juridical	  forms.	  In	  a	  little	  noted	  paradox	  of	  
her	  work,	  Arendt	  advocates	  universal	  lawfulness	  but	  acknowledges	  that	  law	  must	  work	  through	  
particular	  languages	  or	  local	  ethics.	  Intuiting	  the	  “predicament”	  of	  moral	  diversity	  following	  the	  
demise	  of	  divine	  or	  natural	  law,	  Arendt	  condemns	  particular	  and	  universal	  ethical	  systems	  alike	  
for	  irrationally	  fusing	  the	  notions	  of	  “good”	  and	  “right.”	  She	  describes	  as	  fascist	  	  	  
	  
a	  conception	  of	  the	  law	  that	  identifies	  what	  is	  right	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  what	  is	  good	  for	  –	  for	  the	  
individual,	   or	   the	   family,	   or	   the	  people,	   or	   the	   largest	  number	  –	  becomes	   inevitable	  once	   the	  
absolute	   and	   transcendent	   measurements	   of	   religion	   or	   the	   law	   of	   nature	   have	   lost	   their	  
authority.	  [T]his	  predicament	  is	  by	  no	  means	  solved	  if	  the	  unit	  to	  which	  the	  "good	  for"	  applies	  is	  
as	   large	   as	  mankind	   itself.	   For	   it	   is	   quite	   conceivable,	   and	   even	  within	   the	   realm	   of	   practical	  
political	   possibilities,	   that	   one	   fine	   day	   a	   highly	   organized	   and	   mechanized	   humanity	   will	  
conclude	  quite	  democratically	  –	  namely	  by	  majority	  decision	  –	  that	  for	  humanity	  as	  a	  whole	   it	  
would	  be	  better	  to	  liquidate	  certain	  parts	  thereof...99	  
	  
Arendt’s	  conception	  of	   law	  addresses	  the	  absolute	  sovereignty	  asserted	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  
under	  emergency	  conditions.	  Her	  account	  of	  the	  ethical	  corruption	  of	  modernity	  maps	  closely	  
over	  the	  dissident	  discourses	  of	  Solidarity	  and	  FIS.	  She	  identifies	  the	  lost	  world	  of	  universalism,	  
of	  the	  “transcendental”	  compass	  of	  religious	  or	  natural	  law.	  This	  insight	  seems	  poignant	  given	  
the	   religious	   inspiration	   Poles	   and	   Algerians	   took,	   often	   in	   the	   language	   of	   rights	   and	  
fundamental	   social	   obligations,	   against	   modern	   states	   whose	   patterns	   Arendt	   assails.	   Her	  




“unenforceable”	   human	   rights	   recalls	   the	   appeals	   among	   citizens	   in	   Algeria	   and	   Poland	   for	  
redress	  against	  social	  abjection,	  against	  being	  “captured	  outside”	  the	  autocratic	  state.100	  	  
	   Specifically,	  what	  is	  lost	  or	  abandoned	  in	  modernity,	  Arendt	  says,	  is	  the	  universal	  sense	  
of	  human	  being	  envisioned	  in	  Christian	  or	  natural	  law	  addresses-­‐to-­‐all,	  the	  absolute	  hospitality	  
offered	  to	  outcasts.	  Maria	  Langthaler,	  a	  German	  who	  rescued	  Russian	  camp	  escapees	  in	  1945,	  
articulated	  this	  universalism:	  “The	  Lord	  God	  is	  for	  the	  whole	  world,	  not	  only	  for	  Germans.	  It	  is	  a	  
community	  and	   there	  one	  must	  help.	   I	  did	  not	  ask	   them	  to	  which	  party	   they	  belong,	   I	   asked	  
nothing	  at	  all;	  that	  made	  no	  difference	  to	  me.	  Only	  because	  they	  were	  human	  beings.”101	  “Only	  
with	   a	   completely	   organized	   humanity	   could	   the	   loss	   of	   home	   and	   political	   status	   become	  
identical	  with	   expulsion	   from	   humanity	   altogether,”	   Arendt	   laments.	   Anticipating	   Agamben’s	  
“bare	  life”	  and	  Rubinstein’s	  “superfluous	  populations,”102	  she	  remarks:	  	  	  
	  
Before	  this,	  what	  we	  must	  call	  a	  “human	  right”	  today	  would	  have	  been	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  general	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  which	  no	  tyrant	  could	  take	  away.	  Its	  loss	  entails	  the	  loss	  
of	  the	  relevance	  of	  speech…and	  all	  human	  relationship,	  the	  loss,	  in	  other	  words,	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
most	   essential	   characteristics	   of	   human	   life…	   [I]t	   is	   possible	   to	   say	   that	   even	   slaves	   still	  
belonged	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  human	  community;	  their	  labor	  was	  needed,	  used,	  and	  exploited,	  and	  
this	  kept	   them	  within	   the	  pale	  of	  humanity.	  To	  be	  a	  slave	  was,	  after	  all,	   to	  have	  a	  distinctive	  
character,	  a	  place	  in	  society	  –	  more	  than	  the	  abstract	  nakedness	  of	  being	  human	  and	  nothing	  
but	  human.103	  	  	  	  
	  
Arendt’s	  sensitivity	  about	  “being	  human	  and	  nothing	  but	  human”	  is	  not	  an	  abstract	  philosophy,	  
but	  the	  real	  politics	  Algerians	  and	  Poles	  faced	  as	  their	  efforts	  to	  assert	  their	  rights	  to	  citizenship	  
against	  discredited	  dictatorships.	  During	  martial	  law’s	  humiliating	  concentration	  camps,	  torture,	  
threatened	   expulsion,	   Algerians	   and	   Poles	   neared	   the	   reified	   state	   Fanon	   described,	   the	   line	  
Agamben	  conjures	  between	  biological	  and	  social	  life,	  and	  Arendt’s	  “nothing	  but	  human.”	  As	  this	  




the	  reduction	  of	  the	  subject	  to	  a	  thing-­‐acted-­‐upon	  is	  mediated	  through	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  
victims,	  at	  least	  up	  to	  the	  final	  extermination	  of	  biological	  life.	  
	  
§2.e	   Evaluations	  of	  Violence	  
	  
In	  Cabrini	  Green,	  a	  public	  project	  in	  Chicago,	  poor	  white	  and	  black	  kids	  used	  to	  face	  off	  
in	  the	  “glass	  wars”	  game,	  
	  
slinging	   panes	   of	   glass	   across	   the	   street,	   like	   skipping	   stones	   across	   the	  water;	  when	   you	   cut	  
someone	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  you	  scored	  a	  point.	  For	  children	  the	  glass	  wars	  more	  provided	  the	  
pleasure	   of	   physical	   violence	   than	   expressed	   racial	   hate…The	   thrill	   of	   the	   glass	  wars	  was	   the	  
blood.	   Players	   scored	   few	  points	   directly,	   since	   it	  was	   easy	   to	   peer	   outside	   and	   see	   the	   glass	  
coming.	  The	  game	  became	  dangerous	  when	  errant	  panes	  shattered	  against	  the	  back	  walls	  of	  the	  
rooms;	  players	  got	  shards	  of	  glass	  stuck	  in	  their	  ankles	  or	  hands.	  	  	  
Once,	  however,	  a	  young	  black	  girl	  nearly	  died	  of	  a	  cut	  to	  her	  neck.	  Her	  teammates	  got	  
her	   to	   a	   hospital	   by	   flagging	   down	   a	   passing	   bus;	   the	   hospital	   called	   not	   the	   parents	   but	   the	  
police,	  the	  police	  again	  called	  the	  school	  rather	  than	  the	  parents,	  the	  school	  called	  out	  a	  platoon	  
of	   social	   workers,	   who	   descended	   on	   the	   community.	   The	   parents	   thus	   learned	   about	   the	  
incident	  only	  after	   it	  was	  over,	  managed	  by	  professionals…Evidently	  our	  white	  neighbors	  were	  
angry	  at	  the	  authorities	  for	  interfering;	  the	  black	  parents	  were	  more	  angry	  at	  their	  own	  children	  
for	   attracting	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   authorities.	   The	   difference	   makes	   sense.	   Down	   South,	   an	  
incident	  like	  this	  could	  have	  sparked	  off	  attacks	  on	  black	  adults;	  the	  demons	  of	  racism	  could	  be	  
roused	   no	   matter	   who	   was	   the	   victim.	   For	   the	   Chicago	   whites,	   the	   problem	   was	   that	   the	  
authorities	  had	  usurped	  the	  parental	  role.104	  
	  
Under	   identical	  objective	  conditions	  of	  material	  deprivation	  and	  political	  powerlessness	  these	  
two	  racialized	  collective	  subjects	  reacted	  to	  the	  same	  disturbance	  in	  morally,	  analytically,	  and	  
behaviorally	   disparate	  ways.105	   For	   these	   sub-­‐populations	   the	   social	   and	   political	  mapping	   of	  
parents,	  kids,	  each	  other,	  and	  authorities	  (police,	  school,	  social	  work)	  holds	  different	  meanings	  
carried	  over	  and	   reinforced106	   from	  contrary	  experiences.107	  As	  obvious	  as	   this,	   it	   stands	  as	  a	  
historical	   and	   subjective	   rebuttal	   to	   the	   “synchronic	   gaze”	   of	   a	   structural	   or	   institutional	  
rationality	   that	   “bracket[s]	   the	   question	   of	   the	   processes	   that	   produced	   [this	   difference]	   in	  




urbanism,	  and	  space,”	  in	  Katznelson’s	  phrase,109	  differentiates	  responses	  to	  authority	  in	  places	  
like	  Cabrini	  Green110	  and	  speaks	  lifelong	  constructions	  of	  social	  subjectivity	  and	  signification.111	  	  	  	  
	   This	  section	  is	  meant	  to	  add	  one	  last	  element	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  violence,	  its	  experiential	  
evaluation	  by	  the	  wounded.	  Sennett’s	  story	  about	  the	  past’s	  imprint	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  police	  
presence	  for	  white	  and	  black	  parents	  shows	  that	  historical	  conditions	  trump	  current	  conditions	  
in	  politically	  relevant	  responses	  to	  threat	  or	  injury.	  Clearly	  we	  are	  shaped	  by	  our	  pasts,	  although	  
it	  is	  another	  claim	  to	  say	  that	  the	  past	  overwhelms	  the	  present.	  This	  latter	  claim	  is	  often	  made	  
under	  duress	  where	   sunnier	   times	  are	   recalled	  as	   a	   resource	   in	   struggle	  or	   survival.	   “There’s	  
been	  the	  growth	  of	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  historical	  consciousness	  recently,”	  Ringelblum	  observed.	  
“We	  tie	   in	   fact	  after	   fact	   from	  our	  daily	  experience	  with	  the	  events	  of	  history.”112	  Sometimes	  
awareness	  of	  history,	  of	  events	  passing,	   is	  as	  much	  a	  source	  of	  strength	  as	  specific	  memories;	  
as	  Das	  says,	  “I	  have	  tried	  to	  conceptualize	  the	  violence	  that	  occurs	  within	  the	  weave	  of	  life	  as	  
lived	   in	   the	  kinship	  universe	  as	  having	  a	   sense	  of	   the	  past	   continuous,	  while	   the	   sudden	  and	  
traumatic	  violence	  that	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Partition	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  frozen.”113	  In	  this	  section	  I	  
will	  endorse	  and	  qualify	  this	  idea	  that	  historical	  experience	  influences	  our	  responses	  to	  events.	  
This	  is	  a	  pivotal	  element	  in	  my	  argument	  because	  I	  claim	  that	  opposition	  movements	  respond	  
to	  immediate	  suffering	  by	  evaluating	  their	  status	  as	  citizens	  and	  subjects	  based	  on	  their	   long-­‐
term,	  previous	  experiences	   interacting	  with	   the	   regime.	   I	   qualify	   this	   insight	  by	   claiming	   that	  
experiential	  evaluations	  are	  not	  free-­‐floating	  idealist	  constructs	  but	  reflect	  the	  ongoing	  material	  
circumstances	  and	  resources	  of	  those	  past	  interactions.	  That	  these	  statements	  are	  truisms	  suits	  
my	  larger	  argument	  that	  what	  is	  obvious	  intuitively	  has	  been	  bracketed	  in	  explanations	  of	  social	  




	   Václav	  Havel	  called	  hope	  an	  “orientation	  of	  the	  heart	  [that]	  transcends	  the	  world	  that	  is	  
immediately	  experienced,	  and	  is	  anchored	  somewhere	  beyond	  its	  horizons.”114	  This	  enigmatic	  
statement	  can	  be	  troubling	  if	  not	  debilitating	  to	  social	  explanation,	  invoking	  transcendence	  and	  
resources	  from	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  horizon	  that	  force	  us	  to	  acknowledge,	  especially	  in	  cases	  
of	  self-­‐risking	  activism,	  that	  hope	  itself	  must	  be	  anything	  but	  immediately	  justified.	  In	  analyzing	  
race	  and	  ideology	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Fields	  does	  not	  discuss	  hope	  directly	  but	  is	  concerned	  to	  
refute	  the	  view	  that	  ideologies	  can	  have	  such	  autonomous	  power.	  With	  particular	  relevance	  to	  
experiential	  evaluation,	  she	  proclaims	  what	  ideology	  “is	  not”:	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  a	  material	  entity,	  a	  thing	  of	  any	  sort,	  that	  you	  can	  hand	  down	  like	  an	  old	  garment,	  pass	  
on	   like	   a	   germ,	   spread	   like	   a	   rumor,	   or	   impose	   like	   a	   code	   of	   dress	   or	   etiquette.	   Nor	   is	   it	   a	  
collection	   of	   disassociated	   beliefs	   –	   “attitudes”	   is	   the	   favored	   jargon	   among	   American	   social	  
scientists	  and	  the	  historians	  they	  have	  mesmerized	  –	  that	  you	  can	  extract	  from	  their	  context	  and	  
measure	   by	   current	   or	   retrospective	   survey	   research…Nor	   is	   it	   a	   Frankenstein	   monster	   that	  
takes	  on	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own…115	  
	  
Fields	   insists	   that	   the	   ideology	  of	   racism	  exists	  only	   as	   long	  as	   it	   reflects	   the	   true	  practice	  of	  
racism.	  In	  short,	  a	  society	  that	  ceases	  to	  exploit	  people	  on	  a	  racist	  basis	  will	  cease	  to	  have	  any	  
use	  for	  the	  absurd	  idea	  of	  “race,”	  which	  will	  dissolve;	  in	  reverse,	  the	  presence	  of	  racism	  proves	  
the	  prevalence	  of	  racial	  exploitation,	  domination,	  and	  injustice.	  Fields	  holds,	  then,	  that	  ideas	  of	  
any	  social	  consequence,	  such	  as	  racist	  ideology,	  reflect	  a	  material	  baseline	  in	  political	  economy.	  	  
	   This	  conventional	  Marxist	  definition	  of	   ideology	   informs	  my	  project	   for	   the	  principle	   it	  
upholds	  –	   the	  embodied	   imbrication	  of	  material	  and	   ideal	   conditions	  of	   social	   life.	  When	   the	  
Solidarity	  and	  FIS	  movements	  emerged,	  I	  argue,	  they	  reacted	  as	  citizen-­‐subjects	  to	  the	  status	  of	  
their	  social	  resources.	  Poles	  retained	  the	  strike	  option,	  if	  in	  a	  suspended	  form,	  but	  Algerians	  lost	  
their	  meaningful	  political	  membership	  altogether.	  I	  have	  attributed	  the	  situation	  where	  activists	  




communists’	   last	   gasp	   but	   Islamists	   perceived	   the	   Algerian	   pouvoir’s	   crushing	   victory	   –	   to	  
subjective	  evaluations	  of	  objective	  conditions,	  conceptually	  clarifying	  this	  point	  in	  the	  previous	  
section.	  When	  martial	   law	  prevented	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  alike	   from	  using	   the	   resources	   that	  
had	  formed	  their	  subjectivity	  as	  citizens,	  it	  was	  objectively	  true	  that	  neither	  Poles	  nor	  Algerians	  
had	  effective	  tools	   for	  membership	   in	  the	  society	  –	  they	  were	  both	  objectively	  dehumanized.	  
But	  Poles	  and	  the	  Polish	  political	  economy	  did	  not	  lose	  the	  systemic	  promise	  of	  necessary	  labor	  
power,	  so	  their	  social	  resource	  was	  in	  abeyance,	  immanent	  in	  the	  overall	  social	  structure	  and	  in	  
their	  physical,	  embodied	   lives	  as	  workers.	  These	  are	   the	  points	   I	  would	  stress	   in	   saying	  more	  
about	  ideology:	  that	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  and	  experiential	  evaluation	  –	  like	  ideology	  in	  the	  sense	  
Fields	  intends	  –	  are	  objective	  and	  subjective,	  material	  and	  ideal,	  as	  well	  as	  mental	  and	  physical.	  
This	  is	  not	  a	  recent	  insight,	  but	  an	  element	  of	  Marx’s	  sociology	  affirmed	  in	  my	  research.	  This	  is,	  
finally,	  pertinent	  to	  the	  outcome	  as	  subjective	  evaluations	  and	  objective	  conditions	  converge	  in	  
the	  dependent	  variable	  violence/non-­‐violence.	  	  	  	  
	   The	  concept	  “ideology,”	  manifestly	  related	  to	  my	  preferred	  concept	  of	  “evaluation,”	  has	  
long	   been	   associated	   with	   a	   simplistic	   sense	   of	   truth/falsity	   and	   “flawed”	   understanding.116	  
“Ideology	   consists,”	   Žižek	   says,	   “in	   the	  very	   fact	   that	   the	  people	   ‘do	  not	  know	  what	   they	  are	  
really	  doing,’	   that	   they	  have	  a	   false	   representation	  of	   the	   social	   reality	   to	  which	   they	  belong	  
(the	  distortion	  produced,	  of	  course,	  by	  the	  same	  reality).”117	  This	  conventional	  case	  of	  ideology	  
appears	   in	  Marx’s	  depiction	  of	   liberal	  “false	  consciousness”;	  we	  think	  ourselves	  free	  when	  we	  
vote	   in	   elections	   that	   capitalist	   rationality	   establishes	   to	   eliminate	   our	   freedom.	   That	   is,	   we	  
think	  we	  are	   free	  voters	   choosing	  candidates,	  but	  we	  are	   really	  doing	  capitalist	  atomism	  and	  




patriarchal	  conservatism;	  we	  think	  we’re	  fighting	  a	  “war	  on	  terror,”	  but	  we	  are	  really	  doing	  the	  
military-­‐industrial	   complex.	   In	  all	   such	  accounts	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  we	  are	   really	  doing;	  we	  
are	  misled,	  confused,	  and	  bewildered	  –	  misrecognizing	  our	  world	  and	  necessarily	  ourselves.118	  
If	  asked	  what	  we	  are	  doing,	  we	  would	  get	   it	  wrong	  –	  our	  knowledge	  of	  our	  activity	  would	  be	  
incorrect.	  Any	  revolutionary	  project	  of	  human	  emancipation	   from	  this	  social	   falsity	   requires	  a	  
total	  critique	  of	   the	   ideology	   that	  systemically	  converts	  capitalism	   into	  democracy,	  patriarchy	  
into	  romance,	  the	  military-­‐industrial	  complex	  into	  the	  “war	  on	  terror.”	   If	   ideology	  falsifies	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  social	  world	  to	  enslave	  us	  in	  illusion,	  distraction,	  and	  artifice,	  then	  freedom	  can	  be	  
realized	  only	  by	  casting	  truth,	  clarity,	  or	  reality	  against	  ideology.	  	  
	   The	  sources	  of	  illusion	  and	  misrecognition	  morphed	  across	  Marx’s	  writings	  on	  ideology.	  
If	  Marx	   had	   an	   “early”	   style	   or	   sensibility,	   it	   is	   a	   romantic	   strain	   in	   depicting	   imaginative	   re-­‐
humanization.	  In	  “On	  the	  Jewish	  Question”	  Marx	  claims	  that	  the	  human	  need	  for	  free,	  creative,	  
and	  social	  existence	  drives	  alienated,	  exploited	  people	  to	  project	  their	  quashed	  capacities	  into	  
expressive	  fantasies.	  Religion,	  democracy,	  liberalism,	  and	  human	  rights	  express	  in	  “inverted”	  or	  
“mediated”	  ways	  repressed	  human	  capacities	  –	  “the	  [self-­‐]recognition	  of	  man	  in	  a	  roundabout	  
way,	  through	  an	  intermediary.”119	  Humans	  translate	  their	  besieged	  potency	  into	  fantasies	  of	  an	  
all-­‐powerful	  deity,	  their	  desire	  for	  community	  into	  democratic	  faith,	  and	  their	  exploited	  labor-­‐
power	   into	   images	   of	   capitalism	  expelled	   from	   the	   collective	   self,	   viz.	   the	  public	   realm.	   Such	  
inversions	   mean	   that	   people	   invent	   narratives,	   symbols,	   or	   spaces	   above	   and	   beyond	   their	  
material	   conditions	   as	   they	   reclaim,	   indirectly,	   their	   human	   essence.	   In	   addition,	   in	   a	   rarely	  
grasped	  aspect	  of	  Marx’s	  analysis,	   these	   fantasies	  do	  not	  merely	   invert	   the	  world	  or	  produce	  




they	   live	   in.	   For	   instance,	   religious	   belief	   does	   not	   merely	   project	   humanity	   as	   divinity	   in	   a	  
soothing	  theodicy	  of	  salvation,	  but	  it	  also	  contains	  a	  direct	  rejection	  of	  religion	  itself.	  Although	  
religious	  people	  do	  not	  realize	  it,	  by	  demanding	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state,	  that	  church	  
be	  privatized,	  they	  are	  actually	  declaring	  that	  they	  want	  theology	  purged	  from	  public	  life,	  from	  
themselves,	  the	  public.	  Likewise,	  the	  superficial	  commitment	  to	  liberal	  individualism	  is	  a	  coded	  
message	  that	  denounces	  bourgeois	  ethics	  by	  banishing	  them	  from	  the	  communal	  order.	  	  	  
	   Ideology’s	  falsity	  and	  truth	  here	  lie	  in	  human	  invention	  –	  it	  is	  a	  fictive	  but	  real	  expression	  
of	  human	  suffering.	  In	  early	  Marxian	  schemes,	  antipodean	  class	  versus	  human	  desires	  generate	  
an	  ideological	  consciousness	  whose	  falsity	  is	  a	  psychic	  simulacrum	  and	  social	  displacement	  that	  
exceeds,	   transcends,	  or	  negates	  material	   conditions	   and	   resources.	   Experience	  of	   the	   factory	  
floor	  does	  not	  directly	  create	  the	  false	  beliefs	  (religion,	  democracy,	  rights)	  that	  express	  true	  if	  
suffocated	  human	  attributes;	  rather,	  the	  inextinguishable	  human	  character	  adds	  to	  the	  material	  
reality	  a	  re-­‐humanizing	  assertion	  of	  psychological	  autonomy	  and	  social	  irreducibility:	  imagined	  
deities	  who	  will	  rescue	  us	  in	  the	  anti-­‐capitalist	  afterlife.	  This	  version	  of	  ideology	  –	  where	  reified	  
humans	  superimpose	  on	  their	  physical,	  embodied	  lives	  compensatory	  fantasies	  rooted	  in	  their	  
own	  denied	  subjectivity	  –	  combines	  the	  social	  truth	  (of	  exploitation)	  and	  falsity	  (religion/rights).	  
The	  cause	  of	   ideology	   is	  class	  domination	  and	  exploitation;	   its	  source	   is	  psychological	   redress	  
exceeding	  the	  immediate	  experience	  of	  material	  conditions.	  In	  this	  way,	  ideologies	  of	  religion,	  
democracy,	   liberalism,	  and	  rights	  are	  quasi-­‐autonomous	  inventions	  of	  the	  mind	  re-­‐configuring	  
the	  world	  against	  its	  material	  determination.	  
	   In	  Marx’s	  early	  writing	  on	  ideology,	  then,	  we	  find	  “a	  theory	  of	  historically	  specific	  social	  




of	  a	  historical/material	  reality	  they	  don’t	  fully	  apprehend.”120	  To	  believe	  in	  religion	  or	  God,	  one	  
refuses	  the	  material	  reality	  of	  the	  cash	  nexus	  in	  one’s	  mind,	  hopes,	  and	  becoming	  but	  in	  a	  way	  
that	   is	   also	   a	   re-­‐materialization	   of	   one’s	   own	   experience,	   re-­‐oriented	   by	   the	   discipline	   and	  
release	  of	  faith.	  In	  this	  ideology,	  the	  falsity	  refracts,	  performs,	  and	  generates	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  
truths:	   bourgeois	   truths	   of	   wage	   labor,	   repressed	   truths	   of	   human	   capacity,	   and	   emergent	  
truths	  of	   revolution.	   The	   falsity-­‐truth	  dialectic	   here	  originates	   in	   the	  mental-­‐spiritual	  work	  of	  
the	  aggrieved	  as	   innate,	   involuntary	  abreaction.	  The	  key	  point	  here	   is	   that	  the	  falsity,	  seen	   in	  
the	  fetishes	  of	  God,	  voting,	  or	  rights-­‐discourse,	  does	  not	  directly	  translate	  but	  rather	  indirectly	  
transcends	  material	  existence;	  that	  is,	  the	  beliefs	  deeply	  held	  by	  the	  objectified	  and	  exploited	  
inhabitants	  of	  feudal	  or	  bourgeois	  orders	  cannot	  be	  inferred	  or	  deduced	  from	  their	  experience;	  
they	   invent	  narratives,	   images,	  and	  happy	  endings	  as	  an	  act	  of	   reclaiming	  by	  expressing	  their	  
humanity;	  and	  they	  do	  this	  not	  as	  objects	  or	  subjects	  in	  the	  ordinary	  senses	  of	  these	  terms,	  but	  
as	  liminal	  object-­‐subjects	  whose	  human	  “essence”	  expresses	  itself	  in	  images	  that	  mediate	  and	  
meliorate	  suffering	  and	  alienation.	  	  
	   “Later”	  Marx	  offers	  another	  version	  of	  ideology	  that	  re-­‐locates	  the	  falsity	  of	  ideology	  in	  
doing	  rather	  than	  knowing	  (fantasizing).	  Marx	  re-­‐situates	  the	  fetish	  and	  its	  origin	  in	  an	  account	  
of	  false	  consciousness	  radiating	  directly	  from	  the	  production-­‐consumption	  process.	  He	  sees	  the	  
fetish	   as	   the	   commodity-­‐form	   consolidated	  when	  we	   value	   the	   products	   of	   labor	   instead	   of	  
production	  or	   labor	  as	   such.	   In	  passages	  on	  “contemplative	  materialism”121	  and	  “fetishism	  of	  
commodities	  and	  the	  secret	  thereof”122	  Marx	  answers	  materialist	  objections	  that	  psychological	  
projections	  are	  process	  of	  false	  rather	  than	  material	  consciousness.123	  In	  Capital,	  Marx	  derives	  




form	  materially	  as	  commodities.	  His	  equation	  [M]oney-­‐[C]ommodity-­‐[M]oney	  summarizes	  how	  
capitalism	   gets	   people	   to	   attribute	   human	   value	   to	   exchanged	   commodities	   and	   currencies,	  
while	  failing	  to	  perceive	  the	  productive	  process	  behind	  these	  –	  specifically	  the	  human	  misery,	  
inequity,	   and	   alienation	   in	   the	   “hidden	   abode	   of	   production.”	   The	   central	   point	   is	   that	   in	  
“commodity	  fetishism”	  false	  beliefs	  or	  perceptions	  directly	  reflect	  the	  partial	  and	  fragmentary	  
vantage	   afforded	   by	   our	   social	   and	   productive	   location	   in	   the	  mode	   of	   production.	  We	   add	  
nothing	  to	  our	  physical,	  material,	  and	  psychic	  experience	  in	  generating	  the	  commodity	  fetish.	  If	  
the	  commodity	  is	  the	  new	  god,	  unlike	  the	  imaginary	  divine	  presence	  this	  one	  is	  real.	  	  
	   Here	   the	   ideological	   falsity	   represents	   “not	   knowing”	   one’s	  world,	   a	   lack	   imposed	   by	  
social	  and	  economic	  constraints	  and	  reflected	  in	  the	  commodity	  fetish.	  If	  religious	  fabrications	  
compensating	   for	   suffering	  are	   forged	   in	   the	   realm	  of	   knowing	  as	   a	   revolt	   against	  doing,	   the	  
commodity-­‐fetish	   translates	  material	   into	  mental	   life,	  a	  knowing	   forged	  by	  doing.	  Thus,	  Marx	  
shifts	  the	  source	  and	  content	  of	  “false	  consciousness”	  from	  what	  we	  do	  mentally	  (imagine)	  to	  
what	  we	  do	  physically	   (produce):	   from	  minds	   to	  bodies,	   from	   ideal	   to	  material.	  Our	  activities	  
directly	  construct	  our	  mental	  life,	  including	  the	  Symbolic	  Order	  that	  shapes	  and	  reflects	  us.	  So	  
Marx	  re-­‐grounds	  the	  falsity	  of	  our	  consciousness	  in	  material	  conditions	  that	  directly	  forge	  our	  
perception	  of	  social	  and	  personal	  life.	  Marx	  himself	  may	  be	  partly	  responsible	  for	  confusions	  on	  
this	  point,	  however,	  as	  he	  says	  early	  in	  Capital	  that	  
	  
the	   existence	   of	   the	   things	  qua	   commodities	   and	   the	   value-­‐relation	   between	   the	   products	   of	  
labor	   which	   stamps	   them	   as	   commodities,	   have	   absolutely	   no	   connection	  with	   their	   physical	  
properties	   and	   with	   the	   material	   relations	   arising	   from	   them.	   There	   it	   is	   a	   definite	   social	  
relationship	  between	  men	  that	  assumes,	  in	  their	  eyes,	  the	  fantastic	  form	  of	  a	  relation	  between	  
things.	  	  In	  order	  to	  find	  an	  analogy,	  then,	  we	  must	  have	  recourse	  to	  the	  mist-­‐enveloped	  regions	  





Marx	  is	  obtuse	  or	  abstract	  here,	  since	  “social”	  bases	  of	  ideology	  and	  false	  consciousness	  cover	  
both	  “early”	  relatively	  idealist	  and	  “late”	  relatively	  materialist	  accounts.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  objected	  
that	  “early”	  Marx	  corrected	  Feuerbach	  by	  re-­‐grounding	  his	  claim	  that	  “God	  is	  alienated	  man”	  in	  
material	   rather	   than	   ideal	   structures.125	  Still,	   the	  difference	  between	   the	  gods	  of	   religion	  and	  
democracy	  and	  the	  god	  of	  the	  commodity	  mark	  an	  analytical	  split	  that	  looks	  roughly	  like	  this:	  
	  
	   	   Suffering	   Mystified	  	  	   Fetish	   	   Optic	   	   	  
Ideology	  I	   Alienation	   Humanity	   Religion/God	   Excess/Addition	  	  
Ideology	  II	  Exploitation	   Product	  	  	  	  	   Commodity	   Lack/Subtraction	  
	   	  
	   In	  early	  Marx	  capitalism	  seems	  to	  conclude	  the	  process	  of	  dehumanization,	  defined	  as	  a	  
lost	  capacity	  to	  see	  oneself	  in	  the	  world	  substantively,	  either	  in	  one’s	  creativity	  or	  society.126	  If	  
feudalism	   afforded	   an	   artisanal	   subjectivity,	   however	   obsolescent,	   in	   craft-­‐making	   or	  mutual	  
obligation,	  capitalism	  finally	  suffocates	  this	  human	  experience,	  or	  species	  life.	  In	  both	  cases	  of	  
ideological	  falsity	  –	  divinity,	  commodity	  –	  “to	  denounce	  fetishism	  is	  to	  find	  behind	  an	  imaginary	  
formation	   a	   structurally	   symbolic	   relation,”127	   but	   those	   structures,	   symbols,	   and	   relations	  
transform	   with	   the	   deepening	   of	   capitalism,	   especially	   the	   diffusion	   of	   commodity-­‐form,	   -­‐
valuation,	   and	   -­‐fetishism.	   This	   shows	   Marx’s	   “materialist”	   consistency,	   as	   his	   account	   of	  
ideology	  reflects	  capitalism’s	  improving	  ability	  to	  re-­‐structure	  human	  valuation	  and	  subjectivity	  
by	  preventing	  emancipatory	  images.	  From	  the	  1840s	  to	  the	  1870s,	  Marx	  reports	  a	  systemically	  
conservative	  human-­‐as-­‐commodity	  replacing	  an	  immanently	  revolutionary	  human-­‐as-­‐God,	  the	  
“similar”	  fetish	  marking	  a	  world-­‐historical	  upheaval	  where	  indirect	  re-­‐humanization	  through	  the	  




	   As	  Žižek	  stresses,	  Marx’s	  insight	  was	  not	  merely	  that	  we	  prize	  commodities	  and	  profits	  
over	  humans	  and	  values,	  or	  that	  capitalist	  instrumentality	  or	  competition	  are	  so	  all-­‐consuming	  
that	  we	  come	  to	  identify	  commodities	  as	  human	  value.	  As	  liberal	  humanists	  criticize	  capitalism	  
in	   just	   these	   terms,	  Marx	  pointedly	   critiqued	   these	   “highly	   conscious”	   critics	  of	   this	   capitalist	  
fetishism.	   Rejecting	   the	   artifice	   of	   commodity	   fetishism,	   the	   sophisticated	   thinker	   of	   social	  
totality	  strives	   to	  see	   it	  clearly,	   fully,	   contextually,	   to	  correct	   false	  perception.	  He	  argues	   that	  
commodities	  are	   fetishes	   that	  obscure	   the	  real	  world	  –	   the	  “real”	   relationships	  of	  workers	   to	  
products,	   exploitation	   to	   bargains,	   or	   corporate	   investments	   to	   drone-­‐warfare.	   Thus,	   he	   will	  
insist	  that	  commodity	  fetishism	  is	  itself	  the	  locus	  of	  falsity,	  illusion,	  ideology,	  or	  spectacle.	  But,	  
Marx	  insists,	  precisely	  this	  view	  is	  false,	  because	  in	  capitalism	  commodity-­‐relations	  are	  the	  real	  
social	  formation,	  and	  thus	  to	  perceive	  the	  world	  in	  commodity-­‐fetishist	  terms	  reflects	  the	  truth.	  
In	  turn,	  to	  pretend	  otherwise	  is	  false.	  Depicting	  the	  commodity-­‐fetish	  as	  false	  consciousness	  or	  
illusion,	  the	  critic	  would	  wrongly	  claim	  that	  true	  consciousness	  and	  presumably	  truth	  per	  se	  are	  
available	  in	  rigorous	  knowledge	  of	  the	  total	  social	  system	  that	  “sees	  through”	  the	  fetish.	  	  
	   So	  the	  conscious	  subject	  is	  wrong;	  he	  sees	  the	  world	  ideologically	  and	  falsely	  in	  thinking	  
that	  knowing	  the	  totality	  of	  doing	  can	  break	  the	  grip	  of	  artifice	  and	  deception	  by	  removing	  the	  
blinders	  of	  commodity-­‐centricity.	  The	  elitist	  totalizing	  theorist	  restores	  the	  primacy	  of	  knowing	  
over	  doing,	  which	  is	  now	  false,	  in	  a	  doomed,	  socially	  abstract	  effort	  at	  revitalizing	  awareness	  as	  
the	  path	  to	  emancipation.	  The	  knowing	  humanist	  says,	  “Capitalism	  has	  falsified	  human	  life	  into	  
market	   rationality,”	   “financial	   flows	  are	   fictional,	   unlike	   real	  people	  and	  economic	   suffering,”	  
etc.	  In	  a	  typical	  inversion,	  Marx	  sees	  this	  “true	  consciousness”	  as	  another	  false	  consciousness.	  It	  




In	  this	  sense,	  commodity	  fetishism	  is	  the	  true	  consciousness	  of	  capital.	  To	  pretend	  otherwise	  is	  
the	  real	  ideological	  falsification.	  As	  Žižek	  puts	  it:	  	  
	  
[T]he	   highest	   form	   of	   ideology	   does	   not	   reside	   in	   getting	   caught	   in	   ideological	   spectrality,	  
forgetting	   about	   its	   foundation	   in	   real	   people	   and	   their	   relations,	   but	  precisely	   in	  overlooking	  
this	   Real	   of	   spectrality	   and	   in	   pretending	   directly	   to	   address	   "real	   people	   with	   their	   real	  
worries."	  Visitors	   to	   the	   London	  Stock	  Exchange	  get	   a	   free	   leaflet	   that	  explains	   that	   the	   stock	  
market	  is	  not	  about	  mysterious	  fluctuations	  but	  about	  real	  people	  and	  their	  products.	  This	  really	  
is	  ideology	  at	  its	  purest.128	  
	  
Hence,	  people’s	  highly	  developed	  consciousness	  about	  what	  they	  know	  and	  do	  leads	  them	  to	  
misdiagnose	  the	  provenance	  of	  false	  social	  perceptions;	  they	  locate	  miscomprehension	  of	  the	  
world	  in	  mental	  instead	  of	  physical	  activity	  –	  in	  knowing,	  not	  doing.	  Precisely	  by	  extrapolating	  
philosophical	  themes	  or	  political	  meanings	  from	  activity,	  doing,	  physicality,	  and	  sensuousness,	  
he	  says,	  conscious	  ideology-­‐critics	  methodically	  misconstrue	  the	  social	  world.	  The	  unmediated	  
experiences	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  capitalist	  exploitation	  and	  statist	  coercion	  are	  the	  real	  world:	  
social	  truth	  that	  speaks	  concretely	  and	  directly.	  	  
	   One	  product	  of	  bourgeois-­‐statist	  experience	  is	  the	  fragmentary	  view	  each	  member	  gains	  
of	  the	  productive-­‐extractive-­‐distributive	  process.	  Subjects	  inhabit	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  forces	  of	  
a	  social	  system	  and	  form	  directly,	  but	  partially,	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  social	  truth	  of	  that	  system.	  
What	  would	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  system	  have	  a	  false	  view	  of	  its	  workings,	  or	  
a	  true	  view?	  In	  Marx’s	  sense,	  abstractions	  of	  lived	  habitations	  themselves	  form	  an	  idealism	  of	  
self-­‐designated	  conscious	  humanists	  who	  desire	  the	  truth/falsity	  of	  the	  world	  to	  be	  located	  in	  
the	   luxurious	   life	  of	   the	  mind	   rather	   than	   in	   the	  material	   life	  of	   the	  body.	  Yet	   from	  the	  early	  
account	  of	  ideology,	  we	  retain	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  dual	  corporeality	  (body	  politic/body	  personal)	  




am	  raising	  an	  analytical	  dilemma	  for	  the	  account	  of	  fetishism;	  it	  must	  specify	  how	  or	  if	  a	  system	  
of	  social-­‐subjective	  enclosure	  produces	  creative	  perception	  or	  willful	  action	  that	   is	   irreducible	  
to	  material	  circulation.	  If	  commodity	  fetishism	  describes	  capital’s	  totalization	  of	  social	   life	  and	  
de-­‐totalization	  of	  social	  optics	  –	  its	  coeval	  invention	  of	  radical	  social	  holism	  and	  fragmentation	  –	  
we	  need	  to	  know	  the	  source	  of	  our	  awareness	  of	  this	  bifurcated	  absolute	  social	  formation.	  It	  is	  
not	  obvious	  how	  the	  ability	  to	  perceive	  commodity	  fetishism	  itself	  does	  not	  redound	  to	  credit	  
the	  humanist	  account	  of	  cognitive	  autonomy	  or	  liberal	  theories	  of	  the	  subject.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  
commodity	  fetishism	  fosters	  awareness	  of	  its	  operations,	  then	  either	  awareness	  of	  commodity	  
fetishism	  is	  a	  purely	  material	  product	  or	  some	  non-­‐material	  interpretive	  intervention	  occurs	  to	  
achieve	  this	  awareness.	  Marx’s	  view	  could	  be	  that	  fetishism	  and	  theoretical	  awareness	  of	  it	  are	  
material	  expressions	  of	   social	  or	  productive	   relationships.129	   If	   this	  were	   true,	   this	   theoretical	  
awareness	  would	  still	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐necessary	  element	  within	  capitalist	  reproduction,	  not	  
an	  inherent	  product	  for,	  or	  of,	  that	  system.	  In	  short,	  the	  theory	  of	  commodity	  fetishism	  –	  which	  
for	  Marx	  and	  Žižek	  is	  itself	  a	  commodity	  –	  is	  not	  initially	  produced	  for	  profit,	  but	  is	  generated	  as	  
a	  creative	  intervention	  that	  is	  then	  captured	  and	  commodified.	  This	  reclaims	  Marx’s	  early	  view	  
that	  under	  capitalist	  exploitation	  and	  alienation	  people	  retain	  a	  capacity	  to	  invent	  and	  express	  
genuinely	  anti-­‐capitalist	  convictions,	  desires,	  and	  insights.	  A	   liberating	  awareness	  of	  fetishism,	  
in	  this	  view,	  acts	  like	  religious	  or	  “political	  emancipation”	  –	  as	  yet	  another	  sigh	  of	  the	  oppressed	  
generating	  images	  of	  escape	  and	  recuperation.	  	  	  
	  	   Marx’s	  and	  Žižek’s	  accounts	  of	  the	  fetish	  illuminate	  Sennett’s	  portrayal	  of	  the	  glass	  wars	  
game	  in	  Cabrini	  Green,	  where	  the	  police	  triggered	  such	  distinct	  evaluations	  by	  the	  objects	  and	  




object	  or	  subject	  –	  never	  wholly	  self-­‐legislating	  or	  systemically	  inscribed.	  For	  Marx	  and	  Sennett,	  
this	  object-­‐subject	  admixture	  is	  precisely	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  substantiated	  and	  theorized	  in	  social	  
explanations.	  When	  white	  and	  black	  parents	  reacted	  to	  invasive	  law	  enforcement	  as	  protection	  
and	  threat,	  respectively,	  their	  subjective	  response	  was	  a	  willful	  reaction	  to	  their	  objective	  pasts	  
in	  a	  racial	  landscape.	  Similarly,	  when	  the	  commodity	  fetishism	  that	  replaces	  religious	  or	  political	  
fantasies	  is	  destabilized	  by	  material	  threats	  to	  commodified	  social	  relations,	  worker-­‐citizenship	  
will	  reflect	  the	  instability	  of	  dehumanized	  labor	  in	  novel	  systemic	  subjectivities.	  Hence	  subject	  
formation	   combines	   acted-­‐upon	  and	  acting-­‐on,	  objects	   and	   subjects	  of	   institutional	   contexts.	  
Between	   under-­‐	   and	   over-­‐determined	   social	   evaluations	   and	   actions,	   people	   act	   as	   systemic	  
subjects	   not	   by	   exiting	   their	   situation	   but	   deploying	   and	   adapting	   its	   resources	   for	   the	  
variations	  they	  have	  developed	  on	  its	  overarching	  values.	  	  
	   The	  structures	  that	  subjectivize	  people	  can	  be	  as	  intensive	  or	  extensive	  as	  language	  and	  
consciousness,	  so	  that	  in	  extreme	  cases	  of	  indoctrination	  subject	  and	  object	  collapse	  into	  each	  
other.	  When	  citizenship	  regimes	  ground	  our	  systemic	  subjectivity	  in	  social	  resources,	  they	  forge	  
objective	  settings	  that	  generate	  our	  orientations,	  expectations,	   inclinations,	  or	   interpretations	  
but	  do	  not	  wholly	  dictate	  how	  we	  will	  think,	  feel,	  or	  act.	  Objective	  social	  systems	  and	  subjective	  
responses	  are	  parametric	  in	  this	  sense:	  if	  I	  think,	  feel,	  or	  act	  purely	  as	  a	  subjective	  will	  “of	  my	  
own”	  or	  as	  a	  seamlessly	  objective	  component	  “of	  a	  system,”	  I	  am	  not	  a	  systemic	  subject,	  vis.	  an	  
effective,	  meaningful	  member	  of	   a	  human	  polity.	   To	  be	  a	   systemic	   subject	  entails	   the	  use	  of	  
socially	   relevant	   resources	   to	  achieve	  objectives	   that	  are	   rendered	  coherent	   in	   the	  discursive	  
environment.	  Contextual	  coherence	  implies	  that	  subjectivity	  is	  best	  not	  defined	  as	  a-­‐contextual	  




	   The	  divide	  between	  justice	  and	  law	  exemplifies	  how	  the	  subjective	  emerges	  objectively.	  	  
If	  I	  wish	  to	  morally	  challenge	  a	  legal	  apparatus	  or	  decision,	  short	  of	  revolution	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  a	  
principle	  of	  justice	  I	  have	  derived	  at	  some	  subjective	  remove	  from	  the	  juridical	  order.	  But	  to	  be	  
effective,	  my	  moral	  appeal	  “outside	  the	  law”	  must	  conform	  to	  extra-­‐	  or	  non-­‐legal	  values	  upheld	  
by	  my	  fellow	  denizens.	  I	  cannot	  successfully	  advocate	  just	  any	  moral	  principles;	  and	  if	  I	  adduce	  
moral	  views	  not	  already	  held	  by	  my	  compatriots,	  I	  risk	  being	  considered	  irrational	  or	  idiotic	  for	  
good	   reasons.130	   So	  as	   long	  as	   I	  opt	   for	   voice	  over	  exit	  my	   subjectivity	  operates	  within	   social	  
confines	  beyond	  my	  control;	  my	  willful	  subjectivity	  is	  objectively	  constituted	  in	  a	  system.	  In	  my	  
explanation	  of	  persistent	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  and	  sudden	  Algerian	  violence	  under	  martial	   law,	  
the	  citizenship	  regime	  structures	  subjectivity	  in	  this	  way.	  Workers	  and	  clients	  interact	  with	  the	  
state	  through	  the	  meanings	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  politicized	  labor	  or	  patronage;	  to	  act	   in	  some	  
other	  system	  than	  this	  citizenship	  regime	  would	  decrease	  their	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  This	  is	  an	  
enduring	  paradox	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  Marx	  and	  much	  post-­‐structural	  theory	  cited	  above,	  notably	  
Foucault’s	  disciplinary	  power:	  subjectivity	  must	  be	  enabled	  by	  objective	  social	  systems	  to	  which	  
it	  can	  then	  respond	  within	  its	  parameters.	  	  
	   Sennett’s	   tale	  of	   the	   glass	  wars	   game	  emphasizes	   three	  observations	   found	   in	  Marx’s	  
comments	   on	   commodity	   fetishism	   and	   Fanon’s	   dehumanization	   thesis	   that	   underscore	   my	  
argument.	   First,	   evaluations	   are	   experiential	   –	   the	   continuity	   of	   past	   events	   as	   they	  mediate	  
present	  circumstances.	  Second,	  experiential	  evaluations	  are	  collective;	  they	  represent	  historical	  
and	  objective	  patterns	  of	  social	  subject-­‐formation.	  Third,	  experiential	  evaluations	  and	  subject-­‐
formation	  produce	  social	  systems	  (regimes,	  norms,	  institutions)	  animated	  by	  gaps	  between	  the	  




Confronting	  state	  coercion	  and	  expulsion,	  Polish	  Solidarity	  and	  Algerian	  Islamists	  responded,	  we	  
might	  say,	  to	  the	  experiential	  evaluations	  of	  their	  subjectivities,	  threatened	  with	  extinction	  and	  
measuring	  their	  historical	  resources	  for	  survival.	  	  
	   In	  the	  event,	  Algerians	  and	  Poles	  enacted	  two	  Marxist	  forms	  of	  experiential	  evaluation	  –	  
religious	  and	  class-­‐consciousness.	  In	  his	  essays	  on	  ideology,	  this	  contrast	  maps	  over	  two	  related	  
progressions:	   labor’s	   advance	   from	   religious	   to	   class	   subjectivity	   and	   theory’s	   advance	   from	  
idealist	   to	  materialist	   understanding.	   The	   violent	   parochialism	   of	   Algerian	   Islamists	   and	   non-­‐
violent	   universalism	   of	   Polish	   workers	   parallels	   these	   two	   progressions	   as	   the	   endurance	   of	  
Poles’	  effective	  citizenship	  and	  social	  resources	  enabled	  non-­‐violent	  commitments	  by	  securing	  
worker-­‐citizen-­‐subjectivity.	   If	   the	   inference	   is	   that	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	   is	  morally	  or	  humanely	  
superior	  to	  Algerian	  violence	  and	  that	  this	  advance	  mirrors	  Marx’s	  preference	  for	  realism	  over	  
fantasy	   and	   class	   over	   religion,	   it	   could	  mean	   that	   the	   capacity	   to	  mobilize	   an	   address-­‐to-­‐all	  
rather	   than	   an	   address-­‐to-­‐some	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   practical	   co-­‐existence	   of	   objective	   and	  
























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  L.	  Hughes:	  	  	   	  A	   critical	   work	   has	   a	   very	   deep	   background;	   it	   does	   not	   come	   in	   a	  
moment.	  	  I	  am	  perfectly	  willing	  to	  come	  back	  and	  give	  it	  to	  you	  later,	  if	  
you	  are	  tired.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  R.	  Cohn:	  	  	   	  No,	  we	  will	  sit	  here	  as	  long	  as	  you	  want	  to	  go	  on.	  	  But	  you	  are	  missing	  
the	  point	  completely.	   	  What	  we	  want	  to	  determine	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  
you	  meant	  those	  words	  when	  you	  said	  them.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Hughes:	  	  	   Sir,	  whether	   or	   not	   I	  meant	   them	  depends	  on	  what	   they	   came	   from	  
and	  out	  of.	  
US	  Senate	  Testimony1	  
	  
	  
Humans	   have	   constantly	   shifting	   and	  deeply	   contradictory	   attitudes	   and	  desires,	  
which	  we	  can	  render	  seemingly	  constant	  and	  consistent	  only	  at	  very	  high	  price,	  a	  
price	   few	  moderns	  are	  willing	   to	  pay.	  The	   realization	  of	   this	   is	  perhaps	   the	  most	  
important	   thing	   that	   divides	   us,	   but	   it	   divides	   us	   forever,	   from	   a	  world	   in	  which	  
Kantian	  philosophy	   could	  be	   taken	   seriously.	  We	   can’t	   generalize	   all	   our	  maxims	  
successfully,	   and	   we	   don’t	   have	   to.	   I	   can	   easily	   disapprove	   of	   and	   oppose	   a	  
proposal	  to	  introduce	  gladiatorial	  games	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  and	  yet	  remain	  





§3.a	   Principles	  of	  Comparison	  	  
	  
	   This	  chapter	  introduces	  the	  cases	  with	  critical	  analyses	  of	  similarities	  that	  draw	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria	   into	   fruitful	   comparison	  and	  differences	   that	  may	  explain	   their	   divergent	  paths.	   I	  
have	  presented	  the	  puzzle	  and	  listed	  the	  commonalities	  that	  enrich	  it	  above	  (§1.a).	  Because	  the	  
outcomes	   I	  examine	  diverge	   this	  chapter’s	  primary	  concern	   is	   to	  address	  differences	  between	  
Poland	  and	  Algeria	  that	  could	   impeach	  my	  explanation	  (§1.b).	   In	  these	  prefatory	  comments,	   I	  
will	  briefly	  qualify	  my	  research	  and	  writing	  decisions.	  	  	  
	   This	  chapter	  assumes	  that	  social	   scientific	  methods	  can	  offer	  criteria	   for	  asserting	  and	  




assumption	  is	  posited	  so	  as	  to	  address,	  not	  suppress,	  debates	  about	  reliable	  social	  knowledge.	  I	  
adopt	  Mill’s	  comparative	  method	  –	  matching	  different	  antecedent	  and	  consequent	  variables4	  –	  
cautiously,	   knowing	   it	   has	   been	   criticized	   for	   its	   static,	   non-­‐causal	   configurations	   and	  
inferences.	   Similarly,	   I	   process	   trace	   institutional	   and	   activist	   trajectories	   to	   supplement	   the	  
comparative	  format,	  knowing	  the	  problems	  of	  imposing	  initial	  conditions	  and	  isolated	  variable	  
analysis	  on	  historical	  narratives.	  Waldner,	  for	  example,	  insists	  that	  comparative	  process	  tracing	  
alone	  does	  not	  provide	  causal	  mechanisms:	  “for	  proponents	  of	  process	  tracing,	  
	  
the	  distinction	  between	  a	  causal	  pathway	  and	  a	  causal	  mechanism	  imposes	  an	  obligation	  to	  not	  
claim	   too	   much.	   Identifying	   causal	   pathways	   in	   a	   critical	   ingredient	   of	   science.	   But	   the	  
identification	   of	   mechanisms	   has	   been	   celebrated	   as	   going	   one	   step	   further,	   as	   adding	   deep	  
explanatory	   knowledge…Those	  who	   identify	   processes	   but	   not	  mechanisms	   should	   take	   great	  
pains	  to	  demarcate	  properly	  their	  explanatory	  accomplishments.5	  	  	  
	  
Responding	  to	  this	   insight,	   I	  state,	  trace,	  and	  test	  the	  mechanism	  of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  as	  the	  
motor	  of	  the	  causal	  pathway	  from	  state	  and	  subject	  formation	  to	  social	  agitation,	  without	  any	  
pretense	  that	  an	  ideographic,	  small-­‐N	  study	  will	  produce	  “deep	  explanatory	  knowledge.”6	  	  
	   My	  hope	   is	   that	   this	  chapter	  and	  the	  case	  studies	  provide	  a	  credible	   resolution	  to	   the	  
puzzle	   posed	   in	   the	   introduction	   and	  perhaps	   join	  ongoing	  discussions	   in	   the	   sub-­‐field	   about	  
political	   knowledge	  and	   social	   explanation.	  This	   chapter	   thus	   replaces	   the	   standard	   literature	  
review	   that	   takes	   a	   separate	   chapter	   to	   review	   alternative	   explanations	   of	   the	   dependent	  
variable.	  Instead,	  I	  derive	  a	  review	  of	  literatures	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  research	  design,	  to	  
isolate	   variables	   that	  might	   explain	   the	   eventual	   Algeria	   violence	   and	   Polish	   non-­‐violence.	   A	  
literature	  review	  drawn	  from	  the	  cases	  rather	  than	  variables	  serves	  my	  explanation	  of	  specific	  
outcomes	  and	  avoids	  digressing	   into	  arguments	  about	  violence,	   institutions,	  and	   resources	   in	  




rather	  the	  opposite,	  I	  wish	  to	  see	  if	  a	  narrow	  puzzle	  and	  solution	  might	  facilitate	  exploration	  of	  
micro-­‐political	   dynamics.	   If	  my	   study	  were	   to	   contribute	   to	   a	   grand	   theory,	   happily,	   it	  would	  
come	  from	  specific	  findings	  of	  a	  small	  study	  that	  confines	  explanation	  to	  a	  different	  grandeur	  –	  
that	  of	  subject	   formation.7	   In	  this	  spirit	   I	  do	  not	  address	   insightful	   thematic	  readings	  of	  these	  
outcomes,	  such	  as	  “third	  wave”	  democratization,8	  the	  “rise	  of	  civil	  society”9,	  or	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
grassroots	  democracy.10	  	  
	   I	  will	   turn	  to	  my	  modified	   literature	  review	  after	  some	  smaller	  notes	  about	  this	  study.	  
First,	  to	  find	  the	  impetus	  to	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  strategies,	  I	  study	  divergent	  outcomes	  from	  
similar	  conditions.	  Radically	  distinct	  responses	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  to	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  
law	  generate	  a	  puzzle	  that	  has	  survived	  the	  finest	  intra-­‐regional11	  research	  on	  state	  formation	  
and	  social	  movements12	  and	  on	  political	  sociology	  and	  social	  action.13	  I	  do	  not	  in	  this	  sense	  see	  
my	  argument	  as	  correcting	  or	  contesting	  others	  but	  assimilating	  or	  responding	  to	  them,	  often	  
within	  their	  agendas	  or	  premises.	  The	  findings	  from	  my	  cases	  that	  framing	  is	  both	  material	  and	  
ideal,	   for	   instance,	  or	   that	  historical	  evaluations	  more	  than	   immediate	  conditions	  of	  suffering	  
define	  protest	  decisions	  are	  intended	  as	  interlocutions	  with	  other	  works	  on	  ideational	  forces	  or	  
political	   opportunity	   structures.14	   So	   I	   relegate	   academic	   commentaries	   to	   endnotes,	   where	  
parallels	  and	  distinctions	  are	  drawn.	  My	  explanation	  may	   recall	  Huntington’s	   linking	  effective	  
party	   centralization	   to	   stable	   social	   integration	   in	  Political	  Order	   in	   Changing	   Societies,	   but	   it	  
slows	  the	  analysis	  to	  stop	  and	  counter	  his	  analysis	  or	  differentiate	  it	  from	  mine.	  
	   Second,	  I	  limit	  my	  case	  selection	  to	  already-­‐existing	  widespread	  movements	  to	  bracket	  
the	  potential	  problem	  for	  my	  hypothesis	  of	  successful	  dehumanization	  of	  a	  population,	  i.e.,	  the	  




evolution	  rather	  than	  emergence	  of	  social	  activism	  allows	  me	  to	  ask	  how	  citizen-­‐subjectivities	  
structure	  strategies;	  how	  systems	  without	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  operate	  is	  a	  related	  but	  arguably	  
distinct	  question	  (§2.d).15	  But	  if	  my	  model	  addresses	  the	  effects	  of	  meaningful	  membership	  in	  
decision-­‐making,	  for	  that	  very	  reason	  it	  is	  troubling	  to	  exclude	  cases	  where	  state	  brutality	  has	  
actually	   reified	  subjects,	  eliminating	   their	  will,	   citizenship,	  and	  subjectivity	  without	   rebellion.16	  
This	  puzzle,	  the	  vanishing	  point	  between	  subject	  and	  object	  (say,	  between	  Saddam’s	   Iraq	  and	  
Algeria),	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  cannot	  be	  solved	  without	  a	  robust	  theory	  of	  human	  consciousness.	  
This	  constraint	  leaves	  me	  to	  glean	  from	  case	  studies	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  regimes	  how	  they	  
vary	  in	  structure	  and	  outcome.	  	  
	  	  	   Third,	   I	   confine	  my	   study	   to	  manageable	  parameters.	   Soon	  after	   the	   fall	  of	   the	  Soviet	  
empire,	  Adam	  Przeworski,	  an	  analyst	  of	  Poland	  and	  social	  science	  methods,	  wrote:	  	  	  
	  
[S]ocial	   science	   is	  not	  very	  good	  at	   sorting	  out	  underlying	  causes	  and	  precipitating	  conditions;	  
witness	  the	  fifty	  years	  of	  controversy	  over	  the	  fall	  of	  Weimar.	  For	  the	  response	  to	  the	  question	  
“Why	  did	   communism	  collapse?”	   is	   not	   the	   same	  as	   to	   ‘Why	  did	   it	   collapse	   in	   the	   autumn	  of	  
1989?’	  It	  is	  easier	  to	  explain	  why	  communism	  had	  to	  fall	  than	  why	  it	  did.17	  	  	  
	  
His	   criteria	   for	   “sorting	   out	   underlying	   causes	   and	   precipitating	   conditions”	   are	   stringent.	  He	  
thinks	  a	  strong	  explanation	  would	  have	  to	  show	  not	  only	  why	  an	  empire	  had	  to	  fall	  but	  also	  why	  
it	   did	   fall	   –	   and	   by	   why	   he	   means	   when.	   My	   research	   design	   prepares	   an	   examination	   of	  
institutional	   effects	   on	  protest	   outcomes	   in	   a	   definite	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   frame.	   The	   cases	  
focus	  on	  the	  time	  period	  in	  relatively	  autarkic	  Poland	  (§4)	  and	  Algeria	  (§5)	  from	  state	  formation	  
to	  activist	  responses	  to	  martial	  law.	  This	  frame	  lets	  me	  compare	  the	  variables	  I	  have	  advanced	  




causal	  properties	  between	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  while	  also	  tracking	  ambient	  factors	  within	  each	  
country	  that	  may	  have	  affected	  the	  outcomes	  or	  debates	  in	  the	  specialized	  literatures.	  	  
	   Finally,	  in	  keeping	  with	  my	  wish	  to	  study	  particular	  institutions	  of	  subjectivity,	  adopting	  
a	  refined	  conventional	  concept	  of	  violence	  (§1.b),	  I	  recognize	  certain	  shared	  features	  of	  Polish	  
and	  Algerian	   political	   domination	   and	   resistance	  without	   addressing	   them	  –	   prominently	   the	  
exercise	   and	   effect	   of	   disciplinary,	   ideological,	   and	   bio-­‐political	   power.	   Authoritarian	   rule	   in	  
Poland	   and	   Algeria,	   as	   in	   all	   modern	   states,	   governed	   with	   combined	   tools	   that	   cannot	   be	  
ignored	  in	  portraying	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  power	  and	  action.	  Exclusions	  like	  this	  occur	  as	  I	  
wish	  to	  analyze	  only	  similarities	  that	  merit	  drawing	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	   into	  a	  comparison	  and	  
only	   differences	   that	  may	   explain	   discretionary	   outcomes.	   Examining	   the	   shared	   and	   distinct	  
features	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  authoritarian	  political	  arrangements	  sifts	  out	  all	  but	  citizenship	  
regimes	  and	  social	  resources	  as	  the	  sources	  of	  dissident	  choices	  and	  yields	  case	  studies	  focused	  
on	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  	  
	   Having	  said	  that,	  I	  do	  not	  casually	  or	  grudgingly	  analyze	  alternative	  variables	  or	  theories,	  
but	  consider	  them	  as	  grave	  challenges	  to	  my	  account.	  None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  insinuate	  that	  analytical	  
rigor	  will	  prove	   religious	  values	  or	  Soviet	   intimidation	  did	  not	  decide	  the	  outcomes.	   I	  suspect,	  
instead,	   that	  scrutiny	  may	  deepen	   confusion	  about	   the	   cause	  of	  violence.	  Perhaps	   this	   is	  why	  
Przeworski	   says,	   comfortingly,	   that	   “social	   science	   is	   not	   very	   good	   at	   sorting	   out	   underlying	  
causes	   and	   precipitating	   conditions.”	   As	   I	   implied	   earlier,	   we	   should	  welcome	   the	   possibility	  
that	  social	  science	  cannot	  explain	  violence	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  our	  knowledge	  but	  only	  as	  a	  last	  





If	  [some]	  notion…does	  not	  make	  any	  sense…then	  one	  should	  simply	   let	   it	  go,	  even	  if	  one	  does	  
not	   immediately	  see	  what	  exact	  effect	   that	  will	  have	  on	  one’s	  mode	  of	   living	  and	  thinking.	  To	  
demand	   that	   thinking,	  whatever	   the	   circumstances,	  always	   be	   ‘affirmative’	   is	   itself	   a	   form	   of	  
repression	  that	  we	  should	  resist,	  and	  also	  a	  form	  of	  folly.18	  
	  
§3.b	   Poland	  and	  Algeria:	  Similarities	  
	   	  
	   This	  section	  on	  the	  similarities	  between	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  is	  divided	  into	  political	  and	  
discursive	  histories,	  admittedly	  clumsy	  rubrics.	  The	  political	  history	  will	  follow	  the	  chronological	  
order,	  roughly,	  from	  state	  building	  through	  the	  declaration	  of	  martial	  law	  –	  that	  is,	  tracking	  the	  
variables	  until	   the	  explanatory	  difference	   in	   the	  cases	  produced	  the	  divergent	  outcomes.	  The	  
discursive	  history	  is	  topical,	  not	  chronological,	  and	  compares	  a	  range	  of	  ideological	  and	  cultural	  
aspects	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  life.	  This	  section	  encapsulates	  political	  and	  discursive	  features	  of	  
the	  countries	  in	  a	  suggestive	  rather	  than	  conclusive	  manner,	  given	  the	  depth	  of	  each	  topic.	  This	  
section	  seeks,	  then,	  to	  provoke	  interest	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria;	  to	  promote	  them	  as	  productively	  
compared;	  and	  to	  offer	  reasons	  why	  these	  factors,	  as	  more	  similar	  than	  different,	  are	  excluded	  
from	  the	  causal	  pathway.	  This	  last	  purpose	  especially	  justifies	  a	  lengthy	  consideration	  of	  Polish	  
and	   Algerian	   similarities.	   Several	   shared	   political	   or	   discursive	   elements	   are	   counter-­‐intuitive	  
and	  must	  be	  argued	  into	  similarity.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  next	  section	  denies	  that	  proposed	  
differences	  explain	  the	  outcomes,	  this	  section	  denies	  that	  certain	  variables	  are	  different	  at	  all.	  If	  
my	  discussion	  is	  wrong	  about	  a	  difference,	  it	  immediately	  weakens	  my	  explanation;	  in	  contrast,	  




weight	   of	   the	   variable	   is	   shown	   in	   a	   separate	   argument.	   This	   possibility	   means	   this	   section	  
matters	  as	  much	  as	  the	  one	  after	  and	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  tour	  d’horizon.	  
	  
	   §3.b.1	   Political	  history	  
	  
	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   state	   formation	   succeeded	   the	   imperial	   invasion,	   occupation,	  
partition	   and	   finally	   military	   decimation	   of	   their	   societies.	   Poland	   (1795-­‐1918)	   and	   Algeria	  
(1783-­‐1962)	  had	  similarly	   long	  periods	  of	  external	  domination,	  marked	  by	  foreign	  penetration	  
and	   domestic	   resistance.	   Poland,	   Algeria.	  While	   Russia,	   Austria,	   and	   Prussia	   trisected	   Poland	  
France	   assimilated	   and	   settled	   Algeria,	   whose	   family	   lineages	   (zawaya)	   and	   brotherhoods	  
(turuq)	  achieved	  unprecedented	  unity	  under	  expansive,	  exploitative	  colonial	  rule.	  The	  images	  of	  
occupied,	  reconfigured	  Algeria	  and	  Poland	  contrast.	  Once	  fragmented,	  Algeria	  was	  integrated;	  
once	   integrated,	   Poland	  was	   disintegrated.	   The	   inference	  might	   be	   that	   independent	   Algeria	  
inherited	  an	  experience	  of	  centralized	  states	  and	  cohesive	  opponents,	  cultivated	  under	  French	  
control,	  that	  Poland	  lacked.	  But	  the	  French	  colonization	  of	  Algeria	  proved	  as	  decentralizing	  and	  
fragmenting	   as	   Poland’s	   partition.	   The	   relatively	   secluded,	   city-­‐state	   political	   economies	   that	  
grew	  up	  under	  French	   supervision,	  populated	  by	   intermediate-­‐class	   immigrants	   from	  Corsica,	  
Italy,	  and	  Spain	  defined	  urban	  centers	  like	  Bône19,	  creating	  internal	  division	  and	  colonization	  as	  
divided	  and	  disconnected	  as	  the	  Polish	  population	  during	  the	  partition	  and	  German	  occupation	  
of	  WWII.20	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  militantly	  resisted	  foreign	  control	  on	  national	  and	  religious	  lines,	  
repeatedly	  taking	  up	  arms	  while	  cultivating	  a	  constitutive	  demand	  for	  independence.21	  
After	   a	   brief	  moment	   of	   hope	   for	   autonomy	   and	   national	   recognition	   in	   the	   interwar	  




economically.	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  together	  came	  to	  symbolize	  the	  worst	  of	  fascistic	  and	  imperial	  
savagery,	  which	  had	  massacred	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  and	  razed	  their	  societies	  with	  the	  mixture	  
of	   ferocity	   and	   indifference	   notorious	   in	   racist	   total	   war.22	   Their	   infrastructures	   destroyed,	  
populations	  gutted,	  and	  economic	  wealth	  pillaged,	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  founded	  postwar	  states	  
in	  the	   literal	  rubble	  of	  war	  and	  poverty	  of	  dependency.	  These	  struggles	  also	   inherited	  vibrant	  
agitations	  among	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  seeking	  to	  define	  the	  new	  states	  and	  their	  obligations	  to	  
citizens,	  a	  mobilization	  of	  energy,	  parties,	  and	  programs	  that	  recalls	  an	  overflowing	  account	  of	  
Haiti’s	  “postoccupation	  period”	  (1934-­‐):	  “a	  bewildering	  welter	  of	  evanescent	  mini-­‐movements,	  
groupuscules,	   political	   parties,	   and	   publications	   mutating	   almost	   too	   rapidly	   for	   the	   eye	   to	  
follow.”23	   Both	   states,	   under	   the	   distinct	   hegemonies	   of,	   respectively,	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   and	  
France,	  confronted	  the	  dilemmas	  typical	  of	   late	  developers:	  highly	  motivated	  citizens’	  making	  
diverse	  if	  not	  incompatible	  demands	  on	  impoverished	  and	  conflicted	  ruling	  elites	  for	  favorable	  
policies	  and	  state	  institutions.	  As	  a	  result,	  Poland’s	  communist	  party	  and	  Algeria’s	  army	  and	  FLN	  
struggled	  for	  several	  years	  under	  provisional	  state	  structures	  to	  articulate	  membership	  criteria	  
for	  citizens	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  regime.	  Marx	  described	  this	  chaotic	  dynamic	  effectively:	  	  	  
	  
Like	   the	   government,	   everything	   that	   was	   instigated,	   attempted,	   or	   enunciated	   during	   this	  
period	  proclaimed	  itself	  to	  be	  provisional.	  Nothing	  and	  nobody	  ventured	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  the	  right	  
of	  existence	  and	  of	  real	  action…Every	  party	  construed	  it	   in	   its	  own	  sense.	  Having	  been	  won	  by	  
the	  proletariat	  by	  force	  of	  arms,	  the	  proletariat	   impressed	  its	  stamp	  on	  it	  and	  proclaimed	  it	  to	  
be	   a	   social	   republic.	   There	  was	   thus	   indicated	   the	   general	   content	   of	   the	  modern	   revolution,	  
which	  stood	   in	  most	  singular	  contradiction	  to	  everything	   that,	  with	   the	  material	  at	  hand,	  with	  
the	   degree	   of	   education	   attained	   by	   the	   masses,	   under	   the	   given	   circumstances	   and	  
relationships,	   could	   be	   immediately	   realized	   in	   practice…In	   no	   period	   therefore	   do	  we	   find	   a	  
more	  confused	  mixture	  of	  high-­‐flown	  phrases	  and	  actual	  uncertainties	  and	  clumsiness,	  of	  more	  
enthusiastic	   striving	   for	   innovation	  and	  more	  deeply	   rooted	  domination	  of	   the	  old	   routine,	  of	  
more	   apparent	   harmony	   of	   the	   whole	   society	   and	   more	   profound	   estrangement	   of	   its	  





	   Marx	  evokes	  the	  “confused	  mixture	  of	  high-­‐flown	  phrases	  and	  actual	  uncertainties	  and	  
clumsiness”	  of	  the	  state	  building	  process	  in	  both	  countries,	  notably	  naming	  the	  people’s	  parties	  
and	  public	  programs	  of	  a	  “social	  republic.”	  One	  central	  difference	  between	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  
one	  central	  to	  Marx’s	  passage	  and	  my	  explanation,	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  proletariat.	  Poland,	  in	  
the	  nineteenth-­‐century,	  had	  a	  class-­‐conscious	  proletariat,	  absent	  in	  Algeria,	  competing	  for	  state	  
largesse	  with	   a	   powerful	   agricultural	   base,	   present	   in	   Algeria.	   State	   centralization	   and	   ruling	  
elite	  consolidation	  were	  achieved	  in	  both	  countries	  through	  public	  provision;	  citizen	  integration	  
in	   political	   parties	   and	   ancillary	   informal	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   work	   sites	   and	   patronage	  
networks;	  and	  physical	  coercion.	  But	  Motyl	  distinguishes	  conditions	   in	  Central-­‐Eastern	  Europe	  
from	  those	  of	  Algeria,	  although	  “challenges	  facing…the	  successor	  states	  [are]	  unprecedented:	  	  	  
	  
Never	  before	  have	  postcolonial	  elites	  had	   to	   sweep	  away	   the	  wreckage	  of	   totalitarianism	  and	  
build	  everything	  from	  scratch.	  Native	  elites	  have	  been	  untrained,	  unskilled,	  and	  unprepared	  for	  
the	  tasks	  of	  governing	  countries	  in	  all	  postcolonial	  settings,	  but	  only	  the	  post-­‐Soviet	  elites	  must	  
also	  overcome	  a	  seventy-­‐year	  totalitarian	  legacy	  that	  did	  not	  just	  distort,	  in	  classical	  and	  colonial	  
fashion,	   the	   polities,	   societies,	   economies,	   and	   cultures	   inherited	   from	   pre-­‐Soviet	   times	   but	  
actually	  destroyed	  them.	  Indian	  elites	  inherited	  British	  institutions;	  Algerian	  elites	  could	  draw	  on	  
an	  intact	  society;	  even	  black	  South	  Africans	  are	  in	  a	  comparatively	  better	  position,	  since	  existing	  
white	  institutions	  can	  be	  opened	  to	  them.25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	   It	  is	  difficult	  to	  compare	  the	  disembowelment	  of	  different	  societies	  in	  such	  times,	  surely,	  
and	  the	  pressures	  they	  impose	  in	  survivors.	  Not	  only	  had	  partition	  impeded	  autonomous	  Polish	  
institutional	  development,	  which	  now	  the	  Soviets	  would	  as	  well,	  but	  also	  the	  Nazi	  occupation	  
was	  designed	  to	  obliterate	  the	  country.	  During	  the	  Wehrmacht’s	  invasion	  of	  Poland,	  the	  head	  of	  
the	   Reichssicherheitshauptampt	   (Reich	   Security	   Main	   Office)	   and	   second	   to	   Himmler	   in	   the	  
Schutzstaffel,	  Reinhard	  Heydrich,	  ordered	   the	  Einsatzgruppen	   to	  murder	  all	  Polish	  communist	  




priests,	  public	  officials,	  upwardly	  mobile	  peasants,	   and	   the	  most	  prominent	   industrialists	   and	  
bankers…[as	  well	  as]	  relatives	  and	  friends…”26	  Not	  only	  were	  elites	  directly	  targeted	  but	  for	  the	  
entire	   population	   the	   “aim	   of	   the	   Nazi	   regime	  was	   not	   to	   assimilate	   but	   decimate	   the	   non-­‐
German	  population	  in	  the	  areas	  to	  be	  colonized	  in	  order	  to	  clear	  space	  and	  seize	  resources	  for	  
Germans.”27	  Within	  weeks	  the	  Germans	  burned	  531	  towns	  and	  villages,	  committed	  714	  mass	  
executions,	   killing	   16,376	   persons	   –	   most	   Polish	   Christians	   and	   many	   children.28	   The	   earlier	  
Polish	  military	  repulsion	  of	  the	  Soviets	  in	  1920	  foretold	  the	  horrors	  to	  succeed	  these	  atrocities	  
under	  Stalin29:	  “most…	  commanders,	  Russian	  or	  Polish,	  who	  played	  a	  role	  in	  1920…were	  caught	  
up	  in	  the	  machinery	  of	  terror”30	  and	  brutality	  of	  Russification31	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  quasi-­‐autonomy.32	  	  
	   If	  Poland’s	  suffering	  and	  victimization	  were	  distinctively	  comprehensive	  and	  unrelieved,	  
in	  political	  terms	  the	  effect	  of	  Algeria’s	  colonization	  and	  revolution	  were	  comparable,	  from	  the	  
“dismemberment	  of	  the	  great	  tribes”	  of	  Algeria	  by	  the	  French	  in	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  to	  the	  
rise	  of	  anti-­‐imperial	  “Jacobin	  Islam.”33	  Indeed,	  much	  as	  in	  Poland,	  the	  newly	  independent	  state	  
in	  Algeria	  inherited	  a	  long	  history	  of	  systematic	  efforts	  to	  dismantle	  the	  indigenous	  institutions	  
and	  inhabitants	  with	  incessant	  waves	  of	  immigration,	  land	  appropriation,	  and	  political	  changes	  
enforce	  by	  incarceration	  and	  massacres.	  As	  Ruedy	  says,	  
	  
Settler	   colonialism	   in	   124	   years	   effectively	   destroyed	   in	   Algeria	   the	   primary	   elements	   of	   the	  
traditional	   elite.	   Most	   were	   undone	   by	   the	   corrosive	   effects	   of	   years	   of	   military	   conflict,	   by	  
systematic	   and	   state-­‐engineered	   dispossession	   by	   colons	   and	   their	   landed	   wealth,	   or	   by	   the	  
legislative	   and	   judicial	   procedures	   specifically	   aimed	   at	   substituting	   the	   colonial	   state	   as	   the	  
mediator	  of	  interpersonal	  and	  intergroup	  relations.34	  
	  
Finally,	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  were	  assailed	  and	  cleansed	  at	  the	  height	  of	  political	  consciousness	  
and	  activism,	  both	  sides	  preparing	  the	  ground	  for	  state	  formation.	  The	  expulsion	  of	  returning	  




French	  assault	  on	  Algerians	  beginning	  in	  the	  same	  year	  after	  Algerians	  in	  Constantine	  and	  Sétif	  
murdered	  colons.	  It	  was	  the	  survivors	  of	  comprehensive	  dispossession	  and	  destruction,	  forming	  
coalitions	   of	   inexperienced	   rulers,	   bureaucrats,	   generals,	   and	  party	   organizers,	  who	  designed	  
regimes	  In	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  that	  could	  integrate	  diverse	  and	  passionate	  interests.35	  
Poles	  and	  Algerians	  referred	  to	  these	  regimes	  simply	  as	  the	  power	  or	  powers.	  Algerians	  
call	   their	   state	   le	  pouvoir;	   Poles	   call	   it	  wladze,	   “literally	   ‘powers.’	   The	  word	   is	  untranslatable,	  
since	   its	  meaning	   is	  embedded	   in	   the	  entire	   system	  of	  political	   relations	  under	  which	  Poland	  
has	  been	  ruled	  since	  1948.”36	  Although	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  citizenship	  regime,	  a	  practical	  mode	  
of	  politicizing	  and	  incorporating	  non-­‐state	  agents	  into	  the	  centralizing	  state,	  differed	  in	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria,	   the	   two	   states	  developed	   common	  governance	  apparatuses.	   In	   “overcoming	   the	  
problem	   of	   securing	   accountability	   of	   rationalized	   administrative	   roles	   to	   political	   leaders,”	  
each	  state	  combined	  what	  Silberman	  calls	  “informal	  social	  networks	  [with]	  systematic	  eligibility	  
characteristics”	  and	  “formal	  organization	  of	   leadership,	  principally	  through	  political	  parties.”37	  
Informal	   networks	   run	   on	   “private	   criteria	   for	   exclusion”	   in	   which	   “accountability	   is	   secured	  
through	  shared	  social	  status	  and	  experience	  of	  political	  and	  administrative	   leaders”;	   in	  formal	  
systems,	  such	  as	  political	  parties,	  the	  “criteria	  for	  eligibility	  are	  public	  and	  well	  defined.”	  Setting	  
aside	  distinct	  formal	  regime-­‐types	  in	  his	  study	  and	  mine,	  which	  lends	  terms	  like	  public	  different	  
meanings,	   this	   duality	   illuminates	   a	   difference-­‐within-­‐a-­‐similarity	   in	   Poland	   and	   Algeria.	   Each	  
state	  relied	  on	  informal	  and	  formal	  mechanisms	  to	  secure	  its	  infrastructural	  capacity	  to	  monitor	  
citizens	  and	  claim	  central	  authority.	  The	  Polish	  communist	  party	   (PZPR)	  and	  Algerian	   socialist	  
party	  (FLN)	  were	  formal	  systems	  of	  social	  location,	  promotion,	  and	  surveillance	  that	  paralleled	  




Single-­‐party	  military	  rule	  appear	  to	  be	  similar	  formal	  components	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  
authoritarianism,	  but	  this	  commonality	  requires	  qualification.	  Specialists	  on	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  
note	  that	  granular	  study	  of	  these	  “public”	  mechanisms	  of	  recruitment	  and	  coercion	  reveal	  that	  
Poland’s	  party	  and	  Algeria’s	  military	  were	  the	  decisive	  political	  instruments	  of	  public	  policy	  and	  
ruling	   class	   incumbency.	   Roberts,	   for	   instance,	   states	   that	   “the	   Party	   of	   the	   FLN	   never	   ruled	  
Algeria,”	  a	  military	  government	  since	  1962,	  but	  merely	  enforced	  and	  justified	  its	  decisions.38	  In	  
contrast,	  Michnik	  always	  insisted,	  the	  military	  never	  dictated	  to	  the	  communist	  party	  in	  Poland,	  
although,	  Davies	  says,	  “the	  triumph	  of	  the	  one-­‐party	  system	  was	  never	  perfectly	  complete.”39	  
To	   sort	   out	   these	   descriptions,	   we	   may	   distinguish	   between	   policymaking	   and	   governance	  
patterns	  while	   qualifying	   the	   sense	   of	   “formality”	   in	   both	   cases.	   First,	   in	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	  
ruling	  elites	  dictated	  as	  crony	  capitalists40	  and	  political	  entrepreneurs,	  using	  party	  and	  military	  
apparatuses	   to	   enforce	   their	   decisions,	   so	   it	   can	   be	  misleading	   to	   reduce	   policy	   adoption	   or	  
implementation	   to	   these	   institutions	   themselves.	   If	   the	   party	   or	   the	   military	   consistently	  
operated	  to	  promote	  its	  own	  interests,	  however,	  this	  might	  signal	  a	  party-­‐state	  versus	  a	  military	  
state,	  with	  potential	  impact	  on	  my	  outcomes	  –	  we	  might	  expect	  citizens	  of	  party-­‐run	  state	  to	  be	  
less	  militarized	  than	  citizens	  of	  an	  army-­‐state.	  But	  scrutiny	  suggests	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  party	  
was	  a	  personnel-­‐management	  system	  while	   the	  military	  used	   its	  coercive	  power	  to	  secure	   its	  
business	   interests.	   These	  priorities	   and	  hierarchies	   appeared	  especially	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   and	  
declaration	   of	   martial	   law.41	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   PZPR	   was	   inherently	   illegitimate,	   as	  
Stalin	  conceded,	  and	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  military	  particularly	  against	  workers,	  even	  to	  restore	  
“order,”	   instantly	  called	   into	  question	  the	  “worker	  state’s”	  credibility.	   In	  contrast,	  because	   its	  




legitimate	  party.	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  greater	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  army	  or	  party	  in	  Algeria	  
relative	   to	   Poland	   would	   explain	   the	   outcomes	   in	   question,	   especially	   since	   the	   army	  
discredited	  itself	  with	  the	  1992	  putsch.	  
One	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  military	  or	  revolutionary	  leaders	  are	  more	  disciplinary,	  
rigid,	  or	  unimaginative	   in	  dealing	  with	  opposition	  movements,	  hammers	  seeing	  all	  protests	  as	  
nails.	   It	  must	  be	  said	   in	  this	  respect	  that	  the	  Algerian	  regime	  from	  1962	  until	   the	  present	  has	  
been	  relatively	  consistent,	  whereas	  the	  Polish	  regime	  began	  as	  a	  far	  more	  totalitarian	  structure	  
than	  the	  FLN-­‐ALN	  sought	  or	  achieved	  and	  then	  “de-­‐Stalinized”	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  1953	  speech.	  
As	  Ekiert	  describes	  it,	  “The	  Stalinist	  period	  in	  Poland	  ends	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes	  in	  1956:	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	   controlled	   de-­‐Stalinization	   crisis	   reconstituted	   Poland’s	   political	   elite	   and	   led	   to	   limited	  
concessions	   to	   various	   social	   groups	   and	   organizations.	   Repressive	   political	   practices	   were	  
abandoned	  or	  altered,	  despite	  the	  preservation	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  legacies	  of	  the	  Stalinist	  
transformation	   and	   the	   institutional	   structures	   of	   the	   party-­‐state.	   	   Although	   the	   post-­‐1956	  
regime	   gradually	   retreated	   from	   its	   promises	   of	   political	   liberalization	   and	   economic	   reforms,	  
Poland	  never	  came	  close	  to	  a	  reestablishment	  of	  Stalinist-­‐type	  political	  control.42	  
	  
As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  more	  detail,	  like	  Poland	  Algerian	  rulers	  grasped	  the	  need	  for	  support	  among	  
the	  citizenry	  and	  bargained	  and	  negotiated	  its	  way	  to	  practical	  legitimacy.	  But	  here	  we	  have	  to	  
remember	  that	  authoritarian	  rule	  achieves	  greater	  power	  by	  engaging	  the	  subjects	  rather	  than	  
objects	  of	  the	  state	  (§2.d).	  “Authoritarian	  legitimacy”	  in	  each	  case	  achieved	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  
totalitarian	  enclosure	  what	  Andrei	  Plesu	  calls	  the	  “imperfection	  of	  evil:	  
	  
Communist	   dictatorships,	   especially,	   distinguish	   themselves	   by	   the	   surprising	   interstices	   in	  
which	   rules	   are	   suspended.	   The	   law	   can	   suddenly	   become	   lax	   for	   no	   apparent	   reason….[T]he	  
infringement	  of	  the	  totalitarian	  norm	  plays	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  configuration	  of	  intellectual	  
life	  under	  dictatorship…	  [Arbitrariness	  seems	  only	  to	  weaken	  the	  functional	  network	  of	  power.	  





To	  summarize	  where	  we	  are	  in	  depicting	  similarities:	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  developed	  centralized	  
formal	  and	  informal	  mechanisms	  of	  power	  operated	  through	  the	  military-­‐party	  nexus	  to	  resolve	  
problems	  of	  unstable	  incumbency	  and	  intra-­‐elite	  conflict	  by	  integrating	  citizens	  into	  negotiated	  
and	  partially	  legitimate	  regimes	  after	  crippling	  foreign	  assaults	  on	  their	  countries.	  As	  I	  have	  also	  
implied,	   Poland	   gradually	   added	   politicized	   labor-­‐intensive	   production	   sites	   to	   its	   system	   of	  
citizen	   assimilation,	   and	   this	   state-­‐worker	   nexus	  without	   substantive	   counterpart	   in	   Algeria’s	  
exclusive	  reliance	  on	  informal	  networks	  will	  become	  the	  key	  instrument	  of	  the	  state.	  
	   Late-­‐developing	  states’	  capacity	  to	  construct	  a	  regime	  and	  to	  forge	  citizens	  into	  discrete	  
subjects,	  as	  these	  distinct	  supplemental	  practices	  of	  citizen	  assimilation	  entail,	   implies	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria	  exemplify	  the	  “over-­‐institutionalization”	  thesis	  posited	  by	  Kesselman:	  
	  
The	  cause	  of	  political	  disorder	  in	  modern	  politics	  is	  the	  obverse	  of	  the	  cause	  of	  political	  disorder	  
in	  developing	  polities.	  By	  contrast	  to	  transitional	  regimes,	  in	  modern	  polities	  disorder	  does	  not	  
derive	   from	   the	   inability	   of	   political	   institutions	   to	   contain	   participation.	   Rather,	   it	   frequently	  
comes	  from	  their	  past	  success	  in	  accommodating	  challenges,	  demands,	  and	  rising	  participation	  –	  
for	  this	  very	  past	  success	  may	  hinder	  current	  adaptation.44	  	  	  
	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  state	  formation	  gained	  by	  “accommodating	  challenges,	  demands,	  and	  rising	  
participation”	   that	   indeed	   came	   to	   restrict	   ruling	   elites’	   room	   for	   maneuver.45	   Algeria	   and	  
Poland	  were	  both	  over-­‐institutionalized	  states,	  according	  to	  this	  formulation;	  despite	  achieving	  
bureaucratic	  competence	  after	  a	  generation,	  the	  regimes	  were	  over-­‐extended	  in	  commitments	  
to	  citizens,	  notably	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  distributive	  obligations,	  and	  largely	  incapable	  of	  policy	  adjustments	  
that	  would	  guarantee	  incumbency	  and	  avoid	  social	  agitation.46	  Both	  countries	  consolidated,	  in	  
addition,	  “asymmetrical	   institutionalization,”	  “whereby	  the	  political	  system	  is	  strong	  out	  of	  all	  
proportion	  to	  other	  social	  systems,	  even	  though	  the	  latter	  may	  be	  even	  more	  highly	  valued.”47	  




by	  institutionally	  accommodating	  “rising	  participation,”	  is	  consistent	  with	  Waldner’s	  description	  
of	  “precocious	  Keynesianism.”48	  Fitting	   this	  model	  neatly,	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  overcame	   intra-­‐
elite	  conflict	  by	  giving	  side-­‐payments	  to	  “constituent	  clients,”	  securing	  incumbency	  by	  allying	  a	  
sub-­‐section	  of	   the	   ruling	   class	  with	  a	   sub-­‐section	  of	   the	   ruled	  or	   “popular	   class.”	  As	   a	   result,	  
however,	   ruling	   elites	   consolidated	   a	   state	   and	   regime	   conditioned	  on	   cross-­‐class	   obligations	  
that	  bind	  the	  state	  to	  its	  contract	  with	  a	  now	  dependent	  constituency.	  
	   These	  models	  of	  over-­‐institutionalized	  a	  precious	  Keynesian	  state	  incorporation	  differ	  or	  
complement	  each	  other	  in	  deriving	  subsequent	  hindrances	  to	  policy	  latitude	  from	  the	  means	  of	  
initial	  state	  consolidation.49	  Both	  focus	  on	  state	  commitments	  to	  social	  actors;	  Waldner	  focuses	  
on	  collective	  action	  dilemmas,	  while	  Kesselman	  emphasizes	  bureaucratic	  path	  dependence.50	  In	  
cases	  of	  similar	  social	  outlays	  and	  integration	  into	  state	  agencies	  or	  policy-­‐making	  processes,	  an	  
intervening	  variable	  is	  required	  to	  explain	  the	  rise	  and	  variation	  in	  widespread	  social	  agitation.	  
For	   instance,	  Habermas’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  “overburdened”	  state,	  with	   its	   family	  resemblance	  
to	  Kesselman’s	  over-­‐institutionalized	  state,	  is	  descriptive	  but	  not	  explanatory:	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  explanation	   [of	   crisis]	  begins	  with	  an	  “inflation	  of	  expectations	  and	  claims,	  heightened	  by	  
competing	   political	   parties,	   the	   mass	   media,	   and	   pluralist	   interests.	   The	   pressure	   of	   popular	  
expectations	  “explodes”	  in	  a	  drastic	  expansion	  of	  the	  volume	  of	  state	  activity.	   	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  
steering	   instruments	  of	   state	   administration	  are	  overburdened.	   This	   overburdening	   leads	   to	   a	  
loss	   of	   legitimacy,	   especially	   when	   the	   scope	   of	   state	   activity	   is	   restricted	   by	   parliamentary	  
power	  blocs	  and	  when	  citizens	  blame	  the	  government	   for	   tangible	  economic	   losses.	  This	   is	  all	  
the	  more	  when	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  population	  depends	  on	  material	  compensation.51	  	  	  
	  
His	  account	  of	  “legitimation	  crisis”	  is	  a	  valid	  general	  portrayal	  but	  “no	  satisfactory	  explanation	  is	  
given…for	  the	  dynamics	  of	  change”52	  and	  no	  variation	  in	  this	  “explosion”	  acknowledged	  or	  thus	  




like	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  produced	  such	  distinct	  social	  movements	  suggests	  that	  an	   intervening	  
variable	  is	  needed	  for	  a	  “satisfactory	  explanation”	  of	  how	  these	  crucial	  state	  dynamics	  evolve.53	  	  	  	  
The	  earliest	  significant	   indication	  of	   the	  constraints	  on	  state	  prerogative	   in	  structuring	  
the	   political	   economy	   of	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	   is	   their	   similar	   failure	   to	   collectivize	   agricultural	  
production.	  Algerian	  autogestion	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  Polish	  collectivization	  in	  the	  1950s	  were	  
reversed	  within	  a	  few	  years.	  Well	   into	  their	  import	  substituting	  industrialization,	  urbanization,	  
and	  modernization	  programs,	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  had	  retained	  largely	  agricultural	  populations.	  
Stalin’s	  1944	  land	  reform	  had	  destroyed	  the	  extant	  Polish	  aristocracy	  and	  gentry,	  distributing	  all	  
private	  holdings	  over	  50	  hectares	  to	  poor	  peasants.54	  From	  this	  starting-­‐point,	  collectivization	  
threatened	   a	   reversal	   for	   rural	   workers;	   thus,	   “the	   political	   authority…had	   to	   retrench	   and	  
compromise…in	   the	   area	  of	   agriculture	  when	   the	   regime	  had	   to	  withdraw	   in	   1956	   from	   its…	  
collectivization	  because	  the	  Polish	  peasant	  was	  unwilling	  to	  give	  up	  the	  gains	  he	  had	  personally	  
derived	  from	  the	  land	  reform.”55	  Sweeping	  privatizations	  of	  rural	  Poland	  sacrificed	  a	  core	  tenet	  
of	  socialist	  praxis,	  creating	  a	  demonstration-­‐effect	  for	  the	  efficacy	  of	  social	  protest.	  	  In	  this	  light,	  
the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  state’s	  capitulation	  matters	  greatly.	  After	  “the	  number	  of	  collective	  farms	  
fell	   from	   10,150	   on	   30	   September	   to	   1,534	   on	   31	   December	   1956…price	   subsidies	   and	  
guaranteed	   grain	   quotas	   remained	   until	   1989.”56	   Hardly	   a	   simple	   material	   buy-­‐off,	   this	   de-­‐
collectivization	   established	   a	   permanent	   class	   of	   powerful	   rural	   smallholders;	   holding	   over	  
three-­‐quarters	   of	   arable	   land	   in	   a	   country	   where	   thirty	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   labor	   force	   was	  
agricultural,	  this	  “big	  chunk	  of	  the	  population	  wanted	  a	  change	  of	  regime,	  convinced,	  wrongly,	  




institutionalized	  an	  enemy	  to	  overcome	   intra-­‐elite	  conflict	  and	  prevent	  an	  opposition	  alliance	  
among	  “intellectuals,	  students,	  radical	  party	  activists,	  and	  workers.”58	  	  	  
In	   contrast,	   Algerian	   agriculture	   was	   a	   class	   hierarchy.	   In	   1962	   25,000	   families	   held	  
estates	  of	  100	  hectares	  on	  half	   the	  arable	   land;	  “100,000	  middle	  peasant	  households	   farmed	  
holdings	  of	  from	  10	  to	  50	  hectares;	  [and	  s]ome	  450,000	  families	  farmed	  holdings	  smaller	  than	  
10	  hectares	   and	  of	   these,	   about	   120,000	  owned	   less	   than	   1	   hectare.”59	   The	   state’s	   “socialist	  
turn”	  carried	  the	  “agrarian	  revolution,”	  affecting	  “one-­‐fourth	  of	  the	  agricultural	  land	  and	  about	  
120,000	   beneficiaries,	   who	   were	   organized	   into	   cooperatives	   of	   various	   types”	   under	  
bureaucratic	   federal	   management.60	   Algerian	   collectivization	   thus	   ramified	   into	   landowner	  
opposition	  and	  “support	   from	  those…from	  poorer	  and	  peasant	  backgrounds.”61	  This	  disparity	  
between	  the	  residual	  and	  effective	  landed	  elites	  of	  the	  Algerian	  countryside	  and	  the	  egalitarian	  
and	  powerful	  landed	  workers	  of	  Poland	  might	  seem	  critical	  for	  subsequent	  protest	  events	  and	  
regime	  instability.	  Algerian	  elites	  but	  Polish	  peasants,	  along	  with	  the	  Catholic	  Church,	  opposed	  
rural	  socialism,	  after	  all,	   suggesting	  a	  reactionary	  non-­‐state	  power	  source	   in	  Algeria	  absent	   in	  
Poland.	  But	   the	  contrast	   should	  not	  be	   schematized	   for	   ready	   inferences	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   revolutions	  
from	   above	   and	   below.	   In	   each	   country	   landed	   classes	   prevailed	   in	   a	   socially	   conservative	  
agenda,	   preventing	   or	   reversing	   state-­‐driven	   collectivization	   by	   effecting	   rural	   incorporation.	  
Moreover,	   in	   both	   cases	   rural	   privatization	   and	   incorporation	   were	   defined	   by	   state	   control	  
over	   “all	   aspects	  of	   the	  production	  process,	   [including]	  all	   sources	  of	   supply	  of	   fertilizers	  and	  
fodder,	   all	   banks,	   and	   all	   distribution	   and	   sales	   networks.”62	   Differentiated	   by	  wealth,	   Polish	  
and	   Algerian	   landowners	   acceded	   in	   their	   bargained	   pacification,	   leading	   to	   a	   marginal	   or	  




of	   the	   state	   in	  hard	   times,	   renounced	   rural-­‐incorporation	  may	   target	   the	  party	   structure	   in	  a	  
manner	  irreducible	  to	  simplified	  class-­‐revolutionary	  statics.	  	  
	   Failed	  or	  “corrected”63	  efforts	  in	  socialist	  economies	  to	  collectivize	  agriculture	  in	  state-­‐
directed	   cooperatives	   attest	   to	   the	   political	   importance	   of	   incorporating	   rural	   populations.	  
Socialist	   cooperatives	   constituted	  a	   coercion-­‐and-­‐surveillance	   strategy	  organized	  as	  a	   form	  of	  
industrialized	   “kinship	   economy”	   combining	   material	   and	   social	   reciprocity	   of	   agricultural	  
societies	  with	  modern	  production.64	  Indeed,	  rural	  incorporation	  may	  have	  been	  a	  sine-­‐qua-­‐non	  
of	   institutional	   consolidation	   that	  allowed	  broad	  political	   support	   for	   further	  development	   to	  
occur	  at	  all.	  As	  one	  study	  of	  state-­‐building	  and	  rural	  politics	  puts	  it,	  	  
	  
In	   virtually	   every	   case	   of	   rural	   incorporation	   regime	   founders	   use	   the	   political	   leverage	  
generated	  by	  rural	  support	  to	  establish	  corporatist	  controls	  over	  urban	  labor	  movements	  which	  
are	  attached	  to	  regime-­‐supporting	  political	  parties,	  creating…an	  ‘integrative	  party	  system’	  that	  
can	  contain	  social	  conflict…If	  and	  when	  extra-­‐coalitional	  opponents	  of	  these	  political-­‐economic	  
arrangements	  emerge,	  they	  will	  have	  great	  difficulty	  soliciting	  mass	  support	  and	  they	  will	   thus	  
be	  more	  easily	  isolated	  and	  defeated	  without	  regime	  change.65	  	  	  
	  
Algerian	   and	   Polish	   state	   formation	   adhered	   to	   this	   pattern,	   first	   attempting	   strong	  
agricultural	  centralization,	  then	  pacifying	  rural	  constituents	  through	  bargains,	  concessions,	  and	  
incentives	  –	  in	  both	  cases	  incorporation	  strategies	  aimed	  at	  stable	  coalition-­‐formation.66	  Given	  
the	  dominion	  of	   the	  party	   systems	   in	   communist	   and	  postcolonial	   socialist	   states,	   one	  might	  
credit	  the	  party	  with	  whatever	  durability	  centralization	  achieved,	  including	  peasant	  integration	  
managed	  by	  the	  communist	  party.	  Following	  Collier	  and	  Collier	  we	  could,	  on	  this	  logic,	  describe	  
Poland	  and	  Algeria	  as	  in	  effect	  “labor”	  and	  “radical”	  parties67,	  and	  perhaps	  derive	  the	  outcomes	  
from	  the	  endurance	  of	  these	  “party”	  systems.	  This	  presence	  of	  urban	  or	  rural	  labor	  as	  a	  social	  




framework	   is	   tempting.	   That	   is,	   one	   could	   either	   credit	   the	   official	   party	  with	   any	   successful	  
incorporation	  or	  call	  the	  any	  form	  of	  integration	  in	  effect	  a	  party.	  We	  could	  then	  try	  to	  define	  
failed	  and	  successful	  party	  incorporation	  to	  see	  if	  it	  maps	  over	  protest	  strategies.	  The	  problem	  
with	  this	  strategy,	  it	  seems,	  is	  that	  the	  measure	  of	  party	  efficacy	  becomes	  protest	  itself,	  which	  
means	  party	  activity	  becomes	  a	  descriptor	  or	  falls	  out	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  social	  agitation.	  We	  
find	  this	  circularity	  in	  Huntington’s	  claim:	  “In	  modernizing	  society	  ‘building	  the	  state’	  means	  in	  
part	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   effective	   bureaucracy,	   but,	  more	   important,	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	  
effective	  party	  system	  capable	  of	  structuring	  the	  participation	  of	  new	  groups	  in	  politics.”68	  	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  know	  whether	  rural	  incorporation	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  
strengthened	  or	  weakened	  the	  political	  parties	  or,	   in	  that	  regard,	  whether	  this	  shared	  failure-­‐
turned-­‐success	   (failed	   collectivization-­‐turned-­‐incorporation)	   affected	   protest	   outcomes.	   It	   is	  
feasible	  that	  the	  process	  held	  an	  inverse	  predictive	  value:	  the	  higher	  the	  party	  efficacy	  or	  rural	  
incorporation,	   the	   lower	   the	  regime	  durability.	  Here	  the	  comparative	   incorporations	  noted	  by	  
Huntington	  but	   theorized	  by	  Waldner	  enter	   the	   causal	   story.	   In	  his	  model	  deriving	  economic	  
and	   political	   outcomes	   from	   intra-­‐	   or	   cross-­‐class	   coalitions,	  Waldner	   holds	   that	   the	   effect	   of	  
discrete	  incorporation	  patterns	  on	  the	  politicized	  class	  structure	  is	  paramount	  –	  specifically,	  the	  
“reduction	   in	   influence	   or	   even	   elimination	   of	  major	   portions	   of	   the	   former	   political	   elite.”69	  
Polish	   and	   Algerian	   elites	   incorporated	   rural	   classes	   without	   directly	   or	   immediately	   costing	  
former	  political	  elites	  power.	  Different	  rural	  class	  structures	  inherited	  by	  the	  postwar	  regimes	  
tempt	  greater	  distinctions.	   In	   this	  sense,	  similarities	   in	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  rural-­‐incorporation	  
show	  early	  signs	  of	  state	  vulnerability	  to	  cooperative	  citizens	  rather	  than	  clear	  gains	  for	  party	  or	  




seems	  both	   states	   purchased	   stability	   at	   high	   short-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	   costs.	   Rural	   resistance	   to	  
state	  encroachment	  derived	  in	  part	  from	  efforts	  to	  protect	  religious	  endowments	  derived	  from	  
property	   holdings,	   yielding	   similar	   patterns	   of	   anti-­‐authoritarian	   and	   sometimes	   anti-­‐secular	  
feelings	  among	  prominent	  religious	  leaders.	  	  
Rural	   incorporation	  did	  not	   enable	   agricultural	  workers	  or	  owners	   to	  dictate	   terms	   to	  
the	   states,	   which	   repressed	   prices	   to	   subsidize	   industrialization.	   In	   conjunction	   with	   rural	  
integration,	   Poland	  and	  Algeria	  based	   their	   distinct	   import-­‐substituting	   industrialization	  plans	  
on	   urban-­‐biased	   and	   foreign-­‐indebted	   state	   investment,	   planning,	   subsidies,	   and	   welfare	  
payouts.	  On	  the	  debt	  ledger,	  Frieden	  reports	  that	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  were	  among	  the	  world’s	  
top	  commercial-­‐rate	  borrowers	  from	  the	  1960s	  on:	  	  
	  
In	  the	  1960s	  governments	  in	  such	  widely	  varied	  countries	  as	  Algeria,	  Brazil,	  Mexico,	  and	  South	  
Korea	   –	   in	   partnership	   with	   and	   financed	   by	   the	   international	   banks	   in	   a	   pattern	   of	   foreign	  
indirect	   investment	   –	   began	   the	   systematic	   construction	   of	   integrated	   domestic	   economic	  
structures.	   These	   nationalistic	   state-­‐capitalist	   regimes	   have	   joined	   with	   the	   internationalist	  
finance-­‐capitalists	   of	   the	   Euromarkets:	   the	   banks	   provide	   the	   capital,	   the	   state	   provides	   the	  
muscle	  and	  brains	  to	  force-­‐march	  the	  countries	  involved	  into	  the	  industrialized	  world.71	  	  
	  
Note	  that	  Algeria	  was	  a	  member	  of	   this	  prestigious	  club	  of	  debtors,	  because	   its	  “petro-­‐state”	  
revenues	   afforded	   it	   an	  excellent	   credit	   rating;	   in	   contrast,	   Poland	  was	   credible	   for	   its	   labor-­‐
intensive	   and	   -­‐repressive	   industries.	   Ironically,	   one	   reason	   these	   ideologically	   communist	   or	  
socialist	   states	   borrowed	   from	   high-­‐interest	   private	   banks	   was	   their	   refusal	   to	   become	  
indentured	  to	  state-­‐capitalism.	  Richards	  and	  Waterbury	  summarize	  the	  economic	  portfolio	  and	  
dilemmas	  of	  the	  Algerian	  economy:	  	  
	  
The	   key	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   Boumediène	   strategy	   were	   excess	   capacity,	   overcentralization,	  
unemployment,	   massive	   rural-­‐to-­‐urban	   migration,	   and	   serious	   neglect	   of	   agriculture.	   These	  




imposed	   hardships,	   but	   failed	   to	   deliver	   a	   restructured	   economy.	   The	   situation	   in	   the	   early	  
1980s	   was	   increasingly	   difficult.	   Labor	   productivity	   had	   actually	   declined	   in	   both	   the	  
hydrocarbon	   and	   the	   nonoil	   public-­‐industrial	   sector…These	   problems	   can	   be	   traced	   to	  
the…concentration	  on	  heavy	  industry	  and	  to	  management	  problems	  of	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  	  
The	   economic	   argument	   for	   developing	   heavy	   industry	   was	   based	   on	   linkage	   effects:	   These	  
industries	  were	  to	  provide	  the	  basic	  materials	  for	  others	  that	  would	  supply	  the	  population	  with	  
its	  needs.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  basic	  metals	  and	  energy	  industries	  have	  high	  forward	  linkages,	  but	  they	  
are	  also	  very	  capital-­‐intensive	  and	  create	  relatively	  few	  jobs.	  Worse,	  in	  Algeria	  they	  were	  run	  as	  
monopolies,	  giving	  enterprise	  managers	  little	  reason	  to	  be	  efficient.72	  
	  
	   Similarly,	  by	  1981,	   the	  year	   the	  state	   imposed	  martial	   law,	  Poland’s	  “foreign	  debt	  had	  
escalated	  to	  $27B	  with	  the	  industrialized	  West:	  $2billion	  more	  than	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  total	  
reserves…The	  implacable	  force	  of	  compound	  interest	  has	  raised	  debt-­‐service	  above	  the	  level	  of	  
Polish	   falling	   exports…as	   Western	   creditors	   dictated	   more	   draconian	   preconditions	   for	   the	  
rescheduling	  of	  the	  debt.”73	  “It	  was	  certainly	  an	  unfortunate	  coincidence	  [for	  Gierek’s	  economic	  
restructuring	  of	  the	  early	  1970s]	  that	  foreign	  indebtedness	  was	  reaching	  high	  levels	  but	  before	  
investment	   paid	   off	   in	   terms	   of	   productivity	   and	   greater	   exports	   the	   Polish	   economy	   was	  
affected	  by	  the	  international	  inflation	  and	  recession	  that	  followed	  the	  first	  energy	  crisis.”74	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   doctrinaire	   insistence	   on	   extreme	   centralization,	   excessive	   investment	   in	  
heavy	  industry,	  and	  concomitant	  neglect	  of	  agriculture	  and	  consumer	  goods,	  Gierek’s	  policy	  of	  
rapid	   industrialization	  –	   financed	  by	  Western	  banks	  and	  paid	  for	  by	   increasing	  exports	  of	  coal,	  
copper,	   and	  other	  products	   –	   resulted	   in	   staggering	  debts,	   the	  decline	  of	   industries	   lacking	   in	  
support	   infrastructures	  and	  unable	  to	  produce	  enough	  exports	  for	  a	  dwindling	  foreign	  market,	  
and	  thus	  in	  the	  virtual	  paralysis	  of	  the	  country’s	  economy.75	  	  	  
	  
Poland	   and	   Algeria	   had,	   then,	   similar	   economic	   dilemmas:	   over-­‐centralization,	   indebtedness,	  
decreasing	  productivity,	  and	  refusal	   to	  restructure	  the	  economy.	  Because	   in	  both	  cases,	  state	  
legitimacy	  rested	  on	  economic	  success,	  given	  the	  discursive	  focus	  on	  distribution	  and	  equality,	  
economic	  failures	  set	  the	  citizens	  against	  the	  state	  politically.	  After	  years	  of	  collective	  sacrifice	  




these	  state	  policies	  were	  inflammatory,	  even	  without	  visibly	  growing	  income	  disparities.	  Note,	  
among	   these	  similarities,	  one	  key	  distinction	  between	  Algeria’s	   capital-­‐intensive	  and	  Poland’s	  
labor-­‐intensive	  production,	  fostering	  weak	  and	  strong	  working	  classes,	  respectively.	  
	   Leading	  up	  to	  the	  uprisings	  followed	  by	  martial	  law,	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  suffered	  severe	  
fiscal	  crises	  that	  forced	  them	  to	  adopt	  austerity	  measures	  that	  discredited	  their	  rule	  and	  caused	  
mass	  suffering.	  Both	  states	  had	  steep	  debt	  service	  payments	  on	  commercial	  loans	  taken	  in	  an	  
effort	  at	  stimulus-­‐led	  rather	  than	  development	  or	  reform-­‐led	  growth.	  Both	  economies	  suffered	  
from	  incoherent	  domestic	  policy	  and	  global	  oil-­‐price	  shocks,	  although	  causal	  inferences	  linking	  
these	  shocks	  to	  social	  movements	  are	  contested.	  How	  oil	  rents	  affect	  regime	  construction	  is	  a	  
significant	  difference	   that	   I	   address	  below,	  but	   the	   shared	  experience	  with	  oil-­‐price	   shocks	   is	  
relevant	  here	  mainly	  in	  similarly	  spurring	  protests.	  Algeria’s	  political	  economy	  depended	  on	  oil-­‐
rent	  distribution,	  and	  the	  1984-­‐	  oil-­‐price	  drop	  impoverished	  Algerians	  who	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  
1988.	  Poland	  suffered	  its	  oil	  crisis	  in	  reverse,	  in	  an	  earlier	  period,	  during	  the	  rise	  in	  prices	  during	  
OPEC’s	  manipulation	  of	  the	  oil	   trade,	  1973-­‐4.	  The	  higher	  prices	  hit	  the	  Gierek	  regime	  when	   it	  
was	   implementing	   reforms	  requiring	   reserves	   imperiled	  by	  even	  small	   shifts	   in	  oil	  prices.	  As	   I	  
have	  implied,	  these	  fiscal	  crises	  rendered	  both	  states	  functionally	  insolvent,	  trapping	  them	  with	  
massive	  foreign	  debt,	  threatening	  the	  informal	  “contract”	  based	  on	  side	  payment	  distributions,	  
and	   derailing	   development	   schemes.	   Again,	   these	   startling	   similarities	   do	   not	   obviously	  map	  
over	  the	  outcomes	  in	  question.	  In	  the	  causal	  model	  I	  have	  presented,	  it	  is	  worth	  stressing,	  fiscal	  
crisis	  constitutes	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  protest	  that	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  assessing	  state	  responses	  to	  




	   These	  fiscal	  crises	  sparked	  spontaneous	  and	  diffuse	  demonstrations	  that	  contributed	  to	  
gradually	   converging	   and	   unified	   opposition	   movements.	   Algeria’s	   1988	   riots	   began	   as	  
spontaneous	  protests	  against	  inflation,	  unemployment,	  poverty,	  and	  reduced	  subsidies;	  led	  to	  
criticisms	   of	   government	   corruption	   and	   growing	   disparities	   of	   income;	   and	   with	   the	   brutal	  
state	   reprisals	   finally	   promoted	   relatively	   organized	   Islamist	   groups	   to	   form	   an	   opposition	  
coalition	   powerful	   and	   secular	   enough	   to	   attract	  many	   non-­‐Islamists.	   The	   ascendance	   of	   the	  
Islamists	  was	   organizational,	   institutional,	   and	   economic	   as	  much	   as	   ideational.	   The	   Islamists	  
neither	   led	   nor	   appropriated	   the	   1988	   riots,	   but	   rather	   coordinated	   and	   steered	   them,	   and	  
gradually	  gathered	  a	  diverse	  constituency	  of	  investors.	  The	  emerging	  anti-­‐FLN	  campaign	  did	  not	  
in	   the	   first	   instance	   reflect	  an	   Islamist	  agenda	  but	  a	  broadly	   shared	  set	  of	  political	  and	  social	  
criticisms.	  Indeed,	  popular	  sentiment	  was	  as	  much	  directing	  the	  Islamist	  agenda	  from	  below.	  As	  
Roberts	  says,	  “it	   is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  popular	   feeling	   in	  Algeria	  over	  the	  Gulf	  crisis	   [1990]	  was	  
whipped	   up	   by	   the	   Islamists.	   Rather,	   this	   feeling	   was	   a	   largely	   spontaneous	   reaction	   to	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   crisis	   itself,	   and	   obliged	   the	   Islamists	   to	   modify	   their	   positions	   very	  
considerably	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  in	  touch	  with	  their	  popular	  constituency.76	  Having	  conferred	  with	  
Islamist	   leaders,	  and	  after	  the	  army	  “crushed	  the	  [1988]	  uprising”77,	  Algerian	  President	  Chadli	  
Benjadid	  announced	  “necessary	   reforms	   in	   the	  political	   field.”	  After	  a	   tainted	   referendum	  on	  
his	   presidency	   to	   protect	   his	   position,	   he	   promised	   changes	   including	   a	   new	   constitution	  
allowing	  independent	  political	  associations;	  modifications	  in	  the	  FLN,	  comprising	  a	  putative	  de-­‐
militarization;	  participation	  by	  autonomous	  parties	  in	  upcoming	  competitive	  local	  and	  national	  




	   Poland	  witnessed	  a	  cycle	  from	  the	  1950s	  until	  the	  1980s	  of	  chimerical	  state	  investment	  
plans,	  abrupt	  economic	  retrenchment	  with	  price	  hikes	  and	  subsidy	  retractions,	  worker	  protests,	  
regime	  capitulation,	  reversals	  of	  austerity	  measures,	  and	  removal	  of	  state	  leaders.	  The	  pattern	  
reinforced	  the	  power	  of	  workers	  to	  menace	  ruling	  elites	  over	  discrete	  policy	  decisions	  but	  not	  
to	  effect	   a	   structural	   change	   in	   the	   communist	   command	  economy,	  with	   its	   selective	  market	  
innovations	  over	  time	  at	  the	  firm	  and	  intermediate	  management	  level.	  This	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  
“socialist”	   state	   capitalists	   of	   Algeria	   –	   party	   rulers	   and	  military	   entrepreneurs	   who	   profited	  
from	  state-­‐contracted	  investments.	  As	  in	  Algeria,	  Polish	  dissidents	  gradually	  shifted,	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s,	   toward	  political	   demands	   for	   self-­‐determination.	   In	  Poland	   this	  meant	   the	  decision	   to	  
develop	   grassroots	   and	   organized	   civil	   society,	   focused	   on	   independent	   trade	   unions,	   and	   to	  
reject	  “positivism”	  and	  “revisionism,”	  the	  terms	  in	  Polish	  political	  discourse	  for	  intra-­‐systemic,	  
top-­‐down	   reformism.	   In	   August	   1980	   the	   Solidarity	   movement	   compelled	   the	   Polish	   United	  
Workers’	  Party	   (PZPR)	   to	   sign	   the	  Gdansk	  Agreement	  with	  Solidarity,	  permitting	   independent	  
unionism.	  Rank-­‐and-­‐file	  workers,	  allied	  with	  professionals,	  writers,	  and	  the	  Church,	  were	  now	  
working	  throughout	  Poland	  to	  form	  an	  independent	  inter-­‐factory	  trade	  union	  movement.	  The	  
towering	  figure	  of	  Solidarity	  leader	  Wałęsa	  should	  not	  eclipse	  the	  populist	  egalitarianism	  of	  the	  
citizens	   and	  workers	  who,	   in	   fact,	   lifted	   him	  up;	   “workers	  worshipped	  Wałęsa,	   they	   cheered	  
him,	  chanted	  his	  name,	  brought	  him	  little	  presents,	  reached	  out	  to	  touch	  him	  as	  he	  passed.	  And	  
yet,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  this	  worship	  was	  entirely	  provisional.	  They	  were	  well	  aware	  that	  Wałęsa	  
was	  fallible	  and	  vain,	  and	  when	  he	  put	  a	  foot	  wrong	  they	  would	  noisily	  oppose	  him.”79	  	  
	   Scholars	  debate	  whether	  Solidarity	  was	  “anti-­‐systemic”80	   locally	  but	  systemic	  or	   liberal	  




focused	  on	  intra-­‐state	  protest	  movements,	  Poland’s	  opposition	  was	  as	  radically	  anti-­‐systemic	  as	  
Algeria’s.	  As	  Malia	  puts	  it,	  “Though	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  a	  union,	  Solidarity	  was	  also	  the	  eternal	  
return,	  but	  in	  non-­‐violent	  form,	  of	  the	  classic	  Polish	  insurrectionary	  struggle	  for	  independence	  
and	   democracy,	   or	   for	   the	   ‘self-­‐governing	   republic’	   as	   the	   union’s	   program	   put	   it	   in	   clear	  
reference	  to	  the	  historic	  Polish	  Commonwealth.”82	  Indeed,	  the	  impression,	  perhaps	  drawn	  from	  
Solidarity’s	  non-­‐violence	  itself,	  should	  not	  stand	  that	  Poles	  were	  inherently	  non-­‐violent	  or	  that	  
non-­‐violence	  was	  a	  form	  of	  risk-­‐avoidance.	  As	  Kubik	  says,	  the	  period	  1970-­‐1980	  instilled	  a	  “new	  
tradition	  of	  Polish	  workers’	  martyrdom,	  developed	  predominantly	  in	  the	  Gdańsk	  observances	  of	  
the	  anniversaries	  of	   the	  December	  1970	  massacre.”83	  Not	  merely	  symbolic	   recognition	  of	   the	  
fallen,	  these	  were	  preparations	  for	  dangerous	  actions.	  In	  Lipski’s	  words:	  
	  
This	   was	   a	   struggle	   with	   totalitarianism	   in	   its	   Bolshevik	   version,	   for	   which	   any	   individual	   life	  
counted	  for	  nothing	  and	  could	  be	  sacrificed	  at	  any	  time	  to	  the	  Moloch	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  socialism,	  
to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  ruling	  class,	  party,	  or	  clique.	  KOR	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  be	  different;	  here	  
one	  could	  offer	  a	  sacrifice	  only	  of	  oneself,	  when	  one	  believed	  that	   it	  was	  necessary	  and	  right,	  
but	  never	  of	  anyone	  else,	  although	  this	  was	  never	  discussed	   in	  KOR	  and	  any	  discussion	  would	  
have	  been	  considered	  inappropriate.84	  	  	  
	  
Although	  in	  contemporary	  parlance	  Islamist	  jihadis	  are	  uniquely	  tempted	  by	  violent	  martyrdom,	  
Wolicki	  gives	  a	  similar	  picture	  of	  the	  overall	  capacity	  in	  the	  Polish	  tradition	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice:	  
	  
In	  this	  philosophy	  of	  history,	  Poles	  occupy	  a	  special	  place.	  	  Out	  of	  all	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe	  they	  
have	  most	  strongly	  maintained	  their	  faith	  in	  God	  in	  its	  traditional	  sense	  and	  responded	  with	  the	  
greatest	  intensity	  to	  this	  philosophical	  revival	  after	  Vatican	  II.	  The	  Polish	  faith	  is	  both	  the	  most	  
parochial	   and	   the	   most	   universalistic,	   the	   most	   naïve	   and	   the	   most	   enlightened,	   the	   most	  
private	  and	  the	  most	  public,	  and	   it	   is	  oriented	  toward	  the	  salvation	  of	  both	  the	   individual	  and	  
the	  world	   at	   large.	   	   This	   does	   not	  mean,	   of	   course,	   that	   this	   has	   been	   accomplished	  without	  
conflict	   or	   effort,	   or	   that	   it	  will	   survive	  without	   the	   individual	   involvement	  of	   the	   faithful	   and	  





Taken	  together,	  Poland’s	  Solidarity	  and	  Algeria’s	  FIS	  were	  comparably	  self-­‐sacrificial,	  grassroots	  
activists	  motivated	  by	  similar	  moral	  demands	  for	  institutional	  reform	  not	  only	  to	  improve	  their	  
standard	  of	  living	  but	  also	  to	  expand	  the	  space	  of	  self-­‐assertion	  and	  recognition	  in	  their	  polities.	  
	   As	  I	  said	  in	  presenting	  the	  puzzle,	  both	  regimes	  reacted	  by	  attempting	  to	  divide	  growing	  
dissident	  movements	  by	  passing	  unprecedented	  neo-­‐corporatist86	  reforms	  with	  varying	  impact	  
on	   real-­‐world	   state	  operations.	   In	  Algeria,	   ruling	  elites	   responded	   to	   the	  1988	  protests,	   after	  
killing	  perhaps	  500	  peaceful	  protesters,	  with	  a	  national	  referendum	  and	  legalization	  of	  political	  
parties	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   promised	   elections	   that	   ran	   from	   local	   to	   national	   between	   1990	   and	  
1991.	  The	  Polish	  state,	  responding	  to	  a	  blossoming	  coalition	  of	  workers	  and	  intellectuals	  in	  the	  
Workers’	   Defense	   Committee	   (KOR)	   energized	   by	   the	   1976	   worker	   uprisings	   and	   state	  
repression,	  attempted	  to	  fragment	  various	  productive	  sectors	  and	  regional	  factory	  systems	  with	  
discretionary	  financial	  incentives.	  According	  to	  Staniszkis	  and	  Shapiro,	  in	  this	  period	  Poland	  was	  
turning	  to	  a	  new	  corporatism	  roughly	  between	  1976	  and	  1980.87	  A	  crucial	  similarity	  here	  is	  the	  
effort	   of	   the	   authoritarian	   state	   to	   retain	   power	   against	   rapidly	   concentrating	   citizen	  
organizations	  through	  reforms	  intended	  to	  divide	  them	  by	  changing	  their	  long-­‐standing	  means	  
of	  effective	  citizenship.	  Trying	  to	  buy	  time	  while	  developing	  a	  systemic	  response,	  both	  regimes	  
risked	   more	   concerted	   and	   resourceful	   opposition	   responses.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   rise	   of	  
motivated	   and	   organized	   dissent	   movements,	   concurrent	   with	   fiscal	   crises,	   concerned	   and	  
hemmed	  in	  both	  states.	  	  
	   After	  decades	  of	  intra-­‐systemic	  bargaining,	  years	  of	  economic	  hardship	  for	  citizens,	  and	  
months	  of	  unprecedented	  dissentious	  discipline	  and	  unity,	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  dissidents	  and	  




expanding	  the	  public	  sphere	  with	  grave	  institutional	  innovations	  and	  systemic	  dangers.	  As	  the	  
states’	   tactics	   emboldened	   rather	   than	   fragmented	   regime	   opponents,	   providing	   them	   new	  
social	  resources,	  ruling	  elites	  abruptly	  reversed	  course,	  abrogating	  reforms	  and	  exceeding	  the	  
harshest	   previous	   responses	   to	   civil	   unrest	   or	   opposition	   demands.	   In	   Algeria	   the	   National	  
Liberation	  Army	  (ALN)	  removed	  Chadli,	  dismissed	  the	  election	  results,	  and	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  
emergency.	  In	  Poland	  the	  military	  (PPA)	  abruptly	  removed	  CP	  head	  Kania	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1981	  and	  
declared	  martial	  law	  on	  13	  December,	  rounding	  up	  Solidarity	  and	  KOR	  activists	  en	  masse.	  Both	  
states	  deposited	  citizens	  in	  concentration	  camps	  and	  beat	  or	  tortured	  them.	  That	  is,	  in	  Poland	  
the	  PZPR	  and	  in	  Algeria	  the	  FLN,	  ruling	  parties	  that	  had	  claimed	  civilian	  leadership,	  abdicated	  to	  
explicit	  military	  rule;	  the	  PPR	  and	  ALN	  were	  officially	  running	  Poland	  and	  Algeria.	  	  
	   Military	   leadership	   lost	  prestige	  established	   in	  past	  defiance	  against	  external	   forces	   in	  
liberation	  struggles.	  Here	  one	  distinction	  without	  a	  difference	  under	  martial	  law	  is	  that	  Algerian	  
rule	  was	  consolidated	  and	  “legitimized”	  from	  the	  start	  by	  revolutionary	  militants	  from	  the	  war	  
with	  France,	  whereas	  the	  Polish	  civilian-­‐military	  ethos	  separated	  the	  PZPR	  from	  the	  PPR.	  In	  this	  
view,	   the	   ALN’s	   usurpation	   (12	   Jan	   1992)	   extended	  military	   rule	   in	   Algeria88	   while	   the	   PPA’s	  
coup	   (13	  Dec	  1981)	  established	  military	   rule	   in	  Poland.	  Algeria’s	  military	  had	  always	  directed	  
politics,	  but	   the	  Polish	  army	  had	  studiously	  avoided	  giving	   the	   impression	  that	   it	  made	  policy	  
decisions.	  Before	   the	   two	  coups,	   then,	   the	  ALN	  was	  discredited	  but	   the	  PPA	  “was	  one	  of	   the	  
most	   highly	   respected	   and	   trusted	   institutions	   in	   Polish	   society[,]	   creating	   a	  myth	   of	   its	   own	  
fairness	   and	   impartiality…[with	   no]	   fear	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   particular	   officers	  would	   ever	   be	  
judged	  or	  criticized	  publicly.”89	  This	  evident	  difference	  might	  imply	  a	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  anti-­‐




law	   broke	   the	   military’s	   exceptional	   status	   at	   the	   height	   of	   radicalizing	   demands	   for	   state	  
reforms.	  The	   repression	   tipped	   the	  balance	  between	   this	  myth	  of	   the	  upright	  military	  and	   its	  
real	   practices,	   already	   tilting	   since	   the	   army	  used	   its	   “regulars”	   to	   suppress	   the	  1970	  worker	  
revolts	  and	  given	  the	  growing	  popular	  resentment	  that	  “the	  army	  [had]	  intervened	  repeatedly	  
to	   strengthen	   and	   consolidate	   communist	   power	   in	   Poland,	   and	   was	   on	   several	   occasions	  
deployed	  directly	  against	  the	  population.”	  With	  the	  decline	  of	  positivism	  military	  support	  of	  the	  
PZPR	  was	  revaluated	  much	  as	  the	  FLN’s	  revolutionary	  credentials	  were	  downgraded	  in	  Algeria.	   	  
The	  elite	  officer	  corps	  in	  each	  country	  dismissed	  the	  head	  of	  state,	  halted	  liberalization,	  
incarcerated	  opponents,	  and	  immured	  their	  power	  in	  unaccountable	  ruling	  cliques	  –	  the	  Haut	  
Comité	   d’État	   (HCE)	   in	   Algeria	   and	   the	   Wojskowa	   Rada	   Ocalenia	   Norodowego	   (WRON)	   in	  
Poland.90	  Intense	  infighting	  ensued	  among	  ruling	  elites	  over	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  new	  ruling	  
clique	   and	   extent	   of	   unconstitutional	   emergency	   conditions,	   including	   mass	   purges,	   torture,	  
special	  courts,	  and	  internment	  camps.91	  According	  to	  the	  literatures,	  both	  states	  tried	  to	  deflect	  
criticism	  of	  the	  “rational”	  and	  “honorable”	  military	  by	  deploying	  paramilitary	  forces	  or	  militias	  
for	  domestic	  coercion,	  a	  technique	  underwritten	  by	  the	  “legendary”	  patriotic	  sacrifices	  of	  the	  
FLN	  and	  Polish	  Home	  Army.	  The	  mirage	  and	  unmasking	  of	  the	  military’s	  higher	  national	  calling	  
and	  instrumental	  rationality	  did	  not	  surprise	  especially	  younger	  citizens	  without	  memory	  of	  the	  
Algerian	  or	  Polish	  wars	  of	  independence.	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  dissidents	  no	  longer	  believed	  that	  
“[b]y	   separating	   the	   problems	   of	   foreign	   or	   civil	   war	   from	   those	   of	   the	   army	   as	   a	   social	  
class…the	   latter	   could	  be	   confined	   to	   acting	   in	   a	   purely	   instrumental	   capacity.”92	  Martial	   law	  
exposed,	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  the	  military	  and	  state	  alike	  as	  enemies	  serving	  a	  ruling	  class.	  
	  





One	   could	   imagine	   attributing	   the	   divergent	   outcomes	   in	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	   to	   their	  
evidently	  distinct	  democratic	  traditions,	  especially	  because	  Poland’s	  liberum	  veto	  power	  in	  the	  
parliament	  (Sejm)	  famously	  granted	  mid-­‐level	  Polish	  landowning	  citizens	  leverage	  over	  the	  king	  
before	  the	  American,	  French,	  and	  Haitian	  revolutions.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Algerian	  political,	  social,	  
and	  economic	  order	  in	  the	  same	  period	  was	  organized	  around	  a	  network	  of	  self-­‐contained,	  self-­‐
governing	  religious	  brotherhoods	  (turuq)	  led	  by	  charismatic	  Muslim	  leaders.	  Before	  comparing	  
these	  normative	   situations,	  we	  need	   to	   consider	   the	   logic	   in	  a	   “democratic	  peace”	  argument	  
applied	  to	  these	  two	  cases	  and	  outcomes.	  	  
Democracy	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  peacefulness	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  generally	  institutional,	  
ideological,	  and	  cultural.	  That	  is,	  broadly,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  one	  can	  track	  tendencies	  toward	  non-­‐
violence	  or	  peace	  back	  to	  democratic	  institutions,	  beliefs,	  or	  values.	  It	  will	  always	  be	  difficult	  to	  
establish	   entailed	   relationships	   between	   substantively	   distinct	   concepts	   like	   democracy	   and	  
peace,	  or	  strategies	  and	  institutions.	  But	  the	   intuitions	  are	  that	  democratic	   institutions	  create	  
binding	   structures	   of	   procedural	   mediation93;	   that	   democratic	   ideology	   commits	   people	   to	  
those	   institutions94,	   even	   if	   their	   procedural	   coherence	   appears	   to	   outstrip	   their	   substantive	  
rationality;	  and	  that	  democratic	  values	  instill	  in	  people	  convictions	  about	  the	  power	  of	  speech	  
and	  cooperation	  in	  problem	  solving.	  These	  views	  surface	  in	  debates	  about	  whether	  “democracy	  
needs	  democrats,”	  that	  is,	  whether	  an	  ethos	  of	  egalitarian	  justice	  or	  horizontal	  obligation	  must	  
support	  formal	   institutions	  of	  equal	  citizenship	  rights	  manifest	   in	  elections.	  Notably,	  since	  the	  
period	  of	  authoritarian	  and	  martial	  rule,	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  have	  expressed	  their	  indifference	  




I	  will	  treat	  the	  proposed	  argument	  as	  a	  conjoined	  claim	  that	  an	  internalized	  experience	  
of	   democratic	   practices	   and	   commitments	   underlies	   the	   different	   outcomes	   in	   Poland	   and	  
Algeria.	  That	  is,	  I	  will	  consider	  whether	  a	  democratic	  normative	  subject	  was	  more	  dominant	  in	  
Poland	  than	  in	  Algeria,	  on	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  this	  normativity	  has	  pacific	   influences,	  whether	  
because	  democracy	  stabilizes	  value	  pluralism,	   institutionalizes	  uncertainty,	  mediates	  disputes,	  
creates	  bargaining	  incentives,	  encourages	  coalitional	  compromises,	  or	   inculcates	  resignation.	   I	  
will	  ignore	  for	  now	  the	  reduction	  of	  Algerian	  history	  to	  putatively	  anti-­‐liberal	  Islamic	  dogma,	  as	  I	  
consider	  religious	  divergence	  below	  (§3.c).96	  It	  must	  be	  said	  here,	  though	  it	  applies	  throughout	  
this	  chapter,	  that	  comparing	  concepts	  as	  historical	  objects	  or	  political	  identities	  across	  different	  
times,	  places,	  peoples,	  and	  cultures	  is	  a	  problematic	  endeavor,	  which	  explains	  my	  cautious	  tone	  
in	  making	  these	  comparisons.	  
	   In	  Algeria,	  the	  turuq	  were	  communities	  often	  called	  brotherhoods	  or	  hostelries	  run	  by	  a	  
Muslim	  clan	  or	  family	  lineage.	  The	  five	  turuq	  were	  interlinked	  social	  and	  power	  centers	  rooted	  
in	  the	  broad	  west	  African	  trade	  routes	  and	  operating	  with	  significant	  remoteness	  from	  Algiers,	  
dominated	  by	  the	  Ottomans	  until	  the	  French	  invasion	  of	  1830.	  Known	  as	  centers	  of	  resistance	  
to	  Turkish	  and	  then	  French	  rule,	  the	  brotherhoods	  were	  strong	  political	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  
that	  organized	  and	  funded	  libraries,	  schools,	  welfare,	  visitors’	  quarters,	  and	  other	  typical	  duties	  
of	  a	  state.	  The	  turuq	  were	  regulatory,	  distributive,	  educational,	  and	  ministerial	  associations	  that	  
coordinated	  efforts	  with	   traders,	  Muslim	  Pilgrims,	  other	   turuq.	   These	  brotherhoods	  managed	  
inheritance,	   property,	   endowments,	   and	   governance	   through	   formal	   legal	  mechanisms97	   and	  
the	  informal	  but	  highly	  regular	  tradition	  of	  consultation	  (shura).98	  The	  shura	  gathers	  members	  




leaders	  to	  popular	  views	  in	  shared	  deliberation	  and	  interpretation	  (ijtihad)	  of	  Islamic	  principles,	  
practically	   applied.	   This	   practice	   of	   representative	   collective	   life	   establishes	   an	   elite-­‐popular	  
reciprocity	   and	  publicity	  whose	  negotiations	  and	  agitations	  potentially	  destabilize	   Islamic	   law	  
(shari’a),	  and	  clearly	  mediated	  Sunni	   legislation	  as	  well	  as	  fostering	  anti-­‐Ottoman	  and	  -­‐French	  
rebellions.99	  Most	   important,	   the	   turuq	   embedded	   in	   Algerian	   political	   thought	   the	   belief	   in	  
shura	  as	  the	  source	  of	  collective	  decision-­‐making	  based	  on	  popular	  accountability	  –	  a	  concept	  
explicitly	  invoked,	  as	  well,	  in	  1980s	  Algerian	  protests.	  
	   The	  Polish	  liberum	  veto	  allowed	  “a	  single	  individual	  to	  destroy	  the	  parliamentary	  [Sejm]	  
session,”	   itself	  a	  constraint	  on	  royal	  prerogative.	  Poland’s	  participatory	  decentralization	  was	  a	  
more	  formalized	  and	  individual	  institution	  than	  that	  of	  the	  contemporaneous	  communal	  Islamic	  
shura.	  But	  both	  systems	  operated	  on	  similarly	  influential	  and	  normative	  principles	  of	  inclusive	  
decentralization.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  systems	  were	  always	  effective	  or	  successful;	  indeed,	  
each	  was	  accused	  of	  weakening	  central	  rule	  and	  institutional	  coherence	  and	  inviting	  conquest.	  
Poland’s	   “veto”	   system	  was,	   if	   anything,	   less	   stable	  or	   consistent	   than	  Algeria’s	  shura	   system	  
among	  the	  turuq:	  
	  
[The]	  szlachta	  [nobility]	  of	  the	  wider	  ‘communitas	  nobilium’	  voiced	  their	  hopes	  and	  fears	  at	  the	  
local	   assemblies,	   sejmiki…During	   the	   fifteenth	   century,	   the	   practice	   grew	   for	   the	   holding	   of	  
larger	  regional	  assemblies,	  a	  development	  which	  nurtured	  the	  emergence	  of	  representatives	  or	  
‘envoys’…[and]	   their	   own	   separate	   chamber	   at	   the	   Sejm…The	   Sejm	   was	   never	   able	   to	  
disencumber	   itself	  of	   its	  original	  character	  as	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  the	  faction-­‐ridden	  royal	  council,	  
mistrusted	  by	  the	  szlachta	  at	   large…The	  szlachta’s	  attitude	  to	  the	  veto	  was	  ambivalent.	   It	  was	  
the	   ‘palladium	   of	   liberty,’	   yet	   individuals	   who	   wielded	   it	   were	   widely	   condemned.	   In	   the	  
eighteenth	  century	  it	  was	  as	  common	  to	  talk	  proceedings	  out	  as	  to	  disrupt	  the	  Sejm	  outright.100	  
	  
	   Given	   the	   imperial	   histories	   of	   Poland,	   partitioned	   from	   1795	   to	   1918,	   and	   Algeria,	  




Algerians	  had	  much	  opportunity	   to	  express	   their	  deepest	  cultural	  ethics	  or	  political	  beliefs.	  A	  
potential	   but	   minor	   comparison	   could	   be	   made	   for	   the	   interwar	   period,	   where	   Poland	   was	  
independent	   for	   a	   generation	   and	   Algerian	   activists	   generated	   anti-­‐colonial	   publications	   and	  
political	  parties	  of	  several	  stripes.	  Given	  the	  persistent	  pressures	  of,	  respectively,	  the	  Russians	  
and	   French,	   these	   short-­‐lived	   experiments	  with	   self-­‐rule	   or	   civil	   society	  were	   at	   best	   limited	  
expressions	  of	  the	  democratic	  or	  civic	  normative	  outlooks	  of	  Poles	  or	  Algerians.	  In	  that	  light,	  it	  
is	  hard	  to	  generalize,	  for	  instance,	  from	  the	  reactionary	  turn	  of	  Józef	  Piłsudski’s	  second	  Republic	  
from	  1926	  till	  1935102	  or	  Ahmed	  Ben	  Bella’s	  purges	  after	  1962,	  much	  less	  to	  compare	  them,	  as	  
expressions	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  values	  in	  response	  to	  independence.	  Still,	  at	  any	  opportunity,	  
Poles103	   and	   Algerians104	   immediately	   organized	   peaceful	   organizations,	   interest	   groups,	  
authors’	   circles105,	   political	   parties,	   and	   other	   civil	   society	   associations.	   If	   autocratic	   states	  
consolidated	   power	   in	   Poland	   and	   Algeria	   against	   such	   proclivities,	   thwarting	   a	   deep-­‐seated	  
“democratic	  ethos”	  underscoring	  them,	  they	  seemed	  historically	  to	  have	  comprised	  egalitarian	  
and	  activist	   in	  orientation.	  Even	   in	   these	  general	   terms,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   interpret	   the	   fates	  of	  
Solidarity	  and	  the	  FIS/GIA	  as	  expressing	  subterranean	  differences	   in	  the	  commitments	  to	  rule	  
by	  the	  people.	  	   	  
No	   credible	   juridical	   apparatus	   existed	   in	   Poland	   nor	   Algeria	   during	   the	   period	   under	  
study,	  which	   can	  be	   seen	  best	   in	   its	   constitutional	   and	   representative	   conceits.	   Each	   country	  
revised	  its	  nominal	  constitution	  in	  response	  to	  popular	  opposition,	  though	  in	  circumscribed	  and	  
symbolic	   fashion.	   Poland’s	   1975	   Constitutional	   emendation	   giving	   the	   PZPR	   the	   “leading	  
political	  role	  in	  society”	  “consolidated	  a	  wide	  opposition	  movement	  ranging	  from	  the	  Catholic	  




Charter”	  issued	  a	  new	  Constitution	  to	  “provide	  for	  state	  control	  over	  the	  economy,”	  including	  
private	  enterprise	  and	  property	  “if	  it	  contribute[d]	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  country	  and	  [was]	  
socially	  useful.”107	  Constitutional	  artifice	  in	  both	  countries	  reflected	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  
law	  and	  human	  rights.	  In	  Poland	  “[v]agueness,	  unclear	  wording,	  loopholes,	  and	  the	  bending	  of	  
rules	  depending	  on	  the	  need	  of	  the	  moment	  all	  contribute	  to	  an	  arbitrary	  interpretation	  of	  legal	  
acts.”108	  Likewise,	  during	  the	  period	  under	  review,	  “The	  precondition	  for	  securing	  human	  rights	  
in	   Algeria	   [was]	   the	   establishment	   of	   law-­‐bound	   government	   in	   general.	   This	   problem	   [was]	  
complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   at	   no	   point	   since	   1962	   have	   Algeria’s	   successive	   written	  
constitutions	  corresponded	  to	  its	  real,	  unwritten	  constitution.”109	  In	  both	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  no	  
reliable	   legal	  or	  constitutional	  architecture	  existed	  as	  a	  social	  resource	  for	  ordinary	  much	   less	  
activist	  citizens.	  
Mamdani	   has	   suggested	   that	   “[e]ven	   the	  most	   radical	   political	   action,	   such	   as	   action	  
that	   accompanies	   the	   rise	   of	   insurgent	   identities,	   has	   to	   take	   as	   it	   starting	   point	   identities	  
enforced	  by	   law,	  even	   if	   to	  break	  out	  of	  a	   legal	   straightjacket.	  That	   is	  why,	  whether	  officially	  
enforced	  or	   insurgent,	  political	   identities	  need	  to	  be	  understood	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  process	  of	  
state	  formation.”110	  Thus	  the	  absence	  of	  meaningful	   legal	  or	  rights-­‐affording	  systems	   in	  these	  
countries	  does	  not	  suggest	  the	  irrelevance	  of	  the	  juridical	  but,	  one	  might	  say,	  the	  relevance	  of	  
that	  absence	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  formation	  and	  opposition	  movements.	  In	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria,	  the	  appeal	  to	  worker	  or	  Islamist	  identity	  –	  in	  both	  cases	  progressing	  gradually	  from	  
insider-­‐reformist	  to	  outsider-­‐rebellion	  in	  response	  to	  state	  intransigence	  –	  is	  notably	  an	  appeal	  
not	  to	  rights	  or	  law,	  but	  to	  oneself	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  citizen,	  in	  a	  sense	  a	  right	  to	  be	  oneself.	  Surely,	  in	  




an	  end	  outside	  of	  juridical	  minimalism	  or	  negative	  liberties.	  Poles	  and	  Algerians,	  when	  they	  said	  
anything	  about	  law	  or	  rights,	  referred	  to	  formal	  protections	  of	  the	  subjectivities	  they	  had	  long	  
cultivated	  outside	  juridical-­‐legal	  discourse	  and,	  in	  Mamdani’s	  terms,	  in	  response	  to	  its	  vacuous	  
role	  in	  the	  states’	  structuring	  of	  citizenship.	  Finally,	  where	  law	  constituted,	  in	  a	  longer	  historical	  
frame,	  a	  general	  attitude	  toward	  the	  juridical,	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  conceived	  legality	  as	  a	  mode	  
of	  separating	   centralized	   state	   from	  citizens	  and	  subjects.	  Ottoman	  and	  French	   legal	   systems	  
existed	  parallel	  to	  indigenous	  Algerian-­‐Muslim	  traditions,	  inculcating	  an	  understanding	  that	  an	  
overall	   juridical	   system	  comprises	  multiple	   sub-­‐systems	   in	  order	   to	  distinguish,	  not	   integrate,	  
the	  state	  and	  society.	  Likewise,	  according	  to	  Bernhard,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  East	  Central	   Europe	  civil	   society	  was	  able	   to	   carve	  out	   limited	  areas	  of	   autonomy	   from	   the	  
ruling	   dynastic	   states.	   However,	   the	   monarchies	   were	   also	   able	   to	   maintain	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  
autonomy	   from	   civil	   society.	   Critically,	   parliaments	   were	   constrained	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
monarchy,	   and	   governments	   were	   not	   fully	   responsible	   to	   the	   parliament…The	   pattern	   of	  
political	  development	  in	  this	  region	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  Rechtstaat	  –	  a	  state	  
of	   law.	  Boundaries	  between	  state	  and	  civil	   society	  were	   regulated	  by	   law.	  Exercise	  of	  political	  
power	   was	   codified	   in	   a	   well-­‐defined	   system	   of	   law	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   fell	   short	   of	   fully	  
developed	  parliamentary	  democracy.111	  
	   	   	  
In	  addition	  to	  comparing	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  legal	  conceptions,	  perhaps	  we	  might	  ask	  if	  
they	  differed	  in	  their	  fidelity	  to	  “civil	  society,”	  “cosmopolitanism,”	  “tolerance,”	  “recognition,”	  or	  
even	  democratic	  values,	  and,	  if	  so,	  how	  this	  difference	  might	  explain	  their	  divergent	  opposition	  
strategies	  under	  martial	   law.	  I	  have	  already	  derived	  from	  the	  Polish	   liberum	  veto	  and	  Algerian	  
shura	  systems	  a	  general	  criticism	  of	  the	  view	  that	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  have	  historically	  opposed	  
conceptions	  of	  “rule	  by	  the	  people.”112	  But	  here	  the	  argument	  would	  be	  that	  disparities	  in	  deep	  
values	  concerning,	  for	  instance,	  the	  sanctity	  of	  human	  life	  might	  have	  subcutaneous	  and	  path-­‐




negotiability	  of	  ethical	  demands	  could	  be	  rooted	  in	  profoundly	  resonant	  identities,	  such	  as	  the	  
imperial	  struggles	  of	  “Islam	  and	  the	  West,”	  heightened	  by	  relatively	  recent	  efforts	  to	  assimilate	  
these	   loyalties	  under	  artificially	  neutral	  bureaucratic	   institutions.114	  For	  a	  simple	  and	  concrete	  
example,	   Algeria	   and	   the	  MENA	   generally	   have	   been	   seen	   as	   external	   to	   “western”	   political	  
phenomena,	  while	  Poland	  is	  seamlessly	  included	  in	  the	  central	  events	  of	  cosmopolitan	  western	  
political	  and	  cultural	  developments.	  The	  Solidarity	  movement	  becomes	  a	  central	  instance	  in	  the	  
story	  of	  post-­‐1968	  western	  trends	  toward	  non-­‐violence,	  then,	  which	  would	  be	  unthinkable	  for	  a	  
movement	  in	  a	  MENA	  country.115	  My	  interest	  here	  is	  not	  in	  Orientalist	  discourses,	  but	  rather	  in	  
a	  possible	  argument	  that	  Poles	  did	  not	  resort	  to	  violence,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Algerians,	  because	  they	  
had	  a	  more	  civil	  or	  cosmopolitan	  cognitive	  paradigm.	  My	  approach	   to	   this	   issue	   is	   somewhat	  
idiosyncratic,	  perhaps	  counter-­‐intuitive,	  and	  informal.	  I	  will	  compare	  what	  might	  be	  considered	  
expressions	  of	  this	  variable,	  let	  us	  call	  it	  cosmopolitan	  civility,	  such	  as	  treatment	  of	  minorities.	  If	  
we	  find	  that	  Poles	  are	  more	  inclusive,	  pacific,	  or	  accepting	  toward	  the	  weaker	  in	  the	  midst,	  one	  
can	  imagine	  divining	  in	  this	  distinction	  the	  roots	  of	  a	  great	  proneness	  for	  non-­‐violent	  activism.	  	  
	   Polish	  and	  Algerian	  attitudes	  and	  treatment	  toward	  their	   Jewish	  minorities	  have	  come	  
under	  great	  scrutiny	  in	  recent	  years,	  notably	  around	  Polish	  complicity	  with	  the	  Nazi	  occupation	  
and	  around	  Algerian	  culpability	  for	  the	  departure	  of	  Jews	  after	  independence	  from	  France.	  For	  
both	  countries,	  the	  conditions	  of	  Jewish	  political	  standing	  provide	  a	  long	  history,	  going	  back	  to	  
the	  early	  medieval	  period	  with	   the	  declaration	  of	  autonomous	   Jewish	   rights	   in	   the	  Statute	  of	  
Kalisz	   in	   Poland	   (1264)	   and,	  much	  more	   recently,	   the	  Decrét	   Crémieux	   extending	   citizenship	  
rights	  to	  Jews	  French	  Algeria	  (1870).	  Without	  romanticizing	  the	  previously	  harmonious	  situation	  




relations	  were	  not	  merely	  a	  story	  of	  symbiosis	  between	  small	  Jewish	  communities	  and	  Catholic	  
or	  Muslim	  majorities	  eroding	  and	  degenerating	   into	   riots,	  battles,	  massacres,	  expulsions,	  and	  
finally	  Nazi	   genocide,	  Algerian	  pogroms,	   and	  Vichy	  denationalization.	   The	   crimes	   included:	   in	  
Algeria,	  a	  massacre	  (Algiers,	  1805)	  and	  physical	  attacks	  (Algiers,	  1896-­‐7,	  by	  colons;	  Constantine,	  
1934,	  1962),	  and	  expatriation	   (Statut	  des	   juifs,	  1940);	   in	  Poland,	  massacres	   (Jedwabne,	  1941;	  
Kielce,	  1946),	  and	  attacks	  (Posnan,	  Warsaw,	  &c.,	  1968).	  Such	  atrocities	  are	  notoriously	  hard	  to	  
interpret	  at	  their	  expression	  of	  profound	  cultural	  commitments	  or	  racist	  attitudes,	  as	  they	  are	  
hateful	  but	  potentially	  exceptions	  to	  quotidian	  cooperation	  or	  friendship	  to	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  (and	  French)	  bystanders.	  In	  addition,	  again	  because	  of	  the	  imperial	  legacies	  
(broadly	  construed)	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  identify	  the	  indigenous	  nature	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  Poland	  and	  
Algeria.	  On	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  provenance	  of	  anti-­‐Jewish	  sentiment,	  Arendt	  writes:	  	  	  
	  	  
When	  one	  realizes	   that	  both	  Polish	  and	  Romanian	  anti-­‐Semitism	   import	   their	  arguments	   from	  
Germany,	  that	  even	  France,	  in	  a	  country	  where	  there	  are	  neither	  Jews	  nor	  a	  Jewish	  question,	  is	  
battling	  the	  troops	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Republic	  while	  mouthing	  anti-­‐Semitic	  slogans,	  and	  that	  we	  are	  
now	  encountering	  German	  influence	  in	  Palestine,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  countries	  of	  North	  Africa,	  
then	   perhaps	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   so-­‐called	  world	   Jewry	  we	   cannot	   afford	  
such	  slogans	  of	  “return”	  without	  endangering	  the	  Jews	  of	  every	  nation,	  including	  Palestine.116	  	  	  
	  
Thus,	  for	  Arendt,	  perhaps	  in	  a	  Euro-­‐centric	  moment,	  anti-­‐Semitism	  seems	  essentially	  a	  
European,	  more	  specifically	  a	  German	  phenomenon.	  A	  survey	  of	  Jewish	  treatment	  and	  standing	  
in	  Algeria	  and	  Poland	  demonstrates	  its	  autochthony,	  ambiguity,	  and	  complexity	  and	  cast	  doubt	  
on	  anti-­‐Semitism	  as	  a	  distinguishing	   factor	   linked	   to	  Algerian	  violence	  or	  Polish	  non-­‐violence.	  	  
Under	  Ottoman	  rule,	  	  
	  
Jewish	  and	  Christian	  communities	  had	  a	  special	  position,	  because	  they	  paid	  the	  poll	  tax	  and	  had	  




loyalty.	  In	  the	  capital	  and	  in	  the	  provinces,	  the	  government	  recognized	  a	  spiritual	  head	  of	  each	  
community	  as	  having	  a	  certain	  legal	  jurisdiction…In	  this	  way,	  the	  non-­‐Muslims	  were	  integrated	  
into	  the	  body	  politic.	  They	  did	  not	  fully	  belong	  to	  it,	  but	  an	  individual	  might	  rise	  to	  a	  position	  of	  
power	   or	   influence,”	   especially	   as	   “money-­‐lenders	   or	   bankers	   to	   the	   central	   government	   or	  
provincial	  governors,	  and	  as	  managers	  of	  tax	  farms.”117	  	  
	  
Jewish	  traders	  privileged	  for	  their	  expertise	  thrived,	  but	  also	  suffered	  resentful	  reprisals.	  In	  late	  
18th-­‐century	  Algeria,	  the	  local	  dey,	  permitting	  the	  Jewish	  Bushnaq	  and	  Bakri	  families	  to	  export	  
wheat,	   threatened	  Ottoman	  rulers	  and	  Algerian	  growers	  alike.	   In	  1805,	  after	  the	  wealthy	  and	  
connected	  Nephtali	  Bushnaq	  was	  murdered	  and	  his	  Turkish	  killer	   lauded	  by	  Algerian	  religious	  
leaders,	   “Turks	   and	  non-­‐Turks	  went	   on	   a	   rampage,	   killed	   about	   200	   Jews,	   and	   looted	   Jewish	  
property.”118	  But	  such	  horrors	  were	  rare;	   indeed,	  “when	  the	  French	  landed	  in	  the	  bay	  of	  Sidi-­‐
Ferruch,	  the	  Jews	  of	  Algeria	  were	  already	  organized	  into	  a	  ‘nation’”	  that	  thrived.119	  	  
	   Inspired	   by	   Jewish	   neutrality	   toward	  Muslim	   anti-­‐imperialism	   and	   eager	   to	   assimilate	  
Algerians,	  France	  first	  insinuated	  itself	  into	  Jewish	  life,	  then	  insinuated	  Jews	  into	  French	  life.	  In	  
1845	  France	  created	  consistoires	  run	  by	  French-­‐trained	  “civilizing”	  rabbis,	  in	  Algiers,	  Oran,	  and	  
Constantine.	   In	   1865	   France	   offered	   citizenship	   to	   Muslims	   and	   Jews	   who	   renounced	   their	  
personal	  status	  laws,	  i.e.,	  their	  religion	  –	  an	  offer	  288	  of	  35,000	  Jews	  and	  even	  fewer	  Muslims	  
accepted.120	   France	   then	   issued	   the	   Decrét	   Crémieux	   (24	   Oct	   1870),	   naturalizing	   all	   Jewish	  
Algerians.121	   Subsequent	   anti-­‐Jewish	   attacks	   –	   peaking	   during	   the	   Dreyfus	   affair	   –	   were	   by	  
colons,	  not	  Muslims	  who	  shared	  Jews’	  reluctance	  to	  assimilate.122	  Paradoxically,	  the	  admixture	  
of	   colon	   domination	   and	   anti-­‐Semitism	   in	   Algeria,	   like	   that	   of	   the	   Nazis	   in	   Poland,	   was	   so	  
intense	   as	   to	   obscure	   or	   prevent	   clear	   sense	   of	   Algerian	   anti-­‐Semitism.	   Arendt	   may	   be	  
excessively	  exculpating	  of	  Algerians	  but	  she,	  again,	  attributes	  local	  attitudes	  to	  invasion:	  “[a]fter	  





Cries	   of	   “Vive	   Hitler”	   were	   common	   in	   Algerian	   movies,	   and	   considerable	   propaganda	   was	  
circulated	   among	   the	   natives.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   these	   activities	   were	   supported	   by	   the	  
French	   colonials,	   who	   admired	   Hitler’s	   racial	   policy	   and	   who	   were	   only	   too	   glad	   to	   see	   the	  
violent	   feelings	   of	   the	   economically	   depressed	   and	   politically	   underprivileged	   population	  
directed	   against	   Jews	   rather	   than	   themselves…[I]n	   1935,	   [Maurice]	   Violette	   [former	   Algerian	  
governor]	  flatly	  told	  the	  Senate:	  “If	  there	  is	  anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  Algeria,…Europeans…fan	  it.”123	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Even	  the	  Muslim-­‐Jewish	  violence	  in	  Constantine	  (Aug	  1934)	  is	  prohibitive,	  escalating	  like	  
a	   barroom	   brawl	   when	   a	   Jewish	   soldier	   assailed	   Muslims	   at	   a	   mosque,	   Muslims	   stoned	   his	  
house	  in	  the	  Jewish	  Quarter,	  and	  counter-­‐attacks	  spiraled	  for	  weeks	  until	  four	  Muslims	  and	  23	  
Jews	  were	  killed.124	  Such	  events	  seem	  exceptional	  to	  intra-­‐religious	  comity,	  most	  notably	  during	  
WWII	  when	   Jews	  and	  Muslims	  were	   in	  peril.	   In	  Oct	  1940	  Vichy	  abrogated	  Crémieux	  with	   the	  
Statut	   des	   juifs,	   disappointing	   Algerian	   colons	  who	   sought	   harsher	   anti-­‐Jewish	   laws.	   Algerian	  
Vichyists	  exceeded	  the	  Statut’s	  provisions,	  excluding	  Jews	  from	  primary	  and	  secondary	  schools;	  
the	   official	   14%	   quota	   had	   already	   sent	   home	   18,500	   Jewish	   pupils.	   Among	   them,	   Jacques	  
Derrida	  reports	  that	  in	  Algeria,	  “I	  was	  a	  member	  of	  what	  was	  called	  the	  native	  Jews,	  who	  during	  
those	  times	  experienced	  more	  support	  from	  the	  Algerians	  than	  from	  what	  were	  known	  as	  the	  
Algerian	  French.”125	  This	   is	  hardly	  surprising,	  given	  “the	  Vichy	  government’s	  revocation	  of	  the	  
Crémieux	   decree,	   which	   left	   Derrida,	   along	   with	   all	   the	   other	   Algerian	   Jews,	   stateless.”126	  
	   But	  Muslim-­‐Jewish	  relations	  were	  not	  defined	  by	  hostility	  or	  passivity.	  Muslim	   leaders	  
abjured	   anti-­‐Jewish	   aggression,	   declaring	   in	   solidarity	   (Nov	   1942):	   “By	   putting	   down	   the	   Jew	  
one	  only	  brings	  even	  closer	  together	  the	  Muslim.	  It	  was	  thought	  that	  at	  the	  abrogation	  of	  the	  
Crémieux	   decree	   the	   Muslims	   would	   rejoice;	   but	   [we]	   can	   see	   the	   dubious	   worth	   of	   a	  
citizenship	  that	  the	  granting	  authority	  can	  take	  away	  after	  70	  years’	  enjoyment.”	  Ferhat	  Abbas	  




and	  always	  against	   the	  Arabs.”	  Algeria	  was	   the	  “setting	   for	  one	  of	   [WWII’s]	  most	   remarkable	  
episodes	  of	  solidarity	  with	  Jews,”	  where	  imams	  instructed	  Muslims	  not	  to	  capitalize	  on	  Jewish	  
dispossession.	  According	  to	  Satloff:	  
	  
Not	  a	  single	  Arab	   in	  Algiers	  stepped	  forward	  to	  accept	  Vichy’s	  offer	   [to	  seize	  Jewish	  holdings].	  
One	   Friday	   in	   1941,	   religious	   leaders	   throughout	   the	   city	   gave	   sermons	   warning	   all	   good	  
Muslims	   to	   refuse	   all	   French	   offers	   to	   serve	   as	   conservators	   of	   Jewish	   property.	   	   They	   even	  
forbade	  Muslims	  from	  purchasing	  auctioned	  Jewish	  goods	  at	  below-­‐market	  prices…[d]espite	  the	  
economic	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  Arabs	  during	  the	  war.127	  	  	  
	  
Yet	  around	  independence	  nationalists	  attacked	  Jewish	  symbols	  and	  celebrities,	  murdering	  the	  
Constantinois	  Jewish	  community	  spokesman	  and	  maalouf	  singer	  Raymond	  Leyris	  and	  spurring	  a	  
mass	   exodus	   of	   Jews	   from	   Algeria.128	   Anxious	   Jewish	   belonging	   between	   colon	   and	  Muslim,	  
always	   corrosive,	   had	   collapsed	   in	  Muslim-­‐Jewish	   polarity	   and	   aggressive,	   if	   conflicted,	   anti-­‐
Semitism.129	   It	  was	  not	   the	  Nazis	  or	  WWII	  but	   revolutionary	   independence	   that	  dispossessed	  
Algeria’s	   Jews.	   Even	   then,	   Jewish	   communal	  property	   “largely	   remained	  under	   the	   control	  of	  
the	  Federation	  of	   Jewish	  committees	   in	  Algeria,”	  soon	  “the	  only	  country	   in	  the	  world	  besides	  
Israel	  to	  recognize	  and	  enforce	  Jewish	  religious	  holidays	  officially.”130	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   This	  pattern	  took	  extreme	  form,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  for	  Polish	  Jews,	  similarly	  distinctive	  in	  
cultural	  terms	  even	  as	  modern	  “urbanization	  and	  concomitant	  overcrowding”	  threatened	  some	  
of	   their	   traditions	   and	   laws.131	   “In	   1939	   [Hitler]	   told	   the	   Polish	   ambassador	   Jozef	   Lipski	   he	  
hoped	  to	  settle	  the	  Jewish	  question	  by	  mutual	  agreement	  with	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  and	  Romania.	  	  
He	   was	   thinking	   of	   shipping	   the	   Jews	   to	   a	   colony.	   Lipski	   replied	   that	   if	   Hitler	   could	   find	   a	  




incident,	  Polish	   Jew-­‐haters	   in	   some	  quarters	  publicly	   celebrated	   the	  advent	  of	  Nazism	  before	  
Algerian	  Muslims	  rallied	  to	  protect	  Jews	  from	  it.133	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
My	  mother	  was	  brought	  up	  by	  a	  woman	  –	  her	  mother,	  my	  grandmother	  –	  who	  was	   the	  only	  
surviving	   member	   of	   her	   family.	   When	   Grandma	   was	   nineteen	   and	   Grandpa	   was	   seventeen	  
years	  old,	  they	  had	  run	  away	  from	  Łódź,	  also	   in	  mid-­‐Poland,	  to	  Germany	  to	  marry,	  against	  the	  
wishes	  of	  their	  families	  which	  belonged	  to	  different	  communities,	  Orthodox	  and	  Hasidic.	  	  After	  
their	  marriage,	  they	  followed	  Grandpa’s	  family	  and	  emigrated	  to	  London.	  	  Between	  August	  1939	  
when	   she	   and	  my	   grandfather	   last	   holidayed,	   as	   they	   did	   annually,	   in	   Łódź,	   and	   1949,	   when	  
Cousin	  Gutta	  came	  and	  told	  my	  grandparents	  that	  she,	  a	  remote	  cousin,	  was	  the	  only	  one	  left,	  
fifty	  members	  of	  Grandma’s	   family	  were	   killed	  –	   the	   children	  bayoneted	   first	   in	   front	  of	   their	  
parents.	  	  Nowadays	  my	  mother	  denies	  this;	  she	  denies	  that	  it	  happened	  and	  she	  denies	  that	  her	  
mother	  suffered	  from	  it,	  so	  deep	  is	  her	  own	  unresolved	  suffering.	  	  This	  denial	  and	  unexamined	  
suffering	  are	   two	  of	   the	  main	   reasons	   for	  her	  all-­‐jovial	  unhappiness	  –	   the	  unhappiness	  of	  one	  
who	  refuses	  to	  dwell	  in	  hell,	  and	  who	  lives,	  therefore,	  in	  the	  most	  static	  despair.134	  
	  
One	  problem	  here	  is	  assessing	  the	  level	  and	  nature	  of	   local	  attitudes	  toward	  minorities	  under	  
conditions	   of	   external	   occupation	   and	   violence.	   How	   does	   one	   assign	   a	  weighting	   system	   to	  
selective,	  anecdotal	  evidence	  of	  collaboration	  with	  Nazis	  against	  the	  many	  instances,	  only	  some	  
recorded,	   of	   Poles	   rescuing	   Jews?135	  As	  one	   SS	  officer	   said,	   “You	  Poles	   are	   a	   strange	  people.	  
Nowhere	   in	   the	   world	   is	   there	   another	   nation	   which	   has	   so	   many	   heroes	   and	   so	   many	  
denouncers.”136	   Rescuers	   were	   not	   only	   privately	   squirreling	   away	   Jews	   at	   great	   risk	   to	  
themselves	  and	   their	   families	   (§I.d),	  but	  highly	  driven	  and	  organized.	   In	  September	  1942,	   the	  
Directorate	   of	   Civil	   Resistance,	   announcing	   the	   genocide	   in	   a	   proclamation	   published	   in	   the	  
underground	  presses	  and	  broadcast	  abroad,	  protested	  “in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  entire	  Polish	  nation	  
against	   the	  atrocities	  perpetrated	  on	  the	   Jews.	  All	  Polish	  political	  and	  civic	  groups	   join	   in	   this	  
protest.”137	  	  
	   From	  4	  Dec	   1942	   the	  Council	   of	  Assistance	   to	   the	   Jews	   channeled	  help	   to	   the	   Jewish	  




outside	  the	  ghettos	  by	  providing	  them	  with	  living	  quarters,	  documents,	  food,	  medical	  care,	  and	  
financial	  help,	  and	  by	  facilitating	  communication	  between	  members	  of	  the	  same	  families	  living	  
in	  different	  localities.”138	  The	  renowned	  Żegota	  assistance	  council	  began	  its	  work	  in	  the	  Warsaw	  
Ghetto	   but	   soon	   “sent	   its	   representatives	   from	   Warsaw	   to	   Lwów	   and	   Kraków	   to	   transmit	  
directives	   and	   to	   organize	   regional	   councils.”139	   The	   council	   worked	   with	   the	   special	   Jewish	  
Bureau	  of	   the	  Home	  Army,	   set	   up	   in	  winter	   of	   1941-­‐2,	  which	   coordinated	   activities	   not	   only	  
with	  the	  intelligentsia	  and	  cultural	  elites	  but	  also	  “with	  the	  workers’	  functionaries	  organized	  in	  
the	  ‘Bund.’”140	  “In	  no	  other	  German-­‐occupied	  country	  was	  there	  an	  organization	  like	  ZEGOTA…	  
though	  the	  terror	  directed	  against	  the	  Aryan	  populations	  of	  these	  countries	  was	  nowhere	  near	  
as	  extreme	  as	  in	  Poland.”141	  	  
	   Before	   the	   German	   invasion,	   however,	   the	   Polish	   government’s	   ethno-­‐nationalization	  
measures	  “amounted	   to	  economic	   strangulation	  of	  broad	  sections	  of	   the	   Jewish	  population,”	  
“exacerbated	  by	  other	  measures,	  such	  as	  the	  restriction	  of	  Jewish	  students	  in	  universities	  (the	  
infamous	  ‘numerus	  clausus’),	  random	  violence	  on	  streets	  and	  [at]	  schools,	  and	  open	  adulation	  
of	  Nazi	  anti-­‐Jewish	  measure	  across	   the	  border.	  The	  powerful	  Catholic	  Church	   failed	   to	   take	  a	  
stand	   against	   the	   official	   anti-­‐Semitic	   policies	   of	   the	   ruling	   class	   (some	   even	   condoned	   it,	  
accusing	  the	  Jews,	  as	  in	  Cardinal	  Hlond’s	  1936	  pastoral	  letter,	  of	  [corrupting]	  the	  youth.”142	  On	  
6	   June	  1934	   the	  Endeks	  of	   the	  anti-­‐Semitic	  National	  Democratic	  party	  carried	  out	  anti-­‐Jewish	  
“pogroms	   throughout	  Poland.”	   The	   Jewish	   labor	  movement	   faced	   intimidation,	   and	  everyday	  
Jew-­‐hatred	  was	  rife,	  such	  as	  being	  called	  “dirty	  Jew”	  in	  Łódz	  and	  outbursts	  like	  the	  pogroms	  in	  
the	  year	  before	   the	  Nazi	   invasion	  that	  ended	  only	  when	  “Jews	  resisted…They	  put	  up	  a	   fight.”	  




the	  Poles,	  helped	  the	  Nazis	  pick	  out	  the	  Jews.”143	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  rescuing	  Jews,	  Eva	  
Hoffman,	  whose	  parents	  were	  hidden	  and	  saved,	  	  
	  
It	   is	  unclear	  why	  the	  rescuers	  were	  so	  often	  condemned	  by	   their	  countrymen,	  whether	   it	  was	  
out	  of	  pure	  anti-­‐Semitism,	  or	  political	   considerations…,	  or	   fear	   that	   they	  would	   reveal	  others’	  
nefarious	  acts,	  or	  the	  common	  man’s	  dislike	  of	  excessive	  magnanimity…But	  often	  the	  rescuers	  
themselves	  didn’t	  want	  to	  talk	  about	  what	  they	  had	  done,	  and	  the	  people	  whom	  they	  had	  saved	  
did	  not	  maintain	  contact.	  Why	  this	  is	  so	  is	  puzzling.144	  
	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  was	  significant	  native	  resistance.	  A	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  the	  Polish	  
population	   joined	   in	   rescue	   or	   protection	   efforts	   against	   the	   Nazi	   and	   Polish	   atrocities,	   but	  
participants	  included	  Jews,	  Catholics,	  and	  Protestants.	  On	  17	  March	  1936	  Polish	  Jews,	  Liberals,	  
and	   workers	   staged	   a	   strike	   with	   a	  mass	   demonstration	   against	   Polish	   anti-­‐Semitism.145	   The	  
“moderately	  religious”	  were	  the	  most	  anti-­‐Semitic;	  Catholics	  were	  relatively	  liberal	  and	  open	  to	  
“outgroups.”146	   Some	   “rescuers…were	   persecuted,	   even	   killed	   by	   the	   native	   population	   after	  
the	  war	  because	  they	  had	  hidden	  Jews	  during	  the	  Nazi	  occupation	  of	  Poland.	  Helping	  Jews	  to	  
survive	   was	   not	   only	   dangerous,	   it	   was	   not	   popular.”147	   Amazingly,	   anti-­‐Semites	   risked	   their	  
own	   lives	   to	   save	   Jews.	   Marek	   Dunski	   saved	   500	   Jews	   even	   though	   he	   detested	   them	   for	  
dividing	  the	  nation	  by	  “illegally	  placing	  Jewish	  children	  in	  orphanages	  and	  convents.”	  Likewise,	  
National	  Democratic	  party	  member	  Hela	  Horska	  saved	  fourteen	  Jews	  and	  helped	  scores	  more;	  
survivor	  David	  Rodman	  testifies:	  “Once	  she	  and	  I	  were	  watching	  from	  the	  window	  [as]	  the	  Nazis	  
were	  executing	  Jews.	  Before	  I	  realized	  what	  had	  happened	  she	  [had]	  fainted.	  She	  used	  to	  come	  
home	  and	  cry	  for	  the	  Jews.	  She	  used	  to	  run	  around	  incessantly	  trying	  to	  place	  Jewish	  children,	  




that,	  across	  social	  positions,	  more	  Poles	  helped	  Jews	  or	  silently	  observed	  that	  help	  than	  joined	  
the	  Nazi	  slaughter.149	  
	   Current	  discursive	  anti-­‐Semitism	   is	  difficult	   to	  ascertain	   in	   the	  Algerian	  case.	  The	   Jews	  
have	   left	   Algeria	   and	   are	   not	   a	   focus	   of	   domestic	   politics	   or	   rhetoric	   there.	   As	   for	   foreign	  
political	  rhetoric,	  anti-­‐Semitism	  per	  se	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure.	  “Jew”	  (yuhud)	  is	  a	  floating	  signifier	  
in	   Islamist	  and	  Arab	  nationalist	   jargon	  used	  in	  the	  main	  to	  mean	  “Israeli.”150	  Evidence	  of	  anti-­‐
Jewish	  hatred	   among	  Algerians,	   such	   as	   desecrations	   in	   France,	   is	   scant.	   Comparatively,	   “the	  
rise	   of	   xenophobic	   nationalism	   [and]	   the	   reemergence	   of	   anti-­‐Semitism,	   without	   Jews”	   has	  
prevailed	  in	  Poland151	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  in	  Algeria,	  where	  anti-­‐Zionism	  seems	  the	  greater	  
collective	  motivation.152	  Outrage	  over	  post-­‐communist	  anti-­‐Semitism	  in	  any	  guise	  burst	  forth	  in	  
Bronislaw	  Geremek’s	  strident	  remark:	  “I	  am	  a	  child	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Ghetto.	  My	  family	  perished	  
in	  the	  Ghetto.	  I	  am	  the	  Foreign	  Minister	  of	  the	  democratically	  chosen	  government	  of	  the	  now-­‐
free	  Poland.	  That	  speaks	  for	  itself.”153	  As	  a	  social	  trend	  in	  Poland,	  anti-­‐Semitism	  has	  historically	  
been	   racist,	   a	   Jew-­‐antipathy	   heightened	   by	   nationalist	   responses	   to	   economic	   or	   democratic	  
competition	   since	   1989.154	   But	   there	   are	   also	   mundane	   political	   sources.	   Accusation	   of	  
collaboration	   –	   echoed	   in	   Poland’s	   post-­‐communist	   “lustration”	   policy	   –	   have	   been	   coded	   in	  
anti-­‐Semitic	  terms.155	  As	   in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  several	   leading	  Politburo	  members	  of	  the	  Polish	  
Communist	  Party,	  including	  the	  domestic	  police	  director,	  were	  Jewish,	  and	  this	  brought	  out	  the	  
Jew-­‐haters,	  typically.	  Polish	  assistance	  with	  Israel’s	  Eichmann	  investigation	  shows	  the	  power	  of	  
external	   influences	  such	  as	   the	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war.	  With	  Soviet	   support	  Poland	  cooperated	  with	  
Israeli	   researchers	   during	   the	   Eichmann	   trial.	   The	   intentions	   were	   impure;	   concerns	   with	  




the	  context	  of	  anti-­‐fascism.”156	  In	  1968,	  “Zionism”	  and	  Judaism	  were	  conflated	  in	  a	  conspiracy-­‐
laden	  mindset	   abstracted	   from	   direct	   Israel-­‐Poland	   relations.	   Poland’s	   “right-­‐wing	   nationalist	  
government.”157	   Hard	   as	   it	   is	   to	  measure	   or	   code	   small	   or	   individual	   episodes	   of	   anti-­‐Jewish	  
hostility,	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  cosmopolitan	  values	  potentially	  constraining	  intolerance	  or	  violence,	  
broad-­‐based,	  collective	  anti-­‐Semitism	  does	  not	  weight	  in	  Poland’s	  favor.158	  	  
	   Turning	  to	  another	  slightly	  askew	  indicator	  of	  potentially	  pacifying	  cosmopolitan	  values,	  
I	  will	  address	  Poles’	  and	  Algerians’	   relationship	  to	  France.	  France	   is,	   in	  part,	  a	  synecdoche	  for	  
Europe	  but	  it	  also	  has	  specific	  and	  revealing	  meanings	  in	  the	  political	  life	  of	  Poland	  and	  Algeria.	  
The	  propinquity	  of	  Poles	  to	  France	  on	  a	  personal	  or	  political	  level	  reflects,	  one	  might	  argue,	  an	  
intimate	  association	  with	  Europe	  relative	  to	  Algeria’s	  extimate	  alienation.159	  That	  is,	  Poland	  and	  
Algeria	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  inside/outside	  of	  the	  European	  fold,	  with	  potential	  implications	  for	  
the	  modes	  of	  “civilized”	  political	  comportment.	  Recent	  signs	  of	  these	  relationships	  abound.	  For	  
instance,	  during	  the	  Solidarity	  strike	  in	  August	  1980,	  French	  unionists	  arrived	  in	  Poland	  to	  show	  
their	  support.160	  Nothing	   like	  this	   is	   imaginable	   in	  Algeria	   in	  favor	  of	  even	  the	  most	  moderate	  
Islamist	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  movement.	  More	  recently,	  while	  the	  Algerian	  state	  adopted	  much	  of	  
the	  French	  governance	  system	  by	  necessity,	  Poland	   looks	  to	  France	  as	   its	  model,	   for	  example	  
rejecting	   judicial	   review	  based	  on	  French	   jurisprudence;	   indeed,	  “[T]he	  reliance	  of	   the	  reborn	  
Polish	  state	  on	  the	  French	  Third	  Republic’s	  theory	  of	  parliamentary	  supremacy	  precluded…the	  
concept	  of	  the	  judiciary’s	  right	  to	  review	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  parliamentary	  statutes.”161	  
These	  disparate	  relationships	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  core	  of	  the	  European	  enlightenment	  
are	  inscribed	  principally	  in	  the	  contrasting	  connections	  to	  French	  imperialism.	  To	  put	  it	  crudely,	  




imperial	   warfare	   while	   Poles	   courted	   them	   as	   workers,	   intellectuals,	   or	   parvenus.	   Algerian	  
leaders	   pushed	   for	   anti-­‐French	   mobilization	   while	   Polish	   elites	   became	   glib	   French-­‐inflected	  
cosmopolitans	  –	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  cavalier	  Russian	  intelligentsia	  in	  Dostoyevsky’s	  bilingual	  The	  
Gambler,	  not	  of	  Algeria’s	  parochial,	  peasant,	  Muslim	  mujahedeen.	   In	  part	  this	  draw	  to	  France	  
was	  an	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  revolution,	  paradoxically	  among	  disfranchised	  nobility:	  
	  
The	   Polish	   nobles	  were	   feudal	   landowners…[y]et	   their	   fight	   against	   the	  Russian	   tsar	   led	   them	  
into	  conflict	  with	  the	  whole	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  structure	  imposed	  on	  Europe	  after	  1814	  and	  
again	   after	   1848,	   and	   to	   find	   common	   purpose	   with	   revolutionaries	   and	   democrats	   across	  
Europe.	   For	   the	   British	   Chartists,	   the	   French	   republicans,	   and	   the	   German	   communists,	   the	  
Polish	   struggle	   was	   their	   struggle	   –	   and	   exiled	   Poles	   from	   noble	   families	   were	   to	   be	   found	  
fighting	  in	  Italy,	  Southern	  German,	  Hungary,	  and	  Paris.162	  
	  	  
	   It	   is	   not	   surprising,	   then,	   that	   as	   Abd	   el-­‐Qadir’s	   fought	   for	   Algeria’s	   freedom	   against	  
French	   imperialists,	   the	  “best	  Polish	  writers	   in	   the	  nineteenth	  century	   lived	   in	  Paris.	  The	   idea	  
was	  that	  as	  an	  outsider	  you	  could	  speak	  more	  freely	  and	  you	  could	  even	  have	  a	  better	  view	  of	  
the	   situation	   at	   home.”163	  Within	   France,	   “Polish	   Catholic	   immigrants	   eager	   to	   blend	   in	   and	  
become	   assimilated,	   while	   preserving	   only	   a	   memory	   of	   traditions	   whose	   observance	   was	  
limited	  to	  the	  private	  sphere”	  –	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  long-­‐insulated	  “French	  Islam.”164	  Thus,	  by	  
the	  mid-­‐19th-­‐century	  France	  was	  the	  center	  of	  Polish	  political	  exile	  and	  cultural	  life:	  
	  
The	   Polish	   Emigration	   in	   France	   was	   undoubtedly	   the	   senior	   émigré	   community	   in	   the	  
nineteenth	  century.	  Until	   the	   installation	  of	  Polish	  miners	   in	  the	  Pas	  de	  Calais	   in	  1919-­‐1920,	   it	  
was	   largely	   political	   in	   character.	   The	   Hotel	   Lambert,	   the	  Bibliothèque	   Polonaise,	   the	   Société	  
Littéraire	   were	   institutions	   of	   major	   importance.	   With	   Adam	   Mickiewicz	   at	   the	   Collège	   de	  
France,	  and	  with	  Słowacki,	  Niemcewicz,	  and	  Czartoryski	  strolling	  down	  the	  boulevards,	  for	  thirty	  
or	   forty	   years	   after	   the	  November	   Rising	   [1830]	   Paris	  was	   a	  more	   significant	   center	   of	   Polish	  





But	   long	   before	   this,	   and	   before	   the	   French	   landed	   at	   Sidi	   Ferruch,	   Stanisław	   Augustas,	   had	  
“modeled	  himself	  on…the	  pragmatic	  and	  legendarily	  popular…Henry	  IV”	  and,	  during	  the	  French	  
revolution,	   “was	   being	   referred	   to,	   even	   by	   radicals,	   as	   ‘the	   heart	   and	   body	   of	   the	   nation.’”	  
Replacing	   the	   “old	   noble	   Commonwealth”	   with	   a	   “new	   nation,”	   he	   conferred	   the	   new	  
constitution	  (3	  May	  1791)	  “to	  universal	  chants	  of	  ‘The	  King	  with	  the	  Nation,	  the	  Nation	  with	  the	  
King’”166	   As	   part	   of	   this	   legacy,	   “[w]e	   also	   find	   the	   original	   image	   of	   nineteenth-­‐century	  
nationalism	  in	  France,	  seen	  by	  many	  east	  of	  the	  Rhine	  as	  both	  the	  home	  of	  political	  philosophy	  
and	  a	  model	  national	  state.”167	  	  
The	  impression	  French	  modernity	  and	  nationalism	  made	  on	  its	  colonized	  differed	  across	  
and	  within	  imperial	  conquests.168	  But	  the	  impression	  bequeathed	  by	  nineteenth-­‐century	  history	  
is	  of	  Algerian	   resistance	   to	   cosmopolitan,	  universalist	   France	  and	  Polish	   identification	  with	   it.	  
Perhaps	  one	  major	  exception	  proves	  the	  rule:	  initial	  Polish	  support	  for	  and	  subsequent	  betrayal	  
of	   France	   in	   the	  Haitian	   uprising	   during	   the	   Revolution.169	   Here	   “the	   defection	   of	   Polish	   and	  
German	  troops,	  who	  were	  quick	  to	  take	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Haitian	  insurgents,	  show	  that	  a	  union	  
that	   strengthens	   is	   not	   just	   one	   that	   is	   made	   up	   of	   people	   of	   the	   same	   color.”170	   Overall,	  
however,	   into	  the	  twentieth-­‐century,	  Poles	   identified	  with	  French	   ideologies,	   institutions,	  and	  
values,	  whereas	  Algerians	  had	  far	  more	  ambivalent,	  suspicious,	  and	  critical	  views	  toward	  them.	  
Polish	  activists	  spent	  formative	  years	  in	  France	  as	  an	  exilic	  community	  whose	  progressive	  hosts	  
supported	   them	   against	   injustice	   at	   home	   (partition,	   Nazism,	   Stalinism);	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  
Algerians	  visited	  France	  as	  poor	  workers	  or	  political	  exiles,	  anxious	  colonial	  subalterns	  haunting	  




In	  her	  excruciating	  memoir,	  Anita	  Lobel	  recalls	  that	  when	  the	  Germans	  first	  rolled	  into	  
Krakov,	   and	   her	   nanny	  muttered,	   “Niemcy,	  Niemcy”	   (“Germans,	   Germans”),	   she	   heard	   Poles	  
yelling	  out,	  “No,	  No!	  They	  are	  French.	  Surely	  they	  must	  be	  French.”171	  At	  about	  the	  same	  time,	  
to	   avoid	  military	   service,	  Michel	  Warschawski’s	   grandfather	   left	   his	   shtetl	   in	   Lodz,	   eventually	  
ending	  up	  in	  Strasbourg,	  a	  “border	  town,”	  “in	  fact	  a	  ghetto,	  without	  walls	  and	  without	  police,	  
but	  a	  ghetto	  nonetheless.”172	  Under	  the	  Concordat	  “that	  Alsatian	  peculiarity	  that	  makes	  religion	  
a	   component	   element	   of	   the	   Republic,…the	   Jewish	   community	   of	   Strasbourg	   was	   powerful,	  
organized,	   and	   above	   all	   visible,”	   a	   town	   of	   inter-­‐	   and	   “intra-­‐community	   barriers…between	  
Alsatian	  Jews	  and	  Ost-­‐Juden,”	  both	  separated	  from	  Catholic,	  Lutheran,	  and	  Calvinist.	  Later,	  “in	  
the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   Muslims	   did	   not	   exist,	   or	   rather,	   were	   simply	   not	   acknowledged.	   Of	  
course,	  the	  expulsion	  of	  the	  Jews	  from	  Strasbourg	  (at	  the	  beginning	  of	  WWII),	  no	  matter	  what	  
their	  origin,	  and	  the	  terrible	  fate	  they…shared,	  opened	  up	  the	  postwar	  relations	  between	  these	  
communities;	  but	  only	  to	  a	  certain	  point:	  	  the	  boundaries	  did	  not	  disappear,	  nor	  did	  the	  natives’	  
feelings	   of	   superiority.”	  Warschawski	   records	   his	   alienation	   in	   this	   milieu,	   which	   shaped	   his	  
response	  to	  other	  immigrant	  communities	  in	  France:	  	  	  	  	  
	  
I	   relived	   this	   estrangement	   within	   the	   Jewish	   community	   with	   the	  mass	   immigration	   of	   Jews	  
from	  North	  Africa;	  first	  from	  Morocco	  after	  the	  Agadir	  earthquake	  [1960],	  then	  from	  Algeria	  on	  
the	  eve	  of	   that	   country’s	   independence.	   Confronted	  with	   the	  new	  arrivals,	   the	   Jews	  of	   Polish	  
origin	   behaved	   like	   the	   natives.	   They	   looked	   at	   the	   latter	   with	   that	   same	   surprise	   and	  
condescension	  that	  they	  themselves	  had	  been	  the	  targets	  of	  some	  decades	  earlier…I	  at	  once	  felt	  
closer	  to	  these	  young	  people	  coming	  from	  Agadir	  or	  Oran	  than	  to	  the	  children	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  
families	  of	   the	  Avenue	  des	  Vosges…My	  new	  schoolmates	   suddenly	   changed	  our	  environment.	  	  
The	   heavy	   and	   gray	   atmosphere	   of	   the	   Akiba	   School	   had	   been	   lifted	   and	   a	   new	  warmth	   had	  
gradually	   seeped	   into	   the	   classroom.	   The	   pied	   noir	   accent,	   the	   style	   of	   dress	   and	   haircut	  
contributed	  to	   the	  new	  atmosphere,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  certain	   light-­‐heartedness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   life	  and	   its	  
constraints	   that	  we	  were	  not	   familiar	  with.	   	   It	  was	  not	  easy	   for	   them,	  having	   lost	   forever	   the	  
world	   they	  had	  grown	  up	   in	   to	   come	   live	   in	   a	   country	  where	  everything	  was	  different.	   	   From	  
sunny	  and	  Mediterranean	  Algeria	  to	   imperial	  and	  very	  continental	  Strasbourg,	  the	  change	  was	  





Presumably	  such	  experiences	  would	  confirm	  for	  Poles	  the	  value	  of	  secular	  revolutionary	  
egalitarianism	   but	   for	   Algerians	   its	   imperial	   hypocrisy	   –	   lessons	   recalled,	   fittingly,	   when	   the	  
French	  supported	  the	  cancellation	  of	  elections	  and	  declaration	  of	  martial	  law	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  Algerian	  contempt	  and	  Polish	  fondness	  for	  enlightenment	  dispositions	  
created	   a	   background	   condition	   for	   their	   respective	   religious-­‐absolutist	   and	   liberal-­‐reformist	  
political	   theories	   in	   later	   years?	   In	   addition,	   the	   perception	   that	   Algerian	   immigrants	   were	  
dispossessed,	  economic	  exiles	  while	  Poles	  were	  privileged,	  political	  exiles,	  might	  further	  divide	  
the	  reception	  of	  French	  idealism.	  If	  Algerians	  encountered	  French	  military	  commanders,	  factory	  
employers,	  or	  colonial	  officials,	  Poles	  hob-­‐knobbed	  with	  intellectuals,	  activists,	  or	  bureaucrats;	  
Algerian	  returnees	  likely	  evinced	  populist	  (anti-­‐secular)	  communalism	  while	  Poles	  would	  return	  
home	  with	   reformist,	  deliberative,	  or	   technocratic	   commitments.173	   Finally,	  civil	   societal	  anti-­‐
authoritarian	  discourse	  in	  Poland	  seems	  contrary	  to	  authoritarian	  anti-­‐civil	  societal	  discourse	  in	  
Algeria.174	  Such	   intuitions	  align	  the	  French	  empire	  with	  Algerian	  anti-­‐rationalist	   religiosity	  and	  
French	  hospitality	  to	  Poles;	  it	  does	  not	  cite	  Poles’	  elitism	  –	  absent	  from	  Solidarity175	  –	  but	  their	  
egalitarianism,	  intellectualism,	  cosmopolitanism,	  and	  secularism.176	  	  	  
This	  tempting	  hypothesis	  of	  contrasting	  deep	  structures	  of	  Algerian	  and	  Polish	  political	  
thinking	   is	   inadequate.	  The	  backgrounds,	  motivations,	  and	  experiences	  of	  Algerian	  and	  Polish	  
émigrés	  bore	  more	  similarities	  than	  differences	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  period	  under	  review.	  By	  WWI,	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  peasants	  had	  immigrated	  as	  economic	  refugees	  to	  France	  from	  rural	  areas	  
of	  endemic	  and	  exacerbating	  poverty.	  Algerian	  workers	  began	   immigrating	   to	  France	   in	   large	  




Algerians	   had	   already	   found	   jobs	   in	   France…,	   pioneers	   in	   a	   movement	   that	   would	   become	  
enormous	   as	   the	   century	   went	   on,	   with…demographic,	   economic,	   cultural,	   and	   political	  
consequences.”177	   Also	   by	   then,	   and	   increasingly	   in	   the	   inter-­‐war	   years,	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	  
elites	  had	  marinated	  in	  French	  intellectual	  and	  political	  life.	  	  
Those	  consequences	  would	  meet	  up	  with	  the	  indigenization	  of	  French	  ideas	  in	  Algeria	  a	  
generation	   after	   the	   1871	   defeat	   of	   anti-­‐imperial	   resistance.	   By	   the	   1890s	   most	   Algerians	  
succumbed	  to	  colonial	  integration,	  notably	  through	  French	  education	  and	  military	  service.	  But	  
Algerian	  educated	  elites	  quickly	  agitated	  for	  emancipation	  in	  several	  forms.	  The	  so-­‐called	  Young	  
Algerians,	   the	   initial	   Algerian	  modernist	   “évolués,”	   held	   French-­‐informed	  debates	   in	   political-­‐
cultural	   clubs	   throughout	   the	   major	   cities;	   if	   against	   their	   influence	   and	   France	   arose	   the	  
Islamist	  “vieux	  turbans,”	  even	  many	  of	  them	  “had	  extensive	  exposure	  to	  French	  education	  and	  
were	  perfectly	  bilingual.”178	  As	  Algerian	  nationalist	  tendencies	  erupted	  in	  political	  excitation	  in	  
the	  1930s	  in	  both	  France	  and	  Algeria,	  “the	  influence	  of	  French	  ideas,	  particularly	  the	  liberal	  and	  
liberating	  ideologies	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  the	  French	  Revolution	  [influenced]	  enormously	  
the	  way	   Algerian	   elites	   shaped	   the	  movement	   toward	   national	   liberation.”179	   By	   the	   start	   of	  
WWII,	   then,	   the	   vast	   differences	   between	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   profiles	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   France	   had	  
narrowed	   in	  two	  senses.	  First,	  economic	  and	  political	  emigrants	  were	  similar	  sociologically	  by	  
class,	   occupation,	   and	   expression.	   Second,	   politicized	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   exile	   communities	  
shared	  political	  objectives	  and	  interpretations:	  opposing	  colonial	  coercion	  and	  partition	  with	  a	  






The	   political	   complexion	   of	   the	   wartime	   Polish	   Government	   was	   limited	   only	   by	   its	  
commitments	  to	  the	  principle	  of	   independence,	  to	  the	  war	  against	  Poland’s	   invaders…,	  and	  to	  
the	   territorial	   integrity	   of	   the	   republic.	   Anyone	   who	   accepted	   these	   principles	   –	   …the	  
overwhelming	  majority	  of	  Poles	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  –	  was	  free	  to	  participate	   in	   its	  numerous	  
organs	  and	  agencies.”181	  	  
	  
That	  description	  captures	  the	  Algerian	  movement	  as	  well.	  Wartime	  experience	  furthers	  
this	   comparison.	   Algerian	   and	   Polish	   liberation	   movements	   sealed	   French	   alliances	   against	  
Germany.	  The	  Polish	  government’s	  “Polish	  Army	   in	  France”	  and	  “in	   the	  Levant”	   joined	   forces	  
under	  direct	  French	  command	  in	  1940.182	  Poles	  and	  Algerians	  might	  have	  fought	  side-­‐by-­‐side.	  	  
One	  might	  add,	  in	  light	  of	  Algerians’	  renowned	  martial	  spirit,	  that	  Poles	  “organized	  the	  largest	  
independent	   resistance	  movement	   in	   occupied	   Europe…which	   planned	   to	   fight	   the	   Germans	  
and	   then	   confront	   the	   Soviets	  with	   a	   restored	  Polish	   state.”183	   For	   their	   part,	   in	  Algeria	   “the	  
Arab	   leadership	  was	   initially	   optimistic	   that	   the	  defeat	   of	  Hitler	  would	  usher	   in	   long-­‐awaited	  
reforms,	   and	   when	   they	   issued	   a	   manifesto	   February	   10th	   1943,	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   Allied	  
landings	   in	  North	  Africa,	  they	  took	  great	  care	  to	  emphasize	  their	   loyalty	  to	  the	   ideals	  of	  1789	  
and	   their	   affection	   for	   the	   ‘culture	   of	   France	   and	   the	   West	   that	   they	   had	   received	   and	  
cherished.’”184	  French	  capitulation	  and	  Vichy	  collaboration	  were	  as	  devastating	  to	  Poles’	  anti-­‐
imperial	  dreams	  as	  the	  massacre	  of	  Algerians	  at	  Sétif	  (1945)	  were	  to	  Algerians’.	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  French	  political,	  cultural,	  or	  critical	  tradition	  would	  have	  had	  a	  similar	   impact	  on	  post-­‐war	  
Polish	  and	  Algerian	  nationalism	  and	  socialism	  –	  while	  Catholics	  and	  Muslims	  alike	  might	  have	  
taken	   exception	   to	   its	   secularism.	   This	   parallel	   extends	   to	   the	   “conviction…[of]	   the	   Algerian	  
[revolution]…that,	   even	   in	   dealing	   with	   so	   rational	   and	   civilized	   a	   people	   as	   the	   French,	  
liberation	  was	  made	   possible	   only	   by	   resorting	   to	   the	   gun	   and	   the	   knife.”185	   Nothing	   contra	  




erupted	  in	  1992	  surely	  projected	  the	  betrayal	  of	  the	  French	  revolutionary	  tradition	  embodied	  in	  
the	  corrupt,	  “pseudo-­‐secular”	  Algerian	  police	  state.186	  
	   Patriarchal	  attitudes	  could	  provide	  an	  interesting	  variable	  in	  the	  two	  results	  for	  similar	  
reasons	  –	  perhaps	  sexist	  repression	  of	  women	  is	  a	  good	  barometer	  for	  a	  level	  of	  hostility	  more	  
generally.	  Here	  one	  would	  again	  have	  to	  be	  rather	  textured	  and	  careful,	  but	  in	  the	  end	  it	  is	  not	  
evident	  that	  Poland	  is	  more	  progressive	  than	  Algeria	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  women’s	  freedoms	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  puzzle,	  or	   in	  general.	  Algeria	   is	  renowned	  for	  women’s	  participation	  in	  the	  war	  
against	  France,	  portrayed	  in	  Battle	  of	  Algiers	  and	  elsewhere	  as	  a	  central	  tenet	  of	  revolutionary	  
consciousness.187	  What	  is	  less	  known	  is	  that	  the	  consolidation	  of	  an	  independent	  Algerian	  state	  
reverted	  to	  highly	  gendered	  public-­‐private	  designations,	  essentially	  sequestering	  women	  in	  the	  
domestic	   sphere.	  Essentially	  absent	   from	  public	  policy	  debates,	  women	  became,	  over	   time,	  a	  
bargaining	  chip	  between	  secular	  rulers	  and	  Islamist	  opponents,	  resulting	  in	  the	  notorious	  1984	  
Family	  Code,	  which	  essentially	  traded	  Islamist	  cooperation	  with	  the	  regime	  for	  national	  policies	  
relegating	  women	  to	  the	  home	  as	  what	  feminists	  called	  right-­‐less	  servants	  of	  man	  and	  family.188	  
	   If	  Polish	  women’s	  rights	  exceed	  that	  of	  Algerian	  women,	  it	  is	  not	  without	  similar	  strains	  
and	  ongoing	  policy	  debates	  about	  gender.	  Penn	  laments	  that	  even	  at	  the	  height	  of	  protests	  and	  
oppositional	  success,	   resistance	  to	  the	  Polish	  regime	  was	  cast	   in	  patriarchal	   terms	  as	  a	  “male	  
revolution,	   thus	   institutionalizing	   at	   the	   very	  moment	   that	   a	   democracy	  was	   born,	   women’s	  
invisibility	   in	   the	  Solidarity	  movement.”189	   Like	   the	  Algerian	  women	   in	   the	  French	  Revolution,	  
according	  to	  Penn,	  women	  were	  active,	  affective	  tokens	  in	  the	  gendered	  conflict	  with	  the	  state.	  
Polish	  women	  in	  or	  around	  Solidarity	  were	  surely	  more	  equal	  than	  their	  Algerian	  counterparts	  




but	   women	   did	   support	   the	   violence	   in	  many	   cases	   and	   provide	   its	   backbone,	   although	   the	  
coercion	   in	   recruiting	   assistants	   in	   post-­‐1992	  Algeria	   precludes	   imputing	   positive	   support	   for	  
the	  GIA	  to	  women.	  In	  the	  cases	  of	  abortion	  law191	  and	  labor	  regulations192	  the	  same	  could	  be	  
said,	  where	  shared	  patterns	  of	  male-­‐	  and	  family-­‐centered	  concerns	  are	  not	  identical	  but	  similar.	  	  
Such	  attitudes	  about	  women	  and	  polices	  on	  gender	  may	  bring	  us	   to	   the	  similarities	   in	  
religiosity	   –	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   differences	   in	   religion	   which	   I	   address	   below.	   Algeria	   and	  
Poland	  are	  among	  the	  “many	  societies	  [in	  which]	  religious	  groups	  enjoy	  a	  unique	  institutional	  
legitimacy	  that	   translates	   into	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  advantages	  when	   it	  comes	  to	  contentious	  
politics,”	  such	  as	  “exemptions	  from	  taxation	  or	  conscription”	  and	  a	  distinct	  spatial	  or	  “temporal	  
pattern	   of	   growth	   and	   decline	   from	   that	   of	   secular	   movements.”193	   The	   political	   sanctity	   of	  
religious	  practices	  and	  sites	  derives	  from	  their	  empirical	  presence	  as	  the	  material	  expression	  of	  
their	  religious,	  spiritual,	  and	  “ontological”	  power,	  all	   threatening	  to	  state	  sovereignty.194	  Even	  
the	  most	  brutal	   ruling	  classes	  hesitate	   to	   invade	  mosques,	   churches,	  and	   temples	  because	  of	  
the	  primal	   force	  of	  their	  social	  and	  symbolic	  place	   in	  citizens’	   lives.	  Religious	  centers	  tend	  for	  
this	  reason	  to	  be	  relatively	  inviolable	  even	  under	  secular	  authoritarian	  rule,	  or	  if	  compromised	  
to	  have	  won	  concessions	  or	  adopted	  a	  mediating	  or	  mollifying	  role	  between	  state	  and	  citizen.	  In	  
Poland	   and	   Algeria,	   as	   in	  many	   other	   places,	  most	   people	   are	   committed	   religious	   believers	  
with	  memories	   of	   political,	   social,	   national,	   and	   economic	   campaigns	   urged	   forward	   in	   their	  
name	  by	   theistic	   convictions	  buttressed	  by	   communal	   obligations.	  Where	  drawn	   to	   religions’	  
mystical	   properties,	   people	   rarely	   adhere	   to	   the	   rituals,	   practices,	   and	   networks	   of	   religious	  




all	  kinds	  of	  religions	  with	  mystified	  and	  self-­‐sacrificial	  adherents	  fill	  “churches”196:	  nationalism,	  
capitalism,	  liberalism,	  secularism,	  scientism,	  statism,	  rationalism,	  and	  “high	  modernism”197	  	  
Polish	  Catholics	  from	  the	  1970s	  and	  Algerian	  Muslims	  from	  the	  1980s	  exemplify	  the	  “de-­‐
privatization	   of	   religion”	   among	   activists	   confronting	   unresponsive,	   ineffective,	   or	   inhumane	  
bureaucratic,	   market,	   and	   repressive	   state	   apparatuses.198	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   citizens	   were	  
given	  church	  and	  mosque	  “organizational	  opportunity,”	  a	  key	  protest	  resource.199	  In	  each	  case	  
this	   “autonomous	   space”	   for	   religious	   collective	   identity	   antedated,	   was	   challenged	   by,	   and	  
resisted	  state	  prerogative.	  “The	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  has	  always	  been	  part	  of	   the	  world	  of	  
Polish	  politics,”	  as	  Davis	  says,	  “whether	  it	  likes	  it	  or	  not.	  Not	  only	  in	  its	  corporate	  existence	  as	  a	  
wealthy,	   ancient,	   and	   respected	   institution,	   but	   also	   through	   the	   actions	   and	   attitudes	   of	   its	  
priests	  and	  people,	  it	  has	  exerted	  a	  powerful	  influence	  on	  all	  political	  developments.”200	  Polish	  
communism	  –	  which	  Stalin	  compared	  to	  saddling	  a	  cow	  –	  gave	  up	  secularizing	  Poland	  by	  1956.	  
During	  the	  early	  years	  of	  communist	  consolidation,	  the	  editors	  of	  “Tygodnik	  Powszechny	   [The	  
Universal	  Weekly],	  a	  high-­‐level	  Catholic	   cultural	  magazine	  with	  a	  pronounced	  anti-­‐totalitarian	  
political	   orientation…refused,	   unlike	   those	   of	   all	   the	   other	   Polish	   magazines,	   to	   publish	   an	  
idolatrous	  obituary	  of	   Joseph	   Stalin.”201	   Still,	   the	  Church	  accommodated	   the	   state,	  mediating	  
and	  stabilizing	  the	  regime	  more	  than	  opposing	  it,	  until	  1976	  when	  KOR,	  official	  Catholicism,	  and	  
workers	  were	  pushing	  for	  a	  unified	  “civil	  society.”202	  	  
In	  Algeria,	  the	  socio-­‐political	  structure	  of	  sub-­‐coastal	  Muslim	  brotherhoods	  bolstered	  an	  
established	   religious	   civil	   society.	  These	  brotherhoods,	  as	   I	  discussed,	  were	  organized	  around	  
charismatic	   “saints”	  whose	   hostelries	   ran	   learning	   centers,	   distribution	   networks,	   and	   ethical	  




inferences	  prevail	  concerning	  the	  continuity	  of	  Islamist	  activism	  into	  modern	  state	  formation	  in	  
Algeria.	  First	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  Islamist	  movements	  or	  anti-­‐state	  resistance	  reiterates	  the	  mystical	  
anti-­‐legalism	  or	  instinctive	  localism	  of	  traditional	  agricultural	  Muslim	  communities;	  that	  is,	  that	  
Islamist	  activism	  against	   the	  Ottoman,	  French,	  or	  Algerian	  state-­‐builders	   reflects	  an	  urban(e)-­‐
rural	  theological	  divide.204	  The	  second	  error	  is	  to	  think	  that	  recent	  Islamist	  politics	  in	  Algeria	  or	  
the	  MENA	  generally	  rejects	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  either	  as	  a	  western	  or	  Christian	  foreign	  imposition,	  
such	  that	  acceptance	  of	  anything	  less	  than	  an	  Islamist	  state	  –	  or	  Caliphate,	  perhaps	  –	  is	  a	  form	  
of	  colonial	  or	  post-­‐colonial	  capitulation.205	  In	  Algeria,	  as	  in	  Poland,	  the	  long	  history	  of	  religious	  
organization	   and	   self-­‐defense	   survived	   state	   attempts	   to	   appropriate	   legitimizing	   symbols,	  
institutions,	  and	   ideologies	  for	  despotic	  purposes,	  but	   in	  neither	  country	   is	  church	  or	  mosque	  
doctrinally	  opposed	  to	  secular	  structures	  or	  beholden	  to	  outside	  sources	  of	  religious	  sanction.	  It	  
is	  doubtful	  as	  well,	  given	  the	  earlier	  remarks	  on	  Polish	  martyrdom	  and	  the	  outcome	  in	  Algeria,	  
that	  Catholic	  or	  Muslim	  precepts	  decided	   the	  social	  outcomes	  of	  modern	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  
authoritarian	  public	  policy.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  the	  common	  elements	  of	  church	  and	  mosque	  in	  
the	   two	   countries:	   strong	   traditional	   base	   in	   rural	   areas	   and	  urban	   centers,	   a	  mediating	   role	  
between	   the	   state	   and	   citizens,	   powerful	   external	   backers	   and	   influences,	   and	   legacies	   of	  
religious	  resistance	  and	  nationalist	  uprisings.	  
	   The	  political	   involvement	  of	   religious	  organizations	   in	  Algeria	   and	  Poland	  gained	   from	  
the	  homogeneity	  of	  their	  populations.	  Algeria	  is	  95-­‐99%	  Muslim,	  Arab	  and	  Berber;	  Poland	  is	  95-­‐
99%	  Catholic	  (Roman).	  This	  was	  due	  largely	  to	  the	  expulsions	  or	  departures	  of	  Jews	  in	  and	  after	  
WWII	  and	  decolonization.	  For	  instance,	  “the	  return	  in	  early	  1946	  of	  nearly	  150,000	  exiled	  Jews	  




bloodily	   expressed	   in	   Kielce	   in	   July	   1946…[T]he	   exodus	   of	   Jewish	   survivors	   capped	   off	   [an]	  
astonishing	  process	  of	  ethnic	  homogenization.”206	  This	  homogeneity,	  if	  anything,	  weighs	  against	  
the	  view	  that	  religious	  or	  ethnic	  values	  dictate	  political,	  material,	  economic,	  ethical,	  or	  symbolic	  
divisions.	  Religious	  or	  national	  consensus	   is	  generally	  an	   invention	  of	  narratives	  cooked	  up	  by	  
political	  entrepreneurs	  attempting	  to	   form	  rather	   than	  mobilize	  an	  existing	  unanimity	  against	  
actually	   diverse	   religious	   interpretations	   or	   ethnic	   demands.	   More	   simply,	   intra-­‐Muslim	   and	  
intra-­‐Catholic207	  contention	  recommends	  caution	  about	  inferences	  from	  this	  increased	  postwar	  
homogeneity.	  The	  violence	  of	  recent	  Algerian	  politics	  and	  the	  history	  of	  Berber-­‐Arab208	  or	  intra-­‐
zawaya	  tensions	  may	  make	  this	  a	  more	  obvious	  point	  in	  that	  case	  than	  in	  the	  Polish	  case	  with	  
its	   images	  of	  mass,	  uniform	  “adherence	  to	  the	   faith	  of	   the	  bulk	  of	   the	  Polish	  population.”	  Six	  
million	  Poles	   greeting	   the	  Pope	   in	   June	  1979	   contrast	  with	  Algeria’s	  divisions	   impressively.209	  
Such	   memories	   are	   crucial	   to	   the	   account	   of	   Solidarity,	   as	   the	   church-­‐labor	   relationship	  
deepened,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  only	   the	  apparent	  uniformity	  of	   such	  gatherings	   that	  strike	  one;	   their	  
peaceful	  forbearance,	  politeness,	  humility,	  and	  devotion	  are	  maybe	  more	  significant.	  
	   Such	  an	  image	  of	  reverent	  but	  explicitly	  political	  gathering	  of	  Catholic	  workers	  lacks	  any	  
correlate	  in	  our	  images	  of	  Islam,	  who	  are	  seen	  praying	  as	  a	  mass	  but	  nothing	  else.	  I	  am,	  again,	  
not	  pursuing	  Orientalist	  tropes,	  but	  querying	  the	  efficacy	  of	  conceivably	  proposed	  explanatory	  
variables.	  Here,	  the	  point	   is	  to	  compare	  similarities,	  either	  by	  equating	  them	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  
or,	  perhaps,	  showing	  unexpected	  differences	  that	  might	  logically	  predict	  different	  outcomes.	  In	  
this	  case,	  we	  have	  reasons,	  perhaps	  overwhelmed	  by	  events,	   to	  expect	  an	  even	  more	  violent	  
Polish	  response	  to	  state	  corruption	  and	  coercion.	  After	  all,	  Polak-­‐Katolik	  identity	  combined	  with	  




employed.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  similarities	  in	  religious	  devotion,	  organization,	  and	  homogeneity	  in	  
Poland	  and	  Algeria	  don’t	  solve	  my	  puzzle	  but	  raise	  another	  –	  why	  didn’t	  Poles	  take	  up	  arms?	  In	  
this	  regard,	  concerning	  the	  resort	  to	  religious	  values	  in	  explaining	  protest	  objectives	  and	  tactics,	  
Michnik’s	  remarks	  on	  the	  Polish	  state’s	  propaganda	  efforts	  are	  eye-­‐opening:	  
	  	  
party	  commentators	  [used]	  the	  specter	  of	  Iranian	  theocracy	  to	  frighten	  the	  Poles,	  [claiming]	  the	  
entire	   Solidarity	   movement	   [was]	   simply	   an	   East	   European	   version	   of	   Iran’s	   conservative-­‐
religious	   revolution	   against	   modernity.	   They	   portray[ed]	   Solidarity	   supporters	   as	   “narrow-­‐
minded	   traditionalists	   feeding	   on	   a	   fanatical	   spiritual	   mishmash	   that	   combines	   a	   perverted	  
version	  of	  Catholicism	  with	  chauvinistic	  forms	  of	  the	  romantic	  tradition.”	  The	  unions’	  supporters	  
[were]	   said	   to	   foster	   the	  belief	   that	   “the	  nation’s	  martyrdom	  will	   be	   rewarded	  by	  benevolent	  
supernatural	  powers”	  and	  “the	  miraculous	   intervention	  of	  mystical	   forces.”	   	  They	  engage[d]	   in	  
“the	  magical	  rituals	  of	  burning	  candles,	  erecting	  crosses,	  and	  undertaking	  pilgrimages	  to	  fight	  off	  
evil	  forces.”	  They	  generate[d]	  “collective	  irrationality,	  steadfast	  in	  their	  belief	  that	  an	  act	  of	  faith	  
can	   reverse	   relations	   of	   power,	   laws	   of	   economics,	   and	   all	   the	   rules	   governing	   political	   life.”	  
Solidarity	  supporters	  [were]	  the	  latter-­‐day	  offspring	  of	  the	  Counter-­‐Reformation’s	  triumph	  over	  
the	   Renaissance.	   In	   August	   1980,	   just	   as	   in	   centuries	   past,	   the	   Catholic	   Counter-­‐Reformation	  
transformed	  the	  thinking,	  Renaissance	  brain	  of	  the	  Pole	  into	  a	  “Stone	  Age	  head,	  moved	  only	  by	  
greed	   and	   superstition,	   closed	   to	   the	   world	   of	   progress.”	   It	   has	   made	   the	   Pole	   a	   fanatical	  
believer	  in	  Polish	  messianism,	  an	  exterminator	  of	  heresy,	  a	  nationalist	  megalomaniac	  “enclosed	  
in	  self-­‐congratulatory	  bigotry	  as	  though	  in	  a	  coffin.210	  
	  
	   	    
§3.c	   Poland	  and	  Algeria:	  Differences	  
	  
	   This	   section	  will	   compare	   the	   three	   leading	   alternative	   explanatory	   variables,	   gleaned	  
from	  the	  separate	  literatures	  on	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  or	  on	  Central	  Europe	  and	  MENA.	  They	  are	  
religious	   values	   (the	   Catholic	   versus	   Muslim	   values),	   economic	   resources	   (oil	   wealth	   versus	  
labor-­‐intensive	  production),	   and	  sovereignty	   (post-­‐imperial	   versus	  ongoing	   imperial	   structure,	  
i.e.,	  the	  threat	  of	  Soviet	  intervention).	  Each	  is	  presented	  and	  analyzed	  as	  a	  feasible	  variable,	  to	  
reflect	  my	  consideration	  of	  them	  as	  I	  researched	  on	  the	  cases.	  I	  try	  not	  to	  disprove	  them	  but	  to	  





	   §3.c.1	   Religious	  values	   	   	   	   	  
	  
One	  objection	  to	  this	  comparison	  has	  been	  that	  diverse	  religious	  communities	  cannot	  be	  
compared,	  especially	  across	  religious	  traditions.	  Here	  the	  specific	  presumption	  is	  that	  Islam	  has	  
a	  greater	  tendency	  than	  Catholicism	  to	  legitimize	  political	  violence	  against	  secular,	  western,	  or	  
national	  states.211	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  Islam	  itself	  might	  explain	  Algerian	  militancy	  and	  Catholicism	  could	  
explain	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  under	  their	  common	  (secular)	  suffering	  and	  deprivation.	  Difficulties	  
immediately	  present	  themselves	  here.	  As	   I	  have	  tarried	  for	  some	  time	  with	  religion	   in	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria,	  this	  will	  be	  an	  analytical	  complement	  to	  the	  previous	  section,	  noting	  that	  the	  point	  
is	  to	  examine	  plausible	  causes	  of	  violence	  in	  religious	  valuation,	  including	  how	  it	  might	  mediate	  
or	   decrease	   temptations	   to	   violence.	   The	   first	   response	   to	   this	   proposed	   variable	   is	   to	   cite	  
specialized	  studies	  that	  reject	   isomorphic	  connections	  –	  diachronic	  and	  synchronic	  –	  between	  
Islam	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  democracy212,	  gender213,	  tolerance214,	  state	  sovereignty215,	  secularization216,	  legal	  
or	  philosophical	  rationality217,	  capitalism218,	  cross-­‐cultural	  coexistence219,	  and	  authority.220	  The	  
lack	  of	  empirical	  correlation	  between	  Islam	  and	  violence	  is	  unsurprising.221	  	  
But	  it	  might	  also	  be	  helpful	  or	  interesting	  to	  address	  the	  logics	  usually	  adduced	  in	  linking	  
religion,	   or	   Islam	   anyway,	   to	   violence.	   It	   is	   common	   to	   derive	   given	   instances	   of	   “religious-­‐
nationalist”	   violence	   directly	   from	   their	   shared	   environment	   without	   testing	   whether	   that	  
environment	   generally	   produces	   violence.222	   They	   tend	   to	   identify	   (1)	  multiple	   instances	   of	  F	  
(fundamentalism)	  and	  (2)	  one	  shared	  environment	  –	  usually	  M	  (modernity)	  –	  in	  which	  the	  many	  
instances	  of	  F	  (F,	  F`,	  F``,	  etc)	  occur.	  They	  deduce	  that,	  if	  M	  is	  always	  present	  where	  F	  is,	  M	  must	  
cause	  F.	  In	  turn,	  all	  F	  is	  said	  to	  reject	  all	  M,	  given	  specific	  anti-­‐M	  beliefs.	  Finally,	  F	  is	  said	  to	  be	  a	  




that	   is	   universal,	   and	   intuitive,	   enough	   to	   encompass	   all	   of	   them.	   “Religious	   fundamentalist	  
militants	  exist	  in	  Oklahoma,	  Egypt,	  India,	  Japan,	  Brazil,	  and	  Israel.	  They	  must	  be	  (1)	  akin	  and	  (2)	  
reacting	   to	   the	   same	   thing,	   something	   that	   exists	   in	   all	   those	  places	   (such	  as	   secularism,	   the	  
State,	   or	   globalization,	   i.e.,	  M223).	   Because	   they	   are	   religious,	   their	   religion	   must	   reject	  M.”	  
Asking	  the	  militants	  themselves	  will	  confirm	  this	  thesis.224	  So	  “the	  point	  of	  religious	  terrorism	  is	  
to	  purify	  the	  world	  of	  these	  corrupting	  influences…[Standard]	  grievances	  often	  mask	  a	  deeper	  
kind	  of	  angst	  and	  a	  deeper	  kind	  of	  fear.	  Fear	  of	  a	  godless	  universe,	  of	  chaos,	  of	  loose	  rules,	  and	  
of	  loneliness.”225	  Tests	  for	  this	  series	  of	  associations	  –	  by	  asking	  if	  M	  and	  F	  even	  correlate	  –	  are	  
rarely	  undertaken.226	  	  
A	  second	  error	  is	  to	  confuse	  “Islamism”	  and	  “Islam,”	  thus	  ignoring	  intra-­‐Islamic	  variation	  
amidst	  M.227	  Researchers	   link	   jihadism	  not	   to	  globalization	  or	   similar	  general	   categories	  of	  M	  
but	   to	  political	  exclusion.228	  Even	  where	   inclusion	  does	  not	  alter	  opponents’	  desires	   it	   affixes	  
their	  behavior	  to	  corporatist	  and	  participatory	  incentives.229	  Islam	  lacks	  “a	  politics”230	  to	  explain	  
specific	  socio-­‐political	  strategies.231	  As	  Bourdieu	  says,	  reflecting	  on	  his	  fieldwork	  in	  Algeria	  and	  
articulating	  what	  I	  am	  conceiving	  as	  subjectivity:	  	  
	  
it	  is	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  Islam	  which	  permeates	  all	  of	  life,	  not	  only	  religious	  or	  intellectual	  life,	  but	  
private,	  social	  and	  professional	  life.	  However,	  to	  consider	  Islam	  the	  determining	  or	  predominant	  
cause	  of	  all	   cultural	  phenomena	  would	  be	  no	   less	   fallacious	   than	   to	  consider	   religion	  as	  being	  
merely	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  structures.	  Indeed	  Islam,	  considered	  as	  a	  religious	  
message,	  is	  not	  connected	  with	  any	  particular	  economic	  or	  social	  system;	  and	  justification	  could	  
very	  well	  be	  found	  for	  radically	  different	  political	  orders	  or	  economic	  systems	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  
same	  religious	  doctrine.232	  	  
	  	  
Thus	  it	  is	  important	  to	  clarify	  that	  colonization	  did	  not	  “produce	  132	  years	  of	  conflict	  with	  the	  




varied	  widely	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  imperial	  citizenship	  regime,	  as	  in	  the	  postcolonial	  regime;	  and	  
in	   these	   varied	   conditions,	  Algerians	  moved	  along	   a	  dense	   theological	   and	  political	   spectrum	  
from	  personal-­‐pietistic	  to	  communitarian	  to	  militarist	  Muslim	  identities,	  not	  to	  be	  conflated.	  
A	  similar	  periodization	  and	  typology	  of	  Polish	  resistance	  to	  external	  occupation	  suggests	  
a	  commonality	  between	  the	  cases	  that	  demotes	  the	  religious	  divergence	  as	  an	  explanation:	  	  	  
	  
The	   experience	   of	   Central	   Europe	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	   four	   stages	   in	   the	   ongoing	  
development	   of	   civil	   society;	   defensive,	   in	   which	   private	   individuals	   and	   independent	   groups	  
actively	   or	   passively	   defend	   their	   autonomy	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   party-­‐state;	   emergent,	   in	   which	  
independent	  social	  groups	  or	  movements	  seek	  limited	  goals	  in	  a	  widened	  public	  sphere	  which	  is	  
sanctioned	  or	  conceded	  by	  the	  reforming	  party-­‐state;	  mobilizational,	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  
of	   the	   party-­‐state	   by	   offering	   alternative	   forms	   of	   governance	   to	   a	   politicized	   society;	   and	  
institutional,	   in	  which	   publicly	   supported	   leaders	   enact	   laws	   guaranteeing	   autonomy	  of	   social	  
action,	   leading	  to	  a	  contractual	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  society	  regulated	  eventually	  by	  
free	  elections.234	  
	  	  	  
Indeed,	  Catholicism	  does	  seem	  a	  poor	  predictor	  of	  social	  dissimulation	  or	  political	  non-­‐violence,	  
as	  French235,	  Irish236,	  and	  other	  histories	  make	  clear.237	  As	  for	  the	  Polish	  case,	  Davies	  says:	  
	  
During	   the	   century	   of	   statelessness	   and	   beyond,	   every	   single	   Polish	   generation	   has	   produced	  
men	   careless	   of	   their	   own	   survival,	   who	   have	   risen	   with	   desperate	   courage	   against	   their	  
tormentors.	   The	   Warsaw	   uprising	   of	   August	   1944	   was	   but	   the	   last	   performance	   of	   a	   drama	  
which	  was	  also	  enacted	  in	  1733,	  1768,	  1794,	  1830,	  1846,	  1848,	  1863,	  1905,	  and	  1920.	  	  On	  each	  
occasion,	  if	  asked	  what	  they	  were	  fighting	  for,	  their	  reply	  might	  well	  have	  been	  the	  same:	  	  for	  ‘a	  
few	  ideas…which	  is	  nothing	  new’.238	  	  	  
	  
Under	  occupation	  and	  partition,	  four	  “courses	  of	  action	  [or	  traditions]	  were	  open”	  to	  the	  vast	  
majority	   of	   Poles	   who	   could	   not	   “aspire	   to	   cultivate	   their	   native	   political	   traditions	   without	  
serious	  fears	  of	  harassment	  and	  violence…:	  	  Loyalism,	  Resistance,	  Conciliation,	  and	  Emigration.”	  	  
Resistance	  here	  refers	  to	  the	  	  
	  
iron-­‐hard	  devotees	  of	   Insurrection…prepared	  to	  use	  all	  possible	  means,	   including	  violence	  and	  




consequential	  branch	  of	  Resistance,	  whose	  tradition	  stretched	  in	  unbroken	  line	  from	  Kościuszko	  
to	  Piłsudski,	  dedicated	  their	  lives	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  Polish	  cause	  at	  all	  costs.	  Over	  the	  generations,	  
they	  produced	  a	  crowded	  gallery	  of	  adventurers,	  folk	  heroes,	  and	  martyrs.239	  	  	  
	  
As	   in	  Algeria,	  these	  four	  categories	  could	  contest	  or	  co-­‐exist	  with	  one	  another,	  their	  “political	  
attitudes	   dominated	  not	   so	  much	  by	   social	   philosophies	   or	   sectional	   interests…but	   rather	   by	  
people’s	   varying	   reactions	   to	   oppression.”240	   This	   schema	   extends	   “exit,	   voice,	   and	   loyalty,”	  
parsing	  two	  kinds	  of	  voice	  found	  in	  Algeria	  as	  well.241	  Resistance	  and	  conciliation	  are	  opposed	  
sub-­‐categories	  of	  voice	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  	  	  
Indeed,	  in	  Algeria	  and	  Poland	  the	  “few	  ideas”	  protesters	  were	  fighting	  for	  –	  varying	  over	  
time	   –	   do	   not	   map	   over	   fundamental	   religious	   commitments	   or	   identities	   with	   explanatory	  
purchase.242	   This	   observation	   extends	   to	   the	   perception	   that	   failure	   of	   “all	   the	   other	   isms”	  
made	  Islamism	  uniquely	  popular	  or	  persuasive	  as	  an	  assessment	  of	  “the	  Arab	  state”	  or	  “Muslim	  
politics,”	  aided	  by	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  mosque	  as	  a	  “uniquely	  inviolable	  political	  space.”	  The	  idea	  
is	  that	  secular	   ideologies	  –	  liberalism,	  socialism,	  nationalism,	  communism,	  and	  capitalism	  –	  all	  
failed	  and	  were	  replaced	  with	  indigenous	  Islamic	  political	  principles	  (which	  in	  turn	  would	  have	  
to	   uniquely	   endorse	   violence).	   Even	   if	   this	   depiction	  were	   accurate243,	  Muslim	   values	   do	   not	  
historically	  seem	  to	  distinguish	  practical	  Algerian-­‐Muslim	  beliefs	  from	  those	  of	  Polish	  Catholics	  
with	  causal	  bearing	  on	  my	  puzzle.	  A	  key	  feature	  of	  KOR/Solidarity	  was	  its	  own	  version	  of	  these	  
pragmatic-­‐communal	  values	  –	  not	  its	  lack	  of	  those	  values.244	  A	  similar	  exhaustion	  or	  corruption	  
of	  “western	  ideologies”	  had	  occurred	  in	  Poland,	  but	  with	  a	  different	  interpretation:	  
	  
The	  encounter	  with	  Poland	   corrodes	  most	  political	   assumptions,	   not	  because	   this	   is	   an	  exotic	  
nation	  but	  because	  it	  presents	  a	  view	  of	  the	  squalid	  under-­‐side	  of	  big	  concepts	  –	  the	  side	  which	  
rests	  on	  top	  of	  human	  beings.	  	  Bismarck,	  with	  his	  grand	  design	  for	  European	  peace,	  becomes	  the	  




and	  Stalin	  lost	  dignity	  in	  the	  hour	  of	  victory	  in	  wrangles	  over	  Polish	  rivers	  and	  villages	  they	  could	  
not	  spell.	  Capitalism	  meant	  that	  the	  nation’s	  factories	  were	  owned	  by	  Germans	  and	  Frenchmen.	  	  
Socialism,	  which	  in	  theory	  comes	  so	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  Polish	  sense	  of	  community	  and	  equality,	  
has	  become	  a	  term	  so	  defiled	  by	  public	  squalor,	  private	  privilege	  and	  hypocrisy	  about	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  that	  it	  has	  become	  for	  the	  moment	  unrecognizable.245	  
	  
The	  politics	  of	  the	  Polish	  Catholic	  and	  Algerian	  Muslim	  uprisings	  are	  divergent	  strategic	  effects,	  
then,	  of	  a	  shared	  criticism	  of	  principled	  ideologies	  under	  authoritarian	  brutality	  and	  corruption.	  
	   §3.c.2	   Economic	  resources	   	   	   	  
	  
If	  positing	  religious	  values	  as	  causes	  of	  opposition	  strategies	  reclaims	  a	  crude	  Hegelian	  
idealism,	  resource-­‐determinism	  recalls	  an	  equally	  simplistic	  Marxian	  materialism.	  Explanations	  
of	  Muslim	  or	  Arab	  political	  trends	  have	  divided	  into	  these	  two	  poles	  until	  relatively	  recently	  in	  
the	  literature.	  The	  field	  has	  been	  known	  to	  derive	  institutional	  patterns	  from	  material	  oil	  rents	  
or	  from	  idealist	  Islamic	  doctrines.	  In	  MENA	  studies	  political	  economy	  and	  hermeneutic	  research	  
converged,	  however,	  when	  neither	  materialist	  stress	  on	  physical	  resources	  nor	  idealist	  stress	  on	  
cultural	   values	   alone	   could	   explain	   forms	   and	   trajectories	   of	   political	   agitation.246	  Algeria	   has	  
been	   subsumed	  under	   the	  materialist	  model	   –	   rentier-­‐	   or	   petro-­‐statism	   –	   and	   idealist	   Islam-­‐
centrism,	  which	  might	  suggest	  that	  interactions	  between	  oil-­‐wealth	  and	  Islamist	  activism	  merit	  
closer	   scrutiny.247	   Similarly,	   Polish	   Catholicism	   and	   labor	   may	   be	   brought	   into	   a	   combined	  
materialist	  and	  idealist	  account	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  social	  movement	  outcomes.	  To	  give	  
further	  impetus	  to	  this	  synthesis,	  this	  section	  will	  discuss	  economic	  resources	  as	  a	  contributing	  
explanatory	  variable	  in	  the	  causal	  pathway	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  protest	  patterns.	  It	  will	  focus	  
on	  the	  oil-­‐state	  hypothesis	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  materialist	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  cases.	  
The	  predominant	  materialist	  claim	  is	  that	  a	  natural	  resource	  that	  can	  be	  exported	  as	  a	  




for	   support	   through	   distributive	   side-­‐payment	   networks.	   Two	   institutional	   effects	   are	   said	   to	  
come	   from	  oil-­‐revenues248:	   states	   can	   avoid	   labor	   and	   other	   kinds	   of	   opposition	  movements	  
and	  citizens	  can	  be	  dissuaded	  from	  material	  grievances	  that	  spark	  reform	  demands.	   In	  recent	  
years	  fine-­‐tuning	  the	  oil-­‐wealth	  argument	  has	  re-­‐affirmed	  an	  inverse	  relationship	  between	  oil-­‐
rents	  and	  civil	  society,	  a	  link	  dismissed	  by	  historical	  institutionalists	  and	  political	  economists	  in	  
its	  initial	  iterations.	  Oil-­‐revenues	  may	  correlate	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  specific	  forms	  of	  democracy	  
or	  civil	  society,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  directly	  vary	  with	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  puzzle	  posed	  here.	  Thus,	  
oil-­‐states	  with	   citizenship	   regimes	   distinct	   from	  Algeria’s	   experience	   government	   crackdowns	  
without	  violent	  or	  dogmatic	  dissident	  reactions;	  for	  instance,	  Venezuela’s	  “explosive	  ‘Caracazo’	  
of	   February	   1989,	   which	   engulfed	   nearly	   every	   city,	   punctuated	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   populist	  
system	  of	  reconciliation,”	  yielding	  “a	  chaotic,	  fluid	  political	   interlude…in	  which	  various	  sectors	  
put	  forth	  incomplete	  projects	  to	  restore	  faith	  in	  the	  developmental	  potential	  of	  democracy.”249	  
The	  presence	  of	  capital-­‐intensive	  oil	  extraction,	  revenues,	  and	  rent-­‐distribution	  (or	  presence	  of	  
capital-­‐intensive	  labor	  extraction,	  equally)	  does	  not,	  therefore,	  explain	  divergent	  institutional	  or	  
movement	  outcomes,	  as	  we	  see	  in	  Algeria,	  Venezuela,	  Texas,	  and	  Norway.	  But	  oil	  wealth	  does	  
provide	  ruling	  classes	  an	   incentive	  to	  form	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  regimes	  that	  eradicate	  
citizen-­‐subjectivity	  under	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law.	  This	  outcome	  is	  facilitated	  by	  state-­‐owned	  
mineral-­‐wealth	  but	  the	  latter	  is	  an	  intervening	  variable	  in	  protest	  outcomes.	  
Oil-­‐rent	  states	  are	  said	  to	  have	  a	  “fundamental	  economic	  policy	  pattern:	  maximizing	  the	  
external	   extraction	   of	   rents	   for	   subsequent	   domestic	   distribution	   through	   public	   spending	  
according	  to	  a	  political	  logic.”250	  Note	  that	  while	  this	  argument	  is	  “materialist”	  or	  “economistic”	  




already-­‐existing	  political	  endowments	  and	  calculations	  or	  generating	  new	  ones.	  Similarly,	  “the	  
rentier-­‐state	  thesis	  [or	  allocation	  state	  thesis]	  argues	  that	  states	  deriving	  most	  of	  their	  revenue	  
from	  external	   sources,	   not	   from	  domestic	   resource	  mobilization,	   are	   characterized	   by	   a	   high	  
degree	   of	   state	   autonomy	   and	   authoritarian	   governments,	   bureaucracies	   that	   are	   oriented	  
toward	   distribution	   and	   not	   [tax]	   extraction,	   and	   an	   emphasis	   on	   consumption,	   not	  
development.”251	   States	   rich	   from	   capital-­‐intensive	   monocultural	   extraction,	   refining,	   and	  
revenue-­‐collection	   can	  distribute	  wealth,	   thus	   avoiding	   demands	   for	   democratic	   or	   collective	  
representation	  by	  taxed	  or	  working	  citizens.	  Capital-­‐intensive	  production	  entrenches	  dual	  anti-­‐
democratic	   tendencies	   by	   obviating	   demands	   for	   inclusion	   from	   individual	   taxpayers	   and	  
collective	  wage	  earners.252	  It	  may	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  oil-­‐wealth	  re-­‐shapes	  rather	  than	  merely	  
supports	  given	  policy	  priorities,	  notably	  by	  persuading	   ruling	   classes	   that	   the	  objective	   of	  oil-­‐
rent-­‐distribution	  will	  be	  to	  prevent	  dissident	  movements	  or	  even	  quietist	  political	  associations.	  
Labor-­‐intensive	   Poland,	   by	   contrast,	   was	   “highly	   industrialized,	   because	   industrialization	  was	  
the	  preeminent	  goal	  of	   the	  communist	  planners.	   In	   fact,	  Poland	  was	  over-­‐industrialized	  when	  
compared	  with	  other	  countries	  at	  a	  comparable	  level	  of	  economic	  development,	  since	  the	  non-­‐
industrial	  sectors,	  particularly	  services,	  were	  starved	  for	  resources.”253	  Poland’s	  state	  sought	  to	  
legitimate	  PZPR	  rule	  via	  production	  and	  growth,	  an	  objective	  that	  always	  reflected	  wariness	  of	  
the	  working	  class.	  Algeria’s	  state	  sought	  to	  avoid	  issues	  of	  legitimacy	  altogether	  by	  distributing	  
rents	   in	  an	  mineral-­‐export-­‐based	  political	  economy.	   It	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  these	  fundamental	  
policy	  orientations	  responded	  to	  available	  resources	  as	  incentive	  structures.	  
	  Viewed	  instead	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  ordinary	  citizens,	  the	  oil-­‐state	  is	  said	  to	  prevent	  




stratified	  class-­‐formation.254	  In	  one	  version	  of	  the	  theory,	  rentier-­‐states	  simply	  preclude	  classes	  
from	  forming	   in	   the	   first	  place,	  permitting	  cohesive	  ruling	  elites	   to	  avoid	  the	  collective	  action	  
dilemmas	  of	  constituency	  clientelism.255	  That	  is,	  oil-­‐wealth	  may	  afford	  states	  greater	  latitude	  in	  
satisfying	  citizens’	  demands,	  earning	  their	  fealty,	  or	  perhaps	  influencing	  their	  identity.	  This	  logic	  
implies	  that	  oil-­‐revenues	  legitimize	  or	  stabilize	  central	  rule	  by	  meeting	  citizens’	  material	  needs,	  
incidentally	   rendering	   the	   regime-­‐designation	   “authoritarian”	   otiose.	   This	   materialist	   view,	  
confining	   citizens’	   political	   claims	   to	   the	   provision	  of	   goods,	   presumes	   individual	   preferences	  
trump	  collective	  action.256	  The	  theory	  that	  patterns	  of	  material	  acquisition	  determine	  political	  
demands	  and	  formations	  suggests	  that	  oil-­‐states	  prevent	  social	  agitation	  in	  good	  times	  because	  
flush	  oil	   states	  use	  state	  spending	  to	  cultivate	  dependent,	  asocial,	  and	  egoistic	  characteristics	  
that	  forestall	  civil	  society,	  associational	   life,	  or	  political-­‐bureaucratic	  modernization.257	   In	  hard	  
times,	  however,	  violence	  recapitulates	  this	   lack	  of	  state-­‐society	  coordination,	  communication,	  
and	   civility.	   The	   oil-­‐state	   perpetuates,	   in	   this	   view,	   a	   political	   practice	   of	   vertical	   integration	  
with	  enduring	  effects	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  reformist-­‐gradualist	  mobilization.	  
Oil-­‐wealth	  or	  mineral-­‐rent	  is	  an	  ambivalent	  factor	  in	  analyzing	  these	  movement	  results	  
because	   the	  dominant	   incentives	  and	  patterns	  among	  states	   flush	  with	  distributive	   resources	  
do	  map	  over	  my	  argument.	  Vertical,	  clientelist	  integration	  via	  undifferentiated	  social	  resources,	  
minimal	  civil	  society,	  and	  restricted	  political	  space	  correlates	  with	  state	  access	  to	  abundant	  oil-­‐
revenues.	   I	  do	  not	  therefore	  deny	  any	   impact	  of	  oil-­‐rents	  on	  the	  distinct	  protest	  outcomes	   in	  
Algeria	  and	  Poland;	  but	  I	  characterize	  them	  as	  indirect	  and	  conditional.	  Indeed,	  as	  Heydemann	  
correctly	  notes,	  
in	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	   the	  Syrian,	   Iraqi,	   Egyptian,	   and	   to	   some	  extent	  Algerian	   regimes	  are	  




militarization	  of	  everyday	  life,	  the	  fiscal	  autonomy	  of	  state	  elites	  stands	  out	  as	  a	  critical	  factor.	  	  
Indeed,	   the	   presence	  of	   such	   external	   resources,	   and	   the	   interest	   of	  Middle	   Eastern	   states	   in	  
securing	  them,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  the	  production	  of	  the	  highly	  militaristic	  
and	   authoritarian	   systems	   of	   rule	   found	   in	   the	   dominant	   single-­‐party	   regimes	   of	   the	  Middle	  
East.258	  	  
	  
The	  institutional	  impact	  of	  state-­‐accrued	  oil-­‐revenues	  must	  be	  qualified	  rather	  than	  dismissed,	  
as	  Chaudhry	  says:	  “oil	  exporters[’]…pursuit	  of	  different	  sectoral	  and	  industrial	  strategies	  belies	  
the	   uniform	   outcomes	   posited	   by	   the	   ‘Dutch	   Disease’	   framework.	   In	   the	   realm	   of	   policy,	   oil	  
exporters	  have	  pursued	  very	  different	  strategies:	  Iraq,	  Malaysia,	  Iran,	  and	  especially	  Algeria,	  for	  
example,	  countered	  the	  pressures	  against	  investment	  in	  tradables	  by	  initiating	  industrialization	  
programs.”259	   In	   addition	   to	   variation,	   the	  patterns	   can	   invert	   expectations;	   as	  her	   studies	  of	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Yemen	  show,	  state-­‐owned	  rents	  can	  decrease	  government	  capacity	  to	  shape	  	  	  
social	  demands,	  identity,	  and	  actions	  relative	  to	  states	  whose	  people	  subsist	  on	  remittances.260	  
It	   must	   be	   added	   that	   the	   causal	   factor	   in	   mineral-­‐rich	   state	   distribution	   strategies	   is	   soft	  
budget	  constraints,	  which	  characterized	  both	  the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  political	  economy,	  further	  
diminishing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  latter’s	  status	  as	  a	  mid-­‐range	  “hydrocarbon	  society.”261	  
Patron-­‐client	  bargains,	  side-­‐payments,	  and	  other	  informal	  instruments	  of	  securing	  state	  
centrality	  exist	  in	  most	  states.	  But	  in	  client-­‐citizenship	  such	  informal	  networks	  form	  an	  exclusive	  
regime	  rather	  than	  a	  supplement	  to	  a	  differentiated	  or	  formal	  social	  resource.	  Yet	  it	  is	  neither	  
logically	   nor	   empirically	   obvious	   that	   access	   to	   oil	   (or	   any	   other	  monopoly-­‐controlled	   export	  
commodity)	  “naturally”262	  directs	  states	  toward	  patronage	  or	  crowds	  out	  alternative	  citizenship	  
regimes.	  Domestic,	  international,	  and	  cultural	  forces,	  again,	  mediate	  the	  effect	  of	  oil-­‐wealth	  on	  
regime-­‐	  or	  protest-­‐type.	  Indeed,	  as	  a	  windfall	  to	  the	  state,	  rents	  seem	  more	  instrumental	  than	  




inhibits	  the	  development	  of	  formal	  institutions	  or	  differentiated	  social	  resources	  and	  citizenship	  
regimes,	  it	  does	  so	  indirectly	  –	  not	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  inherent	  features	  of	  mineral	  wealth	  
but	  as	  the	  deliberate	  use	  of	  mineral	  wealth	   in	  the	  construction	  of	  specific	  non-­‐state	  subjects.	  
Oil-­‐revenues	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  ruling	  through	  undifferentiated	  informal	  mechanisms	  but	  
the	  latter	  remains	  the	  direct	  explanatory	  variable,	  not	  least	  given	  that	  the	  former	  is	  not	  the	  only	  
impetus	   to	   creating	  parasitic	   social	   resources.	   It	  was,	  evidently,	   ruling	  Algerian	  elites	  and	  not	  
their	  oil	  and	  gas	  holdings	  that	  decided	  on	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  that	  denied	  dissidents	  enduring	  
social	  resources,	  eventually	  yielding	  social	  agitation	  and	  violent	  militancy.	  
	   	  
	   §3.c.3	   Sovereignty	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
If	  religious	  (“idealist”)	  or	  economic	  (“materialist”)	  differences	  inadequately	  account	  for	  
Polish	   and	   Algerian	   opposition	   strategies,	   perhaps	   the	   difference	   in	   external	   pressure	   is	  
decisive.	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   suspect	   that	   the	   credible	   Soviet	   threat	   to	   intervene	   inhibited	  
violence	  in	  Poland,	  while	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  outside	  enforcer	  might	  permit	  or	  even	  encourage	  
violence	   in	  Algeria.263	   Polish	   protesters	   lived	  under,	   but	  Algerians	  after,	   imperial	   domination.	  
This	  differential	  is	  so	  stark	  that	  its	  causal	  power	  in	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  is	  regularly	  seen	  as	  self-­‐
evident.	  But	  critical	  examination	  strongly	  qualifies	  or	  undermines	  this	  alternative	  argument.	  	  	  
	   One	  enduring	  shared	  sensitivity	  among	  Polish	  ruling	  elites,	  working	  classes,	  intellectuals,	  
and	  the	  Church	  concerns	  Russian	  or	  Soviet	  intervention.	  If	  one	  anxiety	  has	  unified	  these	  groups	  
it	  is	  Russia’s	  imperial	  designs	  on	  Poland	  since	  the	  17th-­‐century,	  when	  Russian	  serfs	  were	  fleeing	  
to	  Polish	  territories.264	  For	  at	  least	  four	  hundred	  years,	  arguably	  until	  1989,	  Russia	  or	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  partitioned,	  invaded,	  attacked,	  massacred,	  kidnapped,	  executed,	  imprisoned,	  colonized,	  




only	  more	   determined	   and	   systematic	   over	   time,	   culminating	   in	   the	   Eastern	   “bloc.”	   There	   is	  
evidence	   from	   the	   period	   of	   Solidarity	   that	   this	   threat	   was	   real	   and	   inhibiting.	   Former	   East	  
German	   General	   Secretary	   Erich	   Honecker	   claimed	   that,	   “even	   in	   Poland,	   General	   Jaruzelski	  
declared	  martial	   law	   in	  order	   to	  prevent	   [the	  Soviet]	   intervention,”265	   threatened	   in	  a	  private	  
ultimatum.266	  Adam	  Michnik	  has	  said,	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  activists:	  
	  
Along	  with	  the	  shock	  caused	  by	  the	  unexpectedness	  of	  the	  coup,	  and	  the	  Polish	  belief	  that	  the	  
spilling	  of	  blood	   is	   a	  barrier	   that	  must	  not	  be	   crossed,	  one	  more	   factor	  was	  decisive:	  Russia’s	  
shadow.	   The	   possibility	   of	   Soviet	   intervention	   was	   often	   discussed.	   The	   Kremlin’s	   intentions,	  
confirmed	   daily	   by	   statements	   in	   the	   press,	   were	   clear.	   Solidarity	   was	   not	   popular	   in	   the	  
Kremlin.	  The	  discussions	  in	  Poland	  were	  about	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  –	  
of	   its	   entanglement	   in	   the	   Afghan	   conflict[267],	   its	   domestic	   problems,	   and	   of	   the	   complex	  
international	  situation.	  Our	  conclusions	  were	  unclear.	  Some	  of	  us	  quietly	  hope	  that	  it	  would	  be	  
possible	  to	  elaborate	  a	  model	  for	  Polish-­‐Soviet	  relations	  in	  which	  there	  would	  be	  room	  for	  Polish	  
autonomy.	  We	   also	   believed	   that	   the	   Soviet	   leaders	   would	   use	   armed	   intervention	   as	   a	   last	  
resort,	  in	  response	  to	  civil	  war	  or	  a	  seizure	  of	  power.	  We	  thought	  the	  authorities	  were	  using	  the	  
Soviet	  bogey	  only	  too	  willingly,	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  an	  intervention	  
without	   an	   actual	   intervention…The	   specter	   of	   Russian	   invasion	   –	   in	   the	   event	   of	   Jaruzelski’s	  
failure	  –	  was	  crucial	  in	  determining	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Polish	  people.	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  fact	  is	  yet	  
another	  demonstration	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  common	  sense	  and	  rational	  thought	   in	  this	  romantic	  
nation.	  Poles	  can	  do	  more	  than	  fight	  –	  they	  can	  think.268	  	  
	  
One	  minor	  background	  commonality	  in	  this	  political	  comparison	  is	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
supported	   both	   Polish	   and	   Algerian	   regimes.	   The	   asymmetries	   in	   these	   relationships	   are	  
obvious,	   given	   the	   centrality	   of	   Poland	   to	   the	   Eastern	   Block	   relative	   to	   Algeria’s	   peripheral	  
status	  in	  Soviet	  Middle	  East	  foreign	  policy.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  provision	  of	  credits,	  
arms,	  training,	  and	  aid	  to	  Algeria	  made	  the	  latter	  a	  key	  beneficiary	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  contest	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East	  for	  nearly	  thirty	  years.269	  	  This	  does	  not	  make	  Algeria,	  counterfactually,	  as	  likely	  
as	  Poland	  to	  have	  had	  its	  domestic	  political	  fights	  interrupted	  by	  the	  USSR.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
the	  USSR’s	  heavy	  investment	  in	  the	  Algerian	  state	  implies	  dependence	  on	  Soviet	  subsidies	  and	  




USSR,	  even	  without	  considering	  potential	  sources	  of	  external	  imposition	  on	  Algerian	  dissidents	  
by	  French	  or	  American	   seeking	   to	  undermine	   Islamist	   rule.	   Indeed,	  Algerians	  had	  arguably	  as	  
much	  to	  fear	  from	  eternal	  superpower	  opposition	  as	  Polish	  agitators	  had	  in	  1980.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Without	  doubt	  Poland	  was	  a	  pillar	  of	  the	  Soviet	  empire	  –	  a	  front-­‐line	  buffer	  state	  in	  its	  
conflict270	  with	  NATO,	  and	  even	  a	  “western”-­‐inflected	  barometer	  of	  broad	  Soviet	  consolidation.	  
As	  well,	   there	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	   the	  Soviet	  suppression	  of	  popular	  uprisings	   in	  Hungary	   (1956)	  
and	   Czechoslovakia	   (1968)	   preoccupied	   Polish	   activists	   during	   the	   1970s	   and	   into	   the	   “self-­‐
limiting	  revolution”	  of	  1980-­‐89.	  	  Less	  clear,	  however,	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  USSR’s	  minatory	  
posturing	  determined	  the	  progression	  of	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  at	  this	  time,	  especially	  given	  that	  
the	  strikes	  per	  se	  were	  radical	  and	  defied	  Soviet	  intervention.	  Ancillary	  factors	  like	  the	  Helsinki	  
accords	   and	   US-­‐USSR	   tension	   over	   Afghanistan	  made	   it	   implausible	   in	   1980	   that	   the	   Soviets	  
would	  invade	  Poland	  to	  suppress	  the	  uprising;	  opposition	  figures	  argued	  this	  at	  the	  time.	  If	  this	  
were	   false,	   the	   mass	   protests	   should	   have	   drawn	   the	   Soviets	   in	   but	   they	   did	   not.	   Finally,	  
potential	   counter-­‐violence	   is,	  historically,	  a	  poor	  predictor	   for	   initial	   violence.271	  These	  are	  all	  
arguments	  that	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  more	  detail	  to	  assess	  this	  alternative	  explanation.	  	  	  
Surely,	   as	   Kundera	  wrote	   at	   the	   time,	   “In	   Central	   Europe…everyone	   has	   always	   been	  
particularly	  sensitive	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  Russian	  might.”272	  Solidarity	  activists	  wondered	  if	  Soviet	  
elites	  –	  trapped	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  courting	  or	  appeasing	  US	  president	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  –	  
might	   hesitate	   to	   invade.273	   But	   domestic	   events	   provide	   better	   grounds	   for	   rethinking	   the	  
effects	  of	  Soviet	  imperial	  policy	  on	  Polish	  social	  movements.	  Here	  I	  should	  stress	  that	  the	  revolt	  
of	   Polish	   civil	   society	   is	   easily	   misunderstood	   as	   “reformist”	   because	   it	   lacked	   violence.	   The	  




effective	  means	  they	  chose,	  Solidarity	  was	  a	  threat	  to	  communist	  rule	  in	  Poland	  and	  in	  the	  USSR	  
potentially	  –	  not	  only	  or	  principally	   violent	  means.	  Violence	  was	  only	   the	   crudest	   threat	   that	  
provoked	  the	  Soviets,	  yet	  they	  held	  back	  in	  1956,	  1970,	  1976,	  and	  in	  1980	  during	  massive	  public	  
Polish	   fomentations.	  Poles’	   resistance	  equally	   to	   foreign	  and	  domestic	   tyranny,	  Davies	   insists,	  
sequentially	  overcame	  such	  divisions.	  Thus,	  “internal	  squabbles	  plaguing	  the	  new	  government	  
[in	  the	  1920s]	  were	  put	  aside	  as	  the	  whole	  nation	  rallied	  to	  Marshall	  Piłsudski’s	  summons	  for	  
volunteers.	  Many	  thousands	  joined	  up	  for	  crash	  military	  training,	  while	  noncombatants	  carried	  
the	  call	   to	   town	  and	  countryside	   through	  meetings,	  posters,	   and	  pamphlets.”274	  No	   less	   than	  
the	  Nazi	  invasion	  sparked	  a	  “great	  national	  mobilization”	  in	  Poland,	  the	  first	  popular	  movement	  
“in	   Europe	   to	   take	   up	   arms	   against	   the	   Nazis.”275	   In	   the	   most	   stirring	   invocation	   of	   Polish	  
national	  resistance,	  Todorov	  writes	  movingly	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  uprising	  of	  1944:	  
	  
I	  realized	  I	  was	  actually	  reading	  a	  reflection	  on	  heroism.	  Certainly	  the	  rebels	  were	  heroes,	  but,	  
more	  than	  that,	  the	  hold	  that	  heroic	  values	  had	  on	  their	  spirit	  seemed	  to	  have	  played	  a	  decisive	  
role	   in	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	   revolt	  and	   in	   its	  progress.	  This	  heroic	   spirit	  had	  acted	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  
drug;	   it	   kept	   the	   fighters	   in	   a	   state	   of	   exaltation	   that	   helped	   them	  withstand	   even	   the	  most	  
difficult	  ordeal…[For]	  Chief	  of	  Operations	  for	  the	  Polish	  Home	  Army…Colonel	  Okulicki[,]	  General	  
and	   Comander	   in	   Chief	   Tadeusz	   Bor-­‐Komorowski[,	   and]	   Brigadier-­‐General	   and	   Chief	   of	   Staff	  
Tadeusz	  Pelczynski…what	  ought	  to	  be	  far	  outweighed…attention	  to	  what	  was…When	  someone	  
told	   Colonel	   Antoni	   Monter,	   the	   Home	   Army	   region	   commander	   for	   Warsaw,	   that	   a	   certain	  
neighborhood	  had	   fallen	   into	  German	  hands,	  he	   shot	  back,	   ‘I	   do	  not	   accept	   this	   information.’	  	  
That	  attitude	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  hero:	  	  he	  may	  know	  that	  his	  ideal	  is	  unrealizable	  (in	  this	  case,	  both	  
Poland’s	  position	  on	  the	  map	  and	  the	  Red	  Army’s	  military	  potential	  made	  Soviet	  occupation	  a	  
foregone	   conclusion),	   but	   because	   he	   desires	   it	   above	   all	   else,	   he	   pursues	   it	   with	   all	   his	  
might…This,	   it	   seems,	   was	   the	   Polish	   military	   tradition.	   Steiner	   cites	   a	   prewar	   general	   who	  
explains	   to	   his	   subordinates	   that	   material	   shortages	   can	   always	   be	   compensated	   for	   by	   and	  
effort	  of	  will,	  by	  the	  soldiers’	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐sacrifice.	  ‘Let	  there	  be	  an	  inverse	  relation	  between	  
your	  munitions	  and	  Polish	  blood,’	  he	  admonishes	  them.	  	  ‘Anytime	  you	  lack	  some	  of	  the	  former,	  
make	  up	  for	   it	  with	  some	  of	  the	  latter’…To	  claim	  that	  one’s	   ideal	   is	   ‘the	  nation’	   is	  not	  enough,	  
however,	   for	   the	   nation	   can	   be	  many	   things:	   	   a	   group	   of	   human	   beings	   –	  my	   family	   and	  my	  
friends	  or	  my	  compatriots,	  for	   instance	  –	  or	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  places	  and	  houses	  and	  roads.	  	  
These	  interpretations	  Okulicki	  rejects:	  the	  uprising,	  he	  argues,	  must	  no	  be	  postponed	  ‘under	  the	  
pretext	  of	  saving	  a	  few	  lives	  or	  a	  few	  houses.’	  It	  is	  a	  question	  of	  saving	  not	  the	  people	  of	  Warsaw	  
but	   the	   idea	   of	   Warsaw,	   not	   individual	   Poles	   or	   Polish	   territory	   but	   an	   abstraction	   called	  




theirs:	   	   their	   will	   to	   freedom,	   their	   desire	   for	   independence,	   their	   national	   pride…But	   even	  
Poland	  the	  abstraction	  is	  not	  always	  enough;	  Poland	  must	  itself	  be	  offered	  up	  to	  an	  even	  more	  
distant	   ideal	   –	   that	   of	   the	   West,	   which,	   in	   its	   turn,	   comes	   to	   stand	   for	   civilization,	   or	   even	  
“humanity”…The	   insurrection	   becomes	   a	   sacrificial	   act	   in	   the	   name	  of	   a	   series	   of	   increasingly	  
remote	   and	   always	   impersonal	   beneficiaries	   or	   audiences	   –	   Warsaw,	   Poland,	   the	   West,	   the	  
world.	   	   Lives	   are	   sacrificed	   not	   for	   other	   human	   beings	   but	   for	   ideas…The	   rebels	   understood	  
themselves	  to	  be	  writing,	  as	  the	  time-­‐honored	  formula	  has	  it,	  ‘one	  of	  the	  most	  glorious	  pages	  in	  
the	  history	  of	  Poland.”276	  	  	  
	  
We	  should	  not	  minimize	  the	  danger	  to,	  or	  of,	  Polish	  dissidents	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  their	  
non-­‐violence	  was	  factually	  unthreatening	  to	  the	  USSR’s	  stated	  interests,	  did	  not	  raise	  the	  odds	  
of	   interference,	  or	   increase	   the	  USSR’s	  own	  domestic	   concerns.277	  Nor	  may	  we	   cite	  what	  we	  
now	   know	  of	   the	   Soviet	   reluctance	   to	   aggress	   against	   the	   1956	   Poznań	   demonstrations	   at	   a	  
more	  vulnerable	  period	  in	  communist	  party	  consolidation;	  nor	  Brezhnev’s	  subtle	  request	  to	  the	  
Polish	   leadership	  to	  negotiate	  their	  way	  out	  of	   the	  crisis	   in	  1970.	  Despite	  rumbling	  his	   troops	  
around	   the	   Polish	   border	   in	   1956,	   Khrushchev	   admitted	   subsequently	   that	   “as	   we	   began	   to	  
analyze	  the	  problem	  in	  more	  detail	  and	  calculate	  which	  Polish	  regiments	  we	  could	  count	  on	  to	  
obey	  [us],	  the	  situation	  began	  to	  look	  somewhat	  bleak.	  Of	  course,	  our	  own	  armed	  strength	  far	  
exceeded	  that	  of	  Poland,	  but	  we	  didn’t	  want	  to	  resort	  to	  our	  own	  troops.”278	  Surely,	  Poles	  could	  
not	  have	  known	  of	  the	  Soviets’	  specific	  hesitations	  since	  1956	  to	  intervene	  in	  Poland,	  but	  they	  
could	  have	  inferred	  or	  intuited	  from	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  of	  diverse	  activism	  without	  Soviet	  attack,	  
and	  from	  changes	  in	  the	  geopolitical	  situation	  making	  such	  an	  attack	  less	  likely,	  that	  Solidarity	  
would	  be	  permitted	  to	  proceed	  without	  violence;	  and	  that	  violence	  would	  have	  been	  countered	  
by	  the	  Polish	  state	  directly,	  should	  it	  occur.	  	  	  
Fear	  of	  Soviet	   reprisal	  might	  have	   inhibited	   the	  massive	  public	   strikes	  and	  protests	  by	  
openly	   identified	   people	   that	  did	   occur;	   or,	   conversely,	   it	  might	   have	   incited	   the	   clandestine	  




through	   the	   crisis	   [of	   1980]	   as	   a	   political	   weapon	   to	   soften	   up	   the	   strikers.	   But	   the	   Gdansk	  
workers,	   while	   showing	   exemplary	   restraint,	   were	   not	   to	   be	   frightened	   into	   surrender”279,	  
Singer	  says.	  As	  my	  model	  anticipates,	  when	  the	  1980	  uprising	  eventually	  lost	  systemic	  efficacy,	  
“supporters	   of	   Solidarity,	   particularly	   younger	   ones,	   [grew]	   increasingly	   impatient	   with	   our	  
policy	   of	   nonviolence.	   Some	  began	   to	   insist	   that	  we	  had	   to	   prepare	   for	  war.	  Had	  nonviolent	  
struggle	  against	  the	  Communists	  ever	  succeeded?	  they	  asked.”280	   It	  was	  thus	  the	   intransigent	  
pressure	  of	  Communist	  social	  and	  police	  structures	  that	  nearly	  engendered	  activist	  violence.281	  
Moreover,	   the	   specific	   Soviet	   threat	   seemed	   to	   prove	   marginal	   relative	   to	   the	   domestic	  
menace:	   “Even	   though	   the	   Brezhnev	   Doctrine	   was	   dead	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   no	   longer	   a	  
threat,	   few	  things	  had	  changed	   in	   the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Poland”	  by	   the	  mid-­‐1980s.282	  This	  
reference	   to	   past	   Polish-­‐state	   behavior	   offers	   a	   final	   cautionary	   note	   against	   the	   counter-­‐
proposition	  that	  potential	  oppression	  deterred	  protester	  violence.	  Finally,	  inchoate	  indications	  
of	  Russian	  cultural	  nationalism	  in	  this	  period	  presaged,	  along	  with	  the	  rest,	  a	  relative	  insularity	  
that	  further	  lessened	  foreigners’	  sense	  of	  expansionist	  reaction.283	  	  	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  this	  alternative	  hypothesis	  about	  the	  Soviets’	  tamping	  down	  Polish	  
actions	  defies	  the	  oft-­‐heard	  claim	  that	  violence,	  or	  fear	  of	   it,	  causes	  violence;	  here	  the	  idea	  is	  
that	   (potential)	  violence	  discourages	   counter-­‐violence.	  Given	  this	  exceptional	  view,	  and	  many	  
examples	  of	  oppression	  exacerbating	  violence,	  one	  either	  suspects	  it	  is	  an	  ad	  hoc	  description	  of	  
Polish	  civic	  vigilance	  or	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  Polish	  exception	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  elaborated.	  But	  Polish	  
communists	   ruthlessly	  assailed	  protesters	   for	  many	  years	  without	  deterring	  disturbances	   that	  
included	  episodic	  destruction.	  After	  the	  1976	  torching	  of	  the	  PZPR	  Radom	  headquarters,	  “the	  




and	  imprisoning…thousands	  of	  workers.”284	  Far	  worse,	  during	  the	  1956	  Poznań	  demonstrations,	  
the	   1968	   student	  movement,	   and	   the	  1970	   coastal	   strikes,	   the	   state	  massacred,	   arrested,	   or	  
tried	  hundreds	  of	  activists	  without	  halting	  subsequent	  demonstrations.	   Indeed,	  as	  repertoires	  
of	  mass	   non-­‐state	   collective	   action	   deepened,	   professionalized,	   and	   proliferated,	   “the	   use	   of	  
violent	  repression…never	  ceased…–	  the	  protests	  broken	  up	  with	  tremendous	  brutality”	  by	  the	  
Polish	   security	   forces.285	   Reformist	   gradualism	   in	   the	   1980-­‐1989	   Polish	   democratic	   transition	  
may	  have	  eclipsed	  the	  often-­‐fatal	  activities	  against	  atrocious	  state	  coercion.	  But	  this	  recovered	  
pre-­‐history	  reinforces	  that	  Polish	  activists	  were	  not	  intimidated	  easily	  even	  by	  fatal	  communist	  
reprisals.	  	  
Given	  that	  Polish	  uprisings	  endured	  decades	  of	  relentless	  state	  violence,	  it	  seems	  threats	  
of	   despotic	   repression	  do	  not	   explain	  why	  Polish	   freedom-­‐seekers	   never	   turned	   to	   sustained	  
violent	   revolt.	   With	   the	   compulsion	   of	   anger,	   memory	   and	   promise	   of	   state	   brutality,	   and	  
temptations	  of	  clandestine	  terrorism,	  some	  urgent,	  internal	  force	  constrained	  Polish	  militants.	  
It	   is	  surely	  hard	  to	  prove	  the	  combined	  Polish-­‐Soviet	  communist	  forces	  were	  not	  decisive.	  But	  
the	  evidence	  and	  arguments	  adduced	  question	  the	  “Soviet	  factor”	  as	  the	  explanation	  for	  Polish	  
civic	  non-­‐violence,	  particularly	  by	  the	  period	  in	  question.286	  As	  one	  activist-­‐intellectual	  wrote	  at	  
the	  time,	  “it	  would	  be	  erroneous	  to	  see	  the	  choice	  of	  non-­‐violent	  strategies	  as	  simply	  caused	  by	  
the	  possibility	  of	  a	  Soviet	  military	   invasion,	  even	   if	  everybody	  was	  aware	  of	   it.”287	  As	  another	  
scholar	  says,	  “The	  new	  civil	   society	  also	   ignored	  the	  alleged	  threat	  of	   intervention,	  as	  well	  as	  
Cassandran	  predictions	  of	  new	  partitions	  of	  Poland.	   In	  fact,	   it	   ignored	  the	  totalitarian	  political	  
system	  and	  exploded	   into	  a	  massive	  social	  movement.”288	  From	  the	  other	  side	  of	   the	  border,	  




maintained	  its	  commitments	  to	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact.”289	  It	  seems,	  then,	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  refer	  to	  
Poland	  during	  Solidarity’s	  time	  as	  “a	  society…incapable	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  thrust,	  its	  hands	  tied	  









The	  System	  –	  compounded	  by	  the	  Poles’	  skepticism	  about	  all	  systems	  –	  produces	  a	  nation	  
of	  ironists	  and	  gamblers…Disbelief	  in	  all	  symptoms	  of	  official	  life	  is,	  of	  course,	  so	  taken	  for	  
granted	   that	   nobody	   needs	   to	   talk	   about	   it	   very	  much.	   	   Politics,	   like	   religion,	   is	   a	   game,	  
except	  almost	  no	  one	  –	  no	  one	  we	  know,	  anyway	  –	  seems	  to	  believe	  in	  it.	  Poles	  don’t	  need	  
demystifying	  philosophies	  to	  doubt	  all	  sources	  of	  power	  and	  authority.	  Nose-­‐thumbing	  the	  
system	  is	  a	  national	  pastime,	  and	  every	  second	  street-­‐corner	  exchange	  is	  a	  deconstruction.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Eva	  Hoffman1	  	  	  
	  
‘That	  long-­‐dreaded	  fulfillment	  has	  freed	  us	  from	  the	  self-­‐reassuring	  lies,	  illusions,	  subterfuges;	  
the	  opaque	  has	  become	  transparent.’	  Familiar	  forms	  of	  collective	  life	  collapsed	  overnight.	  The	  
debates	  over	  ideologies	  and	  political	  doctrines	  came	  down	  to	  a	  display	  of	  unthinkable	  brute	  
force.	  At	  last,	  modern	  man	  was	  able	  to	  behold	  his	  total,	  unashamed	  nakedness.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Jaroslaw	  Anders	  2	  
	  
Faith	  in	  one’s	  ability	  to	  exert	  influence	  on	  the	  fate	  of	  society	  is	  an	  absolute	  prerequisite	  
for	   political	   activity…[Even	  when]	   faith	   was	   based	   on	   delusions	   civic	   activity	   and	   open	  
demonstrations	  of	  opposition	  were	  its	  real	  and	  positive	  results.	  
Adam	  Michnik3	  
	  
Do	  not	  fear	  those	  who	  kill	  the	  body,	  for	  they	  can	  do	  nothing	  more!	  
Father	  Jerzy	  Popieluszko	  4	  
	  
Are	  not	  these	  informed,	  nonbureaucratic,	  dynamic,	  and	  open	  communities	  
that	   comprise	   the	   “parallel	   polis”	   a	   kind	   of	   rudimentary	   prefiguration,	   a	  
symbolic	   model	   of	   those	   more	   meaningful	   “post-­‐democratic”	   political	  
structures	  that	  might	  become	  the	  foundations	  of	  a	  better	  society?	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Václav	  Havel	  5	  
	  
Polish	  spiritual	   life	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  certain	  inborn	  Hegelianism,	  that	  is,	   it	  often	  seems	  
to	   confirm	   Hegel’s	   intentions,	   as	   if	   in	   a	   given	   historical	   moment	   there	   always	   existed	   a	  
certain	  uniform	  and	  ordinary	  state	  of	  the	  world,	  encompassing	  both	  plants	  and	  economics,	  
morality	  and	  philosophy.	  Hegel’s	  Totalität	  cuts	  us	  in	  two	  like	  a	  ubiquitous	  razor,	  it	  intrudes	  
into	  our	  most	  private	  thoughts,	  like	  secret	  police,	  except	  	  more	  effectively	  because	  not	  only	  
does	  it	  sniff	  and	  examine,	  but,	  first,	  it	  creates	  and	  inspires	  what	  we	  are.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Adam	  Zagajewski	  6	  
	  
In	  Poland,	  amid	  a	  time	  of	  surprising,	  inspiring	  new	  freedom	  for	  the	  country,	  I	  was	  invited	  by	  
chance	  to	  think	  of	  myself	  as	  more	  historically	  determined	  than	  I	  had	  before.	  	  Striving	  to	  think	  
of	  that	  as	  a	  writer’s	  problem,	  a	  formal	  problem,	  I	  felt	  a	  renewed	  sympathy	  for	  every	  sullen	  
student	  doodling	  on	  the	  overflowing	  margins	  of	  some	  grubby	  notebook,	  a	  name	  or	  face.	  








§4.a	  	   Summary	  
	   	   	  
	   The	  goal	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   test	   the	  explanation	  of	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  presented	   in	  
the	  introduction	  against	  a	  brief	  historical	  narrative	  of	  state	  formation	  and	  opposition	  strategies	  
in	  postwar	  Poland.	  My	  hope	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  adequate	  empirical	  account	  of	  dissident	  activities	  
in	  Poland	  to	  evaluate	  my	  theoretical	  model	  deriving	  sustained	  non-­‐violence	  under	  martial	   law	  
from	  Poland’s	  worker-­‐citizenship	  regime	  –	  that	  is,	  from	  the	  predominant	  mode	  of	  state-­‐citizen	  
interaction	  that	  situated	  effective	  Polish	  citizenship	  in	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  systems	  that,	  
enduring	   fiscal	  crisis	  and	  the	  state	  of	  emergency,	  protected	  Poles’	   systemic	  subjectivity.	   I	  will	  
first	  trace	  the	  dialectics	  of	  state	  policies	  and	  dissident	  responses	  under	  Polish	  communist	  rule,	  
and	  then	  recapitulate	  the	  theoretical	  model	  in	  light	  of	  the	  key	  historical	  events.	  I	  will	  combine,	  
then,	  the	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  accounts	  to	  explore	  the	  plausibility	  of	  my	  explanation.	  In	  a	  
concluding	  section	  I	  will	  address	  some	  limitations	  or	  extensions	  of	  my	  causal	  inferences.	  	  	  
	   The	  historical	  narrative	  portrays	  events	  culminating	  in	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  Solidarity	  in	  
communist	  Poland.	  The	  account	  is	  oriented	  toward	  the	  puzzle	  of	  sustained	  non-­‐violent	  dissent	  
under	  communist	  dictatorship	  and	  state	  coercion.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  puzzle	  itself	  must	  
be	  defended,	  since	  the	  commitment	  to	  non-­‐violence	  of	  the	  “self-­‐limiting	  revolution”	  led	  by	  the	  
working-­‐class	  is	  considered	  settled	  law	  in	  the	  specialized	  scholarship	  on	  Polish	  activism.	  I	  am,	  in	  
a	  sense,	  re-­‐opening	  the	  case	  by	  asking	  a	  question	  consensually	  seen	  as	  answered.	  The	  retention	  
of	   Polish	  non-­‐violence	   is	  widely	   viewed	  as	   the	   inherent	   result	   of	   Polish	  beliefs	   or	   values;	   the	  
particular	  convictions	  contentiously	  attributed	  to	  Poles’	  non-­‐violence	  include	  priority	  of	  civility,	  
fear	  of	  Soviet	  invasion,	  repression-­‐fatigue,	  and	  democratic	  traditions.	  Whatever	  reason	  is	  given,	  




as	  corrupt	  and	  illegitimate,	  is	  unsurprising.	  My	  narrative	  selects	  on	  this	  puzzle	  rather	  than	  on	  a	  
theory,	  and	  engages	  a	  diverse	  literature	  that	  does	  not	  find	  my	  dependent	  variable	  problematic.	  
More	  explicitly	  put,	  I	  have	  not	  composed	  the	  historical	  account	  to	  support	  my	  theory	  or	  model	  
but	  to	  represent	  the	  scholarship	  well	  enough	  to	  interrogate	  them.	  	  
	   The	  sources	  and	  meanings	  of	  Solidarity	  are	  contested	  but	  specialists	  agree	  on	   its	  non-­‐
violence;	   institutional	  gradualism;	  popular	  support;	   intellectual,	  professional,	  and	  Church	   ties;	  
and	  diffuse	  social	  organization	  and	  mobilization.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  consensus	  that	  Solidarity	  
reflected	  the	  parallel	  rise	  of	  grassroots	  associational	  autonomy	  and	  demise	  of	  state	  authority,	  
as	  dissident	  and	  ordinary	  Poles	   rejected	  “positivist”	  or	   top-­‐down	   revisionism,	  embracing	   self-­‐
organization	  to	  demand	  autonomous	  unions.	  Clashing	  with	  the	  state	  in	  1956,	  1970,	  and	  1976,	  
protesting	  workers	  had	  regularly	  reversed	  public	  policies	  and	  removed	  top-­‐echelon	  ruling	  elites,	  
while	   discerning	   that	   systemic	   reforms	  were	   unlikely	   and	   progress	   in	   securing	   social	  welfare	  
depended	  on	  worker	  self-­‐legislation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  scholars	  dispute	  the	  social	  provenance	  
of	  the	  Solidarity	  movement,	  and	  more	  broadly	  of	  the	  growing	  discipline,	  vision,	  and	  coherence	  
of	  Polish	  labor.	  It	  remains	  heatedly	  contested	  whether	  the	  union	  coalesced	  and	  evolved	  as	  an	  
increasingly	   sophisticated	   collective	   actor	  within	   the	   internal	   logic	   of	  worker	   initiatives	   or,	   in	  
contrast,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  necessary	   intellectual	   intervention	  and	  guidance.	  Some	  academics	  and	  
participants	   trace	   Solidarity’s	   refined	   commitments	   and	   tactics	   to	   the	   1970	   strike	   and	   state	  
repression;	  others	  cite	  the	  1968	  student	  revolts	  and	  founding	  of	  a	  professional	  and	  intellectual	  
committee	  to	  represent	  and	  advocate	  for	  workers’	  rights	  after	  the	  1976	  riots.	  	  
	   These	  distinct	  views	  texture	  an	  overarching	  agreement,	  though,	  that	  labor	  actions	  such	  




since	  the	  consolidation	  of	  “post-­‐Stalinist”	  communism	  in	  1956.	  It	  seems	  uncontested	  that,	  over	  
the	  next	   generation,	  workers,	   intellectuals,	   professionals,	   and	   the	   clergy	   gradually	   converged	  
around,	   through,	  and	  behind	  the	  Solidarity	  union.	  Researchers	  and	  activists	  concur	   that	   labor	  
agitation	  organized	  civilian	  opposition	  to	  Communist	  authoritarianism	   in	  Poland,	  but	  arguably	  
this	  agreement	  has	  naturalized	  the	  consequential	  non-­‐violent	  strategies	  incrementally	  adopted	  
and	  sustained	  by	  workers	  and	  their	  religious,	  intellectual,	  professional,	  and	  critical	  backers.	  We	  
still	  lack,	  arguably,	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  how	  the	  convergence	  of	  diverse	  anti-­‐communist	  tendencies	  
around	  Solidarity,	  how	  labor’s	  learning	  process,	  indeed	  how	  workers’	  location	  in	  Polish	  society	  
shaped	   leading	  Polish	  dissidents’	   commitment	   to	  non-­‐violence	  under	  martial	   law.	   I	  hope	   that	  
the	  next	  two	  sections	  may	  contribute	  helpful	  theoretical	  observations	  to	  this	  remaining	  puzzle.	  
	  
§4.b	   Historical	  narrative	  	  	  	  
	  
	   It	   is	  typical	  to	  ground	  Poland’s	  modern	  political	  economy	  in	  the	  tenth-­‐century	  baptism	  
of	  King	  Mieszko	  I,	  which	  consecrated	  the	  Catholic	  nation-­‐state	  of	  Poland8,	  and	  its	  Liberum	  Veto	  
that	   gave	   every	   noble	   in	   parliament	   (Sejm)	   veto-­‐power	   over	   royal	   decrees.9	   These	   events	  
symbolize	   the	   continuity	   of	   Polish	   commitments	   to	   the	   Catholic	   faith,	   national	   identity,	   and	  
decentralized	  authority.	  As	  Davies	  says,	  “The	  beginning	  of	  Poland’s	  recorded	  history	  [was]	  the	  
baptism	  of	  King	  Mieszko	  I	  in	  the	  Latin	  rite	  in	  966”	  and	  its	  height	  was	  the	  great	  Polish-­‐Lithuanian	  
Commonwealth	  that,	  by	  the	  16th	  century,	  had	  	  
	  
developed	  a	  unique	  political	  system.	  	  Supreme	  power	  lay	  with	  parliamentary	  gatherings	  of	  the	  
nobility,	   who	   sought	   perfect	   liberty	   for	   themselves,	   and	   perfect	   equality	   among	   themselves.	  	  
Such	   was	   their	   respect	   for	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   individual	   noble,	   that	   in	   time	   the	   extraordinary	  






Poland’s	   partition	   by	   Russia,	   Prussia,	   and	   Austria	   (1795-­‐1918)	   seized	   upon	   this	   decentralized	  
governance	   system,	   often	   blamed	   for	   Poland’s	   vulnerability	   to	   encroachment	   and	   conquest,	  
while	  deepening	  Polish-­‐Catholic	  national	  identity	  and	  resistance.11	  The	  partition	  furthered	  these	  
legacies:	  antipathy	  especially	  to	  Russian	  domination,	  acculturation	  to	  the	  sacrificial	  symbolism	  
of	  militant	  agitation,	  and	  perpetual	  difficulties	  assimilating	  rural	  and	  urban	  citizens	  to	  a	  central	  
state	   authority.12	  One	   recalls	   here	  Napoleon’s	   apocryphal	   comment	   to	  Balashof:	   	   “What	  do	   I	  
care	  for	  your	  allies?	  I	  too	  have	  allies	  –	  these	  Poles…;	  they	  fight	  like	  lions.”13	  External	  domination	  
by	  local	  or	  more	  distant	  outsiders	  spurred	  Polish-­‐Catholic	  nationalism,	  with	  historical	  and	  social	  
variations,	  to	  be	  sure:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
During	  the	  150	  years	  of	  national	  and	  political	  subjugation,	  the	  church	  fostered	  allegiance	  in	  the	  
faithful	  to	  the	  collective	  bodies	  of	  nation	  and	  Church	  rather	  than	  to	  religion	  alone	  as	  a	  road	  to	  
redemption.	   	   Thus	   the	   loyal	   Catholic	   Pole	   did	   not…feel	   compelled	   to	   internalize	   principles	   of	  
piety…His	   Catholicism,	   as	   the	   Church,	   was	   perceived	   in	   broad	   social,	   political,	   and	   symbolic	  
terms…As	  such	  it	  became	  generally	  conservative,	  traditionalist,	  and	  highly	  politicized.14	  
	  
	   Partition	   created	   a	   “‘culture	   of	   dissent’	   that	   would	   be	   revived	   under	   the	   communist	  
regime,”	  with	  the	  Church	  acting	  as	  “guardian	  and	  preserver	  of	  all	  that	  was	  Polish…:	  the	  culture,	  
history,	   language,	   and	   traditions.”15	   Thus	   the	   great	   Polish	   romantics,	   with	   “their	   heroes	   and	  
heroines	   larger	   than	   life”	  and	  “cult	  of	  Freedom,”	  “added	  a	  specifically	  Polish	  note	  of	  Catholic	  
piety.”16	  Occupied	  Poles	  demonstrated	  hair-­‐trigger	  rebelliousness,	  rising	  up	  against	  the	  Czar	  in	  
1863,	  for	  instance,	  without	  the	  slightest	  chance	  of	  success.	  Hardly	  pacifist	  or	  especially	  patient	  
in	  their	  jealous	  autonomy,	  Poles	  resisted	  conquest	  as	  martyred	  Catholic	  nationalists17:	  
	  
During	   the	   century	   of	   statelessness	   and	   beyond,	   every	   single	   Polish	   generation	   has	   produced	  
men	   careless	   of	   their	   own	   survival,	   who	   have	   risen	   with	   desperate	   courage	   against	   their	  
tormentors.	   The	   Warsaw	   uprising	   of	   August	   1944	   was	   but	   the	   last	   performance	   of	   a	   drama	  




occasion,	  if	  asked	  what	  they	  were	  fighting	  for,	  their	  reply	  might	  well	  have	  been	  the	  same:	  for	  “a	  
few	  ideas…which	  is	  nothing	  new.”18	  
	  
Anticipating	  Solidarity’s	  steadfast	  non-­‐violence,	  it	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  these	  uprisings	  do	  
not	  represent	  merely	  angry	  outbursts,	  but	  a	  fundamental	  commitment	  to	  principles	  of	  identity	  
and	  loyalty	  and	  autonomy	  to	  nation	  and	  religion	  that	  called	  for	  militant	  action	  –	  that	  embedded	  
in	  the	  Polish	  political	  community	  a	  belief	  in	  physical	  self-­‐protection,	  principally	  against	  Russian	  
suzerainty	   and	   any	   form	   of	   central	   rule	   that	   rendered	   itself	   illegitimate	   by	   dividing	   Poles	   or	  
undermining	  their	  principal	  social	  institutions.	  Polish	  Catholics	  learned	  that	  “rigid	  conservatism”	  
better	  secured	  survival	  than	  “supple	  reformism”	  and	  that	  “it	  did	  not	  need	  temporal	  power	  to	  
support	  and	  sustain	  it,…that	  it	  could	  even	  remain	  aloof	  from	  the	  secular	  rulers	  [if]	  it	  remained	  
institutionally	  strong	  and	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  nation’s	  feelings.”19	   	  
	   Poles	  finally	  enjoyed	  a	  measure	  of	  independence	  in	  the	  interwar	  period,	  when	  Catholic	  
“moral	  prestige,”	  social	  associations,	  educational	  programs,	  union	  activity,	  and	  political	  debate	  
flourished	  under	  Polish	  self-­‐rule.20	  The	  Church	  and	  state,	  finally	  freed	  of	  imperials	  ukase,	  agreed	  
on	   the	   Concordat	   of	   1925,	   trading	   Vatican	   recognition	   and	   government	   consideration	   in	  
Episcopal	  designations	  for	  Church	  privileges.	  Whether	  the	  Church	  and	  the	  intelligentsia	  –	  from	  
experimental	   artists	   to	   socialist	   activists	   and	  nationalists	   –	   found	   common	  ground,	   especially	  
under	  Piłsudski’s	  creeping	  dictatorship,	  remains	  debated.21	  While	  intellectuals	  were	  “put	  off	  by	  
the	   Church’s	   traditionalism,	   exclusivism,	   and…intense	   anti-­‐Semitic	   prejudice,”	   “the	   Church’s	  
concern	   for	   easing	   social	   tensions	   helped	   to	   weaken	   the	   anticlericalism	   that	   had	   been	  
widespread	  among	   the	   left-­‐wing	  and	   liberal	   intelligentsia…and	  promoted	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  




were	  contesting	  the	  institutions	  and	  obligations	  of	  autonomous	  statehood	  in	  light	  of	  incessant	  
German	   and	   Soviet	   designs	   on	   Polish	   sovereignty.	   General	   Hans	   von	   Seeckt,	   for	   instance,	  
dreading	  a	  two-­‐front	  war	  after	  Versailles,	  “reached	  the	  firm	  conclusion	  that	  the	  greatest	  threat	  
came	   from	   the	   vengeful	   French	  –	  made	   all	   the	  worse	  by	   the	   French	   support	   of	   Poland.	   ‘The	  
existence	   of	   Poland	   is	   intolerable	   and	   incompatible	   with	   Germany’s	   vital	   interests.’”23	   The	  
expulsion	  of	  the	  Soviets	  in	  their	  short	  war	  of	  1920	  did	  not	  secure	  Poland’s	  autonomy	  but	  Poles	  
momentarily	  asserted	  their	  sovereignty	  against	  an	  emerging	  great	  power.	  
	   Poland’s	   fleeting	   sovereignty	   ended	  with	   the	  Nazi	   invasion	   that	   targeted	   intellectuals,	  
slaughtered	  a	  third	  of	  the	  clergy,	  and,	  aided	  by	  postwar	  anti-­‐Jewish	  attacks,	  destroyed	  minority	  
communities,	  leaving	  Poland	  entirely	  Catholic,	  as	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  Describing	  Poland’s	  
losses	  and	  misery	  during	  and	  after	  WWII	  –	  six	  million	  (one-­‐fifth	  of	  the	  population)	  killed,	  with	  
the	  young,	  resistant,	  and	  gifted	  pointedly	  targeted	  –	  as	  both	  materially	  but	  also	  psychologically	  
exceptional,	  Davies	  laments	  that	  “Poles,	  whose	  death-­‐toll	  was	  the	  greatest	  of	  all,	  had	  to	  mourn	  
without	   comfort	   or	   consolation.”	  Where	   Americans,	   British,	   Germans,	   Japanese,	   or	   Russians	  
could	  claim	  some	  victory	  (gaining	  freedom	  by	  defeating	  an	  internal	  or	  external	  foe),	  Poland	  had	  
gained	  least	  and	  suffered	  most	  –	  a	  people	  uniquely	  unable,	  perhaps,	  to	  move	  from	  melancholia	  
to	  mourning.24	  Because	  of	  their	  decimation,	  Poles	  were	  especially	  vulnerable	  after	  the	  war,	  as	  
well,	  to	  the	  whims	  of	  outsiders,	  notably	  the	  imperial	  domination	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.25	  
Yet	   from	  1944	   to	  1956	   the	  Church	   and	   communist	   party-­‐state	   emerging	  under	   Soviet	  
suzerainty	  jostled	  for	  power	  in	  a	  complex	  negotiation.	  One	  timeline	  of	  the	  oscillation	  between	  
repression	   and	   accommodation	   in	   Church-­‐Party	   relations	   lists	   “polemical	   discussion	   (1944-­‐




constructive	  dialogue	  (1959-­‐).26	  Communists	  hoped	  to	  co-­‐opt	  Catholics	  with	  selective	  privileges	  
since	  Catholics	  held	   the	  key	   to	   state	   legitimacy.27	   The	  early	  balance	  of	   interests	   revealed	   the	  
chasm	  between	  communism	  and	  Catholicism,	  which	  Stalin	  himself	  conceded	  with	  his	  comment	  
about	  saddling	  a	  cow.	  Their	  tensions	  erupted	  in	  1949	  when	  the	  Church	  excommunicated	  Party	  
members	  and	  the	  communist	  state	  nationalized	  Church	  land,	  confiscated	  the	  Church’s	  welfare	  
agency,	   censored	   Catholic	   publications,	   eliminated	   religious	   teachings	   in	   school,	   and	   pulled	  
chaplains	   from	  prisons,	  hospitals,	  and	  army	  units.28	  A	  more	  brutal	   repression	  occurred	  during	  
and	  after	  the	  war	  between	  Stalinist	  communism	  and	  Polish	  communist	  and	  socialist	  groups.	  
	   The	  imposition	  of	  Soviet	  communism	  exacerbated	  long-­‐standing	  clashes	  between	  Polish	  
and	  external	  polities	  both	  ideologically	  and	  institutionally.	  Kennedy	  shows	  that	  the	  alienation	  of	  
Poles	  from	  socialism	  was	  an	  impressive	  achievement,	  given	  the	  growing	  multiplicity	  of	  socialist	  
parties	  and	  minor	  union	  actions	  during	  the	  partition.	  “The	  central	  point	  is	  not	  this	  diversity,	  but	  
that	  socialism	  was	  one	  of	  the	  major	  themes	  in	  Polish	  social	  and	  political	  life	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  
of	   the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  beginning	  of	   the	   twentieth.	  National	   independence	   for	  Poland	  
was	   equally	   important,	   however,	   if	   not	   more	   so.”29	   This	   confirms	   Ash’s	   summary	   of	   three	  
patterns	  in	  Polish	  history:	  “The	  Poles	  are	  an	  old	  European	  people	  with	  an	  unquenchable	  thirst	  
for	   freedom;	   freedom	   in	   Polish	   means,	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   national	   independence;	   the	   Polish	  
national	  identity	  is	  historically	  defined	  in	  opposition	  to	  Russia.”30	  	  
	   Initially,	  Polish	  socialists	  “gave	  equal	  place	  to	  national	  independence	  and	  social	  reform”	  
under	  the	  Polish	  Socialist	  Party	  (PPS),	  although	  it	  was	  only	  WWI	  that	  reunited	  factions	  divided	  
over	  the	  question	  of	  militant	  unionism.	  Especially	   in	  the	   interwar	  period	  Polish	  party	  activism	  




relative	   merits	   of	   national	   and	   international	   (socialist	   or	   communist)	   agendas.	   The	   Polish	  
Socialist	  Party	  PPS	  (1892-­‐1948)	  was	  a	  nationalist,	  communitarian	  party	  with	  deep	  roots	  relative	  
to	  the	  Polish	  Workers	  Party,	  KPRP	  (1918-­‐1925),	  which	  was	  so	  “internationalist”	  that	  it	  refused	  
to	   recognize	   sovereign	  Poland	  until	   1923,	   and	   the	  Polish	  Communist	   Party,	   KPP	   (1925-­‐1938).	  
Stalin	   dissolved	   the	   KPP,	   it	   seems,	   because	   its	   popularity	   included	   grassroots	   nationalists.	   Its	  
leading	  figure,	  Władysław	  Gomułka,	  reorganized	  the	  Polish	  communist	  party	  1942	  as	  the	  Polish	  
Workers’	  Party	  (PPR),	  which	  still	  emphasized	  a	  patriotic	  call	  for	  independence.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  
Polish	  Home	  Army	  AK	   (1942-­‐1945)	  was	  defending	   the	   fatherland	   from	   invasion,	   incurring	   the	  
wrath	  of	  not	  only	  the	  National	  Socialists	  in	  Germany	  but	  also	  the	  totalitarian	  communists	  in	  the	  
Soviet	  Union.	  Most	  authors	  depict	  this	  period	  as	  the	  death	  knell	  for	  any	  reconciliation	  between	  
Soviet	  international	  communism	  and	  Polish	  national	  socialist	  traditions.	  
	   Between	   1945-­‐1948,	   “the	   Polish	   Communists	   and	   their	   Soviet	   sponsors	   were	   able	   to	  
crush,	  disperse,	  or	  incorporate	  all	  non-­‐communist	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  country,”	  producing	  the	  
Polish	  United	  Workers’	  Party	  (PZPR).32	  But	  this	  only	  created	  a	  dilemma	  for	  the	  USSR	  between	  
imposing	  communism	  and	  achieving	  legitimate	  rule	  in	  Poland.	  Lepak	  describes	  the	  ill	  prospects	  
of	  Polish	  communism:	  
	  
First,	   the	   party	   had	   always	   been	  widely	   identified	   by	   Poles	   as	   a	   non-­‐Polish,	   antipatriotic,	   and	  
Russian-­‐inspired	  political	  force.	  Second,	  the	  party,	  in	  attempting	  to	  alter	  this	  popular	  perception	  
of	   its	  character	  by	  developing	  a	  more	  national	   ideological	  orientation,	  ran	  directly	   into	  conflict	  
with	  Stalin,	  the	  Comintern,	  and	  the	  CPSU.	  Thus,	  the	  party	  found	  itself	  in	  the	  fateful	  dilemma	  of	  
being	  caught	  between	  the	  national	  political	  interests	  of	  the	  Polish	  people	  and	  the	  international	  
political	  interests	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Communists.	  Third,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  dilemma,	  and	  Stalin’s	  dim	  
view	   of	   the	   KPP,	   the	   united	   party	  was	   subjected	   to	   factional	   struggle	   in	   and	   beyond	   the	   late	  
1940s	   owing	   to	   the	   Kremlin’s	   implantation	   and	   manipulation	   of	   loyal	   “Muscovite”	   Polish	  
Communists.	  Thus	  the	  party	  was	  not	  only	  at	  very	  difficult	  odds	  with	  Polish	  Society,	  but	  was	  also	  
divided	  against	   itself	  as	  a	   result	  of	  Stalin’s	   suspicions	  of	   chronic	  “nationalist	  deviation”	  among	  





Kennedy	  argues	  that	   the	   installation	  of	  communist	   rule	  perpetuated	  opposition	  by	  traditional	  
nationalist	  and	  Catholic	  religious	  interests.	  This	  division,	  furthered	  by	  communist	  duplicity	  and	  
betrayal	   against	   indigenous	   communist,	   nationalist,	   and	   religious	   tendencies,	   would	   prove	  
incurable.	   Davies	   portrays	   the	   imposition	   of	   Stalinist	   institutions	   as	   enduring	   all	   the	   way	  
through	   the	   Solidarity	   period:	   “the	   adoption	   of	   Marxism-­‐Leninism	   as	   the	   sole	   ideology;	   the	  
establishment	   of	   an	   extravagantly	   large	   conscript	   army;	   the	   Command	   Economy	   based	   on	  
central	   planning;	   the	  mania	   for	   heavy	   industry;	   the	   Constitution	   of	   1952;	   and,	   above	   all,	   the	  
monopoly	   power	   of	   the	   Polish	   United	   Workers	   Party…Communist	   Poland…is	   essentially	   a	  
Stalinist	  creation,”	  notable	  for	   its	  “gigantic	  construction	  projects”	  and	  “absolute	  priority	  given	  
to	  heavy	  industry	  –	  especially	  coal,	  iron,	  and	  steel,	  and	  to	  the	  arms	  industry.”34	   	  
	   Noting	  that	  poor	  people	  or	  revolutionary	  movements	  often	  founded	  authoritarian	  states	  
for	  instrumental,	  indigenous,	  and	  temporary	  reasons,	  Davies	  remarks	  that	  in	  
	  
Poland,	  no…domestic	  rationale	  pertained.	  Poland,	  if	  left	  to	  itself	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  
War,	  might	  have	  produced	  its	  own	  form	  of	  democracy,	  as	  in	  1921,	  or	  possibly	  its	  own	  variety	  of	  
dictatorship,	  as	   in	  1926.	  Given	  their	  established	  traditions	  and	  allegiances,	  the	  Poles	  could	  not	  
conceivably	  have	  spawned	  a	  communist	  regime	  of	  their	  own	  accord.	  There	  were	  hardly	  enough	  
native	   communists	   to	   run	   a	   factory,	   let	   alone	   a	   country	   of	   some	   thirty	  million	   people.	   In	   the	  
economic	  sphere,	  Poland	  had	  everything	  to	  gain	  by	  association	  with	  the	  advanced	  economies	  of	  
Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America,	  but	  little	  from	  dependence	  on	  the	  backward	  and	  war-­‐torn	  
economy	  of	  the	  USSR.	  What	  actually	  happened	  in	  1944-­‐1948	  was	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  forcibly	  
imposed	  a	  Soviet-­‐style	  communist	   system	  on	  Poland,	   regardless	  of	   the	  people’s	  wishes	  or	   the	  
country’s	  independent	  interests.35	  	  	  
	  
In	   short,	   the	   imposition	  of	   communist	   rule	  on	  Poland	   itself	  expressed	   its	   incompatibility	  with	  
Polish	  commitments,	  history,	  and	  wishes.	  This	  chasm	  was	  exhibited	  in	  the	  results	  of	  a	  national	  
education	  project	  launched	  in	  1962,	  which	  seems	  to	  have	  highlighted	  more	  than	  overcome	  the	  




was	  greatly	  troubled	  because	  many	  of	  its	  students	  were	  recent	  migrants	  from	  the	  lost	  eastern	  
agricultural	   areas	   to	   recently	   reclaimed	  western	   industrial	   centers	   like	  Gdańsk.36	  Overall,	   the	  
hopeless	  objective	  was	  to	  reform	  Poles’	  ideational	  orientation	  to	  socialism	  and	  secularism:	  
	  
Fulfillment	  of	  such	  demands,	  however,	  is	  not	  without	  its	  problems.	  The	  schools	  are	  supposed	  to	  
turn	  out	  citizens	  capable	  of	  being	  active	  and	  “cooperative”	  members	  of	  the	  new	  technological-­‐
industrial	   and	   Socialist	   community.	   Obstacles	   are	   encountered:	   an	   entrenched	   traditional	  
culture	   perpetuated	   by	   the	   family,	   Church,	   and	   other	   established	   formal	   and	   informal;	  
educational	  traditions	  of	  a	  classical	  and	  humanistic	  character	  and	  elitist	   in	  nature;	  a	  scarcity	  of	  
personnel	  equipped	  to	  meet	  the	  new	  system’s	  technological	  goals	  and	  its	  ideological	  objectives;	  
and	   a	  host	   of	   vested	   interests	   –	   functional,	   economic,	   and	   ideological	   –	   that	  may	  oppose	   the	  
realization	  of	  the	  larger	  goals	  related	  to	  education.37	  
	  
	  
	   Poland’s	  “centrally	  planned	  bureaucracy,”	  in	  the	  “new	  class	  analysis”	  proposed	  by	  Kuron	  
and	  Modzelewski	  in	  their	  seminal	  essay	  in	  1965,	  formed	  the	  production	  regime	  at	  the	  national	  
level	  that	  integrated	  Polish	  workers	  into	  the	  state	  without	  formally	  empowering	  them:	  
	  
The	  CPB	  is	  identified	  as	  the	  new	  “ruling	  class”	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  monopoly	  control	  of	  the	  means	  of	  
production.	   Since	   the	   workers	   must	   sell	   their	   labor	   to	   those	   who	   dispose	   of	   the	   means	   of	  
production,	   the	   working	   class	   remains	   exploited,	   being	   deprived	   “not	   only	   of	   the	   means	   of	  
power	  and	  control,	  but	  even	  of	  self-­‐defense.”	  Because	  of	  its	  control	  over	  surplus	  products,	  the	  
CPB	  can	  support	  an	  extensive	  coercive	  apparatus	  that	  checks	  any	  challenges	  to	  the	  established	  
political	  and	  economic	  relationships.38	  	  
	  
The	  central	  levers	  of	  the	  command	  economy	  in	  Poland	  were	  monopoly	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  
of	  production,	  centralized	  organization	  and	  management	  of	  the	  economy’s	  “socialized	  sector”;	  	  
	  
at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   system…the	   ‘institutional’	   role	   of	   the	   communist	   party	   and	   dominance	   of	  
politics	  over	  the	  economy.	  The	  essence	  of	  this	  third	  feature	  is	  the	  supreme	  role	  of	  the	  party	  in	  
managing	   the	   economy,	   and	   the	   ‘double	   subordination	   system	  whereby	   the	   party	   apparatus,	  
particularly	  at	   its	  center,	   [has]	   the	   incontestable	  right	  of	  supervision	  and	   interference	  at	  every	  
level	   of	   the	   economic	   structure.’	   At	   the	   enterprise	   level	   he	   party’s	   interference	   is	   exercised	  
through	   its	   executive	   organs	   both	   outside	   and	   inside	   the	   enterprise.	   One	   of	   the	   supporting	  
pillars	  of	  this	  role	  of	  the	  communist	  party	   is	  the	  nomenklatura	  system	  of	  appointments	  to	  and	  
dismissal	  from	  specified	  posts.	  The	  institutional	  role	  of	  the	  party	  is	  based	  on	  communist	  control	  




	   On	  25	  Feb	  1956,	  Khrushchev	  delivered	  his	  “secret	  speech”	  against	  Stalinism.	  In	  Poland,	  
Edward	  Ochab	  succeeded	  the	  Soviet’s	  client,	  Boleslaw	  Bierut,	  only	  to	  be	  succeeded	  by	  Gomułka	  
who	  was	  “rehabilitated”	  as	  head	  of	  the	  PZPR	  after	  the	  Stalinist	  state	  attacked	  Poznań	  rioters.	  	  
	  
the	  Stalinist	  period	  ended	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes	  in	  1956.	  The	  controlled	  de-­‐Stalinization	  crisis	  
reconstituted	  Poland’s	  political	  elite	  and	  led	  to	  limited	  concessions	  to	  various	  social	  groups	  and	  
organizations.	  Repressive	  political	  practices	  were	  abandoned	  or	  altered	  despite	  the	  preservation	  
of	  social	  and	  economic	  legacies	  of	  the	  Stalinist	  transformation	  and	  the	  institutional	  structures	  of	  
the	  party-­‐state.	  Although	  the	  post-­‐1956	  regime	  gradually	  retreated	  from	  its	  promise	  of	  political	  
liberalization	  and	  economic	  reforms,	  Poland	  never	  came	  close	  to	  a	  reestablishment	  of	  Stalinist-­‐
type	  political	  control.40	  	  
	  
The	  political	  economy	  of	  Poland	  from	  this	  point	  forward	  was	  consolidated	  around	  the	  PZPR,	  the	  
official	  (state)	  trade	  unions,	  and	  the	  military,	  supported	  by	  a	  security	  apparatus,	  whose	  degree	  
of	   subordination	   to	   the	  party	  would	  be	   “directly	   related	   to	   the	   strength	  and	   cohesion	  of	   the	  
party	  itself.”41	  The	  communist	  state	  was	  organized	  as	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  “dual	  subordination”	  system,	  
with	  “office	  holders	  within	  the	  communist	  state	  system…accountable	  to	  a	  formal	  superior	  for	  
the	  specific	  performance	  of	  his	  duties	  and	  to	  a	  party	  body	  or	  official	  for	  the	  general	  success	  and	  
tenor	  of	  his	  performance.”42	  Lewis	  stresses	  that	  the	  systematic	  coherence	  of	  the	  state’s	  party-­‐
management	  command	  structure	  obscured	  “ambiguity	   [that]	  can	  also	  be	  a	  source	  of	  political	  
strength	  and	  a	  force	  working	  to	  sustain	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  party	  rather	  than	  to	  undermine	  it.”	  
The	   putative	   ideological	   purity	   of	   the	   nomenklatura	   and	   bureaucratic	   rationality	   of	   the	  
Communist	   state	   could	   eclipse	   the	   sociological	   composition	   of	   the	   ruling	   class.	   Podgorecki	  
portrays	  the	  PZPR	  as	  filled	  with	  “the	  so-­‐called	  half-­‐intelligentsia,”	  those	  outside	  the	  “threefold	  
classification”	  of	  elite	  Polish	  society:	  the	  white	  collar	  “real	  intelligentsia,”	  the	  second-­‐generation	  




personnel	  and	  state	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  highly	   friable	  apparatus	  populated	  by	   third-­‐rate	  
managers	  and	  survivors	  of	  Nazi	  cleansing	  that	  deliberately	  targeted	  the	  best	  and	  brightest.	  	  
	   This	  is	  the	  political	  party	  and	  bureaucracy	  that	  greeted	  Gomułka,	  known	  for	  nationalist	  
as	  well	  as	  socialist	  leanings,	  after	  the	  23	  June	  1956	  riots	  at	  the	  Poznań	  Steel	  Works	  locomotive	  
plant	   prompted	   his	   instauration.	   The	   restoration	   and	   elevation	   to	   head	   of	   state	   of	   a	   pro-­‐
independence	  leader	  was	  one	  political	  effect	  of	  “the	  first	  major	  outburst	  of	  worker	  discontent	  
against	  the	  Communist	  authorities”	  in	  Poznań	  “when	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  workforce	  of	  the	  huge	  
Cegielski	  factory,	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  region	  and	  then	  known	  as	  the	  Stalin	  works,	  walked	  off	  their	  
jobs	  and	  marched	  into	  the	  streets	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  June	  28,	  1956…because	  of	  a	  dispute	  over	  
wages…The	   rage	  of	   the	  workers,	   however,	   stemmed	   from	   their	   feelings	   of	   powerlessness.”44	  
Worker	  protests	  were	  triggered	  by	  and	  advanced	  the	  de-­‐Stalinization	  process,	  reversing	  several	  
unpopular	   socialist	  policies	   toward	  workers,	   the	  Church,	   and	  peasants.	  Reforms	   in	   the	  Soviet	  
and	  Polish	  parties	   resulted	   in	   returned	  Church	  political	  and	   financial	   rights,	   released	   religious	  
detainees,	   and	   cessation	   of	   agricultural	   collectivization	   efforts	   and	   return	   of	   peasants	   land	  
holdings	   (§3.b.1).	   The	   workers’	   revolt	   compelled	   “changes	   in	   party	   leadership,	   institutional	  
adjustments,	   and	   important	   concessions	   to	   the	   Catholic	   Church.”45	   The	   PZPR	   exchanged	  
“acquiescence	   from	   the	   Church	   hierarchy	   [for]	   concessions”46	   such	   as	   re-­‐privatized	   land-­‐
holdings	   that	   funded	   religious	   endowments.	   Polish	   Catholics	   celebrated	   their	   newfound	  
freedoms	  by	   founding	  “clubs	  of	   intelligence,”	   running	   for	  office,	  and	   forming	  an	   independent	  
group	  called	  Znak,	  a	  collection	  of	  Catholic	  and	  secular	  intellectuals	  and	  artists	  that	  augured	  the	  
future	   alignment	   of	   Catholics	   and	   activist	   intellectuals.47	   Cardinal	   Stefan	  Wyszyński,	   released	  




communist,”	  Gomułka	  was	  partial	  to	  the	  Church’s	  “liberation	  theological”	  impulses	  and	  allied	  in	  
effect	  with	  the	  Cardinal.48	  	  
	   This	  was	  the	  first	  occasion	  that	  taught	  workers	  they	  could	  collectively	  protest	  and	  strike	  
to	  express	  their	  grievances	  and	  satisfy	  their	  demands	  against	  the	  communist	  state.	  In	  the	  event,	  
workers	  in	  June	  agreed	  to	  send	  Warsaw	  five	  demands,	  including	  a	  20	  percent	  wage	  increase.	  An	  
18	  June	  demonstration	  turned	  violent	  when	  they	  stormed	  the	  city	  jail	  to	  release	  prisoners,	  the	  
radio	   station,	   and	   the	   District	   office	   of	   Security.	   “The	   demonstrations	   escalated	   into	   large	  
antigovernment	  riots	  in	  Poznań	  and	  in	  other	  Polish	  cities”;	  although	  maybe	  “100	  people	  died	  in	  
the	  crackdown…workers’	  councils	  mushroomed	  around	  the	  country,	  independently	  of	  the	  party	  
and	  trade	  unions,	  thus	  signaling	  the	  need	  for	  political	  reforms	  to	  accompany	  the	  administrative	  
changes.”49	  This	  would	  become	  the	  template	  for	  the	  next	  twenty	  years;	  together	  workers	  acted	  
in	  concentric	  rings	  emanating	  out	  from	  an	  initial	  work	  site	  or	  action	  to	  protest	  PZPR’s	  policies,	  
tactically	  withholding	   their	   labor	   power	   from	   the	   overall	   production	   system	   and	   storming	   or	  
burning	   official	   buildings	   in	   aggressive	   acts	   that	   appear	   never	   to	   have	   targeted	   government	  
officials.	   Thus,	   1956	   was	   a	   combined	   event	   of	   Stalinist	   descent,	   Gomułka’s	   ascent,	   and	   the	  
message	  that	  worker	  resistance	  to	  government	  actions	  would	  be	  rewarded	  and	  would	  reward	  
others,	  including	  non-­‐worker	  citizens.	  	  
	   It	   was	   also	   a	   signal	   moment	   in	   postwar	   Polish	   political	   history,	   then,	   when	   discrete	  
groups	  or	  interests	  gained	  collectively	  from	  worker	  militancy.	  In	  addition,	  this	  period	  created	  a	  
general	   sense	   of	   disparate	   groups	   allied	   by	   a	   common	   opponent,	   the	   imposed	   communist	  
regime.	  Potentially	  competing	  workers,	  peasants,	  and	  Catholic	  and	  secular	  intellectuals	  had	  in	  




of	   Catholic	   religiosity	   in	   Poland	   were	   manifest,	   and	   this	   would	   prove	   a	   driving	   force	   in	   the	  
working	   class	  movement	   through	   the	   Solidarity	   era.	   A	   resident	   philosophy	   professor,	  Michel	  
Foucault,	  observed,	  “Marxism	  was	  an	  object	  of	  disgust,	  an	  irrelevant	  theory	  which	  they	  had	  to	  
study	  as	  a	  French	  schoolboy	  might	  have	  to	  study	  the	  catechism.	  Catholicism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
represented	  a	  form	  of	  passive	  resistance.”50	  Despite	  his	  impression	  that	  most	  people	  “went	  to	  
mass	  only	  to	  show	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  regime”51,	  Catholic	  commitments	  were	  profound	  and	  
ineradicable,	  most	  evidently	  in	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  annual	  tour	  of	  the	  Black	  Madonna	  (1957-­‐
1966),	   “seen	  by	  virtually	  all	   Polish	  Catholics,”	  which	   “strengthened	   social	   integration	  on	   local	  
and	   national	   levels	   and	   rejuvenated	   the	   religiosity	   of	   the	   Poles…[T]his	   spectacular	  
ceremony…defined	   the	   cultural	   frame	   of	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   Church	   and	   the	   state	   for	  
decades	  to	  come.”52	  Kubic	  stresses	  that	  after	  1956	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  took	  pains	  to	  “present	  
itself	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  human	  rights,	  freedom,	  and	  genuine	  civil	  society,”53	  further	  testing	  the	  
state’s	  tolerance	  of	  non-­‐state	  organizations	  and	  commitments.	  	  
	   The	  “de-­‐Stalinization,”	  “de-­‐totalization,”	  or	  “de-­‐Communization”	  of	  Poland	  appeared	  to	  
offer	  citizens	  a	  return	  to	  native	  social	  traditions,	  political	  rights,	  and	  pragmatic	  religiosity	  over	  
foreign-­‐imposed	   ideology.54	   The	   thaw	  would	   not	   last	   long,	   but	   Poznań	   set	   a	   precedent	   that	  
would:	   “The	   Polish	   crisis	   in	   1980-­‐81	   was	   the	   culmination…of	   political	   crises	   that	   occurred	  
periodically	  after	  1956	  and	  led	  to	  unexpected	  popular	  protests	  and	  abrupt	  leadership	  changes	  
(since	  1956	  virtually	  all	  top	  Polish	  leaders	  had	  been	  deposed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  unrest)	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
further	   erosion	   of	   the	   Stalinist	   party-­‐state.”55	   In	   this	   period,	   according	   to	  Davies,	   “the	   Polish	  
People’s	  Republic	  had	  ceased	  to	  be	  a	  puppet	  state,	  and	  became	  a	  client	  state	  [and,]	  too	  old	  a	  




empowered	  to	  make	  a	  series	  of	  strategic	  concessions	  to	  popular	  demands	  and	  to	  permit	  three	  
specific	  features	  of	  the	  Polish	  order	  –	  an	  independent	  Catholic	  Church,	  a	  free	  peasantry,	  and	  a	  
curious	  brand	  of	  bogus	  political	  pluralism.”56	  
	   The	   communist	   party	   had	   conceived	   economic	   growth	   as	   the	   vehicle	   to	   political	  
legitimacy	  and	  state-­‐administered	  industrial	  organization	  and	  labor	  productivity	  as	  the	  motor	  of	  
economic	   growth.	   That	  Polish	   ruling	   classes	   conflated	  growth,	   legitimacy,	   and	   stability	  would	  
mean	  that	  they	  relied	  repeatedly	  on	  price	  adjustments	  and	  increased	  demands	  on	  workers	  to	  
increase	  production	   rates.	  As	  we	   shall	   see,	   this	   often	  meant	   the	   state’s	   short-­‐term,	   concrete	  
social	   costs	   imposed	  on	   labor	  were	   long-­‐term	  gambles	   for	  workers	  and	   the	   regime	  alike.	  The	  
development	   strategy	   of	   the	   communist	   system	   initiated	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1950s	   was	   to	   integrate	  
large-­‐scale,	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  sites	  through	  management	  of	  regional	  sectors	  overseen	  
by	  party	  leaders.57	  In	  the	  short-­‐run	  this	  plan	  –	  akin	  to	  contemporaneous	  post-­‐colonial	  efforts	  to	  
politicize	  state-­‐managed	  development	  schemes	  but	  by	  avoiding	  labor	  concentrations	  –	  brought	  
workers,	  management,	  official	  unions,	  and	  the	  PZPR	   into	  a	  coherent	  politics	  of	  production,	   in	  
Burawoy’s	  phrase.	  Seemingly	  efficient,	  productive,	  and	  cohesive,	  the	  assimilated	  material	  and	  
organizational	  features	  of	  early	  state-­‐socialist	  Poland	  seemed	  to	  produce	  
	  
a	   year	   of	   hope.	   We	   had	   seen,	   not	   the	   potential	   (for	   this	   was	   soon	   crushed)	   but	   the	   living,	  
indomitable	  agents	  of	  that	  potential	  at	  work	  within	  those	  societies	  [of	  Eastern	  Europe].	  Behind	  
the	  posters,	  novels,	  and	  films	  [we	  saw]	  workers	  who	  were	  absentees,	  pilferers,	  time-­‐servers,	  as	  
well	   as	  workers	  who	  were	   learning	   to	   defend	   themselves,	   organize,	   and	   take	   common	   cause	  
with	  intellectuals.58	  
	  
	   None	  of	  this	  came	  without	  long-­‐term	  insecurity	  or	  immediate	  cost,	  generally	  benefiting	  




matched	  with	  stick,	  and	  the	  state	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  private	  farmers	  to	  obtain	  the	  three	  
essentials	   for	   small	   scale	   farming	   –	   agricultural	   credits,	   tractors	   and	   other	   machinery,	   and	  
fertilizers.”59	   The	   PZPR	   carefully	   oriented	   concessions	   to	   increasing	   state	   monopolization	   of	  
political	   and	   economic	   resources,	   initiating	   a	   continual	   dynamic	   in	  which	   state	   centralization	  
interacted	  with	  social	  decentralization	  spurred	  by	  working-­‐class	  mobilization.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
immediate	   post-­‐1956	   years	   relaxed	   constraints	   on	   artists	   and	   writers	   that	   reduced	   tensions	  
between	   state	   and	   creative	   citizens.	   Artistic	   activism	   strengthened	   in	   aesthetic	   and	   political	  
terms,	  in	  this	  period,	  presenting	  the	  typical	  dilemma	  among	  ruling	  classes	  between	  permissive	  
and	  restrictive	  policies.	  In	  this	  time,	  Poggioli	  could	  describe	  Poland	  as	  	  
	  
the	   only	   country	   beyond	   the	   curtain	  where	   residues	   of	   aesthetic	   protest	   are	   still	   displayed...,	  
precisely	   because	   that	   “people’s	   democracy,”	  more	   than	   any	   other,	   has	   been	   constrained	   to	  
accept	   compromises	  with	   the	  national	   and	   religious	   spirit.	   If	   avant-­‐garde	   art	   is	   not	   yet	   totally	  
dead	   in	   Poland,	   this	   is	   solely	   because	   their	   culture…is	   affected	   by	   that	   pluralism	   which	  
distinguishes	  the	  modern	  culture	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  world	  –	  a	  pluralism	  that	  suffices	  to	  make	  the	  
new	  order	  less	  totalitarian	  and	  monolithic.60	  	  
	  
The	  radiating	  changes	  “of	  leadership	  and	  policy	  result[ing]	  from	  labor	  protests”61	  gave	  impetus	  
to	  Polish	  artists	  and	  writers,	  even	  as	  the	  cultural	  breather	  was	  slowly	  suffocated	  again	  into	  the	  
1960s.	   “If	   the	   Polish	   October	   opened	   the	   way	   for	   intellectual	   reservations	   about	   the	  
foundations	  of	   the	  system,	  even	  among	   those	  convinced	  of	   the	  value	  of	   socialist	   ideals,	   then	  
those	  doubts	  spread	  through	  the	  younger	  generation	  and	  the	  intelligentsia	  in	  1968.	  From	  that	  
time	  on	  intellectuals	  no	  longer	  supported	  the	  Soviet	  model	  of	  socialism.”62	  	  
	   Between	  1956	  and	  1964,	  the	  relative	  easing	  of	  state	  surveillance	  inspired	  a	  politicization	  
of	  intellectual	  activity,	  resulting	  in	  gradual	  tensions	  over	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  censorship.	  




welter	  of	  publications,	  discussions,	  and	  letter-­‐writing	  campaigns	  were	  beginning	  to	  confront	  the	  
state’s	  invasive	  regulations	  of	  quotidian	  life,	  especially	  critical	  discourse.	  The	  seminal	  document	  
from	  this	  period	  is	  an	  open	  letter	  to	  the	  PZPR	  by	  Jacek	  Kuron	  and	  Karol	  Modzelewski,	  a	  student	  
and	  professor	  at	  Warsaw	  University,	  who	  critiqued	  the	  state	  on	  Marxist	  grounds,	  claiming	  that	  
a	  revolutionary	  situation	  inhered	  in	  the	  chasm	  between	  the	  working	  class	  and	  “central	  political	  
bureaucracy.”	  Each	  was	  sentenced	  to	  three	  years	  in	  jail	  and	  dismissed	  as	  members	  of	  the	  party.	  
Such	   harassment	   included	   intimidating	   trials	   of	  writers	   and	   artists	   accused	   of	   betraying	   “the	  
Polish	   people.”	   Agitation	   against	   these	   tactics	   was	   peaking	   in	   1968	   when	   Kazimierz	   Dejmek	  
directed	  the	  Warsaw	  National	  Theater’s	  performance	  of	  “Forefather’s	  Eve”64,	  a	  play	  by	  Poland’s	  
national	   literary	   icon,	   Adam	   Mickiewicz.	   Although	   selected	   to	   satisfy	   the	   party’s	   call	   for	   a	  
dramatic	  commemoration	  of	  the	  50th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  October	  Revolution,	  the	  play	  contained	  
sentences	  such	  as,	  “The	  only	  things	  Moscow	  sends	  us	  are	  jackasses,	  idiots,	  and	  spies”65,	  and	  so	  
was	   abruptly	   canceled.	   State	   security	   forces	   then	   assailed	   protesters	   on	   university	   campuses	  
with	   shocking	   aggression.	   Karpinski	   chronicles	   the	   ongoing	   crackdown	   and	  proliferating	   trials	  
for	  treason.	  Cries	  of	  “Poland	  awaits	  its	  own	  Dubcek”66	  were	  heard	  in	  the	  streets,	  but	  this	  was	  
also	  an	  organized	  movement,	  led	  mainly	  by	  the	  Union	  of	  Polish	  Writers	  (ZLP)	  who	  issued	  formal	  
demands	   “to	   return	   to	   tolerance	   and	   creative	   freedom,”	   permit	   artistic	   and	   intellectual	  
expression,	  and	  desist	  from	  state	  incursions	  into	  the	  universities.67	  	  
	   The	  state	  launched	  in	  response	  an	  anti-­‐Semitic	  campaign	  against	  the	  movement,	  but	  its	  
long-­‐run	  effect	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  to	  further	  discredit	  the	  regime	  –	  if	  not	  out	  of	  widespread	  
concern	  for	  students	  or	  professors,	   then	  for	   the	  show	  of	  state	  arrogance	  and	  use	  of	   force	  on	  




repression,	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  publicly	  supported	  the	  opposition	  by	  publishing	  their	  articles	  in	  
the	   Catholic	   presses	   and	   “demanding…on	   behalf	   of	   the	   episcopate…the	   release	   of	   arrested	  
students,	   and	   an	   end	   to	   ‘drastic’	   methods	   of	   investigation	   and	   punishment,	   and…truthful	  
reporting.”68	  In	  contrast,	  in	  1968	  the	  workers	  did	  not	  support	  the	  students,	  despite	  gestures	  of	  
alliance	  from	  young	  intellectuals	  and	  teachers,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  this	  was	  due	  to	  anti-­‐Semitic	  
tactics.	  It	  is	  important	  in	  the	  broad	  dialogue	  of	  intellectuals	  and	  workers	  –	  who	  would	  reconcile	  
in	  1976	  with	  the	  founding	  of	  KOR	  –	  that	  they	  were	  mutually	  indifferent	  if	  not	  hostile	  from	  1968	  
until	  the	  worker	  uprising	  in	  1970.	  In	  retrospect	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  the	  state’s	  effort	  to	  draw	  
workers	  into	  a	  racist	  campaign	  against	  the	  universities	  seems	  a	  critical	  juncture.	  First,	  the	  state	  
signaled	  its	   incipient	  plan	  to	  subdivide	  and	  fragment	  diverse	  constituencies	  of	  the	  population.	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  PZPR	  expressed	  a	  relatively	  novel	  intention	  to	  manipulate	  or	  direct	  sections	  
of	  the	  population	  instead	  of	  merely	  punishing	  transgressions.	  This	  seems	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  state	  
grasped	  that	  its	  survival	  depended	  on	  moving	  from	  despotic	  to	  infrastructural	  power	  (§2.b)	  and	  
on	  fostering	  competitive	  and	  vertical	  state-­‐society	  ties	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  growing	  horizontal	  
and	  cooperative	  ties	  already	  evinced	  in	  1956.	  Second,	  the	  strain	  between	  workers	  and	  students	  
in	  1968-­‐1970	  attests	  to	  how	  radically	  Polish	  dissidents	  evolved	  in	  a	  short	  time.	  The	  excesses	  of	  
this	  period	  –	  state	  coercion,	  intra-­‐dissident	  hostility	  –	  seem,	  indeed,	  to	  mark	  a	  breaking	  point	  in	  
postwar	  Poland	  after	  which	  social	  agitators	  turned	  away	  from	  the	  state	  and	  to	  one	  another.	  	  
	   Political	  attacks	  on	  intellectual	  production	  and	  aesthetic	  expression	  were	  followed	  by	  an	  
incremental	  move	  to	  liberalize	  the	  political	  economy	  in	  a	  command	  framework.	  After	  “the	  Fifth	  
Congress	  in	  1968…resolved	  to…break	  out	  of	  the	  Stalinist	  model	  of	  extensive	  industrialization	  to	  




means”	   to	  “solve	   the	  economic	  problem”	  of	   low	  growth,	  excessive	  demand,	  and	  rising	  prices	  
and	   to	   “shift	   from	  quantity	   to	   quality	   in	   Polish	   industry.”	   In	   short,	   the	   state’s	   preoccupation	  
with	   growth	   and	   efficiency	   as	   vehicles	   to	   stabilize	   prices	   and	  meet	   rising	   demand	   promised	  
harder	  work	  but	  only	  predicted	  lower	  prices.	  Indeed,	  despite	  formal	  remarks	  about	  inflationary	  
pressure,	  price	  hikes	  in	  1970	  triggered	  massive	  labor	  protests	  and	  state	  reprisals	  that	  changed	  
the	  political	  economy	  and	  reconfigured	  social	  agitation	  for	  the	  next	  decade.	  The	  general	  result	  
of	  the	  price	  hikes,	  strikes,	  and	  repression	  was	  a	  demonstration	  effect	  of	  labor’s	  defense	  of	  the	  
Polish	  population	  in	  opposing	  the	  state	  at	  the	  risk	  and	  cost	  of	  their	  lives.	  In	  addition,	  massacres	  
of	  workers	  unified	   in	  spirit	   intellectuals,	  religionists,	  and	  professionals	  who	  realized	  that	  they,	  
too,	  could	  be	  victimized	  by	  absolute	  rule.	  For	  instance,	  violence	  inaugurated	  a	  tense	  decade	  of	  
Church-­‐state	  disputes,	  not	  least	  as	  workers	  in	  Poland	  are	  devoted	  Catholics.	  As	  usual,	  the	  PZPR	  
shuffled	   state	   figures,	   replacing	  Gomułka	  with	  Edward	  Gierek,	   an	  act	  of	  penance	  not	   reform,	  
but	  one	  that	  briefly	  registered	  with	  workers	  who	  considered	  the	  new	  party	  leader	  one	  of	  them.	  
He	  had	  appeared	  personally	  in	  Gdańsk	  during	  the	  fighting,	  breaking	  communist	  form	  evidently	  
by	  speaking	  directly	  to	  strikers	  about	  their	  demands.	  Again,	  the	  workers	  learned	  from	  their	  use	  
of	  labor	  power	  to	  compel	  ruling	  elites	  to	  respond	  –	  not	  only	  in	  symbolically	  significant	  gestures	  
such	  as	  switching	  party	  leaders	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  terrible	  actions,	  but	  also	  by	  retracting	  
offensive	  policies	  such	  as	  price	  increases.	  More	  precisely,	  during	  the	  1970	  strikes	  and	  violence	  –	  
again,	  the	  workers	  attacked	  and	  burned	  government	  offices	  and	  a	  prison	  –	  workers	  developed	  
tactics,	  discourses,	  and	  objectives	  that	  suggested	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  labor	  activism.	  	  
	   In	   his	   broadside	   against	   “elite”	   or	   “Leninist”	   analyses	   centered	   on	   the	   pedagogy	   of	  




mobilizations	  and	  the	  unprecedented	  state	  repression,	  resulting	  in	  dozens	  of	  massacred	  Polish	  
laborers,	   in	  which	  “the	  workers	  created	   their	  own	  meaning	  and	  salience,	  at	  a	   time	  when	   the	  
state’s	  authority	  had	  weakened.”	  From	  a	  “structural	  crisis	  [of	  rigidified	  Leninist	  states	  entangled	  
with	  oversized	  and	  outdated	  working	  classes,”	  two	  political	  arguments	  emerge:	  
	  
The	   first	   is	   that	   the	   main	   characteristics	   of	   Solidarity,	   its	   master	   frames,	   were	   created	  
autonomously	   by	   Polish	   workers	   six	   years	   before	   the	   creation	   of	   KOR	   [Workers’	   Defense	  
Committee]	  and	  ten	  years	  before	  the	  rise	  of	  Solidarity.	  The	  sit-­‐down	  strike	  and	  the	  inter-­‐factory	  
strike	  committee	  are	  the	  organizational	  breakthroughs.	  The	  programmatic	  [innovation	  was]	  the	  
demand	  for	  free	  trade	  unions,	  independent	  of	  the	  party.	  These	  findings	  push	  the	  direct	  origins	  
of	   Solidarity	   in	   its	   programmatic	   and	   organizational	   dimensions	   back	   six	   years	   earlier	   than	   is	  
generally	   thought.	   They	   also	   change	   the	   dynamic	   agent	   from	   the	   intellectuals	   to	   the	  workers	  
[who	   sought]	   to	   build	   a	   democratic	   project	   as	   an	   answer	   to	   the	   contradictions,	   crises,	   and	  
pathologies	  inherent	  in	  Leninist	  states.69	  	  
	  
Crucially,	  Laba	  declares	  that	  “the	  available	   interview	  data	  and	  primary	  source	  materials	   [from	  
1970]	  illustrate	  quite	  clearly	  a	  process	  in	  which	  Polish	  industrial	  workers	  substituted	  assertion	  
for	  subordination,…transforming	  themselves	  from	  the	  objects	  to	  the	  subjects	  of	  politics.”70	  The	  
old	  approach	  of	  the	  state	  to	  its	  denizens	  –	  in	  the	  words	  of	  poet	  Antoni	  Slominski:	  "stuffing	  their	  
mouths	  with	  sausage	  so	  they'll	  shut	  up"71	  –	  could	  no	   longer	  render	  working-­‐class	  uprisings	  as	  
episodic	  replies	  to	  particular	  and	  readily	  withdrawn	  policies.	  In	  1970,	  working-­‐class	  mobilization	  
emerged	  in	  inchoate	  form	  as	  a	  movement	  for	  labor	  but	  also	  for	  all	  Poles.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Gierek	  
personally	  announced	  the	  social	  power	  of	  labor	  in	  addressing	  the	  workers,	  asking	  for	  their	  help,	  
proposing	   “a	   new	   explicit	   social	   pact	   between	   the	   workers	   and	   the	   socialist	   system,”	   and	  
offering	  “an	  open	  recognition	  of	  their	  power	  of	  veto.”72	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  Gierek	  was	  preparing	  his	  long-­‐range	  plan	  for	  the	  economy.	  	  





The	   sequence	   varies	   little	   in	   its	   broad	   outline.	   It	   begins	   with	   the	   arrival	   of	   a	   shining	   new	  
government,	   promising	   radical	   economic	   changes	   and	   liberal	   political	   reforms.	   Gradually	   this	  
ruling	   group	   is	   affected	   by	   political	   decay	   until	   it	   degenerates	   into	   the	   same	   sort	   of	   stifling	  
autocracy	   which	   it	   replaced,	   a	   clique	   out	   of	   touch	   with	   the	   needs	   and	   wishes	   of	   the	   Polish	  
people.	  Correspondingly,	  the	  management	  of	  the	  economy	  –	  at	  the	  outset	  dedicated	  to	  raising	  
living	  standards	  and	  filling	  the	  shops	  –	  drifts	  off	  course	  into	  grandiose	  and	  irrelevant	  investment	  
projects.	   The	   burden	   returns	  with	   increasing	  weight	   to	   the	   shoulders	   of	   the	  most	   vulnerable	  
section	   of	   the	   society,	   the	   industrial	   working	   class.	   Economic	   discontent	   finally	   touches	   off	   a	  
working-­‐class	  revolt.	  The	  leads	  more	  or	  less	  directly	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  political	  leadership	  and	  its	  
replacement	  by	  a	  new	  team	  –	   in	   its	  turn	  flourishing	  promises	  of	  reform	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  
public	  opinion.	  A	  cycle	  has	  ended.	  The	  next	  begins	  as	  this	  new	  leading	  clique,	  after	  only	  a	  few	  
months	  in	  which	  the	  newspapers	  are	  free	  and	  sausage	  is	  plentiful,	  is	  slowly	  drawn	  into	  the	  same	  
process	  of	  degeneration.73	  
	  
Anticipating	   that	   growth	  would	   “normalize”	   the	   state’s	   relationships	   to	  workers,	   the	   Church,	  
intellectuals,	   and	   professionals	   whose	   desires	   for	   deeper	   reforms	   were	   converging,	   Gierek	  
conceived	  of	  an	  economic	  model	  comprising	  increased	  investment,	  enabled	  by	  massive	  foreign	  
borrowing,	   that	  would	   stabilize	   prices,	   increase	   real	   income,	   develop	   Poland’s	   infrastructure,	  
and	   improve	  overall	  welfare.	  However	  radical	   these	  proposals	  may	  have	  seemed	   in	  official	  or	  
ideological	   communist	   dogma,	   not	   least	   the	  proposed	   indebtedness	   to	   capitalist	   lenders,	   the	  
plan	  again	  expressed	  the	  state’s	  refusal	  to	  restructure	  the	  economy.	  Gierek’s	   investments	  did	  
succeed	   for	  several	  years,	  notably	   in	   increasing	  Poles’	   standard	  of	   living	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  
annual	  growth	  rates.	  But	   in	   the	   long-­‐term,	   roughly	   from	  1971	  to	  1975,	  expensively	   leveraged	  
state	  spending	  on	  domestic	  production	   ignored	  the	   looming	  fiscal	   impasse	  and	  contradictions	  
straining	  relations	  among	  the	  PZPR,	  management,	  and	  labor	  under	  increasingly	  	  	  
	  
complex	  industrial	  structures	  and	  management	  practices.	  This	  growing	  industrial	  concentration	  
in	  postwar	  Poland	  intensified	  social	  divisions	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  gave	  rise	  to	  political	  conflicts	  
that	  could	  not	  be	  accommodated	  through	  the	  existing	  institutional	  arrangements.	  By	  the	  1970s	  
communication	   broke	   down	   among	  management,	   the	   party,	   and	   the	  work	   force	   because	   the	  
structures	  of	  these	  institutions	  no	  longer	  corresponded.	  Most	  critical	  was	  the	  breakdown	  in	  the	  
representation	  of	  working	  class	  interests	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  enterprises,	  for	  labor	  institutions	  




party’s	   remedy	   for	   these	   ills	  was	   to	   reassert	   the	   role	   of	   party	   organizations,	   but	   not	   of	   labor	  
institutions,	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  management.	   [W]orkers	   became	  more	   alienated	   from	  management	   and	  
the	  party,	  and	  sought	  alternate,	  informal	  means	  of	  representing	  their	  interests.74	  	  	  	  
	  
	   Bielasiak	   adds	   that	   tracing	   increasing	   labor	   autonomy	   and	   disaffection	   to	   industrial	  
organization	  shows	  that	  “it	   is	  precisely	  because	   the	  party	   leadership	   resisted	  decentralization	  
and	  worker	  participation	   that	   it	   experimented	  with	   various	   forms	  of	  enterprise	  organization”	  
that	  worsened	  widespread	  regime	  legitimacy.	  Discrete	  incentives	  to	  each	  group	  supplemented	  
aggregate	  material	   progress.	   For	   instance,	   the	   state	   restored	   to	   the	  Church	  properties	   in	   the	  
“recovered	  areas”	  that	  the	  communists	  had	  held	  since	  1950.75	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  communist	  
party	   in	  this	  period	   intended	  to	  overcome	  growing	  disparities	  between	  particular	   labor	  needs	  
and	  centralized	  party	  and	  management	  organizations	  by	  discretionary	  side-­‐payments.	  To	  put	  it	  
another	  way,	  after	  the	  1970	  state-­‐worker	  conflict	  and	  coeval	  specialization	  of	  production,	  labor	  
was	  becoming	  more	  horizontally	  linked	  to	  other	  work	  centers	  than	  to	  state	  managers	  and	  party	  
directors.	   Polish	   social	   arrangements	   and	   orientations	   in	   general	   seemed	   to	   be	   dissociating	  
from	   the	   centralized,	   hierarchal	   state	   and	   party	   institutions	   and	   cultivating	   self-­‐organization.	  
	   The	  emergence	  of	  an	   incipient	   civil	   society	   co-­‐extended	  with	   the	  abandonment	  of	   so-­‐
called	  revisionism,	  the	  belief	  in	  reform	  programs	  issued	  by	  the	  state	  apparatus	  by	  more	  liberal-­‐
minded	  party	  members.76	  This	  decision	  to	  turn	  inward	  to	  achieve	  individual	  and	  collective	  self-­‐
legislation	  and	  -­‐discipline	  is	  a	  rarely	  appreciated	  aspect	  of	  many	  20th-­‐century	  movements,	  and	  a	  
strong	  feature	  of	  Islamist,	  Catholic,	  and	  other	  religious	  trends	  emphasizing	  personal	  piety	  and	  
inter-­‐subjective	  responsibilities	  beneath	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  state.	  An	  overarching	  turn	  from	  
state-­‐	   to	   society-­‐centered	   social	  mobilization	  among	  Polish	  activists	   is	   contested	  but	  within	  a	  




communist	  state	  agencies:	  “disputation	  about	  politics	  within	  the	  democratic	  opposition	  needed	  
to	   be	   set	   aside	   because	   specific	   individuals	   and	   their	   families	   needed	   help.”77	   This	   was	   the	  
founding	  principle	  of	  the	  Workers’	  Defense	  Committee,	  founded	  in	  1976	  by	  Kuron,	  Jan	  Lipski,	  
Adam	  Michnik	  and	  others,	  after	  the	  Ursus	  and	  Radom	  resistance	  to	  price	  hikes	  triggered	  state	  
violence	  and	  detentions:	  
	  
Kuron’s	   theory	   of	   organizing	   was	   simple:	   “Musi	   się	   coś	   dziać.”	   People	   have	   to	   see	   that	  
“something	   is	   happening.”	   For	   a	  movement	   to	   succeed,	   people	  must	   be	   in	  motion.	   Collecting	  
funds,	   visiting	   workers’	   families,	   attending	   trials,	   puts	   them	   in	   motion	   together.	   Such	   self-­‐
organization	  is	  both	  a	  means	  to	  a	  specific	  purpose	  and	  an	  ultimate	  goal.”78	  
	  
	   Michnik’s	  concurrent	  essay,	  “A	  New	  Evolutionism”	  (1976),	  registered	  the	  disillusionment	  
of	  intellectuals,	  workers,	  and	  Catholics	  alike	  with	  intra-­‐systemic	  reformism	  and	  more	  generally	  
ideological	   abstraction	   associated	  with	   communist	   pronouncements	   about	   sacrifice	   and	   class	  
unity.	  With	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  revisionist	  Marxist	  humanism	  following	  the	  state’s	  attack	  against	  
student	  activists	   in	  1968,	  Michnik	  eulogized	  the	  “neopositivist”	  Catholic	  cooptation	  strategy.79	  
The	  shared	  optimism	  of	  revisionists	  and	  neopositivists	  that	  “change	  would	  come	  from	  above”	  
via	  “positive	  evolution	  of	  the	  party,	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  rational	  policies	  of	  wise	  leaders,	  not	  by	  
incessant	   public	   pressure,”80	  was	   dead.	  While	   intellectuals	   and	  workers	  were	   allying	   through	  
labor	  activism	  and	  state	   reprisals,	   the	  Catholic	  Church	   retained	   its	  mediating	   role,	  albeit	  with	  
excessive	  fealty,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  KOR	  members.	  Here	  Znak-­‐Catholic	  support	  for	  the	  repression	  
of	  the	  Radom	  strikes	  redoubled	  the	  dedication	  of	  Michnik	  and	  his	  colleagues	  to	  labor:	  	  
	  
“New	  Evolutionism”	   is	  based	  on	   faith	   in	   the	  power	  of	   the	  working	   class,	  which,	  with	  a	   steady	  
and	   unyielding	   stand,	   has	   on	   several	   occasions	   forced	   the	   government	   to	   make	   spectacular	  
concessions.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  foresee	  developments	  in	  the	  working	  class,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  question	  
that	   the	   power	   elite	   fears	   this	   social	   group	   most.	   Pressure	   from	   the	   working	   classes	   is	   a	  





	   This	  was	  a	  radical	  development	  in	  Polish	  politics	  –	  for	  the	  confluence	  of	  intellectuals	  and	  
workers	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  the	  growing	  horizontality	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  and	  for	  its	  egalitarian,	  if	  
lexically	  ordered,	  division	  of	   labor.	  As	   the	  “social	  group…that	   the	  power	  elite	   fears,”	   that	  has	  
“on	  several	  occasions	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  make	  spectacular	  concessions,”	  workers	  would	  
be	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  social	  change	  and	  political	  dissidence	  for	  a	  general	  mobilization	  of	  critical	  
and	  activist	  citizens.	  This	  coalition	  of	  between	  labor	  and	  KOR	  was	  not	  merely	  “pragmatic”	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  lacking	  principled	  commitments	  or	  reducing	  its	  efforts	  to	  material	  subsistence,	  but	  in	  
the	  principled	  goal	  of	  combining	  distinct	  modes	  of	  valuation	  and	  social	  situation	  toward	  a	  single	  
goal	  under	  a	  complementary	  leadership.	  That	  political	  objective	  drove	  KOR’s	  practical	  example	  
in	  protecting	  workers,	  as	  humble	  servants	  of	  the	  key	  activist	  class	  whose	  actions	  demonstrated	  
moral	  commitment	  to	  the	  universal	  Polish	  subject.	  Indeed,	  KOR’s	  ethos,	  	  
	  
defined	   for	   the	   most	   part	   by	   implication	   and	   example,	   stressed	   matter-­‐of-­‐factness	   and	  
scrupulous	  honesty,	  nonviolence	  and	  forbearance,	  plus	  reluctance	  to	  sit	   in	   judgment.	  Much	  of	  
this	  echoed	  the	  basic	  Christian	  tenet	  of	  charity,	  and	  KOR’s	  members,	   largely	  unbelievers,	  soon	  
found	  themselves	  pursuing	  their	  goals	  in	  harmony	  with	  Catholic	  colleagues.	  82	  
	  
Meanwhile,	  real	  wages	  were	  plummeting,	  prices	  were	  rising,	  and	  external	  debt	  skyrocketing.83	  
As	   if	   trying	  to	  prove	  how	  detached	  they	  were,	   the	  PZPR	  revised	  the	  constitution	  at	   this	   time,	  
binding	  Poland	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  USSR	  and	  provoking	  the	  “letter	  of	  59”	  writers	  and	  scholars,	  
including	  Adam	  Zagajewski	  who	  was	   then	   fired,	   interrogated,	  and	  monitored	  when	  he	   joined	  
the	  opposition.84	  
	   As	  organized,	   independent,	  and	  renowned	  intellectuals	  converged	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  




the	  Church	  readily	  tilted	  its	  tactical	  balance	  between	  its	  communist	  counterparts	  and	  Catholic	  
constituencies.	  When	  the	  episcopate	  accused	  the	  PZPR	  of	  violating	  Church	  education	  rights	  and	  
property	   in	  1976,	  the	  state	  aggressively	  plundered	   its	   funding	  sources	  and	  proposed	  a	   loyalty	  
oath.85	  The	  state’s	  Religious	  Affairs	  Director,	  Kazimierz	  Kąkol,	  proclaimed,	  “While	  allowing	  the	  
Church	  to	  function,	  we	  will	  never	  go	  back	  on	  our	  principles…We	  will	  never	  permit	  the	  religious	  
upbringing	  of	  children.	  If	  we	  cannot	  destroy	  the	  Church,	  we	  shall	  at	   least	  stop	  it	  from	  causing	  
harm.”86	   This	   hostility	  would	  not	  define	  Church-­‐PZPR	   relations,	   but	   it	   demonstrated	   to	  many	  
the	  combined	  alienation	  and	  arrogance	  of	  ruling	  elites	  at	   this	   juncture.	  Mieczysław	  Rakowski,	  
the	  “voice	  of	  Gierek,”	  tried	  to	  correct	  this	  impression	  with	  an	  overture	  to	  the	  Church	  to	  reaffirm	  
its	  status	  as	  mediator	  to	  other	  Polish	  advocacy	  groups,	  notably	  workers:	  “If	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  
Catholic	  Church	   in	  Poland	  will	  continue…a	  policy	  of	  cooperation	  as	  opposed	  to	  confrontation,	  
and	   if	   they	  will	   take	   an	  active	  part	   in	  building	  our	   socialist	   fatherland,	   then	   the	  Marxists	  will	  
certainly	  be	  ready	  to	  help	  settle	  problems	  which	  still	  exist	  today.”87	  The	  “established	  pattern”	  
of	  “the	  Church’s	  behavior”	  was	  thus	  restored	  while	  proving	  the	  state’s	  concern	  to	  bridge	  citizen	  
and	  state	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  concessions	  to	  the	  Episcopate.88	  Crucially,	  the	  Church,	  intellectuals,	  and	  
workers	  were	  allied	  across	  distinct	  institutional	  and	  ideological	  interests	  and	  religious	  identities.	  
Workers	   backed	   by	   the	   Church	   and	   armed	  with	   the	   strike	   and	   labor	   power,	   posed	   a	   double	  
threat	  to	  the	  state	  coming	  to	  represent	  and	  focus	  Polish	  subjectivity	  beyond	  the	  factory	  floor.	  	  
Cardinal	  Wyszyński	  publicly	  denounced	   in	  1977	  the	  “daily	  humiliations”	  of	  those	   lining	  
up	  to	  get	  “essential	  needs	  of	  the	  people”	  by	  apparatchiks	  still	  obsessed	  with	  “top	  performance	  
of	  production.”89	  This	  was	  a	  public	  signal	  of	  commitment	  beyond	  the	  coffers	  and	  pedagogical	  




speaking	   to	   and	   of	   all.	   The	  Workers’	   Defense	   Committee,	   similarly,	   gathered	   “socialists	   and	  
liberals,	  Catholics,	  Jews,	  and	  nonbelievers”	  to	  defend	  “a	  simple	  and	  profound	  belief	   in	  human	  
freedom.”90	   Two	   dynamics	   were	   at	   work	   in	   this	   phase.	   First,	   a	   popular	   consensus	   on	   Polish	  
dignity,	  rights,	  and	  material	  equality	  united	  the	  Church,	  intellectuals,	  professionals,	  and	  workers	  
economically	  and	  ideologically.91	  Second,	  in	  defiance,	  the	  state	  continued	  its	  tactic,	  since	  1970,	  
“to	   jump	  start	   the	  economy	  by	  upgrading	  the	  technology	  of	  Polish	   industry,	  borrowing	  about	  
$20b	  from	  western	  governments	  and	  banks	  [by	  1977].	  The	  idea	  was	  simple,	  though	  wrong:	  	  
	  
Poland	   did	   not	   need	   to	   change	   the	   economic	   system,	   but	   just	   to	   use	   better	   machinery.	  
Remarkably,…the	  huge	  amount	  of	   foreign	  borrowing	  produced	  almost	  no	   increase	   in	  Poland’s	  
exports	  to	  Western	  markets.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  loans	  could	  not	  be	  repaid.	  Poland	  became	  one	  of	  
the	   first	   countries	   in	   the	  world	   to	   fall	   into	  debt	  crisis	  after	  a	   round	  of	  heavy	  borrowing	   in	   the	  
1970s.	  By	  the	  late	  1970s,	  Poland’s	  access	  to	  new	  loans	  had	  dried	  up,	  and	  Poland	  was	  struggling	  
to	  make	  debt-­‐service	   repayments.	   The	   shift	   from	  capital	   inflows	   to	   capital	   outflows	   created	  a	  
dramatic	  squeeze	  on	  the	  economy.”92	  
	  
	   As	  an	  odd	  emblem	  of	  the	  state’s	  notorious	  distance	  from	  Polish	  citizens	  and	  subjects,	  in	  
1978	  the	  PZPR	  allowed	  the	  publication	  of	  Ryszard	  Kapuściński	  The	  Emperor,	  about	  the	  Ethiopian	  
dictator	  Haile	  Selassie,	  convinced	  that	  its	  “study	  of	  a	  failing	  reactionary”	  autocrat	  benefited	  the	  
communist	  state	  by	  comparison.93	  This	  was	  the	  kind	  of	  gesture	  intended	  to	  offset	  increasingly	  
vocal	  and	  audacious	  criticisms,	  exemplified	  by	  the	  KOR’s	  “appeal	  to	  society”	  the	  same	  year94,	  an	  
open	  letter	  implicating	  government	  corruption	  and	  cupidity	  for	  social	  poverty	  and	  suffering,	  in	  
short,	  voicing	  their	  material	  grievances	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  “moral”	  and	  “political”	  criminality	  and	  
irresponsibility.	  Criticizing	  state	  performances	   in	  housing,	  health	  care,	  employment,	  consumer	  
provisions,	  and	  work	  conditions,	   the	  KOR	  declared,	   “It	   is	   impossible	   to	  purchase	  any	   items	   in	  




nepotism.”	  In	  addition,	  the	  appeal	  cited	  “increased	  exploitation	  of	  the	  workers”	  and	  “growing	  
social	  inequality”	  in	  contrasting	  the	  “extremely	  difficult	  living	  conditions”	  for	  most,	  to	  “a	  small	  
number	  of	  families	  who	  have	  no	  financial	  worries	  whatsoever	  [given]	  the	  extensive	  system	  of	  
privileges	  for	  groups	  associated	  with	  the	  authorities:	  privileged	  supplies,	  special	  health	  services,	  
allocation	  of	  housing	  and	  building	  lots,	  foreign	  currency,	  and	  special	  recreational	  areas.”	  In	  an	  
especially	  pointed	  ideological	  attack,	  the	  KOR	  accused	  the	  state	  of	  proto-­‐bourgeois	  policies:	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	  miners	  were	   deprived	   of	   free	   days	   to	   compensate	   them	   for	   free	   Saturday,	   that	  
work	  is	  required	  on	  Sundays,	  and	  that	  a	  single	  day’s	  absence	  even	  for	  the	  most	  valid	  of	  reasons	  
(such	  as	  a	  death	  in	  the	  family	  or	  illness)	  leads	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  approximately	  20	  percent	  of	  monthly	  
salary	   –	   all	   this	   can	  be	   compared	  only	   to	  early	   capitalist	   exploitation.”	  Costs	   exceed	   values	  of	  
state	  agricultural	  firms,	  which	  are	  less	  efficient	  than	  the	  family	  farms	  they	  target	  for	  destruction,	  
though	  250,000	  farmers	  had	  “refused	  to	  pay	  retirement	  dues.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  statement	  announced,	  and	  linked,	  political	  and	  cultural	  criticisms	  of	  the	  political	  
elites	  and	  system.	  It	  denounced	  “beatings”	  and	  “murders	  of	  [detainees]	  with	  full	   impunity”	  as	  
exemplifying	   the	   state’s	   systemic	   disregard	   for	   “even	   the	   appearance	   of	   legality,”	   including:	  
ignored	   complaints,	   fabricated	   cases,	   deaths	   of	   witnesses	   in	   prison,	   and	  more	   generally	   the	  
communist	  party’s	  usurpation	  of	  all	  walks	  of	  life,	  from	  scientific	  research	  to	  “literature,	  theater,	  
and	  film	  –	  those	  branches	  of	  culture	  dominated	  by	  language”	  and	  “especially	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  
arbitrary	  throttling	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  thought	  and	  to	  the	  annihilation	  of	  creative	  activities.”	  
	  	   This	   comprehensive	  dissent	   –	   listing	  multiple	   violations	   throughout	  public	   and	  private	  
life	  –	  extended	  even	  beyond	  KOR	  and	  labor,	  suggesting	  a	  diffuse	  critical	  discourse	  at	  this	  time.	  
Thus	  the	  new	  Experience	  and	  Future	  group,	  composed	  of	  “party	  members,	  Catholics,	  and	  non-­‐
aligned	  intellectuals,”	  formed	  “to	  discuss	  the	  deeply-­‐felt	  crisis	  in	  Polish	  social	  life.”	  In	  1980,	  they	  




Solidarity’s	  criticisms	  and	  reflected	  widespread	  grievances	  reported	  in	  rigorous	  opinion	  surveys	  
of	  Polish	  citizens.	  The	  proliferation	  of	  strident	  anti-­‐PZPR	  sentiment	  paralleled	  Gierek’s	  recovery	  
scheme’s	  demise:	  “the	  abuse	  of	  political	  power,	  the	  resulting	  consciousness	  of	  a	  split	  between	  
state	   and	   society,	   and	   the	   rejection	   of	   social	   inequality.	   [A]	   national	   crisis	   [was]	   repeatedly	  
defined	  primarily	  as	  a	  social	  and	  political	  one,	  and	  only	  secondarily	  as	  economic	   in	  nature.”95	  
This	  emphasis	  on	  explicitly	  political	  and	  social	  grievances,	   rather	  than	  the	  economic	  stimulus-­‐
response	   politics	   of	   protesting	   to	   prevent	   lost	   income	   and	   material	   welfare	   following	   price	  
hikes,	  exemplified	   the	  direction	  of	  Polish	  activism	   in	   the	   late	  years	  of	  Gierek’s	  government:	  a	  
diverse	  coalition	  of	  activists	  deeply	  committed	  to	  redressing	  economic	  inequality	  and	  material	  
suffering	  by	  addressing	  their	  sources	  in	  political	  institutions	  and	  social	  organization.	  	  
	   Staniszkis	  has	  identified	  the	  state’s	  response	  to	  its	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  crises	  
as	  neo-­‐corporatist,	  as	  mentioned	  above	  (§3.b.1):	  “a	  new	  form	  of	  interest	  representation	  [that]	  
evolved…in	   the	   mid-­‐seventies”96	   to	   divide	   Polish	   citizens	   into	   separate	   interest	   groups.	   The	  
state	  opened	  “informal”	  channels,	  for	  instance,	  to	  individual	  workers	  to	  apply	  for	  discretionary	  
state	   outlays.	   In	   theory,	   “worker	   pressure	   could…be…leveraged	   to	   help	   extract	   additional	  
resources	   from	   hierarchical	   superiors	   unresponsive	   to	   more	   orthodox	   methods,”97	   creating	  
political	  and	   financial	   incentives	   for	  state	  and	   labor	  alike.	  But	   these	  programs	  were	  obviously	  
devised	   to	   prevent	   the	   systemic	   reforms	   demanded	   by	   a	   growing	   dissident	   movement	   by	  
preoccupying	   workers	   with	   industry-­‐	   or	   plant-­‐specific	   concerns.	   Hence,	   with	   the	   growth	   of	  
material	  incentives,	  workers’	  earnings	  became	  more	  dependent	  on	  management	  discretion	  and	  
performance.	   Differences	   over	   pay	   and	   the	   distribution	   of	   bonuses	   emerged	   as	   the	   most	  




mobilized	  agitators	  with	  public	  and	  private	  schemes	  that	  recalled	  some	  “late	  version	  of	  a	  neo-­‐
colonial	   state	   linked	   to	  a	   large-­‐scale	  economy,	   the	  main	  centers	  of	  which	  were	  elsewhere.”99	  
Or,	  as	  Bauman	  puts	   it,	   “The	  whole	   failed	  political	   strategy	  of	  Gierek’s	   regime	  was	   founded	   in	  
legitimizing	   the	   socialist	   order	   as	  one	  aiding	   and	  abetting	  personal	   gain	   and	   self-­‐interest	   and	  
pandering	  to	  ever	  growing	  consumer	  desires	  [and]	  dismantling	  the	  vestiges	  of	  the	  welfare	  state	  
cultivated	   under	   Gomułka.”100	   The	   failed	   neo-­‐corporatist	   strategy	   perversely	   echoes	  
capitalism’s	  fragmentation	  of	  labor’s	  collective	  identity	  and	  action.	  That	  is,	  as	  Burawoy	  says,	  	  
	  
Class	   consciousness	   leads	   to	   class	   mobilization	   only	   under	   certain	   conditions	   –	   namely,	   the	  
development	  of	   collective	   interests	   and	   collective	   capacities	   to	  pursue	   those	   interests.	   So	   the	  
possibilities	   of	   collective	  mobilization	   are	   undermined	   by	   channels	   for	   individual	  mobility	   and	  
the	  absence	  of	  autonomous	  institutions	  operating	  in	  a	  relatively	  open	  civil	  society.101	  
	  
Imitating	  its	  capitalist	  counterparts,	  the	  Polish	  state	  adopted	  corporatist	  tactics	  “to	  undermine	  
collective	  mobilization	   by	   creating	   channels	   for	   individual	   mobility	   and	   weaken	   autonomous	  
institutions,”	  but	  here	  in	  a	  potentially	  opening	  Polish	  communist	  society.	  Polish	  was	  an	  instance	  
of	  a	  tendency	  in	  this	  period	  and	  region	  to	  adopt	  “a	  corporatist	  political	  structure	  [that]	  enables	  
the	  state	  to	  advance	  domestic	  tranquility,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  by	  negotiating	  among	  self-­‐
seeking	   groups	   that	   are	   odds	  with	   one	   another	   and	   co-­‐opting	   them	   into	   collaborative	   policy	  
arrangements.”102	  But	  it	  seems	  the	  Polish	  state	  was	  attempting	  to	  create	  and	  then	  co-­‐opt	  “self-­‐
seeking	  groups”	  after	  citizen-­‐subjects	  had	  created	  themselves	  as	  a	  unifying	  self-­‐seeking	  group.	  
	   The	  contradictions	  of	  communist	  party-­‐management	  centralization,	  Gierek’s	   incapacity	  
to	  invest	  his	  way	  out	  of	  them,	  and	  the	  braided	  opposition	  of	  workers,	  professionals,	  the	  Church,	  
and	  intellectuals	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  Solidarity	  movement.	  As	  Colas	  observes,	  “the	  advent	  of	  




reborn,	   thus	   manifesting	   its	   ability	   to	   survive,	   its	   unquenchable	   vitality,	   in	   a	   country	   still	  
ruled…by	  the	  communist	  party.”103	  The	  core	  of	  this	  perhaps	  world-­‐historical	  social	  movement,	  
Solidarity,	   was	   the	   adherence	   to	   the	   Polish	   population	   as	   a	   whole,	   led	   by	   workers	   uniquely	  
possessed	  of	  a	  credible	  tool	  against	  the	  state.	  As	  Michnik	  writes,	  “the	  
	  
effective	  rebellion	  against	  communism	  in	  Poland	  was	  a	  rebellion	  of	  the	  masses.	  As	   long	  as	  the	  
communists	  were	   confronted	   by	   elite	   groups,	   they	   could	   ignore	   their	   voices.	   As	   long	   as	   they	  
were	   concerned	   with	   democratic,	   legal	   procedures,	   the	   communists	   did	   not	   take	   them	   into	  
account.	  The	  communists	  only	  began	  to	  take	  the	  opposition	  seriously	  once	  the	  crowd	  sided	  with	  
it.	   They	   had	   to	   talk	   to	   the	   crowd.	   This	   situation	   led	   us	   to	   believe	   that	  we	  were	   effective	   in	   a	  
crowd,	  or	  rather	  that	  we	  were	  effective	  when	  we	  spoke	  the	  language	  of	  the	  crowd…Populism	  in	  
Poland	  was	  the	  language	  of	  the	  workers’	  rebellion	  against	  the	  totalitarian	  state.104	  
	  
One	   sign	   of	   this	   mass	   base	   was	   persistent	   skepticism	   about	   elite	   appropriation	   inside	   and	  
outside	  the	  movement.	  Indeed,	  Touraine	  reports	  a	  pervasive	  egalitarianism	  in	  the	  ranks:	  “at	  the	  
base,	   protest	   and	  questioning	   [were]	  more	  direct,	   since	   at	   the	   top	   the	  need	   to	   negotiate	   an	  
awareness	  of	  external	   threats	   leads	   to	  greater	  caution.”105	  Polish	  working	  class	  attitudes	  also	  
evinced,	  to	  be	  sure,	  anti-­‐intellectual	  tendencies	  directed	  at	  official	  and	  Solidarity	  elites	  alike.106	  
But	  Solidarity	  never	  considered	  allying	  with	  sympathetic	   intra-­‐PZPR	  bureaucrats	  –	   themselves	  
an	  index	  of	  how	  far	  labor	  disaffection	  and	  the	  movement’s	  suasion	  had	  advanced	  –	  instead	  of	  
periodically	  hostile	  workers	  or	  religionists	  “because	  of	  Solidarity’s	   ‘fundamentalist’	  hostility	  to	  
the	  party.”107	  But	  grassroots	  agitation	  did	  not	  overcome	  social	  and	  political	  despair.	  As	  Zbigniew	  
Bujak	  writes,	  Havel’s	  essay	  “The	  Power	  of	  the	  Powerless”	  	  
	  
…reached	  us	  at	   the	  Ursus	   factory	   in	  1979	  at	   a	  point	  when	  we	   felt	  we	  were	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
road.	  Inspired	  by	  KOR,	  we	  had	  been	  speaking	  on	  the	  shop	  floor,	  talking	  to	  people,	  participating	  
in	  public	  meetings,	  trying	  to	  speak	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  factory,	  the	  country,	  and	  politics.	  There	  
came	  a	  moment	  when	  people	  thought	  we	  were	  crazy.	  Why	  were	  we	  doing	  this?	  Why	  were	  we	  
taking	   such	   risks?	   Not	   seeing	   any	   immediate	   and	   tangible	   results,	   we	   began	   to	   doubt	   the	  




ways?	  Then	  came	  the	  essay	  by	  Havel.	  Reading	   it	  gave	  us	  the	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  for	  our	  
activity.	   It	   maintained	   our	   spirits;	   we	   did	   not	   give	   up	   and	   a	   year	   later	   –	   in	   August	   1980	   –	   it	  
became	   clear	   that	   the	   party	   apparatus	   and	   the	   factory	   management	   were	   afraid	   of	   us.	   We	  
mattered.	  And	  the	  rank	  and	  file	  saw	  us	  as	  leaders	  of	  the	  movement.108	  
	  
The	  Feb	  1980	  party	  congress	   led	  by	  First	  Secretary	  Stanislaw	  Kania	  exposed	   intra-­‐elite	  
conflict	  among	   the	  CP,	  with	   criticism	  emerging	   from	  within	  of	  party	   corruption.109	  Perceptive	  
PZPR	  elites	  were	  aware	  of	  defections	   in	   their	  own	   lower	   ranks	  as	  well	   as	   swelling	  opposition	  
among	  the	  newly	  powerful	  Polish	  population.	  For	   instance,	  boosted	  by	  the	  1979	  visit	  of	  Pope	  
John	  Paul	  II,	  former	  Cardinal	  Karol	  Wojtyła	  of	  Krakow,	  the	  Church	  had	  “virtually	  unlimited	  socio-­‐
cultural	  power”	  by	  1980,	  with	  twenty-­‐seven	  diocese;	  7,556	  parishes;	  15,444	  priests;	  forty-­‐two	  
monastic	  institutes	  of	  4,207	  priests	  and	  1,477	  brothers.110	  By	  the	  standard	  of	  continual	  rule	  and	  
popular	  legitimacy,	  a	  visitor	  might	  have	  guessed	  the	  Church	  was	  the	  Polish	  state	  but	  had	  been	  
usurped	  by	  a	  band	  of	  corrupt	  thugs,	  the	  widespread	  sense	  of	  the	  state	  when	  Solidarity	  formed	  
in	  the	  wake	  of	  labor	  actions	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1980.111	  
From	  mainly	  July	  on,	  repeated	  work	  stoppages	  sprang	  up	  in	  a	  disconnected	  fashion,	  with	  
characteristic	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  government	   responses.	   In	   the	  predictable	  pattern,	  wage	   increases	  
ended	   the	  Ursus	   stoppage,	   followed	  by	  walkouts	   in	  plants	   in	  Warsaw;	   in	  every	   case	   “strikers	  
won	  a	  bigger	  pay	  packet.	  Indeed,	  on	  July	  11th,	  managers	  of	  important	  enterprises	  were	  flown	  to	  
Warsaw	  and	  told	  by	  Central	  Committee	  to	  buy	  ‘social	  peace,’	  cheaply	  if	  possible,	  but	  really	  at	  
any	  price.”112	   In	  July	  work	  protest	  actions	  were	  on	  site	  rather	  than	  crossing	  the	  factory	  gates,	  
with	  the	  exception	  of	  Lublin,	  where	  “most	  strike	  committees…had	  similar	  demands”	  that	  would	  
prove	  paradigmatic:	  (1)	  higher	  wages;	  (2)	  family	  allowances	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  army	  and	  security	  
police;	  (3)	  abolition	  of	  ‘commercial	  shops’	  [used	  by	  the	  state	  to	  raise	  prices];	  (4)	  fair	  allocation	  




Gdańsk,	   to	   centralize	   the	   demand	   for	   an	   inter-­‐factory	   strike	   committee	   that	   could	   speak	  
generally	  for	  labor’s	  concerns.	  Solidarity	  emerged	  in	  August	  1980	  as	  a	  state	  within	  a	  state,	  with	  
a	   massive	   infrastructure,	   countrywide	   worker	   support,	   and	   a	   compelling	   strike	   that	   would	  
forcefully	   re-­‐structure	   the	   politics	   labor-­‐state	   relations.	   In	   addition,	   workers	   in	   Solidarity	  
solidified	  their	  alliances	  with	  intellectuals	  and	  the	  Church.	  
On	   14	   August	   1980,	   led	   by	   fired	   electrician	   Lech	   Wałęsa114	   and	   supporters	   of	   the	  
dismissed	   and	   humiliated	   welder	   and	   crane	   operator	   Anna	   Walentynowicz115,	   the	   Gdańsk	  
shipyard	  workers	   went	   out	   on	   strike.	   As	   Starski	   says,	   the	   detailed	   symbolism	   of	   this	   worker	  
mobilization	   is	   crucial.	   For	   instance,	   Walentynowicz	   had	   become	   “an	   enemy	   [of	   the	   state]	  
explicitly	  because	  she	  defended	  others	  and	  could	  organize	  her	  colleagues.	  For	   the	  authorities	  
always	  tr[ied]	  to	  isolate	  those	  who	  could	  become	  leaders.	  After	  the	  strikes	  of	  1976,	  a	  sufficient	  
reason	  to	  receive	  a	  dismissal	  was	  that	  one	  had	  authority	  among	  one’s	  peers	  in	  the	  shipyards.”	  
For	  his	  part,	  Wałęsa,	  long	  active	  in	  coastal	  labor	  organizing,	  including	  a	  role	  on	  the	  1970	  strike	  
committee,	  had	  been	  a	  victim	  of	  the	  state’s	  abuse	  in	  an	  incident	  of	  emblematic	  significance	  to	  
many	   Poles	   –	   he	   had	   been	   arrested	  while	   walking	   his	   baby	   in	   a	   carriage	  which	   the	   security	  
personnel	   then	   abandoned,	   unattended,	   in	   front	   of	   his	   house.	   As	   for	   Solidarity’s	   key	   ally,	  
Cardinal	   Wyszynski	   “sent	   the	   young	   priest	   [Father	   Popieluszko]	   to	   celebrate	   mass	   for	   the	  
strikers.	   His	   knees	   were	   quaking,	   it	   was	   said,	   as	   he	   passed	   through	   the	   gate,	   beyond	  which	  
milled	  several	  thousand	  workers.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  the	  priest	  had	  held	  mass	  in	  a	  factory,	  
the	  first	  time	  during	  a	  strike.”116	  Popieluszko	  spoke	  from	  Wyszynski’s	  “prison	  notes…the	  most	  
succinct	  diagnosis	  of	  totalitarianism	  I	  know:	  a	  system	  supported	  by	  the	  Big	  Lie,	  whose	  purpose	  




the	   treatment	   accorded	   it	   is	   just	   and	   normal.”	   Solidarity’s	   “rebellion	   of	   the	   masses,”	   he	  
declared,	   represented	  a	  “populist…egalitarianism…that	  was	   rational	  within	   the	  confines	  of	  an	  
irrational	  system	  because	  it	  was	  the	  only	  way	  to	  deprive	  the	  political	  system	  of	  legitimacy.”117	  	  
Against	   this	   “irrational”	   treatment,	   only	   intensifying	   since	   1976,	   ten	   million	   workers	  
joined	  Solidarity	  –	  galvanized	  by	  Church	  and	  KOR	  support,	  urban	  and	  rural	  work-­‐sites,	  and	  past	  
successes	   in	   changing	   state	   policies	   and	   politicians.	   But	   “this	   time,	   unlike	   1970	   or	   1976,	   the	  
strikers	   did	   not	   pour	   out	   into	   the	   streets	   or	   attack	   local	   Party	   headquarters;	   they	   occupied	  
factories	  and	  formed	  strike	  committee.”118	  Solidarity’s	  non-­‐violent,	   ideological	  pragmatism,	  its	  
eminent	  “rationality,”	  is	  easily	  mistaken	  for	  moderation	  but	  this	  may	  ignore	  how	  militant	  their	  
non-­‐violence	  was.	  Solidarity	  was,	  indeed,	  	  
	  
a	  total	  social	  movement	  aiming	  to	  change	  all	  aspects	  of	  public	  life…But	  it	  never	  sought	  to	  seize	  
power:	   it	   concerned	   itself	   with	   institutional	   reforms,	   trying	   to	   install	   competent	   and	   hard-­‐
working	   managers	   in	   industry	   and	   wanting	   to	   see	   the	   freedom	   of	   the	   press	   respected	   and	  
censorship	  abolished…a	  popular	  movement	  which	  behaved	  like	  a	   legislative	  assembly	  infinitely	  
anxious	  to	  respect	  legal	  procedures.119	  	  
	  
On	  14	  Aug	  workers	  printed	  posters	  stating,	  and	  leaflets	  disseminating,	  their	  demands,	  “the	  first	  
link	  between	  1976	  and	  the	  1980	  unrest	  which	  was	  spreading”	  in	  response	  to	  incremental	  price	  
increases.	  They	  demanded	  reinstatement	  of	  dismissed	  workers,	  uniform	  increase	  of	  2000	  zlotys	  
for	  everyone,	  family	  allowances	  on	  par	  with	  the	  militia,	  higher	  pensions,	  fair	  reporting	  in	  mass	  
media	  controlled	  by	  the	  government,	  elimination	  of	  so-­‐called	  commercial	  pricing,	  and	  for	  the	  
construction	   of	   a	  monument	   to	   the	   fallen	   of	   the	   1970	  massacre.	  On	   16	   Aug,	  when	   shipyard	  





strike	   committee	   agreed	   and	   Wałęsa	   announced	   that	   the	   strike	   had	   ended.	   Thousands	   of	  
jubilant	  workers	  headed	  for	  the	  gates	  and	  home.	  [Alina]	  Pieńkowska	  was	  enraged,	  realizing	  that	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  agreement	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  strikers	  at	  plants	  throughout	  the	  region	  were	  
being	   left	   in	   the	   lurch.	   She	   found	   the	   voice	   and	   courage	   to	   attack	  Mr.	  Wałęsa:	   ‘You	  betrayed	  
them…Now	  the	  authorities	  will	  crush	  us	  like	  bedbugs.”120	  	  
	  
Pieńkowska’s	   father,	   a	  worker,	   had	  witnessed	   the	  massacre	   of	   strikers	   in	   1970.	  Her	   activism	  
represented	   that	   political	   event;	   as	   she	   put	   it,	   “Here	   in	   the	   shipyard	   I	   stopped	   being	   afraid,	  
stopped	  running	  away,	  and	  became	  a	  real	  person,”	  she	  said.	  	  
	   Such	  events	  indicate	  the	  significant	  legacy	  of	  previous	  worker	  encounter	  with	  the	  state,	  
but	  also	  the	  direction	  of	   its	  decision-­‐making	  from	  the	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  up	  to	  the	  Solidarity	  elites.	  
Once	   “state	   negotiators	   and	   Wałęsa	   seemed	   satisfied,	   “the	   proposed	   agreement	   was	   then	  
democratically	  rejected	  by	  the	  rank	  and	  file	  in	  the	  name	  of	  solidarity.	  The	  Lenin	  Shipyards	  were	  
not	  going	  to	  give	  up	  the	  struggle	  and	  let	  other,	  weaker	  plants	  down…Wałęsa…bowed	  at	  once	  to	  
the	  will	   of	   the	  majority.”121	   Such	   reiterated	   decision-­‐making	   practices	   and	   opinion	   gathering	  
routinized	  Solidarity’s	  practical	  conception	  of	  the	  entire	  Polish	  working	  class,	  notably	  the	  need	  
to	  accommodate	  specific	  factories’	  demands	  as	  well	  as	  develop	  a	  general	  program.	  Within	  the	  
month	  of	  August,	   in	  other	  words,	  Solidarity	  was	  improvising	  a	  strike-­‐based	  political	  and	  social	  
regime	  that	  organized	  a	  constituency	  of	  millions	  through	  a	  centralized	  but	  egalitarian	  system	  by	  
presenting	  universal	  demands	  tailored	  to	  diverse	  needs.	  Solidarity’s	  “self-­‐limiting	  revolution”122,	  
meanwhile,	  received	  public	  religious	  support.	  On	  22	  August,	  the	  Church	  issued	  a	  communiqué,	  
stating,	   “The	  general	   council	  of	   the	  Episcopate	  expresses	   its	  esteem	  both	   for	   the	  workers	  on	  
strike	  and	  their	  committees,	  and	  for	  the	  authorities	  for	  having	  prevented	  disturbances	  of	  public	  
order.”123	  On	  24	  August,	  in	  a	  television	  address,	  Gierek	  “announced	  a	  major	  reshuffling	  of	  the	  




workers]	   had	   a	   memory,	   they	   were	   not	   too	   impressed.”	   Although	   the	   changes	   were	  
“substantial,”	   removing	   one-­‐third	   of	   the	   Politburo,	   including	   Premier	   Babiuch	   with	   his	  
ministers,	  state	  trade	  union	  head	  Jan	  Szydlak,	  and	  propaganda	  minister	  Jerzy	  Lukasiewicz,	  they	  
recalled	  nothing	  more	  than	  changes	  at	  the	  top	  after	  the	  1970s	  repression	  and	  hardly	  augured	  
innovative	  reforms.124	  	  	  
	   Thus,	  Solidarity	  pointedly	  broke	  with	  the	  historical	  pattern,	  retaining	  the	  strike,	  holding	  
the	  movement	   fast	   to	  non-­‐violence,	   gathering	   together	   intellectual	   and	  professional	   support,	  
and	  welcoming	   the	  clergy	   to	   the	   factory	   to	  perform	  mass.	   In	  addition,	   then,	   to	   these	   tactical	  
innovations	  –	   refusing	   temporary	   repeals	  of	  offensive	  policies	  and	  disciplining	  workers	  not	   to	  
attack	  government	  offices	  –	  Solidarity	  also	  appropriated	  the	  work	  site	  itself	  as	  a	  political	  space	  
that	  acted	  as	  an	  official	   statehouse	  of	   the	  people.	  PZPR	  representatives,	  Catholic	  priests,	  and	  
workers	  could	  visit	  the	  Solidarity	  movement	  to	  negotiate,	  lead	  services,	  or	  press	  demands.	  This	  
new	  discipline	  permitted	  solidarity	  to	  secure	  the	  31	  August	  Gdańsk	  Agreement,	  wresting	  from	  
the	  state	  the	  central	  working-­‐class	  demand:	  autonomous	  inter-­‐factory	  committees.	  It	  is	  worth	  
quoting	  key	  provisions	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  bolding	  its	  key	  passages	  to	  convey	  a	  sense	  of	  its	  
revolutionary	  and	  symptomatic	  contents:	  
	  
On	  Point	  1,	  which	  reads:	  “To	  accept	  trade	  unions	  as	  free	  and	  independent	  of	  the	  party,	  as	  laid	  
down	   in	  Convention	  no.	  87	  of	   the	   ILO	  and	   ratified	  by	  Poland,	  which	   refers	   to	   the	  matter	  of	  
trade	  union	  rights,”	  the	  following	  decision	  has	  been	  reached:	  	  
(1)	   The	   activity	   of	   the	   trade	   unions	   of	   People’s	   Poland	   has	   not	   lived	   up	   to	   the	   hopes	   and	  
aspirations	   of	   the	   workers.	   We	   thus	   consider	   that	   it	   will	   be	   beneficial	   to	   create	   new	   union	  
organizations,	   which	   will	   run	   themselves,	   and	   which	   will	   be	   authentic	   expression	   of	   the	  
working	  class.	  Workers	  will	  continue	  to	  have	  the	  right	  to	  join	  the	  old	  trade	  unions	  and	  we	  are	  
looking	  at	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  two	  unions	  structures	  cooperating.	  	  
(2)	  The	  MKS	  declares	   that	   it	  will	   respect	   the	   principles	   laid	   down	   in	   the	   Polish	   Constitution	  
while	   creating	   the	   new	   independent	   and	   self-­‐governing	   unions.	   These	   new	   unions	   are	  




a	   political	   party.	   They	  will	   be	   established	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   socialization	   of	   the	  means	   of	  
production	   and	   of	   the	   socialist	   system	   that	   exists	   in	   Poland	   today.	   They	  will	   recognize	   the	  
leading	  role	  of	  the	  PZPR	  in	  the	  state,	  and	  will	  not	  oppose	  the	  existing	  system	  of	  international	  
alliances.	  Their	  aim	   is	   to	  ensure	   for	   the	  workers	   the	  necessary	  means	   for	   the	  determination,	  
expression,	   and	   defense	   of	   their	   interests.	   The	   government	   commission	   will	   guarantee	   full	  
respect	   for	   the	   independence	   and	   self-­‐governing	   character	   of	   the	   new	   unions	   in	   their	  
organizational	   structure	  and	   their	   functioning	  at	   all	   levels.	   The	   government	  will	   ensure	   that	  
the	  new	  unions	  have	  every	  possibility	  of	  carrying	  out	  their	  function	  of	  defending	  the	  interests	  
of	   the	  workers	   and	   of	   seeking	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   their	  material,	   social,	   and	   cultural	   needs.	  
Equally	  it	  will	  guarantee	  that	  the	  new	  unions	  are	  not	  the	  objects	  of	  any	  discrimination.	  
(3)	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  free	  and	  self-­‐governing	  trade	  unions	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Convention	  87	  of	  the	  
ILO	   relating	   to	   trade	  union	   rights	   and	  Convention	  97	   relating	   to	   the	   rights	  of	   free	  association	  
and	  collective	  negotiation…The	  coming	  into	  being	  of	  more	  than	  one	  trade	  union	  organization	  
requires	  changes	  in	  the	  law.	  The	  government,	  therefore,	  will	  make	  the	  necessary	  legal	  changes	  
as	  regards	  trade	  unions,	  workers’	  councils,	  and	  the	  labor	  code.	  
(4)	  The	  strike	  committees	  must	  be	  able	  to	  turn	  themselves	   into	  institutions	  representing	  the	  
workers	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   enterprise,	   whether	   in	   the	   fashion	   of	   workers’	   councils	   or	   as	  
preparatory	  committees	  of	  the	  new	  trade	  unions.	  As	  a	  preparatory	  committee	  the	  MKS	  is	  free	  
to	  adopt	  the	  form	  of	  a	  trade	  union,	  or	  of	  an	  association	  of	  the	  coastal	  region…	  
(5)	  The	  new	  trade	  unions	  should	  be	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  decisions	  affecting	  the	  conditions	  of	  
the	  workers	  in	  such	  matters	  as	  the	  division	  of	  the	  national	  assets	  between	  consumption	  and	  
accumulation,	   the	   division	   of	   the	   social	   consumption	   fund	   (health,	   education,	   culture),	   the	  
wages	  policy,	  in	  particular	  with	  regard	  to	  an	  automatic	  increase	  of	  wages	  in	  line	  with	  inflation,	  
the	  economic	  plan,	  the	  direction	  of	  investment	  and	  prices	  policy.	  The	  government	  undertakes	  
to	  ensure	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  for	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  these	  functions.	  
(6)	  The	  enterprise	  committee	  will	  set	  up	  a	  research	  center	  whose	  aim	  will	  be	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  
objective	   analysis	   of	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   workers	   and	   employees,	   and	   will	   attempt	   to	  
determine	  the	  correct	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  interests	  can	  be	  represented…The	  new	  unions	  should	  
have	  their	  own	  publications.	  
(7)	   The	   government	  will	   enforce	   respect	   for	   Article	   1,	   paragraph	   1	   of	   the	   trade	   union	   law	   of	  
1949,	  which	  guarantees	  the	  workers	   the	  right	   to	   freely	  come	  together	  to	   form	  trade	  unions.	  
The	  new	  trade	  union	  will	  not	   join	  the	  Central	  Council	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (CRZZ).	   It	   is	  agreed	  that	  
the	  new	  trade	  union	  law	  will	  respect	  these	  principles.	  The	  participation	  of	  members	  of	  the	  MKS	  
and	   of	   the	   preparatory	   committees	   for	   the	   new	   trade	   unions	   in	   the	   elaboration	   of	   the	   new	  
legislation	  is	  also	  guaranteed.125	  
	  
The	  Gdańsk	  Agreement	   legalized	   independent	   trade	   unions,	   rendering	   the	  movement	  
nationally	  and	  officially	   legitimate;	  “when	  Solidarity	  called	  a	  warning	  strike,	  the	  strike	  call	  was	  
followed	  in	  the	  remotest	  corners	  of	  the	  country:	  in	  the	  tiny	  station	  buffet	  and	  the	  village	  pub	  as	  
in	   Ursus	   or	   Huta	  Warszawa.”126	   Poles	   taunted	   the	   state	  with	   “an	   endless	   parade	   of	   political	  




practice	  of	  union	  democracy,	  or	   the	  proper	   income	  of	   steelworkers	   as	   a	  percentage	  of	   gross	  
national	  product.”127	  In	  addition,	  Solidarity	  received	  declarations	  of	  support	  from	  human	  rights	  
groups,	   student,	  and	  rural	  workers.128	  For	   the	   first	   time	  since	   the	   founding	  of	   the	  communist	  
party	  in	  Poland,	  the	  ruling	  class	  had	  formally	  agreed	  to	  share	  policy-­‐making	  with	  another	  group,	  
and	  this	  group,	  Solidarity,	  had	  organized	  millions	  of	  workers	  capable	  of	  withdrawing	  their	  labor	  
from	  the	  state,	  paralyzing	  the	  state	  now	  with	  only	  greater	  efficacy.	  It	  can	  be	  argued,	  to	  be	  sure,	  
that	  the	  articles	  of	  the	  agreement	  are	  a	  last-­‐ditch	  neo-­‐corporatist	  ploy	  to	  sequester	  workers	  in	  
their	  own	  sectoral	  jurisdiction,	  leaving	  the	  rest	  of	  “civil	  society”	  to	  their	  own	  or	  the	  state’s	  rule.	  	  	  
	   But	  several	  trends	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  regime	  from	  “civil	  society”	  cast	  
doubt	  on	  the	  practicality	  of	  this	  interpretation.	  First,	  the	  regime	  was	  “out	  of	  touch”	  enough	  to	  
believe	  it	  could	  still	  control	  workers	  with	  minor	  adjustments	  after	  years	  of	  abusing	  dissenters.	  
Second,	  as	  in	  1956,	  1970,	  and	  1976,	  ruling	  elites	  were	  willing	  to	  make	  concessions	  but	  now	  they	  
appeared	  only	  to	  prove	  the	  opposition’s	  systemic	  criticisms	  by	  re-­‐enacting	  the	  contradictions	  of	  
the	  state	  socialist	  political	  economy.	  Material	  concession	  displayed	  the	  perverse	  incentive	  of,	  in	  
effect,	  paying	  the	  opposition	  to	  protest	  while	  showing	  that	  the	  dissidents	  had	  sufficient	  coercive	  
force	  to	  exact	  further	  compromises;	  thus	  the	  state	  ended	  up	  paying	  them	  to	  continue	  striking.	  
In	   addition,	   the	   regime’s	   concessions	   exhibited	   “neglect	   of	   the	   national	   economy,”129	   which	  
helped	  workers	  to	  stand	  above	  the	  state	  as	  concerned	  not	  only	  for	  personal,	  industry-­‐level,	  or	  
regional	  welfare	  but	  also	  for	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  Poland.	  This	  contrast	  between	  the	  workers	  and	  
“worker	   state”	   in	   their	  national	   concerns	   resuscitated	  or	   resonated	  with	   long-­‐standing	  Polish	  




sacrificing	  Polish	  wellbeing	  for	  personal	  wealth.	  Because	  the	  palliative	  economic	  offers	  were	  in	  
themselves	  irrational	  and	  unsustainable,	  as	  Starski	  says,	  	  
	  
it	   was	   blatantly	   obvious	   that	   the	   ruling	   class	   wanted	   to	   do	   anything,	   including	   ruining	   the	  
country,	   in	   order	   to	   regain	   its	   monopoly	   of	   political	   power	   –	   the	   economy,	   rationality,	   and	  
standards	  of	   living	  of	   the	  population	  were	   just	   tokens	   in	   their	  power	  game.	  This	  was	  a	   lesson	  
that	  striking	  workers	  took	  very	  seriously.	  They	  were	  not	  out	  to	  wreck	  the	  country’s	  economy	  to	  
get	   a	   few	   pennies	  more.	   They	  were	   out	   to	   have	   their	   say	   in	   preventing	   chaos	   in	   the	   country	  
introduced	  by	  the	  very	  same	  ruing	  class	  that	  now	  so	  lightly	  disposed	  of	  the	  national	  budge.130	  
	  
	   With	   its	   extensive	   record	   since	   the	   installation	   of	  Gomułka	   of	   substituting	   superficial,	  
reactive	  compromises	  for	  systemic	  reforms,	  the	  party’s	  and	  management’s	  offers	  and	  promises	  
drew	  open	  laughter	  but	  also	  anger	  for	  several	  reasons	  that	  resounded	  with	  one	  key	  energizing	  
offense:	   corruption.	   By	   1980	   it	  was	   clear,	   at	   least	   to	  workers,	   that	   Polish	   elites	  were	   selfish,	  
deceitful,	   manipulative,	   incompetent,	   traitorous,	   and	   with	   all	   this	   enriching	   themselves.	   The	  
ruling	   class	  would	  not,	   that	   is,	   betray	   only	   the	  workers,	   but	   Poland	   itself;	   indeed,	   these	   two	  
became	  one	  in	  August	  1980.	  The	  ruling	  elites	  were	  now	  trapped	  within	  the	  strict	  parameters	  of	  
retaining	   incumbency,	   achieving	   social	   order,	   and	   securing	   their	   benefits	   –	   all	   by	   yielding	   to	  
Solidarity,	  a	   social	  movement	   that	  could	  paralyze	   the	  economy,	  with	  gains	   that	  would	  mollify	  
rather	  than	  irritate	  them.	  Even	  a	  competent	  government	  would	  struggle	  with	  these	  imperatives	  
and	  the	  Polish	  regime	  was	  evidently	  not	  this,	  or	  perhaps	  they	  were	  hemmed	  in	  by	  1980;	  to	  stay	  
in	  power	  seemed	  to	  entail,	  by	  definition,	  defying	  a	  dissident	  movement	  that	  seemed	  with	  each	  
passing	  day	  to	  be	  taking	  over	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  and	  representing	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  nation.	  In	  
response	  to	  this	  bind,	  party	  leaders	  tried	  to	  smother	  the	  sound	  of	  their	  decisions	  in	  gradualism,	  
a	  kind	  of	  government	  subterfuge,	  while	  still	  trying	  to	  divide	  their	  opponents.	  For	  example,	  party	  




varying	  them	  by	  region	  and	  protest	  response.	  “The	  stratagem	  might	  have	  worked,”	  Singer	  says,	  
“if	   the	   Polish	   labor	  movement	   had	   not	   gained	   experience	   and	   forged	   links	   in	   the	   preceding	  
period.	  In	  practice,	  the	  clever	  tactics	  had	  an	  effect	  opposite	  to	  that	  intended:	  they	  acted	  as	  an	  
inducement	   to	   strike,”	   not	   least	   since	   “the	   Warsaw	   wit,	   with	   their	   knack	   for	   paraphrasing	  
slogans,	  put	  it	  in	  a	  nutshell:	  ‘Those	  who	  do	  not	  strike,	  do	  not	  eat	  meat.’”131	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Third,	   the	   uprising	   instantly	   proved	   deeply	   grassroots,	   religious,	   unified,	  massive,	   and	  
immovable	   in	   its	   commitments,	   but	   also	   spontaneous	   and	   cohesive	   enough	   to	   respond	  
organically	   and	   rapidly	   to	   daily	   evolving	   changes	   by	   increasing	   its	   organizational	   focus	   and	  
strength	  continually.	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  grass	  were	  driving	  the	  movement,	  as	  the	  
underground	  movement	  surfaced	  while	  creating	  its	  unbroken	  ranks	  –	  the	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  led	  the	  
movement	  from	  the	  bottom	  up.	  The	  “horizontality”	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  uprising	  was	  so	  deep	  and	  
pervasive	   that	  not	  only	  were	   its	   leaders	  workers,	  often	  unemployed,	  but	   they	  were	   lifted	  up	  
and	   held	   aloft	   by	   their	   colleagues	   when	   their	   energies	   flagged,	   the	   regime	   compromises	  
tempted	   them,	   or	   intra-­‐industry	   disputes	   loomed.	   Throughout	   August	   workers	   from	   all	   over	  
Poland	   pushed	   Solidarity	   forward	   by	   defying	   state	   instructions,	   adhering	   to	   movement	  
decisions,	   arriving	   en	   masse	   in	   Gdańsk	   to	   represent	   increasing	   numbers	   and	   deepening	  
networks	  of	   strike	  committees,	  and	  encouraging	  Wałęsa	   to	   radicalize	   their	  demands.	  But	   it	   is	  
also	   crucial	   that	   Solidarity	   reflected	   and	   received	   the	   active,	   passionate	   devotion	   of	   non-­‐
workers	   throughout	   Poland.132	   The	   strike	   itself	   coordinated	   workers	   and	   their	   families	   in	   a	  
concerted	   system	   for	   delivering	   meals	   and	   other	   provisions.	   But	   even	   more	   dramatically,	  
perhaps,	   the	  mobilization	   of	  workers	   country-­‐wide	   created	   in	   sentiment	   one	   larger	   family	   of	  




everywhere	   by…strangers	   [who	   offered]	  money,	   food,	   and	   words	   of	   support,”	   gestures	   that	  
“had	   an	   immense	   influence	   on	   the	   coastal	   workers.”133	   Even	   the	   negotiations	   conducted	   by	  
appointed	  union	  representatives	  were	  guided	  by	  the	  immediate	  responses,	  cheering	  or	  booing,	  
of	  workers	  listening	  in	  real	  time	  to	  the	  discussions	  and	  proposals.	  	  
	   Fourth,	  from	  the	  start	  the	  strike	  revised	  an	  established	  and	  acknowledged	  space	  of	  labor	  
productivity,	  a	  literal	  and	  physical	  place	  of	  working	  class	  aggregation,	  consolidation,	  discussion,	  
consciousness,	   and	   finally	   activism.	   That	   is,	   the	   strikers	   activated	   their	   available,	   recognized,	  
gated	  communal	  site	  as	  an	  inviolable	  aspect	  of	  its	  social	  arsenal.	  The	  mobilization	  of	  workers	  in	  
a	  workspace	  had	   in	   this	   sense	  a	  deep	   integrity,	  a	  holism	   in	  which	  subject	  and	  space	  arose	  as	  
one,	  while	  also	  re-­‐constituting	  a	  known	  entity	  –	  the	  work	  force.	  The	  regime	  and	  priests	  came	  to	  
this	  place	  as	  an	  indispensable	  symbol	  of	  respect	  for	  labor.	  Thus,	  the	  political	  space	  of	  the	  work	  
site,	  constituted	  by	  the	  new	  discipline	  of	  radical	  non-­‐violence,	  forges	  the	  necessary	  apparatus	  
of	  sustained	  mass	  opposition.	  For	  all	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  positions,	  statements,	  and	  conditions,	  
Michnik	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  ontological	  status	  of	  Solidarity,	  above	  all:	  	  
	  
Solidarity	  was	  a	  mass	  movement	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  with	  an	  inchoate	  political	  consciousness.	  
They	  wanted	   to	   live	   better,	   to	   have	   less	   poverty,	   less	   fear,	   and	  more	   rights,	   but	   none	   of	   this	  
added	  up	   to	  a	  political	  program.	  Solidarity	  has	  an	  ethos.	   Its	  program	  was,	  don’t	  give	   in	   to	   the	  
Commies,	   learn	   how	   to	   cultivate	   those	   areas	   of	   freedom	   that	   have	   opened	   up.	   Social	   issues	  
were	  formulated	  largely	  [as]	  demands	  for	  improvements	  in	  living	  and	  working	  conditions.134	  
	  
	   Although,	  or	  because,	  it	  had	  no	  clear	  program,	  it	  had	  a	  specific	  constituency:	  “Solidarity	  
was	   a	   confederation	   against	   evil.	   Solidarity	   brought	   together	   three	   great	   political	   cultures:	  
Catholic	   nationalism,	   working-­‐class	   populism	   –	   in	   other	   words	   socioeconomic	   demands,	  




intelligentsia,	  so	  deeply	  rooted	   in	  Poland.”135	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   it	  was	  concretely	   limiting	  the	  
monopolies	  of	   the	  party	   and	  management	  over	   the	   fate	  of	  workers	   and	   citizens.	   The	   former	  
gained	  leverage	  against	  the	  state	  to	  demand	  improved	  health	  and	  safety	  standards,	  while	  the	  
latter	  turned	  to	  Solidarity	  to	  state	  grievances	  about	  their	  welfare	  and	  rights.	  “Before	  the	  party	  
was	  not	  everything,”	  MacShane	  writes,	  “but	  it	  [had	  been]	  the	  final	  arbiter.	  Now	  that	  too	  [had]	  
changed.	  Regional	  officials	  [were]	  obliged	  to	  negotiate	  with	  Solidarity	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues.	  
In	  many	  regions	  bus	  routes	  and	  schedules	  [were]	  reorganized	  at	  Solidarity’s	  request.	  In	  Silesia	  
an	  important	  aluminum	  smelter	  was	  closed	  down	  because	  of	  [its]	  disastrous	  effect…on	  the	  local	  
environment.”136	  Solidarity	  was	  a	  state	  within	  a	  state	  but	  not	  isolated	  –	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  coherent	  
constituency	  it	  could	  successfully	  press	  claims	  against	  the	  PZPR.	  	  
	   The	  effects	  of	  Solidarity’s	  consolidation	  lasted	  for	  sixteen	  months,	  throughout	  1981.	  The	  
effects	  were	   grave,	   including	   increased	   political	   freedoms,	   social	  welfare,	   and	   ongoing	   PZPR-­‐
Solidarity	  negotiations.137	  Criticism	  became	  open	  and	  grew	  radical;	  for	  instance,	  in	  an	  academic	  
conference	   in	  Poznań	   (July	  1981)	   that	   “would	  have	  been	   impossible	   a	   year	  earlier,”	   historian	  
Klech	  Trzeciakowski	  “won	  the	  biggest	  round	  of	  applause	  when	  he	  proposed	  that	  what	  is	  usually	  
referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  events	  of	  1956’	  be	  termed	  a	  workers’	  ‘uprising,’”	  a	  word	  that	  “has	  an	  almost	  
sacred	   connotation	   [of]	   armed	   attempts	   to	   regain	   Poland’s	   independence.”138	   Party-­‐elite	  
tensions	  grew	  through	  the	  summer,	  until	  Kania’s	  near	  ouster	  at	  the	  June	  Eleventh	  Plenum	  and	  
at	   the	   Extraordinary	   Party	   Congress	   in	   July,	   where	   the	   “most	   democratic	   of	   congresses	  
produced…a	  non-­‐descript	  central	  committee…dominated	  by	  discredited	  apparatchiki.”139	  For	  its	  
part,	  Solidarity	  was	  showing	  signs	  of	  ideological	  disarray,	  a	  result	  of	  its	  contentious	  constituency	  




October	  1981	  Wałęsa	  had	  to	  placate	  General	  Jaruzelski	  and	  vice-­‐premier	  Mieczysław	  Rakowski,	  
as	  military	  and	  party	  rulers	  grew	  more	  concerned	  about	  the	  radical	  potential	  of	  Solidarity’s	  less	  
conciliatory	  members.	  	  
	   An	  effort	  to	  overcome	  internal	  strife	  and	  disputation	  may	  have	  persuaded	  ruling	  elites	  
of	  exactly	  this	  radicalization,	  producing	  what	  many	  in	  the	  state	  and	  the	  union	  alike	  considered	  a	  
brazen	  statement	  of	  purpose	  or	  “program,”	  which	  seemed	  abruptly	  to	  stake	  out	  non-­‐negotiable	  
demands	  and	  principles	  in	  a	  way	  that	  contravened	  Solidarity’s	  usual	  mode	  of	  operation.140	  Like	  
statements	   quoted	   above,	   Solidarity’s	   program	   combined	  material	   and	  moral,	   economic	   and	  
political	  charges.	  In	  a	  sort	  of	  preface,	  it	  declared:	  	  
What	   all	   of	   us	  had	   in	  mind	  were	  not	  only	   living	   conditions,	   although	  we	   lived	  poorly,	  worked	  
hard	  and	  very	  frequently	  in	  vain;	  history	  has	  taught	  us	  that	  there	  is	  no	  bread	  without	  freedom.	  
What	  we	  had	   in	  mind	  were	  not	   only	   bread,	   butter,	   and	   sausage,	   but	   also	   justice,	   democracy,	  
truth,	  legality,	  human	  dignity,	  freedom	  of	  convictions,	  and	  repair	  of	  the	  republic.	  All	  elementary	  
values	  had	  to	  be	  mistreated	  to	  believe	   that	  anything	  could	   improve	  without	   their	   rebirth.	  The	  
economic	  protest	  had	  also	  to	  be	  a	  social	  protest,	  and	  the	  social	  protest	  had	  to	  be	  simultaneously	  
a	  moral	  protest.”	  	  
	  
Subtly	  distinguishing	  the	  roles	  of	  Solidarity	  and	  the	  Church,	  the	  document	  invokes	  “the	  heritage	  
of	  independent	  actions	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  workers,	  intelligentsia,	  and	  youth”	  in	  1956,	  1970,	  and	  
1976;	  “the	  1968	  students’	  rebellion,”	  and	  “the	  efforts…of	  the	  church	  to	  preserve	  the	  values	  and	  
the	  heritage	  of	  all	  struggles	  for	  human	  dignity	  in	  our	  country.”	  The	  declaration	  of	  principles,	  as	  
usual,	  cites	  the	  past	  as	  prologue	  and	  as	  pedigree	  driving	  the	  unification	  of	  Polish	  subjectivity:	  
“Our	  union	   rose	   from	   those	   struggles	   and	  will	   remain	   loyal	   to	   them.	  We	  are	   an	  organization	  
combining	  the	  features	  of	  a	  trade	  union	  and	  a	  great	  social	  movement…	  
Owing	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  powerful	  trade	  union	  organization,	  Polish	  society	  has	  ceased	  to	  
be	   divided,	   disorganized,	   and	   lost;	   while	   uniting	   under	   the	   slogan	   of	   solidarity,	   it	   has	  




rebirth…Solidarity	   unites	   many	   social	   trends	   and	   associates	   people	   adhering	   to	   various	  
ideologies,	  with	  various	  political	  and	  religious	  convictions,	   irrespective	  of	   their	  nationality.	  We	  
have	  united	  in	  protest	  against	  injustice,	  the	  abuses	  of	  power,	  and	  against	  the	  monopolized	  right	  
to	  determine	  and	  express	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  entire	  nation.	  
	  
At	  once	   referencing	   recent	   tribulations	  and	  potential	   trials,	   the	  program	  addresses	   “society,”	  
arrogating	  this	  right	  against	  the	  state:	  “There	  is	  the	  danger	  that	  fatigue	  and	  disappointment	  will	  
eventually	  turn	  into	  a	  blind	  destructive	  force	  or	  submerge	  us	  in	  helplessness.	  As	  a	  society,	  we	  
must	  not	   lose	  hope	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  overcome	   the	   crisis…We	  are	   fully	   aware	   that	  Polish	  
society	  expects	  us	  to	  serve	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  enable	  people	  to	  live	  in	  peace.	  The	  nation	  would	  
not	   forgive	   anyone	   for	   treason	   against	   the	   ideals	   that	   brought	   Solidarity	   into	   existence.	   The	  
nation	  would	  not	  forgive	  anyone’s	  acts,	  even	  motivated	  by	  the	  best	  of	  reasons,	  if	  they	  result	  in	  
bloodshed	  and	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  our	  spiritual	  and	  material	  achievements.”	  Two	  days	  later,	  
on	  18	  October	  1981,	  General	  Jaruzelski	  took	  over	  as	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  PZPR.	  
	   But	   on	   28	   Nov	   1981,	   the	   “Central	   Committee	   of	   the	   PZPR	   passed	   a	   resolution	  
proclaiming	   the	   need	   to	   equip	   the	   government	   with	   emergency	   powers	   to	   counteract	   the	  
threat	  to	  ‘the	  socialist	  state	  and	  public	  order	  and	  security.’”141	  On	  3	  December,	  the	  presidium	  of	  
Solidarity’s	  National	   Commission,	  meeting	   in	   Radom,	   announced	   a	   one-­‐day	   strike	   should	   the	  
Sejm	  grant	   the	  state	  emergency	  powers,	  and	  a	  general	  strike	   if	   the	  state	   implemented	  them.	  
The	  government’s	  chief	  negotiator,	  Rakowski,	  later	  said	  the	  PZPR	  decided	  on	  martial	  law	  “after	  
the	  meeting	   that	   Solidarity	   had	   in	   Radom	  on	  December	   3.	   The	   one	  where	   they	   said,	   behind	  
closed	  doors,	  that	  they	  should	  openly	  ask	  for	  power…Radom	  simply	  scared	  us…They	  had	  gone	  
completely	  crazy.	  On	  November	  28,	  when	  Jaruzelski	  tried	  to	  pass	  an	  Emergency	  Powers	  act	  to	  




laugh.	  They	  said,	  ‘If	  the	  government	  makes	  a	  special	  law	  against	  strikes,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  general	  
strike.’”142	  On	  11	  December,	  Solidarity’s	  National	  Commission	  met	   in	  the	  Gdańsk	  Shipyard	  “to	  
decide	  how	  the	  union	  should	  respond	  to	  the	  government’s	  apparent	  determination	  to	  provoke	  
an	  all-­‐out	  confrontation.”	  Jaruzelski	  gave	  a	  radio	  broadcast	  declaring	  Poland	  “on	  the	  edge	  of	  an	  
abyss”	  and	  a	  “national	  catastrophe,”	  and	  announced	  a	  Military	  Council	  of	  National	  Salvation	  to	  
enforce	  the	  “suspension”	  of	  Solidarity,	  a	  ban	  on	  further	  strikes,	   impose	  curfews,	  and	  exercise	  
the	  state’s	  new	  rights	   to	  detain	  anyone	  on	  “justified	  suspicions”	   that	   they	  endangered	  public	  
wellbeing.143	  	  
	   It	  is	  crucial	  to	  stress	  the	  suffocating	  brutality	  of	  martial	  law	  and	  the	  communist	  effort	  to	  
resist	  Solidarity,	  especially	  given	  my	  argument	  that	  non-­‐violence	  persisted	  because	  experiential	  
evaluations	   of	  worker-­‐citizenship	   sustained	   a	   subjective	   analysis	   of	   enduring	   social	   resources	  
despite	   objective	   political	   and	   social	   dispossession.	   Paczkowski	   describes	   two	   rapid	   stages	   of	  
the	  imposition	  of	  martial	  law	  in	  December	  1981,	  bookended	  by	  long-­‐term	  trends	  begun	  in	  the	  
1970s	  toward	  more	  invasive	  security	  practices.144	  The	  first	  stage	  carried	  out	  	  
	  
a	   large-­‐scale	  police	  and	  military	  operation	   that	  had	  been	  prepared	  with	  astonishing	  precision.	  
More	  than	  70,000	  soldiers	  and	  30,000	  police,	  armed	  with	  1,750	  tanks,	  1,900	  personnel	  carriers,	  
and	   9,000	   trucks	   and	   cars,	   along	   with	   several	   helicopter	   squadrons	   and	   transport	  
aircraft…Forces	  were	   concentrated	   in	   the	  main	   cities	   and	   industrial	   centers.	   Their	   task	  was	   to	  
break	   the	   strikes	   and	   to	  paralyze	   the	  normal	   life	   of	   the	   country	   in	   a	  way	   that	  would	   cow	   the	  
population	   and	   preclude	   any	   response	   by	   Solidarity.	   Telephone	   lines	   were	   cut	   (resulting	   in	  
numerous	   deaths,	   as	   people	   were	   unable	   to	   phone	   for	   ambulances),	   and	   the	   borders	   and	  
gasoline	  stations	  were	  closed.	  A	  strict	  curfew	  and	  comprehensive	  censorship	  were	  enforced.	  	  
	  
“After	   ten	   days,”	   Paczkowski	   writes,	   “the	   strikes	   and	   the	   demonstrations	   came	   to	   an	   end,	  
proving	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  plan.	  Fourteen	  were	  killed,	  and	  several	  hundred	  were	  arrested.	  




prison	  sentences	  of	  three	  to	  five	  years	  (with	  some	  as	  long	  as	  ten	  years).	  All	  the	  accused	  were	  
judged	   in	   special	   military	   courts,	   which	   were	   responsible	   for	   halting	   and	   punishing	   ‘any	  
infraction	  of	  martial	  law.’”	  The	  comprehensive	  assault	  on	  Solidarity	  –	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter,	  comparable	  to	  the	  attack	  against	  the	  Islamists	  in	  Algeria	  –	  directly	  targeted	  Solidarity	  
for	  destruction,	  manifestly	   communicating	   its	   intent,	   in	  word	  and	  deed,	   to	  eliminate	  worker-­‐
citizenship	  and	  hence	  systemic	  subjectivity	  by	  outright	  coercion	  and	  juridical	  procedures.	  	  
	   “The	  second	  stage	  of	   the	  repression	  consisted	  of	   the	   internment	  of	  all	  opposition	  and	  
Solidarity	   militants,”	   launched	   the	   night	   of	   12-­‐13	   December.	   “In	   a	   few	   days,	   by	  means	   of	   a	  
simple	  administrative	  decision,”	  Paczkowski	  says,	  “more	  than	  5,000	  people	  were	   locked	  up	   in	  
forty-­‐nine	   isolation	   centers	   located	   outside	   the	   main	   cities.	   The	   primary	   objectives	   were	   to	  
paralyze	  the	  union	  and	  to	  replace	  the	  leaders	  with	  SB[145]collaborators.”	  Mass	  internment	  over	  
the	  next	  year	  “was	  relatively	  easy	  to	  apply,	  since	  it	  dispensed	  with	  the	  need	  for	  magistrates	  or	  
trials,”	  permitting	  the	  state	  to	  corral	  activists	  into	  huge	  holding	  pens.	  It	  may	  have	  been	  easier	  
for	   Jaruzelski	   than	   managing	   hardliners	   who	   sought	   demonstrative	   death	   sentences	   for	  
Solidarity	  agitators	  and	   supporters.	   “Rather	   than	  crush	   social	   resistance	  by	  Stalinist	  methods,	  
[the	  relative	  moderates	  in	  his	  camp]	  decided	  to	  ‘reduce	  tensions,’”	  Paczkowski	  writes.	  “Despite	  
this	  policy,”	  he	  emphasizes,	  lest	  one	  confuse	  this	  directive	  with	  a	  soft	  version	  of	  martial	  law,	  	  
	  
the	  authorities	  forcefully	  suppressed	  Solidarity’s	  demonstrations	  on	  1	  and	  3	  May	  1982	  (marking	  
the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  1791	  constitution	  and	  hence	  a	  traditional	  festival)	  and	  on	  31	  August	  1982	  
(the	   anniversary	   of	   the	   Gdansk	   agreement	   of	   1980).	   Thousands	   of	   people	   were	   arrested,	  
hundreds	  were	  brought	   to	   trial,	   and	   six	  people	  were	  killed.	   In	   these	  public	   trials,	   some	  of	   the	  
leaders	  of	  the	  Solidarity	  underground	  were	  sentenced	  to	  up	  to	  five	  years’	   imprisonment.	  After	  
the	  internment	  centers	  were	  closed	  in	  December	  1982	  and	  martial	  law	  was	  officially	  lifted	  on	  22	  
July	  1983,...as	  many	  as	  1,000	  political	  prisoners	  [remained]	  incarcerated	  for	  underground	  union	  
activity	  [and]	  printing,	  the	  dissemination	  of	  forbidden	  literature	  and	  books,	  or…just	  for	  taking	  up	  





	   There	   remains	  debate	  about	  why	   the	   state	  declared	  martial	   law.	  As	   I	  have	   suggested,	  
one	  view	  is	  that	  the	  movements	  was	  becoming	  “unruly,”	  “radical,”	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  
two.	  Another	  view	   is	   that	   it	  was	   simply	   too	  active	  as	  a	  brimming,	   roiling	   state-­‐within-­‐a-­‐state,	  
with	  seemingly	  unlimited	  latitude.	  Only	  nine	  months	  earlier,	  for	  instance,	  “in	  March	  1981	  [there	  
had	  been]	  an	  endless	  parade	  of	  political	  meetings,	  mass	  rallies,	  and	  private	  discussion	  groups,	  
dealing	   with	   issues	   as	   diverse	   as…anti-­‐Semitism	   in	   Poland,	   the	   theory	   and	   practice	   of	   union	  
democracy,	  or	  the	  proper	  income	  of	  steelworkers	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  gross	  national	  product.”146	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  are	  indications	  the	  state	  may	  have	  been	  planning	  to	  implement	  a	  state	  
of	  emergency	  throughout	  1981.	  As	  Bujak	  recalled	  in	  an	  underground	  1982	  interview,	  “as	  early	  
as	   the	   end	   of	   1980...wives	   of	   Security	   officers	   [were]	   coming	   to	   regional	   headquarters	   and	  
crying	  on	  my	  shoulder,	  saying,	  ‘They’re	  preparing	  camps	  for	  forty	  or	  fifty	  thousand	  people,	  the	  
authorities	  are	  prepared	  to	  shoot,	  you	  have	  to	  do	  something.’”147	  Along	  this	  line,	  Bauman	  says	  
that	   despite	   the	   proximate	   causes	   –	   Solidarity’s	   increasing	   strength	   and	   audacity	   –	   the	   coup	  
continued	  an	  older	  trend	  toward	  reaffirming	  state	  political	  centralization:	  “Jaruzelski’s	   regime	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  culmination	  of	  a	  long	  and	  (with	  qualifications)	  continuous	  process	  of	  shifting	  
the	   values	  of	  nationhood	  and	   statehood	   into	   the	   centre	  of	   a	   ‘fundamental	   principles’	   cluster	  
and	  of	  a	  correlated	  process	  of	  displacement	  of	  the	  Marxist	  class-­‐focused	  Weltanschauung.”148	  
In	   the	  meantime,	   as	   the	   state	   arrested	  and	   interned	  activists	   throughout	   the	   country,	   as	   the	  
“security	  officers’	  wives”	  foretold,	  and	  as	  Solidarity	  was	  driven	  underground	  and	  eventually	  de-­‐
legalized	  (Oct	  1982),	  a	  double-­‐assault	  had	  stricken	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime.	  Not	  only	  
Solidarity	  was	  decimated	  under	  martial	  law;	  so	  were	  its	  counterparts	  in	  the	  political	  regime.	  In	  




Hughes	  describes,	   “Among	  all	   the	  disintegrating	  elements	  of	   state	  and	  party,	   the	  army	  alone	  
remained	  intact,	  and	  under	  a	  chief	  who	  combined	  machine-­‐like	  efficiency	  with	  devotion	  to	  his	  
concept	  of	  the	  public	  good.”149	  
	   Before	  discussing	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  repressive	  matrix	  on	  Solidarity	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  
strike,	  it	  is	  worth	  pausing	  to	  emphasize	  a	  few	  points	  about	  the	  union’s	  agenda.	  This	  discussion	  
often	  takes	  place	  as	  recognition	  of	  Solidarity’s	  establishment	  of	  “civil	  society”	  for	  the	  first	  time	  
in	  Poland,	   roughly	   the	   irremovable	  experience	  of	  associational	  modes	  of	   self-­‐legislation	  apart	  
from	   state	   domination	   and	   party	   prerogative.	   These	   principles	   of	   grassroots	   innovation	   and	  
autonomous	   subjectivity	  enabled	  Solidarity	   to	   form	   its	  umbrella	  organization	  among	  multiple	  
worker	  and	  non-­‐worker	  constituents.	  As	  Wolicki	  describes	  it,	  “the	  kinship,	  if	  one	  can	  call	  it	  that,	  
between	   the	   strategies	   underlying	   the	   social	   activism	  of	   the	   church,	   of	   Solidarity,	   and	  of	   the	  
political	   opposition	   that	   took	   part	   in	   the	   union,	   irrespective	   of	   communal	   worldviews	   and	  
morals,	   stemmed	   from	   sharing	   one	   fundamental	   characteristic:	   an	   unwillingness	   to	   take	  
political	   power.”150	   Ost	   similarly	   depicts	   the	   “essence	   of	   the	   alternative	   politics	   espoused	   by	  
KOR	  and	  Solidarity”	  as	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  “politics	  is,	  and	  should	  be	  an	  active	  and	  widely	  
accessible	  process	  where	  people	  jointly	  shape	  the	  world	  they	  live	  in.	  It	  is	  about	  communication	  
and	  representation,	  about	  empowering	  citizens	  and	  building	  up	   independent	  civil	   society	  and	  
not	  about	  state	  power	  and	  domination	  over	  others.”	  He	  adds:	  
	  
In	  1980-­‐1981,	  the	  word	  that	  appeared	  in	  all	  discussions	  of	  the	  world	  Solidarity	  wanted	  to	  create	  
was	   podmiotowosc.	   Awkwardly	   translated	   as	   ‘subjectivity,’	   the	   word	   refers	   to	   the	   creative,	  
active	  process	  whereby	  people	  become	  the	  ‘subjects’	  of	  history	  rather	  than	  its	  passive	  ‘objects.’	  
People	  must	  no	  longer	  be	  cogs	  in	  some	  machine,	  ordered	  around	  by	  an	  omniscient	  party…,	  but	  
must	   take	   an	   active,	   creative	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   world	   around	   them,	   thereby	   shaping	  





	   Against	  Ost’s	  view	  that	  Solidarity	  represented	  Polish	  re-­‐subjectivization,	  Przeworski	  says	  
the	  movement	  is	  best	  appreciated	  as	  a	  classic,	  if	  narrow,	  labor	  movement152:	  
	  
The	  Polish	  summer	  of	  1980	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  classic	   struggle	   for	  workers	   for	   the	   right	   to	  
organize	  unions	  independent	  of	  their	  employers.	  Neither	  the	  specifically	  communist	  features	  of	  
the	  Polish	   regime	  nor	   the	  amplitude	  of	  workers’	   demands	  detract	   from	   the	  usefulness	  of	   this	  
analogy.	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   official	   unions,	   Polish	   workers	   did	   not	   have	   the	   right	   to	  
organize	  and	  the	  Gdańsk	  strike	  was	  for	  this	  right.	  And,	  as	  in	  the	  west,	  the	  struggle	  for	  the	  right	  
to	   organize	   had	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   general	   impetus	   toward	   democratization.	   Independent	   unions	  
cannot	   exist	   if	   there	   is	   not	   general	   freedom	   to	   associate,	   if	   censorship	   is	   so	   pervasive	   that	  
members	  cannot	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  through	  mass	  media,	  if	  the	  political	  system	  does	  
not	   contain	   institutions	   where	   the	   workers’	   claims	   could	   be	   presented	   to	   the	   society	   and	  
through	  which	  workers’	  demands	  could	  be	  satisfied	  without	  reverting	  each	  time	  to	  the	  ultimate	  
weapon,	   the	   strike.	   Independent	   unions	   can	   exist	   only	   in	   a	   democratic	   political	   system.	   The	  
struggle	   of	   workers	   for	   the	   right	   to	   organize	   always	   generates	   an	   impetus	   toward	  
democratization	  of	  the	  political	  system	  and	  hence	  poses	  the	  problem	  of	  political	  power...[T]he	  
strike	  against	   a	  party	   that	   claimed	   to	   represent	   them	   turned	  out	   to	  be	   just	   a	   strike	   like	  other	  
strikes	  against	  the	  power	  of	  capital	  and	  the	  state.153	  
	  
But	  if	  we	  see	  in	  the	  overlap	  of	   labor	  activism,	  civil	  society,	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  “democratic	  
political	  system”	  the	  work	  of	  worker-­‐citienship,	  we	  need	  not	  choose	  between	  seeing	  Solidarity	  
as	  either	  a	  civil-­‐societal	  movement	  using	   the	  strike	   tool	  or	  a	   labor	  union	  whose	   intrinsic	   logic	  
demands	  civil	  society.	  Touraine	   identifies	   in	  this	  respect	  Solidarity’s	  broad	  social	  program	  and	  
identity,	  constituting	  a	  diffuse,	  deliberative	  strategy	  comprising	  “three	  levels	  of	  action	  –	  trade-­‐
union,	  democratic,	  and	  national.”154	  Similarly,	  Keenoy	  sees	  Solidarity	  as	  the	  “leading	  edge	  of	  a	  
political	  revolution	  and	  institutional	  expression	  of	  a	  mass	  social	  movement	  [that]	  called	  itself	  a	  
trade	   union.”155	  Motyl	   summarizes	   Solidarity’s	   innovations	   powerfully:	   “[t]otalitarianism…had	  
so	  lost	  the	  capacity	  to	  control	  life	  effectively	  that	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  private	  enterprise	  could	  exist	  
in	  both,	  and	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  Solidarity	  were	  able	   to	   form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  genuine	  civil	  




Solidarity	  had	  usurped	  all	  other	  sovereign-­‐state	  capacities,	  formed	  immovable	  union	  autonomy,	  
or	  secured	  the	  practices	  and	  convictions	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  associational	  cooperation.	  
	   Martial	   law	  had	   justifications	  audible	   in	  discourse	  and	  visible	   in	  policy.	  First,	   Jaruzelski	  
claimed	  to	  have	  defended	  Poland	  and,	  by	  extension,	  Solidarity	  from	  Soviet	  invasion.	  The	  conceit	  
was	  that	  martial	   law	  under	  a	  relatively	  benign	  Polish	  General	  would	  show	  some	  deference	  to	  
recent	  historical	  events,	  whereas	  the	  USSR	  would	  not.	  Solidarity	  had	  to	  be	  saved	  from	  itself,	  in	  
other	  words,	  lest	  its	  ambition,	  indiscipline,	  and	  internal	  struggles	  tempt	  obliteration	  by	  imperial	  
decree.	  Michnik	  agreed	   that	   the	  coup	  had	  “defended	  Poland	  against	  both	   intervention	  and	  a	  
conservative	  putsch	  from	  inside	  the	  party,”	  not	  out	  of	  “high-­‐minded	  patriot[ism	  but	  to	  defend]	  
their	   own	   positions	   and	   power.”157	   Second,	   the	   defense	   of	   the	   ruling	   class	   appeared	   in	   this	  
period	  to	  entail	  reforms	  in	  economic	  management,	  particularly	  selective	  decentralization	  from	  
“central	  planners	   [to]	  workers	   councils	   [in]	   small	   and	  medium	  scale	  enterprises.”158	  Although	  
the	   state	   restored	   large-­‐enterprise	   work	   councils	   to	   government	   ministries,	   workers	   gained	  
some	  strength	  at	  the	  firm	  level.	  Bauman	  notes	  this	  reform	  implied	  a	  precise	  formula:	  political	  
centralization	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  economic-­‐productive	  devolution	  to	  workers	  and	  
firms.	  The	  1982	  economic	  reforms	  allowed	  enterprise	  council	  members,	  elected	  by	  workers,	  to	  
select	   directors,	   vote	   on	   corporate	   strategy,	   and	   participate	   in	   decisions	   about	   firm	  
expenditures.	  Martial	   law	  oversaw	  a	  growth	   in	  the	  private	  sector,	  boosting	  employment	  from	  
271,000	  (5.2%)	  in	  1980	  to	  717,000	  (14.7%)	  by	  1989,	  accompanied	  by	  inflation,	  public	  sector	  job	  
losses,	  higher	  crime	  rates,	  increased	  public	  debt,	  and	  a	  “decline	  in	  fear	  of	  the	  security	  apparatus	  




	   Proto-­‐liberal	  reform	  from	  above	  did	  not,	  however,	  please	  dissidents.	  The	  ban	  on	  strikes	  
yielded	  massive	  demonstrations	  throughout	  the	  martial	  law	  period,	  notably	  on	  1	  May	  in	  1982;	  
1	  and	  3	  May	  1983;	  and	  31	  August	  1982	  and	  1984	  to	  mark	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Gdańsk	  Accord.	  	  
A	  moment	  in	  Church-­‐state	  relations	  is	  revealing,	  as	  well.	  Relatively	  protected,	  although	  critical	  
of	  the	  state	  and	  defending	  the	  rights	  of	  workers,	  the	  Church	  continued	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  
ruling	  party.	  On	  8	  Nov	  1982	  Jaruzelski	  and	  the	  Vatican	  announced	  another	  Papal	  visit,	  although	  
this	  may	  have	  been	  a	  “tactical	  concession…to	  torpedo	  the	  strikes	  and	  demonstrations	  ordered	  
by	   the	   Solidarity	   leaders.”160	   If	   “decisively	   defeated”	   on	   this	   occasion,	   Solidarity	   remained	   in	  
opposition:	  calling	  protests,	  holding	  demonstrations,	  scheduling	  strikes,	  and	  forcing	  the	  state	  to	  
respond.	  Having	  negotiated	  a	   strike	   in	  February	  1981,	   the	  Church	  characteristically	  described	  
itself	  as	  the	  voice	  of	  reason	  that	  could	  adjudicate	  between	  labor	  and	  the	  state,161	  but	  was	  not	  
simply	  collaborating.	  With	  subtle	  tactics,	  the	  Church-­‐labor	  connection	  remained	  central	  “in	  the	  
defense	  of	  society’s	  subjectivity…	  
	  
It	   is	   the	   mainstay	   of	   all	   forms	   of	   public	   life	   (even	   for	   nonbelievers),	   both	   in	   direct	   contacts	  
among	  people	  and	  organizationally.	  What	   is	  more,	  the	  experience	  of	  Solidarity	  has	  proved	  the	  
church’s	  new	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  mass	  labor	  movement	  [and	  activities	  of]	  
the	  most	  creative	  groups	  of	  the	  intelligentsia.162	  
	  	  	  
Having	  seized	  evidently	  absolute	  power,	   the	  state	  thus	  felt	  ongoing	   labor-­‐defined	  pressure	  to	  
make	  institutional	  reforms,	  for	  instance	  to	  its	  dubious	  legal	  apparatus:	  	  
	  
In	   1982,	   as	   a	   concession	   to	   Poland’s	   growing	   democratic	   movement,	   the	   Polish	   1952	  
Constitution	  was	  amended	  to	  establish	  the	  Constitutional	  Tribunal,	  a	  quasi-­‐judicial	  body	  similar	  
to	   existing	   European	   constitutional	   courts,	   albeit	   with	   several	   important	   differences.	   While	  
ostensibly	   created	   to	   control	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   state	   action,	   the	   Tribunal’s	   legislative	  
underpinnings,	   passed	   only	   in	   1985,	   limited	   the	   jurisdiction	   and	   operation	   of	   the	   Tribunal,	  
creating	   only	   the	   illusion	   of	   constitutional	   legality	   and	   failing	   to	   substantially	   modify	   the	  




internal	   efficiency	   of	   the	   communist	   system,	   and	   not	   challenge	   its	   most	   fundamental	  
assumptions.163	  
	  
	   None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  Polish	  dissidents	  were	  optimistic	  or	  assured	  under	  martial	  
law.	  In	  his	  panegyric	  to	  non-­‐violence,	  Kurlansky	  exaggerates	  in	  saying	  that	  all	  dissenting	  Polish	  
“factions	   were	   committed	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   non-­‐violence,	   consciously	   embracing	   Gandhi’s	  
belief	   in	   the	  power	  of	  nonviolent	  non-­‐cooperation	  and	  never	  doubting	  that	   it	  would	  work	   for	  
them.”164	  If	  workers	  and	  other	  dissidents	  remained	  hopeful	  or	  faithful	  in	  emergency	  conditions,	  
they	  did	  so	  against	  their	  doubt.	  As	  Weschler	  reports:	  “In	  December	  1981,	  East	  Central	  Europe	  
was	  still	  in	  the	  thrall	  of	  Brezhnev’s	  neo-­‐Stalinism	  –	  perhaps	  more	  desolately	  so	  than	  at	  any	  time	  
in	  the	  previous	  decade.	  Berlin	  1953,	  Hungary	  1956,	  Czechoslovakia	  1968,	  and	  now	  Poland	  1980-­‐
81	   –	   yet	   again,	   a	   tentative	   hope-­‐swelling	   opening	   had	   suddenly	   been	   closed	   down	   with	   a	  
vengeance.”165	  The	  Polish	  opposition	  was	  not	  celebrating	  in	  this	  time;	  they	  despaired,	  and	  some	  
debated	  violence.166	  In	  1983	  Beylin	  remarked	  bitterly,	  “our	  revolution	  –	  which	  was	  self-­‐limiting	  
not	   only	  with	   regard	   to	   action	   but	   also	   to	   political	   thought	   –	   did	   not	   reshape	   the	   sphere	   of	  
culture	   to	   include	  political	  activities.”167	  He	  claims	   that	  because	  Solidarity,	  now	  underground,	  
had	  become	  desultory,	  some	  dissidents	  had	  begun	  to	  promote	  a	  “dangerous	  type	  of	  thinking”	  
advocating	  an	   imitative,	  non-­‐state	  “totalitarian”	  organization	  that	  could	   infiltrate	   the	  state.168	  
He	  charged	  that	  the	  “language	  of	  universal	  community,	  still	  employed	  today,	  has	  provided	  the	  
mass	  power	  and	  motivation	  for	  resistance	  but	  has	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  differentiate	  those	  to	  
whom	  it	  is	  addressed	  –	  namely,	  society.”	  
	   Yet	  even	  radical	  agitators	  did	  not	  take	  up	  arms.	  Asked	  about	  alternative	  tactics	  to	  non-­‐




their	  long-­‐term	  objectives.	  In	  1982,	  Wlasyslaw	  Frasyniuk	  replied	  that	  immediately	  following	  the	  
state’s	  declaration	  of	   “war,”	   “there	  appeared…a	  paper	  published	  by	  a	  group	  calling	   itself	   the	  
First	   Battalion	   of	   the	  Home	  Army…Other	   fanatics	   tried	   to	   get	   pyrotechnicians,	   chemists,	   and	  
God	  knows	  who	  else	  involved	  in	  the	  Regional	  Committee.	  We	  soon	  dissuaded	  them:	  
	  
Interestingly	   enough,	   it	  was	  mostly	  workers	  who	   initiated	   this	   kind	  of	   activity.	   There	  was	  one	  
group	  of	  about	  eighty	  people,	  all	  of	   them	  from	  the	  same	  factory.	   I	  wrote	  them	  an	  open	   letter	  
explaining	  our	  approach	  and	  they	  dissolved	  the	  group	  themselves.	  Ideas	  of	  this	  kind	  border	  on	  
provocation;	  that’s	  why	  we	  always	  react	  strongly	  to	  any	  attempt	  at	  terrorism…169	  
	  
Also	  in	  hiding,	  Bogdan	  Lis	  replied	  to	  the	  same	  question	  concerning	  violence	  in	  1984:	  
	  
Terrorism	  would	  mean	  the	  end	  of	  Solidarity.	  If	  the	  Communists	  began	  to	  line	  people	  up	  against	  
the	   wall,	   the	  most	   determined	   part	   of	   society	   would	   be	   in	   favor	   of	   fighting	   back	   as	   hard	   as	  
possible.	   But	   our	   job	   is	   to	   prevent	   the	  underground	   from	  deviating	   into	   terrorism.	   Foreigners	  
familiar	  with	   Polish	   history	   are	   sometimes	   surprised	   that,	   given	  our	   tradition	  of	   uprisings	   and	  
our	  love	  of	  armed	  struggle	  (even	  when	  it’s	  doomed	  to	  failure),	  so	  far	  not	  one	  shot	  has	  been	  fired	  
on	  our	  side	  in	  this	  “war”	  with	  the	  junta…Terrorism	  is	  a	  last	  resort	  for	  which	  we	  have	  no	  need	  at	  
the	  moment.	   But	   if	   all	   other	   forms	   of	   resistance	   fail,	   if	   the	   poverty	   and	   repression	   get	  worse,	  
then…	  Today	  the	  lads	  who	  want	  a	  fight	  shave	  the	  heads	  of	  collaborators	  or	  throw	  smoke	  bombs	  
into	   their	  apartments;	   tomorrow	   they	  may	  decide	   to	   thrown	  grenades.	  But	   then	  we’ll	   already	  
have	  an	  uprising	  on	  our	  hands.170	  
	  
That	  a	  Solidarity	  activist	  two	  years	  underground	  during	  martial	   law	  claimed	  that	  violence	  is	  “a	  
last	  resort	  for	  which	  we	  have	  no	  need	  at	  the	  moment”	  suggests	  a	  hidden	  source	  of	  forbearance	  
and	   political	   confidence.	   It	   is	   this	   source	   that	   inspired	   the	   incarcerated	  Michnik,	   in	   1982,	   to	  
characterize	  the	  state	  as	  “a	  colossus	  with	  legs	  of	  steel	  and	  hands	  of	  clay…communism	  with	  its	  
teeth	   knocked	  out.”171	  Along	   similar	   lines,	   Szlajfer	   could,	   also	   in	   the	   first	   year	  of	   the	   state	  of	  
exception,	  shrug:	  	  
	  
[W]hat	  this	  “restoration”	  should	  be	  remains	  unclear	  both	  to	  the	  public	  and	  to	  the	  coup	  plotters.	  




but	   transitional,	  but	  not	   in	   the	   sense	   that	  we	  should	  expect	   society	   to	   resist	   immediately	  and	  
vehemently.	  To	  expect	  this	  would	  be	  excessive	  optimism.	  All	  the	  same,	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  what	  
this	  restoration	  will	  be	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  dictatorship	  alone,	  for	  the	  junta	  does	  not	  [have]	  
total	   control	  either	  over	   the	  economy	   (foreign	   trade	  and	  agriculture	   in	  particular)	  or	  over	   the	  
majority	  of	   Solidarity’s	   social	  base.	   The	   junta’s	  present	   control	  of	   the	  working	   class	   is	  nothing	  
but	  police	  control.172	  
	  
	   In	  1986,	  a	  month	  after	  being	  released	  from	  jail,	  Michnik,	  asked	  if	  “oppositional	  activities	  
in	  Poland	  have	  substantially	  diminished,”	  replied,	  “Can	  you	  show	  me	  just	  one	  other	  Communist	  
country	  where	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  five	  hundred	  clandestine	  publications	  is	  even	  imaginable?	  
Even	   if	   we	   accept…a	   certain	   reduction	   in	   these	   activities	   because	   of	   fatigue	   and	   so	   on,	   the	  
opposition	  remains	  the	  only	  force	  that	  can	  negotiate	  with	  the	  government.”173	  But	  were	  there	  
grounds	   for	   such	   claims?	   Indeed,	   throughout	   martial	   law	   the	   state	   was	   never	   free	   from	  
Solidarity	  –	  strikes,	  demonstrations,	  commemorations,	  the	  underground,	  and	  ongoing	  support	  
among	  intellectuals,	  the	  Church,	  professionals,	  and	  even	  the	  youth.	  But,	  more	  simply,	  the	  state	  
could	  ban	  strikes,	  ineffectually,	  but	  the	  PZPR	  could	  hardly	  ban	  work,	  workers,	  or	  their	  potential	  
to	  stop	  working.	  So	  labor’s	  pressure	  on	  the	  state	  persisted.	  In	  1988,	  again,	  “the	  party	  was	  faced	  
by	   the	   most	   serious	   conflicts	   since	   1980…In	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   prospect	   of	   a	   successful	  
breakthrough,	   discontent	   was	   expressed	   in	   strikes	   that	   became	   increasingly	   politicized.”174	  
	   After	   generations	  of	   compelling	   state	   reforms	  by	  withholding	   its	   contribution	   to	   state	  
revenues,	  it	  seems	  apposite	  that	  “social	  pressure	  (strikes)	  and	  the	  opposition’s	  refusal	  to	  accept	  
[selective	  cooptation]	  led	  to	  the	  Roundtable	  Talks.	  At	  that	  moment,	  the	  first	  structural	  breaches	  
in	  the	  authoritarian	  system	  appeared.”175	  In	  May	  1988	  strikes	  erupted	  in	  Gdańsk	  and	  the	  Nowa	  
Huta	   Lenin	   steel	   mill	   near	   Krakow,	   followed	   by	   “a	   wave	   of	   strikes	   in	   a	   great	   number	   of	  




worked	  in	  1980-­‐1981,	  and	  probably	  had	  no	  special	  loyalty	  to	  Solidarity	  itself.	  Over	  the	  duration	  
of	  communist	  rule,	  the	  continuity	  seems	  to	  belong	  not	  to	  Solidarity	  as	  much	  as	  to	  the	  strike.	  To	  
quote	  another	  prison	  letter	  of	  Michnik:	  	  
	  
Let	  us	  repeat:	  Solidarity	  never	  demanded	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  communists	  from	  power	  or	  control	  
by	   the	   union	   of	   the	   ship	   of	   state,	   [although]	   the	   ruling	   apparatchiks	   interpreted	   Solidarity’s	  
declarations	   this	  way.	   They	  perceived	   in	   the	  union	  a	   grassroots	  movement	   for	  expelling	  party	  
committees	   from	  the	   factories;	   they	  were	  haunted	  by	   the	  specter	  of	  elections	   to	   the	  people’s	  
councils;	   they	   had	   nightmares	   about	   the	   national	   referendum	   on	   the	   form	   of	   self-­‐
government…In	  the	  course	  of	  events,	  however,	  it	  became	  obvious	  that	  the	  authorities	  perceived	  
the	   union’s	   willingness	   to	   compromise	   as	   weakness.	   All	   concessions	   had	   to	   be	   extracted	   by	  
strikes	  or	  threats	  of	  strikes.177	  
	  
§4.c	   Theory	  and	  evidence	  
	   Responding	  to	  the	  puzzling	  divergence	  of	  opposition	  responses	  to	  martial	  law	  in	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria,	  I	  hypothesized	  in	  the	  preface	  that	  institutions	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  determine	  the	  
incentives	  for	  non-­‐violent	  and	  violent	  strategies,	  respectively.	  I	  argued	  that	  every	  state	  provides	  
a	  predominant	  mode	  of	  state-­‐citizen	  interaction,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  and	  built	  
upon	  reliable	  means	  of	  communication	  and	  compulsion	  called	  social	  resources.	  Operating	  often	  
beneath	   the	  mechanisms	  of	   the	   formal	   regime-­‐type,	   social	   resources	  and	   citizenship	   regimes	  
constitute	  systemic	  subjects	  –	  they	  situate	  effective	  agency	  in	  the	  representative	  and	  repressive	  
channels	  that	  define	  the	  regime.	  Finally,	  in	  forming	  citizenship	  regimes,	  social	  resources	  vary	  in	  
the	  social	  relations,	  political	  spaces,	  and	  regime	  status	  they	  generate.	  For	  example,	  citizens	  who	  
confront	  the	  state	  principally	  as	  workers	  politicized	  in	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  facilities	  tend	  
to	  have	  horizontal	  and	  cooperative	  relationships;	  compartmentalized	  physical	  spaces	  of	  mutual	  
recognition;	  and	  differentiated,	  thus	  enduring,	  means	  of	  challenging	  ruling	  classes.	  In	  contrast,	  




ties;	  seamless	  and	  unprotected	  political	  spaces;	  and	  undifferentiated,	  thus	  perishable,	  means	  of	  
opposing	  insolvent,	  coercive	  states.	  	  
	   My	  explanation	  for	  Solidarity’s	  non-­‐violence	  under	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law	  seized	  on	  
this	   last	  variable	  –	  differentiation	  or	  autonomy	  of	   the	  social	   resource	   from	  state	  policies	  –	   to	  
argue	  that	  the	  endurance	  of	  the	  strike	  option	  to	  compel	  state	  reforms	  sustained	  systemic	  Polish	  
subjectivity	  and	  obviated	  anti-­‐systemic	  violence.	  The	  history	  above	  of	  Polish	  social	  movements	  
and	   labor	  activism,	  culminating	   in	   the	  unionization	  of	  Solidarity,	   supports	   the	  hypothesis	   that	  
worker-­‐citizenship	  rooted	  in	  the	  social	  resource	  of	  labor	  power	  and	  strikes	  encouraged	  the	  non-­‐
violent	  response	  to	  martial	   law.	  This	  section	  will	  analyze	  the	  plausibility	  of	  this	  explanation	  by	  
working	  the	  model	  back	  through	  the	  historical	  narrative,	  or	  revisit	  the	  history	  more	  explicitly	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  model.	  I	  will	  ask	  if	  Solidarity’s	  ascendance	  corroborates,	  qualifies,	  or	  challenges	  my	  
account	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  causal	  pathway	  from	  citizenship	  regime	  to	  opposition	  strategies.	  
A	  good	  test	  of	  my	  model	  adduces	  evidence	  from	  different	  stages	  in	  the	  actions	  and	  discourses	  
of	  Polish	  dissidents,	   focused	  on	   the	  pivotal	  moments	  of	   state-­‐citizen	  dialectics	   in	  1956,	  1968,	  
1970,	   1976,	   1980,	   and	   1981,	   before	   and	   during	  martial	   law.	   In	   addition	   to	   interrogating	  my	  
specific	  explanation	  of	  non-­‐violence,	   this	  assessment	  will	   inform	  my	  supplemental	   theoretical	  
questions	  about	  subjects	  and	  objects	  of	  violence	  and	  experiential	  or	   immediate	  evaluations.	   I	  
will	  take	  these	  propositions	  in	  ascending	  order	  of	  theoretical	  abstraction.	  
	   Beginning	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  on	  subject-­‐formation	  that	  I	  consider	  
secondary	  explanatory	  variations,	   Solidarity	  emerged	  as	  a	  horizontal,	   cooperative	  mass	   social	  
movement	  operating	  in	  the	  demarcated	  political	  space	  of	  the	  factory.	  Taking	  these	  in	  turn,	  we	  




to	  Solidarity,	  establishing,	  I	  think,	  that	  worker-­‐citizenship	  fostered	  a	  horizontal	  and	  cooperative	  
social	  subjectivity	  among	  and	  beyond	  workers	  themselves.	  Most	  obviously,	  workers	  responded	  
together	  across	  sectors,	   regions,	   skills,	  professions,	  and	   intra-­‐working-­‐class	  disparities	  despite	  
the	   state’s	   repeated	   attempts	   to	   divide	   them	   along	   just	   these	   lines	   with	   policies	   exploiting	  
potential	  structural	  tensions	  or	  rivalries.	  In	  1956,	  1970,	  1976,	  and	  1980	  workers	  reacted	  as	  one	  
to	   the	   government’s	  manipulations,	   recalcitrance,	   or	   brutality.	   Although	   Poland’s	   communist	  
command	  economy	  could	  be	  described	  as	  an	  organic	  machine	  or	  homeostatic	   system,	   it	  was	  
composed	   of	   discrete	   sub-­‐systems	   that	   could	   be	   expected	   to	   compete	   for	   scarce	   material	  
resources,	  real	  or	  artificially	  imposed	  under	  soft-­‐budget	  constraints.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  especially	  
in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  new	  corporatist	  state	  strategy	  adopted	  to	  protect	  Gierek’s	  
indebted	   development	   scheme,	  made	   just	   this	   concerted	   effort	   to	   break	   the	  workforce	   into	  
interest	  group	  constituencies.	   Its	   failure	  reflected	  the	  horizontal,	  cooperative,	  egalitarian,	  and	  
normative	  social	  commitments	  that	  bound	  workers	  tightly	  in	  solidarity	  strikes,	  allied	  walkouts,	  
immediate	   cross-­‐factory	   mobilizations,	   emotional	   and	   practical	   expressions	   of	   sympathy	   for	  
working-­‐class	  strangers,178	  and	  resolute	  demands	  for	  memorials	  to	  fallen	  comrades.179	  	  	  
	   The	  Polish	  working	  class	  also	  enjoyed	  a	  unique	  capacity	  to	  represent	  all	  Poles,	  notably	  in	  
opposing	  the	  state’s	  relentless	  effort	  to	  raise	  food	  prices,	  lower	  real	  wages,	  and	  remove	  other	  
subsidies.	  Precisely	  because	  Solidarity	  was	  a	  working	   class	  uprising	   to	  discredit	   the	   “worker’s	  
state	  and	  party,”	   it	   is	  easy	   to	  overlook	   the	  extension	  beyond	   the	  working	  class	  of	   its	  actions,	  
grievances,	  and	  decisions.	   In	  my	  argument,	   it	   is	  crucial	  evidence	  of	  the	  predominant	  mode	  of	  
integration	  and	  effective	  citizenship	  to	  see	  which	  movement	  becomes	  the	  magnet	  to	  the	  metal	  




Poland	   identifying	  over	   time	   through	   trial-­‐and-­‐error	   the	  optimal	   route	   for	   their	   claim	  making	  
demonstrates	  the	  efficacy	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship	  for	  all	  Poles.	  In	  other	  words,	  Poland’s	  narrative	  
instantiates	  a	  key	  variation	  across	  citizenship	  regimes,	   the	  capacity	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  to	  
include	  people	  outside	  its	  specific	  constituency	  (here,	  workers)	  without	  demanding	  as	  the	  cost	  
of	  inclusion	  sacrifice	  of	  outsiders’	  initial	  claims,	  identities,	  or	  desires.	  As	  I	  have	  discussed,	  in	  the	  
contrast-­‐case	   of	   Algeria,	   Islamists	   attracted	   and	   galvanized	   instrumental	   support	   against	   the	  
state	  among	  non-­‐Islamists,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  their	  secular	  commitments	  due	  to	  the	  vertical	  and	  
competitive	   design	   of	   client-­‐citizenship.	   In	   Poland,	   Solidarity,	   the	   fulcrum	   of	   political	   dissent	  
beyond	  workers,	  gathered	  into	  its	  unionization	  drive	  other	  non-­‐state	  groups	  who	  stood	  to	  gain	  
from	  its	  victory:	  the	  Church,	  intellectuals	  including	  students,	  professionals,	  and	  individuals.	  	  
	   Put	  another	  way,	  in	  fighting	  the	  corruption	  or	  stagnation	  manifest	  in	  economic	  poverty,	  
the	  campaign	  of	  labor,	  particularly	  besieged	  among	  Poles,	  constituted	  an	  address-­‐to-­‐and-­‐by-­‐all:	  
when	  workers	   took	   to	   the	   streets,	  went	  out	  on	   strike,	   held	   a	   stoppage,	  or	   enumerated	   their	  
demands,	  they	  expressed	  grievances	  shared	  beyond	  their	  ranks.	  Changes	  achieved	  by	  workers	  
improved	  the	  welfare	  and	  prospects	  of	  professionals,	   intellectuals,	  and	  Catholic	  clergy,	  as	  the	  
governing	   demands	   of	   these	   other	   citizens	  would	  not	   redound	   to	  workers.	   The	   fundamental	  
grievances	   and	   demands	   of	   these	   groups	   were	   relatively	   discrete	   or	   specific,	   although	   this	  
distinction	  must	   be	  made	   cautiously.	   Intellectual,	   religious,	   or	   professional	   demands	   for	   free	  
expression,	   devotional	   privileges,	   or	   public	   investment	   could	  be	   said	   to	   benefit	   all	   Poles.	   But	  
there	  are	  two	  caveats	  to	  this	  apparent	  symmetry.	  This	  reciprocity	  relied	  on	  the	  dispensation	  of	  
these	   discrete	   claims	   –	   for	   instance,	   what	   play	   was	   being	   restored	   or	   publication	   revived	   –	  




for	  state	  protection.	  This	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  different	  sub-­‐populations	  to	  defend	  one	  
another’s	   interests	  partly	  explains	  the	  alienation	  or	  hostility	  between	  workers	  and	  students	  in	  
1968	  and	  1970,	  but	  also	  why	  it	  was	  resolved	  in	  favor	  of	  intellectual	  support	  of	  the	  working	  class	  
movement	   and	   not	   vice-­‐versa	   –	   to	   the	   point	   where	   KOR	   dissolved	   once	   Solidarity	   formed	   a	  
successful	  union	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1980.	  Despite	  the	  state’s	  discretionary	  wage	  adjustments	  to	  derail	  
labor	  unity	  or	  discredit	  organized	  workers,	  protests	  and	  strikes	  yielded	   increased	   real	   income	  
and	  removed	  governing	  personnel,	  necessarily	  benefitting	  all	  Poles	   in	  contrast	  to	  comparable,	  
group-­‐specific	  dissident	  accomplishments.	  This	  asymmetry	  becomes	  clearer	  if	  we	  stay	  focused	  
on	   the	   means	   that	   define	   citizenship	   regimes,	   adhering	   to	   the	   model.	   The	   question	   is	   not	  
whether	   non-­‐workers’	   demands	   could	   help	   workers	   as	   unionization	   benefits	   non-­‐workers;	  
under	  any	  regime	  ends	  often	  overlap	  different	  group	  interests,	  starting	  with	  the	  desire	  not	  to	  
be	  arrested	  arbitrarily.	  The	  citizenship	   regime,	   though,	   concerns	  means	   and	   the	  subjectivities	  
formed	   in	   their	   rehearsed	   deployment.	   Worker-­‐citizenship	   formed	   a	   horizontal,	   cooperative	  
Polish	   subject	   transcending	   the	   largest	   social	   movement	   in	   modern	   history	   –	   ten	   million	  
members	  of	  the	  Solidarity	  union	  –	  to	  integrate	  the	  citizenry	  as	  a	  whole	  against	  the	  state,	  with	  
the	  power	  to	  overwhelm	  crass	  appeals	  to	  anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  to	  attract	  PZPR	  defectors.	  	  	  	  
	   The	  second	  variation	  in	  citizenship	  regimes	  is	  the	  creation	  and	  effect	  of	  political	  space,	  
“constructed	   spatial	  worlds,	  which	  are	  necessarily	  distinctive	  as	   to	   time	  and	   location,	   [where	  
agents]	   experience,	   interpret,	   and	   fight	   about	   the	   social	   order.”180	   The	   worker-­‐citizenship	  
regime	  in	  Poland	  constructed	  massive	  labor-­‐intensive	  production	  sites	  for	  the	  most	  part	  in	  and	  
around	  rapidly	  populated	  city	  centers.	   I	  have	  suggested	   in	  the	  model	   that	  this	  collectivization	  




derived	  from	  their	  indispensable	  contribution	  to	  state	  revenues	  and	  social	  stability,	  also	  turned	  
what	  was	  initially	  a	  sort	  of	  cage	  into	  a	  defensive	  fortress.	  Here	  I	  would	  draw	  out	  of	  the	  historical	  
narrative	  a	  trajectory	  parallel	  to	  the	  experiential	  pedagogy	  of	  social	  ties.	  There,	  various	  strands	  
of	   Polish	   dissident	   life	   converged	   on	   a	   sophisticated	  method	   and	   perspicuous	  message	   over	  
time;	  here	  that	  process	  had	   its	  counterpart	   in	  the	  gradual	  appropriation	  of	  the	  factory	  as	  the	  
effective	  property	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  In	  the	  state-­‐worker	  dialectic	  the	  factory	  came	  to	  be	  ever	  
more	  the	  spatial	  expression	  of	  the	  workers’	  increasing	  discipline	  and	  self-­‐rule	  as	  they	  honed	  the	  
use	  of	  their	  work-­‐based	  social	  resources.	  The	  production	  site	  became	  one	  of	  those	  resources,	  as	  
workers	   physically	   relocated	   from	   the	   street	   to	   the	   factory.	   In	   1956	   and	   1970,	   we	   saw,	   the	  
workers	   voiced	   their	   grievances	   by	   leaving	   the	   factories	   for	   the	   streets,	   as	   if	   deferring	   to	   an	  
inculcated	  sense	  of	  moving	  from	  a	  private	  or	  specific	  to	  a	  public	  or	  general	  space.	  In	  the	  midst	  
of	  the	  1970	  uprising,	  Laba	  suggests,	  an	  innovative	  working-­‐class	  consciousness	  developed	  that	  
revalued	  this	  polarity	  by	  converting	  the	  factory	   into	  a	  public	  space,	  a	  staging	  ground	  ideal	   for	  
asserting	   workers’	   rights	   to	   organize	   inter-­‐factory	   unions.	   It	   seems,	   then,	   that	   the	   workers’	  
appropriation	  of	  this	  delineated,	  visible,	  unmovable,	  and	  indispensable	  physical	  space	  assisted	  
in	  the	  subject	  formation	  of	  worker-­‐citizens.	  	  
	   The	   labor-­‐intensive	  production	   site	   is	  one	   locus	   in	   the	  Marxian	   image	  of	   a	  movement	  
toward	  workers’	  “consciousness”	  of	  themselves	  as	  historical	  subjects	  and	  not	  objects.	  The	  core	  
mechanism	  here	  seems	  to	  be	  physical,	  discursive,	  and	  visible	  space	  as	  the	  necessary	  condition	  
of	   class	   identity	   “for”	   rather	   than	   “in”	   itself.	   The	   concentration	   and	   proximity	   of	   potentially	  
divided	  or	  competitive	  workers	  in	  a	  physical	  location	  allows	  them	  to	  invert	  any	  mutual	  hostility,	  




place	  of	  work	  is	  also	  a	  pedagogical	  site	  that	  teaches	  each	  worker	  her	  relationship	  to	  others	  in	  
an	  overall	  mode	  of	  production	  and	   its	  social	  relations.	  The	  massive,	  diverse,	  and	  diffuse	  work	  
sites	   in	   Poland	   confirm	   an	   aspect	   of	   this	   depiction,	   though	   not	   by	   associating	   class	  
“consciousness”	  with	   a	   veridical	   grasp	   of	   “true”	   social	   reality.	   Rather,	  against	  mapping	   class	  
over	   a	   specific,	   totalizing,	   or	   abstract	   form	   of	   self-­‐awareness,	   Polish	   workers	   appear	   in	   this	  
study	   as	   “formed	   groups,	   sharing	   dispositions.	   Such	   cognitive	   constructs	   map	   the	   terrain	   of	  
lived	  experience	  and	  define	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  probable	  and	  improbable.”181	  It	  seems	  
the	  evolving	   claim	   to	   speak	   from,	   gather	   in,	   and	   take	  over,	   i.e.,	   effectively	  own	   the	   factories	  
evinces	  Katznelson’s	   focus	  on	  dispositions	   formed	   in	   specific	   situations	  and	   lived	  experiences	  
where	   calculations	   of	   political	   probability	   included,	   in	   this	   case,	   spaces	   of	   dissident	   worker	  
organization.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Gdańsk	  negotiations	  in	  1980,	  we	  find	  workers	  in	  their	  factories,	  
reconceived	  as	  defensive	  fortresses	  expressing	  a	  state-­‐within-­‐a-­‐state,	  or	  what	  Tilly	  would	  call	  a	  
distinct	  sovereignty.	  	  
	   As	  I	  have	  said	  in	  the	  theory	  and	  model,	  citizenship	  regimes	  are	  two-­‐way	  streets	  whose	  
social	  resources	  permit	  reciprocal	  modes	  of	  communication	  and	  coercion	  –	  here	  the	  principle	  is	  
captured	  in	  the	  duality	  of	  the	  plant	  as	  prison	  and	  refuge.	  In	  1980,	  with	  a	  symbolism	  perhaps	  lost	  
on	  priest	  and	  party	  member	  alike,	  Solidarity	  fulfilled	  the	  teleology	   installed	   in	  1970.	   It	  grew	  a	  
practically	  independent,	  non-­‐violent	  government	  from	  chaotic	  street	  demonstrations;	  vengeful	  
attacks	  on	  police	  stations,	  party	  headquarters,	  and	  jails;	  massacres	  and	  mass	  casualties;	  and	  the	  
cycle	  of	  protest	  and	  short-­‐term	  policy	  fix.	  From	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  the	  factory	  and	  shipyard,	  
union	   organizers	   counseled	   civilians,	   collected	   and	   distributed	   dues,	   circulated	   information,	  




The	  political	  space	  of	  the	  factory,	  then,	  encapsulates	  the	  dialectics	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  –	  
the	  state	  provided	  a	  social	  resource	  partially	  constituting	  Poles	  as	  worker-­‐citizens	  whose	  agency	  
was	  confined	  and	  enabled	  through	  the	  political	  space	  of	  production	  sites.	  The	  workplace	  was,	  
then,	  a	  key	  component	  in	  the	  social	  resource	  that	  constituted	  worker-­‐citizenship,	  permitting	  a	  
stronghold	  for	  dissidents	  to	  couple	  their	  labor	  power	  with	  secure	  physical	  means	  to	  symbolize	  
and	  enact	  ruling	  elites’	  dependency	  on	  the	  working	  class.	  	  	  
	   These	  discussions	  of	  horizontal,	  cooperative	  social	  ties	  and	  segmented,	  ambivalent,	  and	  
converted	  politicized	  spaces	  illustrate	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  model	  and	  the	  movements	  across	  its	  
causal	  pathway.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  forming	  an	  authoritarian,	  communist	  politics	  of	  production	  
based	  on	  a	  large	  working	  class	  concentrated	  in	  labor-­‐intensive	  workplaces	  constituted	  Poles	  as	  
the	  subjects	  of	  a	  worker-­‐citizen	  regime.	  Visible	  trajectories	  in	  the	  use	  and	  refinement	  of	  worker	  
fidelity	  and	  physical	  contiguity	  reveal	  the	  working	  out	  of	  this	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  as	  described	  
in	  the	  theory	  chapter	  outlining	  the	  explanatory	  model.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  variations	  in	  
the	  citizenship	  regime	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  secondary	  impact	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  as	  we	  see	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  Poland,	  and	  in	  the	  comparison	  with	  Algeria.	  Specifically,	  I	  have	  proposed,	  based	  
on	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  histories,	  that	  social	  ties	  and	  political	  spaces	  matter	  but	  cannot	  
be	  attributed	  primary	  causal	  or	  determining	  effect	  on	  opposition	  strategies.	  I	  suspect	  that	  this	  
case	  study	  clarifies	  this	  distinction.	  	  
	   My	  argument,	  again,	  is	  that	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  subjectivity	  as	  provided	  and	  practiced	  in	  
the	  citizenship	  regime	  –	  here	  among	  worker-­‐citizens	  –	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  turn	  to	  violence	  
because	  effectively	   expelled	  non-­‐citizens	  will	   reclaim	   their	  willful	   subjectivity	   by	   forcing	   it	   on	  




thesis	  as	  it	  minimally	  associates	  the	  turn	  to	  violence	  with	  conditions	  approaching	  objectification	  
in	  an	  inescapably	  dominant	  social	  order.	  That	  is,	  we	  could	  infer	  from	  Poland’s	  history	  that	  social	  
ties	   guaranteeing	   solidarity	   or	   solace	   among	   fellow	   workers	   in	   political	   spaces	   supporting	   a	  
mini-­‐state	  with	  active	  mini-­‐citizens	  would	  offset	  the	  experience	  of	  objectification.	  This	  emerges	  
from	  the	  case	  study,	  that	  the	  worker-­‐citizenship	  regime’s	  social	  and	  spatial	  provisions	  defrayed	  
the	  sense	  of	  desolation	  and	  vulnerability	  under	  extreme	  duress	  that	  otherwise	  would	  enforce	  a	  
reified	  social	  condition;	  and	  that	  relationships	  and	  spaces	  characterize	  the	  social	   resources	  of	  
citizen-­‐subjectivity.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  horizontal	  social	  ties	  or	  relatively	  secure	  political	  
spaces,	  while	  they	  palliate	  social	  suffering,	  would	  favor	  non-­‐violence	  over	  violence,	  particularly	  
when	   those	   ties	  and	  spaces	  have	  been	  decimated	  under	  martial	   law.	   Indeed,	   the	  violation	  of	  
these	   aspects	   of	  worker-­‐citizenship,	   their	   violent	   usurpation,	  would	   seem	   to	   destroy	   at	   least	  
these	  secure	  resources	  of	  the	  regime,	  exacerbating	  the	  experience	  of	  internal	  expulsion.	  
	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  social	  and	  spatial	  elements	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship,	  and	  
thus	  of	  significant	  practical	  components	  of	  Poles’	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  sharpens	  the	  puzzle	  and	  
commends	  the	  final	  variation	  in	  the	  regime:	  its	  enduring	  status	  under	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  the	  state	  
of	  exception.	  Again	  the	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  citizenship	  regimes	  differ	  on	  a	  third	  aspect	  of	  the	  
social	  resources	  that	  constitute	  subjects	  and	  subjectivities.	  Citizens	  are	  incorporated	  as	  subjects	  
of	  ruling	  elites’	  formal	  political	  organizations	  and	  informal	  social	  networks	  whose	  least	  common	  
denominator	  is	  to	  create	  a	  relatively	  systematic	  distribution	  of	  materials	  goods.	  Citizens	  are,	  on	  
this	  register,	  always	  formed	  in	  regimes	  primarily	  defined	  by	  material	  exchanges	  between	  state	  
and	  citizen.	  As	  I	  said	  in	  presenting	  the	  explanatory	  model,	  worker-­‐citizens	  and	  client-­‐citizens	  are	  




patrons	  accrue	  state	  revenues	  with	  which	  they	  recruit	  clients.	  In	  my	  model	  and	  cases,	  there	  is	  
no	  citizenship	  regime	  without	  a	  material	  exchange;	   in	  turn,	   the	  social	   resource	  –	  the	  strike	   in	  
Poland	  –	  is	  constituted	  on	  this	  material	  exchange,	  acts	  through	  it,	  and	  depends	  on	  it.	  Workers’	  
very	   ability	   to	   mobilize	   the	   social	   resource	   requires	   that	   the	   material	   substance	   of	   worker-­‐
citizenship	  be	  in	  place.	  This	  is	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  that	  effective	  citizenship	  depends	  on	  state	  
provision	   of	   a	   weapon	   or	   tool	   to	   use	   against	   the	   state;	   for	   the	   strike	   resource	   to	   secure	   of	  
worker-­‐citizenship,	  withdrawal	  of	   labor	  power	  –	   i.e.,	  self-­‐removal	   from	  the	  material	  exchange	  
that	  grounds	  the	  regime	  –	  must	  materially	  affect	  the	  state.	  It	  is	  there	  that	  the	  material	  structure	  
the	  citizenship	  regime	  differs	  with	  primary	  causal	  effect	  on	  the	  outcomes.	  
	   Much	  as	  these	  regimes	  diverge	  in	  social	  and	  spatial	  pedagogies,	  patterns,	  and	  practices,	  
they	  vary	  in	  the	  status	  or	  endurance	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  when	  this	  material	  interaction	  at	  
its	  base	  erodes.	  As	  I	  have	  suggested,	  variations	  in	  a	  citizenship	  regime’s	  features	  –	  type,	  space,	  
and	  duration	  of	   its	  subjects	  –	  occupy	  qualitatively	  distinct	  positions	   in	  the	  formation	  of	   those	  
regimes.	  The	  material	  exchange	  is	  the	  founding	  dynamic	  and	  the	  social	  ties	  and	  political	  spaces	  
are	  its	  derivatives,	  which	  we	  can	  see	  more	  clearly	   in	  relationship	  to	  the	  strike	  as	  the	  resource	  
that	  essentially	  structures	  worker-­‐subjectivity.	  Citizens	  become	  subjects	  as	  workers	  through	  the	  
strike,	  the	  indispensable	  tool	  they	  can	  use	  to	  threaten	  incumbents.	  They	  cannot	  use	  horizontal	  
social	  ties	  or	  political	  spaces	  directly	  as	  weapons	  against	  ruling	  classes	  or	  bureaucracies.	  Rather,	  
the	  social	  and	  spatial	  specificities	  of	  workers’	  actions	  and	  plans	  serve	  or	  qualify	  the	  strike	  option	  
and,	  in	  that	  sense,	  contribute	  to	  its	  deployment,	  if	  dependently.	  Without	  the	  power	  of	  strikes,	  
walkouts,	  and	  sit-­‐ins	  to	  force	  communist	  apparatchiks	  to	  pay	  attention	  and	  withdraw	  reforms,	  




would	  not	  have	  afforded	  workers	  power	  against	  the	  state.	  Thus,	  worker-­‐subjectivity	  was	  built	  in	  
Poland	  as	  a	  system	  of	   labor,	  compensation,	  and	  remuneration,	   from	  which	  derive	  patterns	  of	  
relationships	   and	   spaces	   of	   activity.	   The	   chains	   of	   dependency	   run	   from	   the	  material	   to	   the	  
social	  and	  spatial	  relations	  (to	  oversimplify	  for	  expository	  purposes).	  Variation	  in	  the	  status	  or	  
endurance	  of	  this	  material	  exchange,	  then,	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  sustenance	  of	  worker-­‐citizenship.	  
	   Citizenship	   regimes	  have	  differentiated	  or	   undifferentiated	  material	   foundations;	   they	  
are	  either	  autonomous	  from	  or	  parasitic	  on	  state	  solvency.	  The	  strike	  option	  in	  Poland	  did	  not	  
rely	  for	  its	  existence	  and	  operability	  on	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  state	  finances,	  to	  put	  it	  simply.	  The	  test	  
for	  this	  is	  both	  logical	  and	  empirical.	  The	  capacity	  to	  cripple	  an	  employer,	  whether	  corporate	  or	  
statist,	  does	  not	  routinely	  decline	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  corporate	  or	  state	  revenues.	  Indeed,	  a	  fiscal	  
crisis	  that	  weakens	  the	  business	  or	  government	  may	  enhance	  labor’s	  leverage	  against	  owners’	  
prerogative.	  Throughout	  the	  history	  reviewed,	  we	  have	  seen	  precisely	  this	  pattern,	  in	  which	  the	  
state	   justifies	  price	  hikes	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	   imminent	   insolvency	  and	  Polish	  workers	   resisted	  
with	  only	   increasingly	   sophisticated	  strikes	  and	  walkouts	   (1956,	  1970,	  1976,	  and	  1980).	  Thus,	  
differentiated	   citizenship	   regimes	   retain	   even	   in	   hard	   times	   the	   “contract”	   binding	   state	   and	  
non-­‐state	  agencies	  in	  the	  material	  exchange	  that	  produces	  the	  social	  resources	  that	  constitute	  
systemic	  subjectivity.	  Fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law	  under	  a	  differentiated	  regime	  leave	  intact	  the	  
social	   resources	   of	   worker-­‐citizenship;	   however	   critical	   the	  macro-­‐economic	   picture	   or	   state	  
brutality,	   they	   do	   not	   annul	   the	   power	   of	   strikes	   and	   cannot	   exert	   complete	   or	   unmediated	  
sovereignty	  over	  workers.	  To	  test	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  worker-­‐citizenship	  regime	  is	  differentiated,	  
affording	  Polish	  workers	  enduring	  resources	  under	  state	  crisis	  and	  aggression,	  we	  explore	  the	  




worker	  actions.	  We	  examine,	  then,	  the	  continuity	  before	  and	  under	  martial	   law	  of	  the	  state’s	  
repeatedly	  capitulating	  to	  worker	  demands,	  albeit	  as	  the	  means	  necessary	  to	  retain	  power	  and	  
stabilize	  the	  economy.	  We	  ask	  whether	  the	  ruling	  class	  still	  acted	  on	  or	  carried	  out	  the	  stated	  
demands	   of	   Solidarity,	   despite	   banning	   the	   party	   and	   its	   activities.	   As	  we	   have	   seen,	   absent	  
Solidarity	   and	   strikes,	   both	   outlawed	   under	  martial	   law,	   communist	   elites	   felt	   unimpeded	   in	  
raising	  prices	  drastically	  while	   implementing	  watered-­‐down	  versions	  of	  previous	   independent	  
union	  demands,	  such	  as	  a	  role	  in	  management	  decisions	  in	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  firms.	  	  	  	  
	   The	  latter	  comments	  might	  suggest	  that	  differentiation	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  from	  the	  
fiscal	  condition	  of	  the	  state	  is	  a	  semantic	  or	  academic	  exercise,	  but	  here	  my	  explanation	  turns	  
on	   the	   conviction	   that	   citizens	   respond	   to	   state	   actions	   as	   subjects	   constituted	   in	   citizenship	  
regimes.	  They	  ask,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  not	  only	  whether	  they	  still	  have	  the	  items	  they	  want,	  whether	  
they	  face	  unjust	  or	  miserable	  conditions,	  but	  also	  whether	  they	  still	  exist	  as	  systemic	  subjects.	  
They	  also	  answer	   this	  question	  as	  citizen-­‐subjects,	  evaluating	  their	  environment	  for	  the	  social	  
resources	  they	  have	  used	  in	  the	  past	  in	  struggles	  with	  the	  state.	  But	  this	  evaluation	  is	  historical,	  
experiential,	  cumulative	  –	  a	  subjective	  reading	  of	  the	  state’s	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  
possession,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Poland,	  of	  the	  strike	  resource.	  This	  experiential,	  subjective	  evaluation	  
combines	  distinct	  assessments.	  Worker-­‐citizen-­‐subjects	  ask	  if	  their	  weapons	  and	  tools	  are	  gone,	  
suspended,	  or	  operable.	  Under	  a	  differentiated	  regime,	  I	  argue,	  Poles	  evaluated	  their	  resources	  
as	  intact,	  held	  in	  abeyance,	  potent	  as	  an	  irrepressible	  immanent	  weapon.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  have	  said	  
that	  even	  when,	  objectively,	   in	  1982	  or	  1983,	  under	   comprehensive	   state	  assault	  on	  workers	  
and	  unions,	  Poles’	  material	  and	  political	  losses	  were	  absolute	  but	  their	  subjective	  evaluation	  of	  




for	  this	  inference	  appears	  in	  consistent	  remarks	  of	  underground	  and	  imprisoned	  dissidents	  who	  
explicitly	  disavow	  violence	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  workers’	  struggle	  with	  the	  state	  is	  merely	  in	  an	  
unusually	  vicious	  stage;	  that	  the	  state	  was	  buying	  time;	  and	  that	  martial	  law	  signaled	  the	  state’s	  
weakness,	  its	  “legs	  of	  steel	  and	  hands	  of	  clay”	  the	  last	  gasp	  of	  an	  absurd	  behemoth	  whose	  only	  
effective	  response	  to	  the	  uprising	  of	  the	  whole	  society	  was	  that	  of	  a	  risible,	  if	  perilous,	  clown.	  	  
	   In	  the	  capacity	  of	  Solidarity	  underground	  to	  plausibly	  dissuade	  radicals	   from	  anti-­‐state	  
coercive	  measures	  and	  in	  the	  prison	  memoirs	  of	  activists	  we	  hear	  a	  consistent	  message	  that	  the	  
regime	  has	  defeated	  neither	  the	  labor	  movement	  nor	  the	  civil	  society	  stemming	  from	  its	  social	  
means.	  In	  the	  second	  evaluation	  I	  discussed	  in	  the	  model,	  the	  one	  morally	  appraising	  the	  ruling	  
class,	  Poles	  knew	  they	  retained,	  through	  their	  social	  resources,	  their	  subjective	  potential	  under	  
a	   differentiated	   citizenship	   structure.	   But,	   as	   I	   also	   emphasized	   in	   the	   model,	   this	   positive	  
subjective	  evaluation	  was	  not	  based	  on	  fantasy	  or	  mere	  hope,	  it	  rested	  on	  the	  material	  power	  
of	   strikes.	  The	   factories	  and	   shipyards	  and	   infrastructure	  had	   to	   remain	  viable,	   rendering	   the	  
communist	   nomenklatura	   vulnerable	   to	   working	   class	   actions.	   Indeed,	   labor-­‐intensive	  
production	   sites	   and	   state	   reliance	   on	   labor	   power	   remained,	   so	   that	   workers’	   systemic	  
subjectivity	  did	  not	  require	  violence.	  	  	   	  
	  
§4.d	   Concluding	  comments	  
	   As	   I	   conclude	   this	   argument	   linking	   Poland’s	  worker-­‐citizenship	   regime	   to	   opponents’	  
sustained	  non-­‐violent	  response,	  familiar	  vulnerabilities	  in	  its	  architecture	  remain	  and	  perhaps,	  
from	   a	   higher	   altitude,	   new	   challenges	   emerge.	   My	   rhetorical	   strategy	   has	   been	   to	   adduce	  
evidence	  from	  my	  historical	  narrative	  in	  the	  language	  of	  my	  theoretical	  model,	  and	  vice-­‐versa	  




has	  not	  been	  to	  offer	  a	  dispositive	  proof	  that	  differentiated	  citizenship	  regimes	  prevent	  violent	  
reactions	  to	  state	  coercion	  or	  material	  deprivation;	  indeed,	  I	  have	  not	  concluded,	  and	  have	  not	  
designed	  a	  project	  to	  establish,	  that	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  or	  effective	  citizenship,	  is	  a	  necessary	  
or	  sufficient	  condition	  in	  general	  for	  avoiding	  physical	  resistance	  to	  state	  policies.	  Rather,	  I	  have	  
attempted	  to	  claim	  plausibly	  that	  worker-­‐citizenship	  constructed	  a	  systemic	  Polish	  subjectivity	  
that	  endured	  fiscal	  crisis	  and	  martial	  law,	  diminishing	  incentives	  for	  social	  violence	  by	  retaining	  
a	  positive	  evaluation	  of	   the	  citizenship	   regime.	  Having	  expressed	   relatively	  modest	  ambitions	  
about	  the	  explanatory	  parameters	  and	  case-­‐specificity	  of	  my	  project,	  I	  should	  address,	  qualify,	  
or	  deflect	  objections	  to	  my	  argument.	  I	  should	  clarify	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  my	  objective	  in	  these	  
concluding	  comments	  is	  not	  to	  debate	  opponents	  but	  to	  persuade	  readers	  of	  the	  feasibility	  of	  
the	  worker-­‐citizenship	  regime’s	  defining	  contribution	  to	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  against	  alternative	  
explanations	  that	  I	  cannot	  comprehensively	  impeach.	  	  
	   Most	   prominent	   of	   these	   objections	   is	   the	   case-­‐specific	   emphasis	   on	   the	   absence	   of	  
Polish	  sovereignty	  –	  absolute	  or	  relative	  to	  Algeria	  –	  and	  the	  violence-­‐inhibiting	  prospect	  of	  a	  
Soviet	  invasion.	  I	  have	  challenged	  the	  adequacy	  of	  this	  explanation	  of	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  in	  the	  
previous	   chapter	   (§3.c.3);	   but	  will	   reiterate	   succinctly	   the	   central	   points.	   It	   is	   true	   the	   Soviet	  
invasions	  of	  Hungary	  and	  Czechoslovakia	   left	  a	  daunting	  and	   lasting	   impression	  on	  all	  Central	  
Europeans,	  noted	  by	  activists	  and	  writers,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  the	  Soviets	  demanded	  martial	  
law	  under	  threat	  of	  force.	  But	  it	  remains	  unclear	  that	  we	  may	  infer	  a	  successful	  explanation	  of	  
Polish	   non-­‐violence	   from	   testimonials	   about	   a	   potential	   incursion,	   despite	   its	   commonsense	  
feasibility.	   Here	   I	   recall	   a	   remark	   Karpinski	   makes	   about	   Poles’	   reaction,	   knowing	   of	   recent	  




were	   only	   just	   beginning,	   or	   threatening	   to	   erupt.	   Anyone	   who	   believed	   that	   shooting	   at	  
workers	  would	  pacify	   them	  was	  wrong.”182	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  while	   the	  Soviet	  presence	  certainly	  
affected	  Polish	  decisions,	  it	  only	  seems	  to	  follow	  that	  the	  effect	  was	  to	  pacify	  them,	  especially	  
given	   the	   stakes,	   nationalist	   history,	   and	   resentment	   of	   Russian	   imperialism.	   Even	   assuming	  
away,	  again,	  Helsinki,	  Afghanistan,	  NATO,	  and	  an	  explicit	  threat	  by	  the	  US,	  all	  of	  which	  changed	  
conditions	  gravely	  since	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  it	  still	  seems	  Solidarity	  was	  a	  profound	  threat	  to	  
USSR,	  yet	  audacious	  in	  its	  activities.	  Finally,	  attributing	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  to	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  
invokes	  a	  constant,	  but	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  progression	  toward	  grassroots,	  “committee-­‐building	  
rather	   than	  committee	  burning,”	  deliberative,	  and	  non-­‐violent	  campaigns	  stemming	   from	  the	  
pedagogical	   dialectics	   of	   the	   state-­‐citizen	   struggles.	   To	   locate	   the	   source	   of	   the	   non-­‐violent,	  
“self-­‐limiting”	  strategy	  outside	  Solidarity	  discredits	  the	  movement’s	   internal	  development	  and	  
pointedly	  replaces	  the	  revolutionary	  ethos	  of	  dissidents	  with	  the	  mundane	  desire	  for	  physical	  
survival.	   I	   do	   not	   refute	   the	   intervention/pacification	   thesis,	   and	   accept	   that	   the	   Soviets	  
intimidated	  Polish	  activists;	  but	  I	  suspect	  that	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  threat	  passed	  through	  the	  
lens	  of	  domestic	  social	  resources,	  while	  the	  Polish	  regime	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  exception.	  
	   Likewise,	   I	  would	  propose	  that	  another	  strong	   influence	  worked	  through	  the	  historical	  
evaluations	  of	  dissidents,	  namely,	  the	  critique	  of	  violence	  among	  KOR	  intellectual	  activists.	  The	  
view	  here	  is	  that	  when	  academics,	  rights	  advocates,	  teachers,	  lawyers,	  and	  others	  created	  KOR	  
in	  1976	  and	  over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  advised	  them,	  they	  brought	  to	  disorganized	  and	  reactive	  
workers	   ideas	   and	   tactics	   framed	   in	   non-­‐violent	   commitments	   typical	   of	   Polish	   professionals	  
and	  professors.	  This	  argument	  would	  displace	  the	  impetus	  to	  peaceful	  mobilization	  away	  from	  




worker	   discipline	   and	   overt	   commitment	   to	   non-­‐violent	  means	   corresponded	  with	   the	   post-­‐
1976	  coordination	  of	  workers,	  intellectuals,	  and	  professionals,	  who	  described	  non-­‐violence	  as	  a	  
constitutive	  feature	  of	  Polish	  liberal	  rationalism.	  Indeed,	  deep	  traditions	  of	  Polish	  civic	  ethics	  or	  
political	  beliefs	  may	  generally	  endorse	  non-­‐violence,	  such	  that	  communism	  distorted	  the	  typical	  
exercise	  of	  Polish	  values.	   In	  this	  case,	   intellectuals	  were	  properly	  placed	  to	  remind	  potentially	  
violent	  workers	   of	   the	   values	   of	   gradual	   processes	   and	   rational	   deliberations.	   But	   I	  would	   at	  
least	  supplement	  this	  explanation	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  viability	   that	  allow	  advocacy	  of	  non-­‐
violence	  to	  be	  persuasive	  to	  people	  who	  did	  not	  already	  agree.	  That	  is,	  if	  KOR	  or	  independent	  
intellectuals	  influenced	  worker	  decisions,	  presumably	  they	  persuaded	  them	  of	  new	  ideas,	  but	  it	  
would	  seem	  requisite	  that	  this	  process	  of	  persuasion	  refer	  not	  merely	  to	  the	  rhetorical	  skills	  of	  
intellectuals	  but	  a	  fit	  between	  their	  ideas	  and	  lived	  conditions	  that	  they	  addressed.	  Indeed,	  we	  
might	  describe	   this	  meeting	  of	  workers	  and	  advisors	  as	  an	  alliance	  of	   the	  “universal	  class”	  of	  
labor	  and	  particular	  class	  of	  analysts	  merging	  into	  a	  sort	  of	  strategic	  universal	  analysis.	  	  
	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  when	  we	  stress	  conditions	  of	  possibility,	  not	  only	  possible	  conditions,	  
we	  may	  say	  that	  between	  intellectuals	  and	  the	  working	  class,	  the	  latter	  was	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  
the	  former,	  a	  non-­‐equivalent,	  asymmetric	  relationship	  in	  effectively	  deploying	  regime-­‐provided	  
resources	  effectively	  against	  the	  state.	  Worker-­‐citizenship	  posited	  labor	  as	  the	  universal	  class	  in	  
just	   this	   sense;	   its	  weapons	   facilitate	  publicly	   relevant	   activism	   in	   the	  name	  of	   all,	   and	   as	   an	  
address	  to	  all	  (including	  members	  of	  the	  ruling	  class).	  In	  short,	  Solidarity	  could	  exist	  and	  oppose	  
the	  state	  with	  or	  without	  KOR,	  but	   the	   inverse	  cannot	  be	  said	  –	  KOR	  would	  not	  have	  existed	  
effectively	  without	  the	  social	  class	  capable	  of	  crippling	  the	  state	  by	  withdrawing	  its	  labor	  power	  




pacified	  workers	  by	  disciplining,	  training,	  or	  cajoling	  them	  into	  docile	   forbearance	   is	  doubtful,	  
given	  what	  we	  have	  seen	  of	  the	  rapidly	  evolving	  and	  self-­‐defined	  labor	  movement	  and	  its	  many	  
concentric	  circles	  throughout	  the	  Polish	  society	  and	  polity.	  Even	  had	  intellectual	  or	  professional	  
advisors	  convinced	  or	  prevailed	  upon	  Solidarity	  to	  adopt	  methodical,	  steadfast,	  visionary	  non-­‐
violence,	  this	  would	  nonetheless	  indicate	  a	  positive	  manipulation	  of	  an	  existing	  social	  resource,	  
the	  capacity	  to	  strike	  refined	  into	  a	  more	  potent	  weapon.	  
	   Having	  discussed	  two	  regnant	  counter-­‐explanations	  of	  non-­‐violence	  in	  Poland,	  it	  seems	  
beneficial	  at	  this	  juncture	  to	  raise	  significant	  protests	  against	  my	  explanation,	  grouped	  under	  a	  
general	  rubric,	  the	  humanist	  objection.	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  phrase	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  limitations	  of	  
the	  sort	  of	  explanation,	  theory,	  and	  model	  I	  have	  developed	  and	  explicated;	  and	  to	  do	  this	  by	  
recognizing	  several	  intangible	  elements	  of	  Polish	  life	  that	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  non-­‐violence	  
as	  the	  universal	  mode	  of	  address	  to	  the	  PZPR	  and	  to	  fellow	  citizens.	  These	  objections	  are	  drawn	  
from	  educated	  intuitions	  about	  Polish	  political	  sensibilities	  in	  the	  period	  in	  question,	  not	  from	  
the	  academic	  literature	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  by	  posing	  what	  one	  might	  call	  humanist	  objections	  to	  
my	  heuristic	  model,	  I	  can	  engage	  specific	  and	  paradigmatic	  challenges	  at	  once.	  First,	  it	  must	  be	  
considered	  that	  despite	  its	  “post-­‐totalitarian	  status,	  the	  Polish	  state	  apparatus	  was	  an	  efficient	  
police	   state	   capable	  of	  monitoring,	   reporting,	   and	  detaining	   the	  population	  comprehensively,	  
perhaps	  with	  a	  unique	   infrastructural	  power	  derived	   from	  the	  citizenship-­‐regime’s	   reciprocity	  
with	  society	  itself.	  Worker-­‐citizens	  may	  retain	  systemic	  subjectivity	  because	  of	  a	  differentiated	  
regime,	  but	  for	  this	  reason	  state	  and	  citizen	  are	  intimately	  bound	  to	  each	  other	  at	  the	  point	  of	  
production.	  In	  short,	  the	  Polish	  state	  may	  have	  suffocated	  its	  opponents	  for	  a	  considerable	  time	  




or	  resignation	  produced	  Poles’	  peaceful	  response	  to	  the	  state’s	  violence.	  After	  decades	  of	  effort	  
to	  resist	  ruthless	  communist	  despotism,	  Poles	  had	  formed	  an	  unprecedented	  social	  movement	  
of	  millions	  of	  highly	  committed	  adherents,	  wresting	  from	  the	  PZPR	  the	  21-­‐point	  agreement	  in	  
the	  besieged	  city	  of	  Gdańsk,	  granting	  workers	  autonomy.	   In	  one	  day,	  13	  December	  1981,	   the	  
state	  radically	  reversed	  course,	  as	  if	  to	  return	  to	  pre-­‐1956	  Poland,	  and	  perhaps	  this	  ought	  to	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  an	  exhausting	  defeat	  –	  the	  defiant	  and	  mocking	  words	  of	  Michnik	  and	  countless	  
underground	  activists	  amounting	  to	  just	  so	  much	  proud,	  high	  spirited,	  emboldening	  bluster.	  	  	  
	   Perhaps	  by	  1980	  Poles	  had	  been	  so	   traumatized	  by	  30,	  70,	  or	  200	  years	  of	  aggressive	  
political	  contests	  that	  resistance	  was	  defeated	  in	  advance	  by	  a	  larger	  historical,	  or	  experiential	  
evaluation	   than	   the	  one	   I	   have	   rooted	   in	   the	   structure	  of	  meaningful	   citizenship.	  We	   cannot	  
rule	  out	  that	  an	  irreducibly	  particular	  set	  of	  events,	  injuries,	  or	  memories	  erupted	  at	  a	  moment	  
like	  August	  1980	  but	  were	  eventfully	  offset	   the	  next	  year.	  One	  senses	  a	  wounded	  conviction,	  
perhaps,	  in	  Poles’	  immediate	  reaction	  when	  asked	  why	  Poles	  did	  not	  turn	  to	  violence	  when	  the	  
conditions	  seemed	  propitious	  or	  inevitable.	  They	  tend	  to	  respond	  with	  incredulity,	  as	  though	  it	  
were	  unthinkable.	  Their	  own	  view	  that	  the	  peaceful	  and	  procedural	  value-­‐system	  among	  Poles	  
prevailed	  over	   state	   taunts	  must	  be	   taken	  seriously,	  especially	  given	   the	   respect	   for	  equality,	  
fairness,	   and	   accountability	   genuinely	   evinced	   through	   the	   Solidarity	   period.	   Indeed,	   this	  
alternative	  –	  that	  Poles	  congenitally	  are,	  or	  by	  the	  1980s	  had	  become,	  averse	  to	  social	  violence,	  
must	  be	  recognized	  as	  a	  deep	  challenge.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  retention	  or	  emergence	  of	  just	  
such	  a	  value-­‐system	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  effect	  as	  well	  as	  cause,	  leaving	  the	  success	  of	  Polish	  non-­‐
violence	   to	   be	   explained,	   as	   background	   to	  what	   it	   explains.	   Finally,	   the	   humanist	   objection	  




skeptical	   ideographic	   or	   anthropological	   language,	   the	   explanation	   I	   am	   offering.	   This	   is,	   of	  
course,	  an	  anxiety	  in	  my	  own	  presentation	  –	  that	  the	  model	  may	  be	  too	  complicated	  to	  capture	  
the	  events	  in	  Poland	  in	  1980,	  the	  theory	  too	  convoluted;	  or,	  conversely,	  that	  it	  is	  too	  simple	  to	  
convey	  the	  complexity.183	  	  
	   With	  humanist	  objections	  in	  mind,	  I	  might	  rephrase	  while	  defending	  my	  explanation	  of	  
Polish	  non-­‐violence.	  It	  seems	  faithful	  to	  the	  accounts	  I	  have	  written	  and	  events	  I	  have	  adduced	  
to	   infer	  that	  possession	  of	  material	  resources	  to	  threaten	  the	  communist	  state	   lessened	  their	  
temptation	   to	   take	   up	   arms	   in	   defending	   their	   claims.	   Explanations	   of	   Polish	   non-­‐violence	  
advance	  both	  humanist	   and	   causal	   understanding,	   at	   least	   potentially,	   by	  working	  back	   from	  
martial	   law	   into	   the	   history	   of	   Polish	   subjectivity.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   we	   will	   encounter	  
Algeria’s	  distinct	  authoritarian	  citizenship	  regime,	  one	  explicitly	  determined	  to	  avoid	  horizontal	  
class	  formation,	  segmented	  public	  spaces,	  and	  differentiated	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  and	  whose	  










The	  city	  commonly	  known	  as	  Algiers	  –	  infamous	  these	  
days	  for	  the	  great	  and	  ceaseless	  harm	  its	  people	  inflict	  
on	  all	  the	  coasts	  and	  provinces	  of	  the	  Christian	  world…	  
	   Antonio	  de	  Sosa1	  
	  
Almost	   everything	   that	   sets	   us	   above	   savages	   has	  
come	  to	  us	  from	  the	  shores	  of	  the	  Mediterranean.	  
Samuel	  Johnson2	  
	  
If…we	  were	   to	   demonstrate	   by	   our	   behavior…that	   in	   our	   eyes	   the	   old	   inhabitants	   of	  
Algeria	  are	   just	  an	  obstacle	   to	  be	  pushed	  aside	  or	   trampled	  underfoot,	   if	  we	  surround	  
their	  populations,	  not	  to	  lift	  them	  in	  our	  arms	  toward	  well-­‐being	  and	  enlightenment	  but	  
to	  destroy	  and	   smother	   them,	   the	   two	   races	  would	   confront	   a	   life	  or	  death	   situation.	  	  
Sooner	   or	   later,	   Algeria	  would	   become	   a	   closed	   field,	   a	  walled	   arena,	  where	   the	   two	  
peoples	  would	  have	  to	  fight	  without	  mercy	  and	  one	  of	  the	  two	  would	  have	  to	  die.	  
Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville3	  
	  
Islam	  is	  my	  religion,	  Arabic	  is	  my	  language,	  Algeria	  is	  my	  fatherland.	  
Ahmad	  Tewfiq	  al-­‐Madani4	  
	  
The	  natives’	  challenge	  to	  the	  colonial	  world…is	  not	  a	  treatise	  on	  the	  universal,	  
but	  the	  untidy	  affirmation	  of	  an	  original	  idea	  propounded	  as	  an	  absolute.	  
Frantz	  Fanon5	  
	  
It	  is	  like	  two	  insane	  people,	  crazed	  with	  wrath,	  deciding	  to	  turn	  into	  a	  fatal	  embrace	  their	  
forced	  marriage…Forced	  to	  live	  together	  but	  incapable	  of	  uniting,	  they	  decide	  at	  least	  to	  
die	  together…	  [T]he	  fire	  is	  spreading	  and	  tomorrow	  Algeria	  will	  be	  a	  land	  of	  ruins	  and	  
corpses	  that	  no	  force,	  no	  power	  in	  the	  world,	  will	  be	  able	  to	  revive	  in	  this	  century.	  
Albert	  Camus6	  
	  
[Now]	  the	  ideological	  struggle	  must	  take	  the	  place	  of	  the	  war	  for	  
[political]	  liberation,	  and	  [become]…a	  struggle	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  
democratic	  people’s	  revolution…,	  the	  militant	  	  movement	  of	  the	  
agitated	  Algerian	  people	  striving	  to	  build	  a	  new	  society	  and	  a	  new	  state.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   FLN	  (Front	  de	  liberation	  national)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Program	  for	  Algeria7	  
	  
As	  a	  consolation	  he	  tries	  to	  convince	  himself	  that	  compared	  to	  others,	  who	  can’t	  
even	  afford	  to	  fill	  their	  shopping	  baskets,	  he	  can’t	  complain,	  but	  nonetheless	  his	  
Algeria	  has	  changed	  an	  awful	  lot.	  	  So	  he’d	  better	  to	  get	  down	  to	  work	  rather	  than	  
carrying	  on	   about	   it	   and	  making	   it	  worse	  by	   chewing	  over	   this	   resentment	   and	  
those	  insidious	  thoughts	  which	  are,	  there’s	  no	  doubt	  about	  it,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Evil	  








§5.a	   Summary	  
 This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  assess	  my	  explanation	  attributing	  the	  violence	  against	  the	  Algerian	  
state	  under	  martial	  law	  to	  the	  undifferentiated	  client-­‐citizenship	  regime	  that	  evaporated	  under	  
state	  insolvency,	  leaving	  citizens	  bereft	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  when	  the	  government	  annulled	  
the	  results	  of	   its	  subsequent	  experiment	  with	  voter-­‐citizenship.	  The	  chapter	  will	   replicate	  the	  
rhetorical	  framework,	  but	  not	  theoretical	  recapitulations,	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  on	  Poland;	  it	  
will	  present	  a	  short	  historical	  narrative	  of	  key	   institutional,	   ideational,	  and	  social	  events	   from	  
Algerian	   state	   formation	   to	   the	   Islamist-­‐state	  war	  as	   the	  empirical	  basis	   for	   interrogating	   the	  
theoretical	  model	  given	  in	  the	  introduction.	  The	  history	  will	  emphasize	  the	  logics	  of	  regime	  and	  
subject	  formation	  in	  light	  of	  continuous	  struggles,	  under	  and	  after	  colonial	  rule,	  for	  institutional	  
recognition	  and	  autonomy	  from	  centralized-­‐state	  encroachment.	  As	  in	  the	  Poland	  chapter,	  this	  
narrative	  selects	  key	  political	  events	  that	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  puzzling	  outcome	  (here,	  
the	  Islamists’	  violent	  uprising	  after	  election	  results	  were	  annulled	  in	  1992),	  not	  those	  that	  may	  
contribute	  to	  my	  theoretical	  model	  and	  conditional	  explanation.	  
	   The	  theoretical	  section	  will	  read	  this	  account	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  model’s	  variables	  
and	  causal	  derivation	  of	  violent	  resistance	  to	  state	  coercion	  from	  the	  parasitic	  client-­‐citizenship	  
regime.	  It	  will	  explore	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  Algeria’s	  undifferentiated	  regime	  resulted	  in	  violent	  
social	  agitation	  by	  illustrating	  how,	  under	  state	  crisis,	  Algerian	  clients	  lost	  the	  social	  resource	  –	  
withdrawn	  or	  switched	  support	  for	  patrons	  –	  that	  secured	  their	  effective	  citizenship.	  In	  turn,	  it	  
will	  track	  the	  uprising	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  systemic	  dispossession	  and	  its	  aggression	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  force	  state	  attention,	  concessions,	  or	  weakness.	  The	  empirical	  extrapolation,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  




or	  party-­‐elites,	  thus	  diminishing	  the	  threat	  of	  autonomous	  social	  movements	  or	  political	  spaces	  
and	   constituting	   potential	   rivals	   as	   subjects	   whose	   systemic	   relevance	   depended	   on	   state	  
largesse.	  The	  theoretical	  interpretation	  of	  this	  citizenship	  structure	  that	  must	  be	  substantiated	  
is	   that	   by	   rendering	   citizens	   parasitic	   on	   the	   state	  with	   no	   autonomous	   social	   resources,	   the	  
Algerian	  state	  created	  a	  perverse	  double	  movement	  of	  complete	  material	  attachment	  to	  state	  
distribution	  followed	  by	  complete	  political	  detachment	  under	  state	  retrenchment.	  Fiscal	  crisis	  
forced	  the	  first	  evaluation	  I	  have	  discussed	  –	  of	  fair	  policies	  and	  legitimate	  policy-­‐makers	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  
martial	  law	  forced	  the	  second	  evaluation	  –	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  The	  theoretical	  section	  will,	  
then,	  be	  principally	  concerned	  to	  confirm	  that	  these	  material	  and	  political	  crises	  eradicated	  the	  
citizenship	  regime	  of	  Algerian	  activists,	  increasing	  incentives	  to	  violence	  by	  confining	  the	  means	  
of	  subjectivity,	  or	  re-­‐subjectivization,	  to	  anti-­‐systemic	  strategies.	  
	   The	  Algerian	  narrative	  will	  diverge	  from	  its	  Polish	  counterpart	  by	  emphasizing	  in	  greater	  
detail	  the	  formative	  events	  before	  as	  well	  as	  since	  Algerian	  independence	  in	  1962.	  This	  choice	  is	  
to	   reflect	   that	   the	   sources	  and	  dynamics	  of	  Algerian	   state	   institutions	  and	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  
were	  more	   continual	   or	   cumulative	   than	   Poland’s.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Poland,	  whose	   procrustean	  
communist	   governance	   had	   a	   delineated	   timeframe,	   1948-­‐1989,	   Algeria’s	   state	   apparatus	   is	  
difficult	  to	  temporize;	  thus,	  the	  account	  requires	  a	  relatively	  fluid	  periodization.	  This	  assertion	  
refers	  to	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  Algerian	  “stateness,”	  itself	  reflecting	  disputes	  
in	  specialized	  reviews	  about	  the	  social	  composition	  of	  Algeria’s	  polity.	  Two	  leading	  scholars	  of	  
Algerian	  political	  history,	  for	  instance,	  disagree	  on	  Algerian	  state’s	  consolidation	  and	  coherence.	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Ruedy	  dates	  Algerian	  stateness	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  French	  colonization:	  




While	  the	  Regency	  of	  Algiers	  of	  1830	  was	  theoretically	  a	  dependency	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  sultanate,	  
the	   state	   that	   had	   come	   into	   being	   possessed	   all	   the	   classical	   attributes	   of	   sovereign	  
independence:	  a	  defined	  territory,	  a	  human	  community,	  organized	  political	  authority,	  effective	  
independence,	  and	  recognition	  by	  other	  states.9	  	  
	  
Ruedy	  is	  proposing	  that	  under	  Ottoman	  rule,	  which	  ruled	  the	  coastal	  cities	  in	  a	  highly	  mediated	  
imperial	  over-­‐stretch,	  Algerians	  essentially	  had	  developed	  an	   incipient	   state	  organization.	  But	  
Roberts	  restricts	  Algerian	  state-­‐formation	  to	  post-­‐French	  post-­‐colonialism,	  insisting,	  “the	  state	  
established	  by	  the	  FLN	  is	  the	  first	  ever	  Algerian	  state.	  The	  state	  tradition	  in	  Algeria	  is	  a	  tradition	  
of	  alien	  (Turkish,	  French)	  states	  imposed	  upon	  the	  Algerian	  population;	  the	  indigenous	  tradition	  
is	   one	   of	   eternal	   resistance	   to	   such	   states	   by	   a	   fragmented	   population	   of	   self-­‐governing	  
tribes.”10	   Representing	   broader	   controversies,	   Ruedy	   and	  Roberts	   adopt	  Weberian	   criteria	   of	  
sovereignty	  but	  disagree	  on	   the	   timing	  of	  Algerian	   stateness.	  A	  broad	  consensus	  on	  Algeria’s	  
eventual	   state	   institutions,	  however,	  depicts	   its	   ruling	  class	  as	  high	   in	  despotic	  power,	   low	   in	  
infrastructural	  power,	  and	  minimal	  in	  state-­‐society	  dialectics,	  in	  Mann’s	  terms	  (§2.b).	  	  	  
	   While	   military	   and	   party	   elites	   have	   retained	   incumbency	   and	   subjugated	   domestic	  
enemies,	  that	  is,	  the	  state	  is	  not	  viewed	  as	  a	  historically	  effective	  organization:	  one	  that	  has	  the	  
consistent	  capacity	  to	  adopt	  and	  implement	  binding	  policies;	  tax	  its	  population;	  delineate	  and	  
control	   its	   borders;	   establish	   a	   legible	   juridical	   order,	   regulate	   its	  markets,	   or	   secure	  popular	  
support.	   Reason	   usually	   given	   for	   Algeria’s	  weak	   infrastructural	   state	   have	   several	   variations	  
identifying	  different	   forms	  of	  capture	  or	  constraint	  of	  state	  offices	  and	  resources.	  That	  broad	  
argument	  –	  often	  applied	  to	  the	  MENA	  countries	  generally	  –	  is	  that	  the	  centralized	  apparatus	  of	  
the	   state	  cannot	  overcome	  primary	   social	   identities	  or	   sectoral	   interests,	   that	   is,	   remains	   the	  
enemy	  or	  instrument	  of	  sub-­‐populations,	  a	  pattern	  converted	  from	  tribe	  or	  clan	  or	  ‘ulema	  into	  




state	  efficaciously	  and	  enduringly	  vary	  from	  ethnic,	  religious,	  or	  “tribal”	  to	  bourgeois,	  military,	  
and	  bureaucratic.	  In	  this	  light,	  Roberts’s	  statement	  about	  “eternal	  resistance”	  by	  a	  “fragmented	  
population”	  to	  the	  state	  draws	  us	  back	  beyond	  1962	  to	  formative	  periods	  of	  self-­‐collectivization	  
among	  indigenous	  Algerians	  under	  Ottomans	  and	  French	  imperial	  rule.	  The	  overarching	  story,	  
one	  might	  say,	  is	  of	  increasing	  social	  organization	  without	  centralization;	  from	  urban	  centers	  to	  
rural	  areas	  and	  mountain	  villages,	  the	  Algerian	  dialectic	  has	  been	  less	  between	  state	  and	  citizen	  
and	  more	  among	  citizens	  against	  the	  state.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  this	  bifurcation	  plays	  
an	  explanatory	  role	  in	  Algerian	  Islamist	  militancy,	  even	  if	  a	  parallel	  alienation	  marked	  Poland.	  	  
	   As	  I	  mentioned	  above	  (§3.b.1),	  zawiyya	  and	  turuq	  social	  networks	  –	  self-­‐conscious	  mini-­‐
states	  of	  Muslim	  lineages	  organized	  as	  “brotherhoods”	  –	  asserted	   independence	  from	  coastal	  
centralizers,	   resisting	   foreign	   domination	   violently	   while	   nonetheless	   responding	   to	   external	  
pressures	  by	  gradually	  forming	  the	  rudiments	  of	  central	  statehood	  (1783-­‐1871).	  This	  period	  of	  
political	   collectivization	  and	   religious	  polarization	  yielded	   to	   imperial	   pacification,	   cooptation,	  
bargaining,	  repression,	  intensification,	  and	  de-­‐collectivization	  (1871-­‐1914).	  Colonial	  destruction	  
of	   autochthonous	  moral	   economies	   and	   religious	   autonomy	   fragmented	  Algerian	   distributive	  
systems	  and	  capitalized	  or	  commodified	  local	  property	  and	  production.	   In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  
century	   French	   rule	   intensified	   Islamist	   and	   nationalist	   identification	   while	   re-­‐territorializing	  
Algerian	  life:	  mass	  urbanization,	  impoverishment,	  emigration,	  and	  deracination	  re-­‐arranged	  the	  
fabric	   of	   Algerian	   social	   life	   –	   in	  ways	   replicated	   by	   the	  war	   of	   independence	   and	   post-­‐1962	  
independent	  state.	  As	  a	  result,	  nationalists,	  Islamists,	  and	  Francophones	  organized	  to	  confront	  
programs	   for	   acceptable	   subordination	   or	   uprising	   (1920-­‐1939).	   Immediately	   after	  WWII	   the	  




periods	   of	   superficial	   calm.	   The	  war	   re-­‐collectivized	   the	   divided	  Algerian	   polity	  within	  micro-­‐
regimes,	  repressing	  deep	  differences	  in	  a	  unified	  cause.	  French	  forces	  decimated,	   imprisoned,	  
and	  tortured	  Algerians	  who	  turned	  to	  terrorism	  and	  warfare	  eventually	  to	  expel	  French	  colons.	  
The	   independent	  state	   initially	   sought	   to	   retain	   the	  coalition	  established	   in	   the	  war:	  “Islamic-­‐
Socialism”	   favorable	   to	  women,	   Berbers,	   Islamists,	   peasants,	   industrial	   workers,	   technocrats,	  
state-­‐capitalists,	   bureaucrats,	   and	   the	   military	   (1962-­‐).	   Within	   a	   few	   years,	   the	   military-­‐FLN	  
state	   had	   classified,	   distributed,	   and	   begun	   integrating	   citizen	   claimants	   into	   the	   centralizing	  
bureaucracy	  by	  their	  social,	  economic,	  and	  religious	  identities.	  	  	  
During	  this	  period	  the	  Algerian	  state’s	  standardization	  proceeded	  through	  various	  forms	  
of	  collectivization,	  especially	  nationalized	   industries	  and	  communalization	  of	  rural	  production.	  
The	  state	  “Arabized”	  schools	  to	  placate	  Islamists	  excluded	  from	  Francophone	  higher	  education,	  
with	   implications	  for	  employment	  not	   least	  within	  the	  state	  apparatus.	  The	  FLN	  attempted	  to	  
consolidate	  an	  agreed	  Berber-­‐Arab	  party,	  and	  even	  to	  “feminize”	  the	  government	  by	  increasing	  
gender	  equality	  in	  official	  positions.	  From	  the	  beginning,	  inclusionary	  maneuvers	  proceeded	  via	  
vertical	   bargaining,	   interest-­‐group	  appeals,	   negotiated	   concessions,	   reciprocal	   benefits,	   issue-­‐
specific	  resolutions,	  and	  informal	  channels	  of	  side-­‐payment	  distribution.	  This	  mode	  of	  interest	  
representation,	  grievance	  articulation,	  and	  claim-­‐making,	  encouraged	  Algerian	  non-­‐state	  agents	  
to	   organize	   according	   to	   its	   logic,	   creating	   competitive	   bids	   for	   state	   policies,	   straining	   intra-­‐
elite	  cohesion.	  Two	  examples	  already	  mentioned	  –	  the	  state’s	  selective	  bargains	  with	  Islamists	  
and	  women	  –	  were	  rehearsed	  with	  Islamists	  and	  urban	  elite	  French-­‐speakers.	  The	  incentive	  put	  




organizing	  political	  or	  economic	  principle	  outside	  the	  state,	  fostered	  divided,	  incompatible	  sub-­‐
groups	  as	  the	  state’s	  constituency,	  albeit	  succeeding	  in	  preventing	  supra-­‐state	  class-­‐formation.	  	  
As	  I	  have	  detailed	  (§3.b.1,	  §3.c.2),	  Algeria	  based	  its	  development	  agenda	  on	  oil-­‐revenue	  
distribution	  and	  loan-­‐subtended	  capital-­‐intensive	  import-­‐substituting	  industrialization.	  Within	  a	  
generation	  of	  military,	  single-­‐party	  hegemony,	  the	  toxic	  assets	  of	  mineral-­‐export-­‐reliant	  growth	  
collapsed	  with	  the	  oil-­‐price	  plunge	  of	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  State	  cutbacks,	  unemployment,	  increasing	  
class	  disparities,	  and	  manifest	  corruption	  led	  to	  riots	  in	  October	  1988.	  After	  the	  state	  repressed	  
the	  protests,	  killing	  hundreds	  of	  non-­‐violent	  protesters,	   the	  government	  suddenly	  announced	  
reforms	   featuring	   unprecedented	   multiparty	   elections	   following	   a	   presidential	   referendum.	  
During	  this	  reform	  period,	  “Algeria	  underwent	  a	  radical	  political	  transformation.	  From	  late	  1988	  
until	  early	  1992,	  the	  country	  exhibited	  the	  most	  authentic	  and	  robust	  form	  of	  democracy	  ever	  
experienced	   in	   the	   Arab	   world.	   Indeed,	   that	   democratic	   ‘moment’	   exposed	   a	   populist	   bent	  
towards	   pluralism	   within	   Algerian	   civil	   society.”12	   Fervent	   electioneering	   proceeded,	   and	  
despite	  the	  regime’s	  panicked	  arrest	  of	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  FIS,	  the	  opposition	  remained	  
procedural,	   non-­‐violent,	   and	   assured	   with	   each	   local	   electoral	   victory	   of	   eventual,	   peaceful	  
defeat	   of	   the	   regime.	  When	   Islamists	  won	  national	   elections	   in	  December	   1991,	   the	  military	  
annulled	  the	  results,	  declaring	  martial	  law,	  banning	  the	  Islamist	  party,	  and	  arresting	  thousands	  
of	   Algerian	   regime	   opponents.	   In	   the	   ensuing	   state-­‐Islamist	  war	   (1992-­‐1999)	   the	   suffocation	  
and	  domestication	  of	  FIS	  inspired	  the	  Armed	  Islamic	  Group	  to	  take	  to	  the	  hills	  and	  towns	  and	  
wage	   a	   military	   campaign	   against	   the	   state	   and	   its	   supporters.	   The	   chaotic	   slaughter	   that	  
followed	   (1994-­‐1999)	   the	   canceled	   elections	   and	   martial	   law	   were	   another	   battle	   in	   the	  




But	   the	  war	  of	   the	  1990s	  marked	  a	  departure.	  The	  previous	  Algerian	   cycle	  of	  militant	  
resistance,	  quietist	  detachment,	  and	  civic	  mobilization	  exhibited	  a	  sort	  of	  accordion-­‐style	  triple	  
movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  convergence	  and	  divergence,	  but	  unified	  in	  each	  stage	  by	  a	  purpose.	  	  	  
In	  anti-­‐state	  revolts	  (1830-­‐1871,	  1945-­‐1962,	  1992-­‐1999)	  protean	  Algerian	  groups	  subordinated	  
their	   internal	   and	  mutual	   differences	   to	   collective	   struggle.	  After	   defeats,	  Algerians	   gradually	  
reasserted	   their	   displaced	   demands,	   needs,	   and	   desires	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	   –	   in	   strategic	  
compromise	   (1871-­‐1914,	   1962-­‐1979,	   1989-­‐1992)	   or	   civil	   agitation	   (1920-­‐1954,	   1979-­‐1992).	  
These	  waves	   express	   a	   long-­‐standing	   Algerian	   diversity-­‐in-­‐unity	   in	  which	   a	   consensus	   among	  
different	   localities	   and	   identities	   pressed	   against	   state	   centralizers	   for	   social	   autonomy	   –	   for	  
distinct	  ethnicities,	  moral	  economies,	  political	  geographies,	  and	  the	  like.	  But	  one	  can	  also	  find	  in	  
this	  categorical	   repetition	  a	  crucial	   change.	  From	  the	  Algerian	  struggles	  against	   the	  French	   to	  
their	   the	  war	  against	   the	  Algerian	   state,	   there	  are	   signs	   that	   the	   suffocation	  had	  consistently	  
intensified	  as	  this	  fight	  grew	  more	  internal,	  compressed,	  socially	  suicidal.13	  The	  symptom	  of	  this	  
progression	  is	  the	  unsupported	  savagery	  of	  state	  and	  Islamists	  on	  Algerians	  themselves.	  	  
	  
§5.b	   Historical	  narrative	  
	  
In	   1519	   Kheir	   ad-­‐Din,	   ruler	   of	   Algiers,	   invited	   the	  Ottomans	   to	   defend	   his	   Andalusian	  
population	   from	   Spanish	   Hapsburg	   attacks	   begun	   in	   1509.	   The	   Ottomans	   gained	   political	  
sovereignty	   over	   Algiers	   in	   exchange	   for	  military	   protection.	   After	   the	  mid-­‐century	   shoreline	  
battles	   of	   Algiers,	   Tunis,	   Tripoli,	   and	   Cyprus,	   and	   the	  Ottoman	   defeat	   at	   Lepanto	   (1571)	   and	  
victory	  at	  Tunis	  (1574),	  the	  Habsburg-­‐Ottoman	  peace	  treaty	  of	  1580	  ended	  the	  Mediterranean	  




consolidation	  of	  Ottoman	  social,	  political,	  and	  military	  order	  in	  Algiers.	  Pashas	  sent	  by	  Istanbul	  
reigned,	   but	   by	   1659	   Ottoman	  military	   forces	   (or	   ujaq)	   ruled.	   The	   Janissaries,	   renowned	   for	  
their	  Anatolian	  solidarity	  and	  military	  prowess,	  formed	  the	  core	  of	  the	  ujaq	  in	  Algiers,	  while	  the	  
ta’ifa	  band	  of	  seamen	  defended	  and	  financed	  the	  operation.	  Two	  enduring	  patterns	  emerged.	  
First,	  an	  ethnic	  social	  stratification	  created	  a	  spectrum	  from	  the	  minority	  Janissary	  corps	  to	  the	  
majority	   indigenous	   peoples	   inland.15	   Ottoman	   Algeria	   thus	   ramified	   into	   two	   populations.	  	  
“The	   ujaq	   constituted	   a	   foreign	   ruling	   group,	   exercising	   authority	   upon	   the	   fellow	   Muslim	  
Algerian	   community	   without	   wishing	   to	   become	   integrated	   in	   [the]	   predominantly	   tribal	  
character	  of	   the	   indigenous	  Algerian	  society.”16	  But	  this	  “authority”	   initially	  conferred	  greater	  
disparity	   in	   status	   than	   power,	   as	   the	   inland	   agricultural	   producers	   and	   indigenous	   Islamic	  
orders	  retained	  considerable	  autonomy	  from	  central	  rule.	  The	  second	  pattern,	  apposite	  to	  this	  
social	   division,	   was	   the	   exacerbated	   isolation	   of	   the	   urban	   political-­‐military	   elites	   given	   the	  
need	   for	   external	   sources	  of	   income.	   “Because	  Algerian	   agricultural	   surplus	  was	   smaller,	   less	  
accessible	  geographically,	   and	   tapped	  by	  many	   levels	  of	   intermediate	  extraction,	   the	  primary	  
sources	  of	  funds	  to	  pay	  the	  Janissaries	  and	  run	  the	  government	  were	  overseas	  trade,	  especially	  
corsair	  operations.”17	  The	  effort	  to	  turn	  the	  aggressive	  North	  African	  and	  North	  American	  trade	  
disputes	  into	  an	  anti-­‐western	  jihad	  that	  Europeans	  mistook	  for	  mere	  piracy	  is	  forced.18	  Indeed,	  
from	   “the	   seventeenth	   century,	   as	   central	   authority	  weakened,	   real	   power	   in	   the	   capitals	   of	  
distant	   provinces,	   such	   as	   Algeria,	   Egypt,	   or	   Baghdad,	   passed	   [to]	   a	   new	   ruling	   class	   in	   the	  
provinces”	  signaling	  intra-­‐Islamic	  division.19	  	  	  
As	  the	  center	  of	  Ottoman	  life	  slowly	  weakened,	  metropolitan-­‐rural	  conflicts	  intensified,	  




taxation.20	  Finally,	  in	  1783,	  Algerian	  Sufi	  brotherhoods	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  uprisings	  against	  the	  
Ottomans	  for	  whom	  Algeria	  was	  a	  key	  strategic	  outpost	  against	  imperial	  Hapsburg.	  The	  moral	  
and	  economic	  basis	  of	   the	  uprisings	  was	  “popular	   religious”	  communities:	  mystical,	   syncretic,	  
and	  charismatic	  Sufi	  Islamic	  orders	  or	  zawiya-­‐centered	  collectivities.21	  These	  forms	  of	  resistance	  
among	  the	  Tijaniyya,	  Qadariyya,	  and	  other	  turuq	  established	  deepened	  a	  tradition	  of	  Muslim-­‐
founded	  resistance	   to	  external	  or	  centralizing	   rule.	  But	   the	  “Islamic”	  nature	  of	   this	   resistance	  
must	  be	  understood	  in	  its	  full	  social	  implications;	  Islam	  formed	  for	  these	  associations	  an	  entire	  
life,	  but	  that	  life	  could	  never	  be	  reduced	  to	  Islam.	  “Islam”	  meant	  the	  life	  of	  the	  community;	  an	  
ethically	  grounded	  economy,	  education,	  politics,	  and	  bookkeeping	  must,	  by	  definition,	  respond	  
to	  multiple	  non-­‐religious	  demands.	  	  
	   Muslim	  resistance	  continued	  from	  Ottoman	  to	  French	  suzerainty	  but	  the	  latter	  were	  had	  
greater	  military	  force	  and	  determination	  to	  eliminate	  intermediate	  social	  powers.22	  “The	  French	  
remained	  remarkably	  loyal	  to	  the	  early	  humanist	  idea	  that	  one	  is	  entitled	  to	  conquer	  and	  rule	  
the	  less	  civilized	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  civilizing	  them,”	  a	  notion	  spanning	  Christianization	  of	  the	  
godless	  natives	  and	  reorganization	  of	  indigenous	  trade	  route	  territories	  for	  settled	  agricultural	  
cultivation.23	   Some	   “influential	   Parisians”	  were	   also	   lured	   by	   exoticized	   expansion;	   in	   France	  
“hashish’s	  public	  profile	  was	   inexorably	   raised	  as	   the	  colonization	  of	  Algeria	  developed.”24	  By	  
extension	  ferocious	  resistance	  inspired	  the	  justificatory	  modernist	  doctrine	  of	  occupatio	  bellica	  
“as	  a	  legal	  institution	  [that]	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  effort	  to	  re-­‐found	  and	  restore	  the	  
concrete	   spatial	   order	   of	   the	   jus	   publicum	   Europeeum,	   in	   response	   to	   the	   twin	   perils	   of	  
revolutionary	  war	  and	  wars	  of	  liberation.”25	  Expecting	  victory	  over	  the	  “capital”	  to	  bring	  broad	  




brought	  swift	  retaliation…In	  North	  Africa,	  as	   in	  most	  areas	  where	  nearly	  all	  were	  Muslim,	  the	  
people	  were	  ready	  for	  a	  dogged	  fight.”26	  French	  imperial	  repression	  of	  Islamist	  uprisings,	  most	  
notoriously	  of	  ‘Abd	  el-­‐Qader,	  was	  harsh	  and	  deliberate.27	  The	  Marquis	  de	  la	  Gervaisais,	  hardly	  
alone	  in	  his	  awareness,	  predicted,	  “The	  development	  of	  agricultural	  colonization	  will	  produce	  a	  
fatal	   and	   detestable	   necessity:	   the	   expulsion	   and	   extermination	   of	   the	   natives.”28	   Alexis	   de	  
Tocqueville	  similarly	  and	  darkly	  prognosticated,	  	  
	  
If…we	  were	  to	  demonstrate	  by	  our	  behavior…that	  in	  our	  eyes	  the	  old	  inhabitants	  of	  Algeria	  are	  
just	  an	  obstacle	  to	  be	  pushed	  aside	  or	  trampled	  underfoot,	  if	  we	  surround	  their	  populations,	  not	  
to	  lift	  them	  in	  our	  arms	  toward	  well-­‐being	  and	  enlightenment	  but	  to	  destroy	  and	  smother	  them,	  
the	  two	  races	  would	  confront	  a	  life	  or	  death	  situation.	  	  Sooner	  or	  later,	  Algeria	  would	  become	  a	  
closed	  field,	  a	  walled	  arena,	  where	  the	  two	  peoples	  would	  have	  to	  fight	  without	  mercy	  and	  one	  
of	  the	  two	  would	  have	  to	  die.”29	  	  	  
	  
This	  was	  prescient.	  The	  logic	  of	  extermination	  that	  played	  out	  in	  the	  French-­‐Algerian	  war	  of	  the	  
1950s	  and	  the	  FLN-­‐HCE/FIS-­‐GIA	  war	  of	  the	  1990s	  first	  surfaced	  in	  the	  earliest	  phase	  of	  France’s	  
colonial	  consolidation	  or	  “liberal	  imperialism.”30	  
	   Clemens	   Lamping’s	   1848	   travelogue	   typified	   the	   racism	   among	   French	   travelers	   and	  
generals.31	  Only	   fifty	   years	   after	   the	  Terror,	   she	  wrote,	   “The	  most	   contradictory	  qualities	   are	  
often	  united	  in	  the	  Arab	  nature	  –	  harshness	  and	  benevolence,	  cruelty	  and	  generosity,	  rapacity	  
and	  munificence:	  we	  should	  beware	  how	  we	  condemn	  them	  without	  further	  knowledge	  of	  their	  
character,	  and	  we	  must	  on	  no	  account	  measure	  them	  by	  our	  Christian	  and	  European	  standard.”	  
Yet	  the	  French	  were	  wary	  of	  Islam’s	  power.	  In	  1841,	  the	  French	  obtained	  a	  fatwa	  –	  supported	  
by	  the	  rivals	  of	  the	  Fez	  leadership	  and	  ‘Abd	  el-­‐Qader,	  the	  Tijaniyya	  Sufi	  order	  –	  from	  the	  ‘ulema	  
of	  Qairawan,	  Tunisia.	  The	  Tunisian	  ‘ulema	  declared	  that,	  “having	  resisted	  as	  much	  as	  could	  be	  




so	  long	  as	  the	  French	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  their	  practice	  of	  Islam	  or	  violate	  the	  honor	  of	  their	  
women.”32	  This	  modus	  vivendi	  would	  be	  strategic,	  after	  the	  staged	  defeat	  (1847,	  1871,	  1882)	  of	  
military	   resistance.	   By	   1852,	   the	   French	   had	   seized	   864.5	   thousand	   acres	   via	   “sequestration,	  
expropriation,	   and	   a	   form	   of	   districting	   (cantonnement)	   designed	   to	   drive	   out	   the	   native	  
population	   into	   designated	   areas	   away	   from	   the	   coast,”	   swelling	   the	   European	   farming	  
community	  from	  100,000	  in	  1864	  to	  200,000	  by	  1900.33	  These	  “designated	  areas,”	  progenitors	  
to	  the	  internment	  camps,	  biopolitically	  enforced	  population	  shifts	  within	  a	  transformed	  mode	  
of	  productive	  exploitation.	  This	  mass	  resettlement	  of	  Muslim	  Algerians	  under	  imperial-­‐capitalist	  
expropriation	  also	  has	   the	  political	   effect	  of	  weakening	   the	  opposition.34	   Two	  great	  uprisings	  
constituted	  the	  death	  throes	  of	  violent	  anti-­‐colonialism	  until	  1954.	  “The	  great	  Algerian	  rising	  of	  
1871,	  precipitated	  both	  by	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  French	  troops	  during	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  and	  
the	   mass	   resettlement	   of	   Alsatians	   and	   Lorrainers	   in	   Algeria	   after	   it,	   is	   an	   analogous	  
phenomenon	   [to	   the	   Indian	   Rising	   of	   1857-­‐8]…a	   mass	   colonial	   rebellion	   of	   past	   against	  
present.”35	  	  The	  1881	  uprising	  marked	  the	  conquest	  of	  Algeria	  by	  the	  French.36	  
	   But	  “the	  cosmopolitan	  life	  of	  Algiers”	  bustled	  by	  1880	  with	  Italian	  and	  Spanish	  traders,	  
Jewish	   traders,	   uprooted	   peasants,	   and	   the	   French	   army	   “everywhere	   in	   evidence.”37	   No	  
multicultural	  paradise,	  Algiers	  was	  a	  site	  of	  rapine,	  opportunism,	  and	  exploitation;	  a	  “splendidly	  
barbarous	   parade,”	   Algiers	  was	   “schizophrenic”	  with	   cultural	   division,	   anarchic	  with	   poverty,	  
homelessness,	  violence,	  crime,	  and	   lost	  orphans.	  Algeria	  was	  a	  holding	  pen	   for	  criminals.	  The	  
“first	   fugueur”	   or	   “mad	   traveler,”	  Albert	  Dadas,	  was	   “sentenced	   to	   three	   years	   hard	   labor	   in	  
Algeria”	  for	  desertion	  in	  1882,	  having	  meandered	  unseen	  in	  the	  Algerian	  “province”	  for	  years.38	  




	   Although	  Algerians	  never	  capitulated,	  they	  never	  troubled	  the	  French	  order,	  which	  grew	  
only	  more	  entrenched	  and	  efficient	  in	  its	  sovereignty.	  “Although	  French	  colonial	  occupation	  of	  
the	   country	   provided	   the	   most	   potent	   stimulus	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   rural	   resistance	  
movements,	   social	   and	   economic	   conditions	   inherited	   from	   the	   pre-­‐French	   period	   impose[d]	  
considerable	   limits	   on	   these	   movements.”39	   Surely	   by	   the	   1870s	   capitalist	   growth	   and	   its	  
institutional	   and	   legal	   and	   proprietary	   institutionalization	  were	   doing	   as	  much	   conquering	   as	  
the	  French	  military	  forces.	  By	  then	  the	  marabout	  were	  cooperating	  with	  French,	  turning	  from	  
military	  territorialization	  to	  modernization	  –	  a	  reterritorialization	  of	  self	  from	  collective	  external	  
conflict	   to	   semi-­‐individuated	   internal	   struggle	   [jihad].	   An	   exemplary	   instance	   of	   Muslim	  
adaptation	  was	  the	  reformist	  progressivism	  of	  the	  shaykh	  of	  the	  al-­‐Hamil	  zawiyya	  and	  leader	  of	  
the	  Rahmaniyya	  Sufi	  tariqa,	  Muhammad	  ibn	  Abi	  al-­‐Qasim.40	  The	  political-­‐economic	  structure	  of	  
Algeria	   under	   Ottoman	   and	   threatened	   by	   French	   rule	   comprised	   decentralized	   Sufi	  
brotherhoods	   (turuq)	   astride	   highly	   organized	   and	   reliable	   religious	   and	   moral-­‐economic	  
institutions.	   Often	   led	   by	   a	   charismatic	   “saint”	   or	   ‘alim	   (a	   learned	   theological	   scholar),	   the	  
tariqa	   maintained	   schools,	   libraries,	   cultural	   records,	   and	   the	   “reciprocity,	   redistribution,	  
symmetry,	   and	   centricity”	   of	   a	   socially	   “embedded”	   economy	   –	   material	   production	   and	  
circulation	  “submerged	  in…social	  relations.”41	  	  	  
	   Simultaneously,	   from	   “1871-­‐1919,	   French	   colonial	   administrators	   extended	   their	  
political	   authority	   over	   religious	   institutions…by	   creating	   and	   appointing	   an	   official	   Muslim	  
clergy	   –	   [note]	   that	   an	   organized	   clergy	   had	   never	   existed	   before	   in	   Algeria	   –	   and	   then	   the	  
authorities	  determined	  that	  only	  they	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  pay	  this	  group	  of	  clergymen.”42	  As	  a	  




plasticity	   and	   adaptation	   of	   Islamic	   identity	   merit	   comment;	   Algeria’s	   Islamists	   maneuvering	  
challenges	   the	   High-­‐Low	   cultural	   dichotomy	   often	   said	   to	   fragment	  Muslims	   along	   rural	   and	  
urban,	   charismatic	   and	   literate/legalistic	   lines.44	   In	   post-­‐war	   retrenchment,	   a	   consolidated	  
apparatus	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   imperial	   domination,	   then,	   generated	   a	   strategic	   self-­‐
modification	   among	   Islamists	   and	   other	   groups.	   After	   wartime	   rigidification	   of	   identity,	   this	  
politics	  of	  artful	  dissimilation	  and	  hegemonic	  accommodation	  prepares	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  later	  
irruption	   of	   ideas,	   emotions,	   and	   actions	   among	   Algerians	   to	   re-­‐assert	   their	  multiplicity	   and	  
establish	  their	  public.	  	  	  
	   The	  French	  were	  conflicted	  in	  the	  seizure	  of	  imperial	  lands	  for	  Enlightenment	  objectives.	  
French	   Representative	   Baron	   Camille	   de	   la	   Ronciére	   Le	   Noury	   opened	   the	   2nd	   International	  
Congress	  of	  Geographical	  Sciences	  (1875)	  by	  declaring,	  “Gentlemen,	  Providence	  has	  dictated	  to	  
us	  the	  obligation	  of	  knowing	  the	  earth	  and	  making	  the	  conquest	  of	  it.	  This	  supreme	  command	  is	  
one	   of	   the	   imperious	   duties	   inscribed	   on	   our	   intelligence	   and	   on	   our	   activities.”45	   	   Such	  
triumphalism	   had	   odd	   lines	   of	   exception,	   such	   as	   a	   considerable	   readership	   of	   anarchist	  
publications	  among	  the	  colons.	  46	  French	  administrators	  were	  less	  ambivalent.	  In	  1881	  the	  code	  
de	   l’indigènat	   mandated	   the	   corvée,	   permitting	   the	   colons	   to	   conscript	   Algerians	   for	   civil	  
projects	   such	  as	   infrastructure;	   the	  “combination	  of	   systematic	  dispossession	  of	   their	   land	  by	  
legal	  machinations,	  higher	  taxation,	  and	  involuntary	  recruitment	  into	  forced	  labor	  reduced	  the	  
Algerian	  people,	  who	  had	  been	  primarily	  agriculturalists	  and	  pastoralists,	  from	  being	  owners	  of	  
their	  own	  communally	  owned	   farms	   into	   sharecropping.”47	  A	  distinction	  was	   institutionalized	  
between	   two	   types	   of	   land	   acquisition	   in	   one	   publicly	   funded	   system.	   Large	   land	   units	  were	  




indigenous	  Algerians.	  Smaller	  plots	  were	  sold	  with	  a	  quarter-­‐value	  down	  installment	  plan.	  The	  
large	   French	  units,	  with	  massively	   subsidized	   inputs,	   reached	  higher	  economies	  of	   scale	   than	  
the	   Algerian	   –	   respectively,	   7.24	   quintals/hectare	   hard	   wheat	   and	   6.58	   soft	   versus	   5.2	   and	  
5.07.48	  The	  imperial	  territorialization	  of	  Algeria	  has	  to	  be	  imagined	  physically	  as	  the	  spread	  of	  
vast,	  highly	  efficient,	  machine-­‐like	  farming	  areas	  pushing	  indigenous	  peoples	  off	  small	  plots	  and	  
increasingly	  into	  smaller,	  usually	  urban	  or	  poor	  sub-­‐urban	  dwellings.	  	  	  
Note	  that	  France,	  well	  into	  the	  colonization	  project,	  was	  itself	  still	  a	  developing	  country	  
by	   the	   usual	   criteria	   of	   étatiste	   centralization,	   institutionalization,	   and	   standardization.49	   The	  
extension	   of	   French	   development	   techniques,	   strategies,	   and	   ideologies	   from	   home	   to	   the	  
Algerian	  territory	  and	  population	  may	  account	  for	  its	  seeming	  naturalization	  among	  the	  colons.	  
Indeed,	   the	   French	   pacification	   of	   Algeria	   and	   subsequent	   assault	   on	   its	   cultural	   autonomy	  
directly	   re-­‐applied	   the	   Republic’s	   tactics	   in	   battling	   the	   Vendée.	   French	  military	   theorist	   and	  
leader	   Thomas-­‐Robert	   Bugeaud	   in	   the	   1830s	   found	   “his	   Algerian	   assignments	   provided	   an	  
opportunity	  to	  revive	  the	  principles	  of	  mobility,	  morale,	  and	  leadership,	  which	  he	  considered	  as	  
applicable	   to	  western	   France	   as	   to	   either	   Spain	   or	   North	   Africa.”50	   Similarly,	   cooptation	   and	  
secularization	  of	  Muslims	  and	  Islamic	  institutions	  replayed	  French	  policies	  in	  Vendée	  –	  following	  
the	  coercive	  and	  repressive	  techniques	  it	  innovated	  there	  and	  refined	  in	  Egypt.51	  Those	  policies,	  
which	   “made	   the	   Church	   a	   state	   agency,	   and	   the	   priests	   elected	   civil	   servants,”	   included	  
“abolition	  of	   the	   tithe,	   curtailment	  of	  other	   fiscal	   privileges,	   the	  abolition	  of	   religious	  orders,	  
the	   confiscation	   of	   church	   lands,”	   “reorganization	   of	   the	   territorial	   divisions	   of	   the	   French	  
church	  to	  correspond	  to	  new	  civil	  divisions,”	  “fixed	  clerical	  salaries	  paid	  by	  the	  government.”52	  	  




French	   imperialism,	   in	   this	   light.53	  That	  unified	  whole	  was	   the	  means	   to	   ramifying	   the	  French	  
and	  Algerian	   fates	   into	  developed/underdeveloped	  but	  my	  concern	  here	   is	   to	  note	   the	  crude	  
state	  machineries	   in	  play	   in	   this	  period,	   relative	   to	   the	  Fourth	  Republic	   in	   the	  1950s	  and	   the	  
Algerian	  regime	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  	  	  
	   By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  paired	  dilemmas	  common	  in	  empires	  plagued	  French	  control	  
and	  Algerian	  defiance.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  “the	  scarcity	  of	  whites	  made	  it	  essential	  to	  use	  natives	  
on	  a	  large	  scale	  to	  administer	  and	  overawe	  them	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  rulers,	  and	  these	  had	  in	  any	  
case	  to	  administer	  through	  the	  already	  existing	  local	  institutions,	  at	  least	  at	  the	  local	  level.	   	  In	  
other	  words,	  they	  faced	  the	  dual	  problem	  of	  creating	  a	  body	  of	  assimilated	  natives	  to	  take	  the	  
place	  of	  white	  men	  and	  of	  bending	  the	  traditional	  institutions	  of	  the	  countries,	  often	  far	  from	  
suitable	  to	  their	  purposes…The	  indigenous	  peoples	  confronted	  the	  challenge	  of	  westernization	  
as	   something	   much	   more	   complex	   than	   mere	   resistance…In	   French	   Algeria,	   resistance	   was	  
centered	  in	  the	  Moslem	  clergy	  (oulema)	  who	  were	  already	  organizing,	  while	  the	  secular	  évolués	  
tried	   to	   become	   Frenchmen	   of	   the	   republican	   left.”54	   The	   logic	   of	   imperialism	   reversed	   the	  
centralization	   scheme	   eliminating	   middle	   or	   native	   social	   power,	   just	   as	   colonial	   hegemony	  
came	   under	   ideological	   challenge.	   By	   WWI	   “the	   parallel	   between	   localized	   discontent	   and	  
global	   crisis	  was	  not	   coincidental…The	  colonized	  observed	  an	   international	   system	  that	   could	  
not	  maintain	  the	  peace,	  a	  war	  that	  in	  pitting	  Europeans	  against	  each	  other	  destroyed	  the	  myth	  
of	  white	  racial	  solidarity,	  and	  a	  capitalist	  system	  that	  could	  not	  prevent	  precipitous	  worldwide	  
declines	   in	  employment	  and	  production.	   In	   justifying	  colonialism,	  Europeans	  argued	  that	  they	  
dominated	   the	   world	   because	   they	   were	   morally	   intellectually,	   and	   culturally	   as	   well	   as	  




contradicted	  their	  claims,	  the	  less	  credible	  and	  the	  more	  hypocritical	  and	  narrowly	  self-­‐serving	  
appeals	  to	  civilizational	  superiority	  became.55	  	  
	   Revulsion	   at	  WWI’s	   irrationality	   further	   discredited	   French	   prestige	   among	   Algerians.	  
France	   recruited	   300,000	   Algerian	   Muslims	   to	   military	   and	   factory	   work	   with	   the	  
“understanding	   –	   encouraged	   by	   Prime	   Minister	   Georges	   Clemenceu’s	   comments	   in	   1914,	  
1917,	  and	  again	  in	  1919	  –	  that	  the	  Muslim	  majority	  would	  participate	  more	  actively	  in	  Algerian	  
and	   French	   electoral	   politics	   after	   the	   war,”	   when	   France	   would	   stop	   conditioning	   Algerian	  
enfranchisement	   on	   religious	   abjuration.56	   “Clemenceau	   strongly	   implied	   that	   French	  
citizenship	  would	  soon	  be	  granted	  without	  altering	  the	  Muslims’	  personal	  status,”	  but	  France’s	  
1919	  reform	  predicated	  Algerian	  naturalization	  on	  Muslim	  tergiversation.57	  Blum’s	  ascendance	  
did	  not	  augur	  well.	  His	  “first	  act,	  as	  a	  chef	  de	  cabinet	   in	   the	  1914	  Union	  Sacrée	  government,	  
was	  to	  betray	  the	  Socialists’	  solemn	  pre-­‐war	  promise	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  mutual	  slaughter	  
of	  the	  Great	  War.	  In	  1925,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Rif	  colonial	  war,	  he	  informed	  the	  Assembly	  that	  
there	   was	   ‘not	   only	   a	   right,	   but	   a	   duty	   for	   what	   are	   known	   as	   the	   superior	   races	   to	   draw	  
towards	   themselves	   the	   races	   which	   have	   not	   attained	   the	   same	   degree	   of	   culture	   and	  
civilization.’”58	  By	  the	  end	  of	  WWI	  the	  colons	  and	  French	  were	  disparaging	  indigenous	  Algerians	  
as	  bicots	  and	  ratons	  (rats).59	  	  
	   Beginning	  in	  the	  1920s	  French	  and	  Algerians	  burst	  into	  creative	  political	  activity.	  French	  
and	   pieds	   noir	   politics	   ranged	   from	   communist	   to	   fascist,	   the	   former	   debating	   but	   rejecting	  
Algerian	  independence.60	  Algerian	  Muslim	  civil	  society	  also	  relaxed	  its	  strictures,	  opening	  a	  rich	  
discourse	   about	   independence,	   economics,	   nationalism,	   religiosity,	   secularism	   –	   again,	   a	   civil	  




indigenous	  public	   life.	   Sheikh	  Abd	  al-­‐Hamid	   ibn	  Badis,	   or	  Ben	  Badis,	   the	   central	   figure	  of	   the	  
‘ulema	   who	   accepted	   the	   salafi	   message,	   led	   the	   Islamist	   reformists	   who	   –	   following	  
Muhammad	  Abduh	  and	  his	  follower	  Rashid	  Rida	  –	  condemned	  “adulteration	  of	  their	  values	  by	  
Western	   thought,”	   “focused	   on	   the	   ills	   from	  which	   their	   society	   suffered,	   and	   proceeded	   to	  
elaborate	   ways	   to	   remedy	   them	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   Islam.”61	   Ben	   Badis	   mobilized	   “to	  
promote	   a	   reformed,	   scripturalist	   and	   puritan	   Islam	   and	   the	   revival	   of	   Arabic	   language	   and	  
culture,”	   a	   goal	   that	   after	   a	   decade	   of	   activity	   culminated	   in	   the	   Association	   des	   Ouléma	  
d’Algérie	   (1931).62	   The	   principal	   rivals	   of	   these	   ‘ulema	   were	   Ferhat	   Abbas’s	   Jeune	   Algérien	  
movement	  which	  favored	  equal	  rights	  under	  realized	  French	  values	  (egalité)	  and	  sovereignty63;	  
murabit;	   the	   communists	   (PF);	   and	   Messali	   Hadj’s	   militant	   nationalist	   Etoile	   Nord-­‐Africaine	  
(ENA).64	   Aggressive	   attacks	   on	   the	   ENA	   –	   founded	   1926,	   dissolved	   twice	   (1929,	   1937),	   and	  
reconstituted	  as	  he	  Parti	  du	  Peuple	  Algérien	  (1937)	  –	  foreshadowed	  France-­‐Algerian	  hostilities	  
suspended	   by	  WWII.65	   These	   groups	   were	   articulate,	   organized,	   partisan,	   and	   cosmopolitan.	  	  
The	   AOA,	   for	   example,	   founded	   several	   periodicals	   [al-­‐muntaqid	   (critic),	   1925;	   al-­‐shihab	  
(shooting	   star),	   1926;	   and	  La	  Défense,	   193466]	   and	   the	  Tijanniya	  proselytizer	  Muhammad	  bin	  
Abd	  al-­‐Malik	  al-­‐Alami	  influenced	  –	  in	  typically	  anti-­‐parochial	  Algerian	  fashion	  –	  the	  Palestinian	  
Islamist	  nationalist	  and	  populist	  ‘Izz	  al-­‐Din	  al	  Qassam,	  agitator	  against	  Zionist	  settlement,	  British	  
complicity,	  and	  Palestinian	  elitism.67	  	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  resumption	  of	  world	  war,	  then,	  Algerian	  
political	  life	  had	  thrown	  off	  its	  static	  conformity	  for	  a	  fragmental,	  agitated	  civics.	  
	   Blum’s	   first	   act,	   as	   a	   chef	   de	   cabinet	   in	   the	   1914	   Union	   Sacrée	   government,	   was	   to	  
betray	   the	  Socialists’	  pre-­‐war	  promise	  not	   to	  participate	   in	   the	  mutual	  slaughter	  of	   the	  Great	  




he	  harnesses	  his	  sympathy	  for	  “its	  poorest	  men”	  to	  depict	  Algeria	  as	  a	  society	  divided	  into	  still	  
youthful	  children.	  During	  the	  War,	  French	  Minister	  of	  Colonies	  Pleven	  intoned,	  “The	  loyalty	  of	  
these	  native	  peoples	  means	  for	  us	  great	  responsibilities…A	  new	  phase	  in	  our	  colonial	  life	  must	  
begin.	  It	  is	  a	  matter…of	  pursuing	  the	  conquest	  of	  hearts.”68	  This	  was	  partly	  a	  reply	  to	  organized	  
Algerian	  resistance.	  Following	  the	  discrediting	  fall	  of	  France	  in	  1940,	  the	  liberation	  of	  Algeria	  in	  
1942,	   and	   unification	   of	   Algerian	   anti-­‐imperialist	   activists,	   “the	   growing	  militancy	   of	   Algerian	  
nationalism	  was	  expressed	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Amis	  du	  Manifeste	  de	  la	  Liberté	  on	  14	  March	  
1944	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Sétif.”69	  The	  “conquest	  of	  hearts”	  was	  already	  a	  chimera	  at	  war’s	  end	  with	  
the	  riots	  and	  massacres	  at	  Sétif,	  Guelma,	  and	  Kherrata	  on	  8	  May	  1945.70	  Starting	  1	  May	  1945	  
Ferhat	  Abbas’s	  coalition	  of	  Amis	  du	  Manifeste	  de	  la	  Liberté	  and	  the	  banned	  PPA	  had	  protested	  
for	  independence.	  The	  French	  violently	  threatened	  Algerian	  demonstrators	  who	  then	  viciously	  
attacked	   Europeans,	   unleashing	   monstrous	   French	   repression.	   “8	   May	   means	   two	   different	  
things.	   In	   France,	   it	  means	   the	   jubilation	  of	   the	   Liberation.	   In	  Algeria,	   it	  means	   the	  horror	  of	  
repression…That	   was	   the	   day	   the	   Algerian	   war	   began.”71	   Between	   fifteen	   and	   forty-­‐five	  
thousand	  natives	  were	  massacred.	  “[W]hile	  the	  Nurenberg	  Tribunal	  was	  still	   fresh	   in	  people’s	  
minds,	  the	  French	  colonial	  administration	  in	  Algeria	  had	  [killed]	  45,000	  Algerians	  at	  Sétif	  to	  set	  
‘an	  example.’	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Nuremberg	  judgments	  could	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  
Third	  World.	   	   For	   they	   were	   not	   really	   human	   beings.”72	   As	   Hélène	   Cixous,	   born	   in	   Oran	   to	  
Ashkenazi	  German	  refugees,	  recalled	  poetically:	  	  
	  
We	  always	   lived	   in	   the	  episodes	  of	   a	  brutal	  Algeria,	   thrown	   from	  birth	   into	  one	  of	   the	   camps	  
crudely	  fashioned	  by	  the	  demon	  of	  Coloniality.	  One	  said:	  ‘the	  Arabs’;	  ‘the	  French.’	  And	  one	  was	  
forcibly	  played	  in	  the	  play,	  with	  a	  false	  identity.	  Caricature-­‐camps.	  The	  masks	  hold	  forth	  with	  the	  





	   Postwar	  French	  imperialism	  remained	  tenacious	  not	  only	  for	  materialist,	  nationalist,	  and	  
racist	   reasons	   but	   also	   because	   “the	   humiliating	   defeat	   of	   1940	   and	   the	   subsequent	   use	   of	  
North	  Africa	  as	  a	  retreat	  and	  reinvasion	  point	  made	  French	  physical	  presence	  there	  emotionally	  
and	  militarily	  vital	  to	  many	  Frenchmen.”74	  Epitomized	  by	  a	  century	  of	  educational	  reforms	  that	  
testified	  to	  French	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  Algerians	  into	  elite	  administration,	  further	  qualifications	  
to	   French	   racism	   emerged	   from	   novel	   post-­‐war	   citizenship	   policies.75	   In	   1947	   the	   National	  
Assembly	   passed	   the	   “Statute	   on	   Algeria”	   which	   defined	   the	   country	   as	   “a	   group	   of	  
departments	  endowed	  with	  a	  civic	  personality,	  financial	  autonomy,	  and	  a	  special	  organization”	  
–	  an	  Algerian	  Assembly	  with	  two	  colleges,	  one	  Muslim	  and	  one	  mixed.76	  “Muslims	  were	  finally	  
considered	  full	  French	  citizens	  with	  the	  right	   to	  keep	  their	  personal	  Qur’anic	  status	  and	  were	  
granted	  the	  right	  to	  work	  in	  France	  without	  further	  formalities.	  Military	  territories	  in	  the	  south	  
would	   be	   abolished	   and	   Arabic	   would	   become	   the	   language	   of	   instruction	   at	   all	   levels.”77	  
Indeed,	  until	  1962	  Algerian	  immigrants	  automatically	  received	  citizenship	  on	  jus	  soli	  nationality	  
criteria	  regarding	  Algeria	  France	  and	  Algerians	  French.78	  But	  such	  measures	  expressed	  refusal,	  
not	   recognition,	   of	   Algerian	   independence,	   a	   stubbornness	   perhaps	   linked	   to	   colonial	  
“mediocrity	   –	   a	   kind	   of	   etiolation,	   if	   one	   can	   call	   it	   that,	   produced	   by	   administrative	  
consanguinity.”79	   Arendt,	   bearing	   witness,	   remarked:	   “The	   French	   incorporated	   Algeria	   as	   a	  
province	  of	  the	  mother	  country,	  but	  could	  not	  bring	  themselves	  to	  impose	  their	  own	  laws	  upon	  
Arab	  people.	  They	  continued	  rather	  to	  respect	  Islamic	  law	  and	  granted	  their	  citizens	  ‘personal	  
status,’	  producing	  the	  nonsensical	  hybrid	  of	  a	  nominally	  French	  territory,	  legally	  as	  much	  a	  part	  




	   Arab	  nationalism	  emerged	  in	  the	  1950s,	  an	  international	  re-­‐coding	  of	  the	  particular	  Arab	  
peoples	  into	  an	  ambiguously	  ummatic	  universal	  nation.81	  Nasser’s	  1952	  revolution	  traumatized	  
the	   “west.”	  On	   20	  August	   1953	  Moroccan	   Sultan	   Sidi	  Mohammed	  Ben	   Youssef	  was	   deposed	  
and	   exiled	   by	   the	   French,	   spurring	   a	   “steady	   wave	   of	   urban	   terrorism	   and	   guerrilla	   attacks	  
aimed	  at	  French	  settlers.	  The	  same	  violent	  unrest	  was	  spreading	  to	  Tunisia,	  the	  oldest	  French	  
protectorate	   in	   North	   Africa…By	   the	   end	   of	   1955	   the	   French…were	   ready	   to	   grant	   broad	  
autonomy	  evolving	  rapidly	  into	  full	  independence	  to	  Morocco	  and	  Tunisia	  in	  March	  1956,	  while	  
vowing	   to	   hold	   firm	   on	   Algeria.”82	   Similar,	   disruptive	   state-­‐	   building	   and	   economic	  
modernization	   efforts	   in	   Iraq,	   Saudi	   Arabia,	   Syria,	   Jordan,	   and	   Palestine	   spurred	   episodic	  
popular	  uprisings,	  but	  in	  “countries	  that	  had	  fallen	  under	  foreign	  rule,	  such	  as	  Algeria	  and	  India,	  
Muslims’	   reactions	   were	   more	   militant	   and	   more	   sustained.”83	   Algerian	   grievances	   by	   1954	  
were	   beyond	   colonial	   redress.	   Recall	   that	   French	   imperialism	   had	   achieved	   comprehensive	  
alienation	  of	  land	  from	  indigenous	  peoples	  (1830-­‐1880);	  commercialization,	  capitalization,	  and	  
exportation	  of	  agriculture	  (1880-­‐1939)84;	  infrastructural,	  extractive,	  and	  industrial	  development	  
fostering	  widespread	  poverty,	  dependence,	  and	  a	  “small	  Algerian	  working	  class	  concentrated	  in	  
mining	   and	   services”	   (1900-­‐1954).85	   As	   Germaine	   Tillion	   lamented,	   “[T]hough	   [the	   Algerians]	  
have	  always	  loyally	  stood	  by	  us	  in	  our	  hours	  of	  peril,	  they	  have	  almost	  always	  	  –	  or	  at	  least	  more	  
often	  than	  not	  –	  been	  excluded	  from	  our	  successes	  and	  good	  fortunes,	  and	  that	  is	  certainly	  the	  
principal	   cause	   of	   the	   present	   tragedy.”86	   	   Of	   the	   1.2	  million	   non	  muslims	   and	   eight	  million	  
Muslims,	  she	  recorded,	  there	  were	  19,700	  settlers	  of	  whom	  7,432	  own	  less	  than	  25	  acres:	  	  “The	  
‘real	   settlers’	  number	  about	  12,000,	  of	  whom	  300	  are	   rich	  and	  a	  dozen	  or	   so	  extremely	   rich:	  	  




together.”	  The	  Algerians,	  in	  contrast,	  were	  bitterly	  impoverished	  and	  “it	  is	  here	  that	  the	  words	  
which	  have	  engendered	  the	  rebellion	  assume	  their	  true	  significance,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  here	  that	  we	  
can	  hear	  them:	  ‘Why	  should	  we	  keep	  on	  being	  your	  inferiors?	  Why	  can’t	  we	  belong	  to	  both	  the	  
Arab	   world	   and	   to	   the	   West?	   Why	   must	   we	   earn	   lower	   salaries?	   	   Why	   is	   our	   condition	  
necessarily	  one	  of	  contempt?...‘All	  I	  ask	  is	  to	  choose	  my	  own	  death.’”87	  	  
	   Following	   Dien	   Bien	   Phu,	   on	   1	   Nov	   1954	   FLN’s	   attacks	   in	   the	   Aurès	   drew	   fervent	  
demands	  to	  protect	  French	  colons	  in	  Algeria.	  On	  12	  Nov	  1954,	  Minister	  of	  the	  Interior	  François	  
Mitterrand	  declared	  to	  the	  Parliament,	  “I	  will	  not	  agree	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  enemies	  of	  the	  
homeland.	  The	  only	  negotiation	   is	  war!”	  On	   that	  day,	  Pierre	  Mendès-­‐France	   “stated	   that	   the	  
government	  would	  never	  agree	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  compromise.”88	  Algerian	  nationalists	  pushed	  “the	  
Algeria	  question”	  onto	  10th	  General	  Assembly	  UN	  agenda	   in	  1955,	   prompting	   French	   Foreign	  
Minister	  Antoine	  Pinay	  to	  walk	  out.89	  Despite	  the	   infamous	  1954	  start-­‐date,	  the	  “savage	  war”	  
did	   not	   start	   until	   the	   20	   August	   1955	   Philippeville	   massacre	   in	   which	   123	   colons	   were	  
slaughtered,	   prompting	   a	   massive	   retaliation.	   French	   tenacity	   was	   rooted	   in	   domestic	   elite	  
contestation	  within	  Fourth	  Republic	  politics	  –	  especially	  divisive	  parties’	  emboldening	  extremist	  
irredentists	   and	   weakening	   civilian	   leverage	   against	   the	   military.90	   In	   Algeria	   “fighting	   was	  
generalized	  throughout	  the	  country”	  among	  Algerian	  factions	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  latter	  and	  
French	  occupation	  forces;	  it	  is	  true	  that	  “supporters	  of	  the	  FLN	  and	  Messali	  Hadj’s	  Mouvement	  
National	   Algérien	   (MNA)	   fought	   each	   other	   throughout	   the	   war,	   leaving	   more	   than	   ten	  
thousand	  dead	  and	  twenty-­‐five	  thousand	  wounded	  in	  France	  and	  Algeria.”91	  The	  revolution	  was	  
indeed	  a	  coercive,	  brutal	  affair	  internally,	  in	  which	  France-­‐Muslim	  polarization	  and	  intra-­‐native-­‐




diversity	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  war93,	  holding	  their	  heterogeneity	  in	  abeyance.94	  The	  Algerian	  uprising	  
created	   a	   cohesive	  war	   apparatus	   to	   counter	   the	   integration	   of	   fragmented	   Algerian	   objects	  
into	  the	  colonial	  state	  apparatus.	  
	   With	   implications	   for	   the	   durability	   of	   their	   ideological	   tradition,	   the	   French	   military	  
encompassed	  a	  series	  of	  legal	  re-­‐codings	  and	  physical	  re-­‐territorializations.	  
	  	  
[T]he	  Special	  Powers	  Law	  of	  March	  16,	  1956	  permitted	  the	  prefect	  of	  Algiers	  to	  delegate	  to	  the	  
military	  exceptional	  authority	  beyond	  ordinary	  police	  powers.[95]	  These	  powers,	  as	  exercised	  in	  
the	   circumstances	   prevailing	   in	   Algiers	   in	   early	   1957,	   opened	   the	   door	   to	   the	   practice	   of	  
torture…In	  Algiers	  the	  paratroopers	  arrested	  and	  detained	  for	  questioning	  hundreds	  of	  men	  and	  
women	  suspected	  of	  nothing	  more	  than	  possessing	  useful	  information.	  	  The	  key	  provision	  in	  the	  
Special	  Powers	  Law,	  and	  in	  some	  respects	  the	  key	  to	  much	  of	  the	  controversy	  over	  the	  Battle	  of	  
Algiers,	  was	  the	  authority	  to	  intern	  suspects,	  the	  right	  of	  assignation	  à	  résidence	   [house	  arrest	  
(S.R.)].	   	   In	  effect,	  a	  prefecture	  official’s	  signature	  on	  an	  order	  of	  internment	  regularized	  arrests	  
to	  which	  no	   judicial	   authority	   had	   given	   approval.	   Requests	   for	   orders	   of	   internment	  were	   to	  
follow	  immediately	  on	  the	  arrests	  of	  suspected	  terrorists.	  	  And	  the	  paratroopers	  were	  supposed	  
to	   hand	   over	   expeditiously	   for	   internment	   suspects	   for	  whom	   a	   case	   for	   detention	   had	   been	  
made.	  But	  the	  Algerians	  who	  actually	  ended	  up	  in	  internment	  camps	  could	  consider	  themselves	  
fortunate	  indeed.	  Those	  who	  aroused	  the	  army’s	  interest	  ran	  the	  greatest	  risk	  when	  they	  were	  
in	  the	  hands	  of	  its	  specialists	  in	  interrogation.	  Many	  in	  the	  custody	  of	  the	  paratroops,	  subjected	  
to	  endless	  interrogations,	  found	  their	  internment	  repeatedly	  delayed.	  	  Many	  never	  reached	  the	  
internment	  camps	  at	  all,	  but	  disappeared.96	  	  	  
	  
In	  short,	   in	   the	  camps,	   torture	  was	   legally,	  morally,	  and	  strategically	   legitimized.97	  Emergency	  
conditions	  required	  suspension	  of	   law,	  mass	  arrests,	   torture,	  executions,	  disappearances,	  and	  
camps	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  order.98	  It	  matters	  that	  torture	  was	  not	  the	  worst	  the	  French	  considered	  
and	  not	  to	  be	  isolated	  from	  broader	  colonial	  coercion.99	  For	  instance,	  the	  French	  General	  Massu	  
claimed	  the	  pieds	  noirs	  were	  preparing	  to	  subvert	  the	  police	  and	  military	  if	  they	  did	  not	  defeat	  
the	  FLN,	  and	  launch	  an	  all-­‐out	  attack	  by	  flooding	  with	  gas	  and	  burning	  the	  entire	  Casbah	  –	  with	  
its	  70,000	  population	  –	  to	  a	  crisp.100	  Still,	  atrocious	  prisoner	  conditions	  were	  perpetuated	  with	  




inmates	   of	   a	   relocation	   camp	   crouching	   to	   drink	   from	   a	   gutter	   into	  which	   cistern	  water	   had	  
been	  emptied.	  Had	   they	  been	  animals	   they	  would	  have	  been	   led	   to	  a	  watering	   tough.”101	  He	  
added,	  “One	  of	  our	  army	  units,	  whose	  name	  is	  on	  everyone’s	  lips	  yet	  no	  one	  dares	  denounce,	  
subjects	  the	  rebels	  to	  torture	  by	  electrodes	  and	   immersion	  to	  obtain	   information.”102	   In	  1958	  
women	  were	  searched	  and	  tortured	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  an	  astounding	  violation	  of	  war	  norms.103	  
It	  is	  worth	  pausing	  over	  French	  reaction	  to	  its	  actions	  in	  this	  period,	  particularly	  the	  lax	  
and	  ambivalent	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  confronted	  its	  own	  atrocities.	  On	  one	  level,	  a	  surreal	  war	  of	  
position	  was	   fought	  over	   the	   legal	   status	  of	   torture	  and	  combat	  malice.	  Throughout	   the	  war,	  
uncertainty	   about	   law	  and	   sovereignty	   surrounding	   France-­‐in-­‐Algeria	   at	   this	   time;	   specifically	  
whether	  France	  was	  fighting	  a	  “war”	  subject	  to	  international	  jurisdiction	  or	  a	  political	  uprising	  
among	  its	  subject	  citizens.104	  In	  addition,	  as	  late	  as	  1959	  France	  was	  disseminating	  pacific	  and	  
harmonious	   images	   of	   progress	   and	   stability	   in	  Algeria.105	  De	  Gaulle’s	   landmark	   16	   Sep	   1959	  
speech	  broadening	   the	   spectrum	  of	   possible	   settlement	   arrangements	   –	   excluding	   French	  oil	  
holdings	   –	   augured	   well	   for	   Arab-­‐Algerian	   independence.106	   Amidst	   the	   savagery	   of	   the	   war	  
(Horne	  estimates	  one	  million	  Algerians	  killed),	  de	  Gaulle’s	  indecision	  or	  evasiveness	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  a	  seemingly	  obvious	  impasse	  seems	  utterly	  bizarre.	  As	  one	  observer	  put	  it:	  
	  
[S]o	   long	  as	   the	   colonial	  power	  was	  unwilling	   to	  allow	   the	   same	   institutional	   ground	   rules	   for	  
power	  sharing	   in	  the	  colonies	  as	  were	  used	  at	  home,	  they	  could	  not	  retain	   legitimacy.	   	  As	  the	  
events	  of	  the	  late	  1950s	  revealed,	  for	  example,	  the	  Fourth	  French	  Republic	  could	  not	  square	  the	  
circle	   and	   institute	   for	   Algeria	   a	   set	   of	   democratic	   reforms	   that	   it	   enjoyed	   at	   home	   without	  
encountering	  one	  of	  these	  originally	  unacceptable	  outcomes:	  	  losing	  the	  colony	  in	  free	  elections,	  
having	  an	  unacceptably	  large	  number	  of	  Algerian	  deputies	  sitting	  in	  the	  French	  parliament	  (the	  
“integration”	   it	   claimed	   to	   stand	   for),	   and	   ceding	   rule	   in	   the	   colony	   to	   the	   Arab	  majority,	   or	  





	   De	  Gaulle	  showed	  consternation	  over	  France’s	  intentions	  for	  Algérie	  française,	  wavering	  
between	  a	  broader	  African	  expansion	  and	  a	  narrower	  Algerian	  accommodation.108	  He	  seems	  to	  
have	  vaguely	  conceived	  and	  orchestrated,	  if	  fleetingly,	  colonial	  stabilization	  or	  even	  hegemonic	  
expansion	  via	  collaborative	  modernization.109	  As	  this	  vacillation	  at	  the	  top	  showed	  movement	  
toward	  concessions,	  France	  internalized	  the	  war.110	  Unwittingly	  facilitating	  enemy	  recruitment,	  
	  
[a]s	   the	   FLN	   campaign	   hit	   a	   peak	   in	   1960,	   the	   Paris	   authorities	   launched	   a	   counter-­‐offensive,	  
adopting	  methods	  that	  had	  proven	  so	  successful	   in	  Algeria.	  A	  small	  group	  of	   ‘loyal’	  harkis	  was	  
created	  in	  the	  capital	  to	  track	  down	  FLN	  operatives…Within	  less	  than	  a	  year	  the	  harkis	  suffered	  
twenty-­‐four	   dead	   and	   sixty-­‐seven	  wounded,	   but	   the	   results	   seemed	   to	   pay	  off…[F]rom	   spring	  
1960	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  nearly	  1,200	  terrorists	  were	  rounded	  up.111	  	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   systematic	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   reaction,	   French	   nationalists	   carried	   out	  
symbolic	  assassinations	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  independence,	  precipitated	  by	  progress	  in	  the	  Evian	  talks.	  
“The	  whole	  horror	  and	  absurdity	  of	  those	  years	  of	  violence	  and	  terror,”	  Bourdieu	  writes,	  “are	  
somehow	  condensed	   in	   the	  savage	  execution	  of	   [Mouloud	  Feraoun]	  and	  his	   friends	   from	  the	  
Centres	  Sociaux	  by	  a	  group	  of	  OAS	  killers,	  on	  March	  morning	  in	  1962,	  only	  a	  few	  days	  before	  the	  
ceasefire	  that	  was	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.”112	  	  As	  one	  thousand	  five	  hundred	  “terrorists”	  
inhabited	  Fresnes	  prison	  we	  might	  conclude	  that	  internment	  camps	  were	  indigenized	  to	  French	  
soil.	   Ultimately,	   the	   French	   counter-­‐revolution	   “failed,	   partly	   because	   of	   the	   obstinate	   non-­‐
cooperation	  of	   indigenous	  French	  inhabitants,	  partly	  because	  the	  French	  people	  made	  it	  clear	  
that	  they	  were	  unwilling	  to	  support	  another	  prolonged	  colonial	  war	  involving	  unsavory	  means,	  
and	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  irreconcilable	  dilemma	  implied	  by	  their	  slogan,	  l’Algérie	  française.”113	  
At	  independence,	  Algerians’	  strategies	  for	  reconciling	  the	  diverse	  interests	  and	  identities	  




victory.	   Three	   contestants	   for	   power:	   the	   Provisional	   Government	   of	   the	   Algerian	   Republic	  
(GPRA);	  the	  wilaya	  commands	  (six	  generals	  of	  the	  military	  regions);	  external	  army,	  the	  National	  
Liberation	  Army	   (ALN).	   “At	   issue	  were	  wartime	  misdemeanors,	   ideology,	  ethnic	  and	  clan	   ties,	  
loyalties	   to	   specific	   individuals,	   and	   competing	   perspectives	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   post-­‐
independence	   Algerian	   society.	   At	   stake	   was	   the	   very	   center	   of	   political	   power	   in	   the	  
society.”115	  In	  May	  1962,	  the	  Tripoli	  Program	  elected	  a	  political	  bureau	  of	  the	  FLN	  and	  drew	  up	  
political-­‐economic	  plans	  with	  had	  three	  major	  goals:	  modernizing	  agriculture,	  decolonizing	  the	  
economy,	  and	  socialist-­‐industrial	  economic	  development.	  	  
From	  1962,	  Algerian	  party-­‐military	  rule	  established	  a	  rigorously	  methodical	  clientelistic,	  
top-­‐down,	  discretionary	   regime	   committed	   to	  eliminating	   alternative	   sources	  of	   social	   power	  
and	  integrating	  non-­‐state	  actors	  into	  the	  centralizing	  state	  through	  what	  Lowi	  calls	  patrimonial	  
distribution	  of	  oil-­‐wealth.	  Citizen	  and	  state	  bargaining	  often	  resulted	   in	  paralyzing	   inertia,	  but	  
the	  state	  repressed	  social	  conflict	   immediately	  and	  enduringly.	   It	   is	  significant	  that	  “complete	  
civil	  war	  between	  loyal	  ALN	  forces	  and	  dissident	  wilaya	   leaders	  was	  averted	  partly	  because	  of	  
mass	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  fighting	  organized	  by	  the	  [Union	  Général	  des	  Travailleurs],	  or	  
UGTA.”116	  As	  with	  the	  Islamists,	  such	  early	  demonstrations	  of	  potential	  state-­‐threatening	  social	  
power	  caused	  rulers	  concern	  and	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  of	  hierarchic	  governance	  committed	  to	  
minimizing	   labor	  actions	  and	   integrating	   Islamist	  activists.	   In	  general	   terms	  the	  corresponding	  
economic	  program,	  in	  part	  to	  assimilate	  potentially	  disruptive	  workers	  and	  Islamists,	  would	  be	  
to	   pursue	   import-­‐substituting	   capital-­‐intensive	   industrialization,	   urban-­‐biased	   infrastructure	  
and	  distribution	  of	  side	  payments	  to	  popular	  classes,	  and	  legal	  outlays	  to	  constituent	  claimants	  




semi-­‐officially	   as	   “state	   capitalism,”	   financed	   by	   mineral	   receipts	   and	   heavy	   commercial	  
borrowing	  –	  their	  particular	  version	  of	  a	  broad	  trend	  in	  developmental	  state	  investment.	  There	  
seems	   to	   be	   little	   doubt	   among	   otherwise	   contentious	   scholars	   about	   the	   commitment	   of	  
Algeria’s	   ruling	   elites	   to	   “revolutionary”	   nationalist	   public	   policies,	   especially	   some	   form	   of	  
equality,	   although	   the	   coercive	   means	   toward	   this	   end	   were	   evident	   early	   as	   was	   the	  
construction	  of	   a	   political	   economy	   largely	   to	   fragment,	   isolate,	   and	  privatize	   the	   population	  
into	  interest	  group-­‐oriented	  identities	  responsive	  to	  individuated	  state	  and	  military	  leaders.	  	  
	   The	  objective	  of	  import-­‐substituting	  production,	  accumulation,	  and	  re-­‐distribution	  was,	  
then,	  economic,	  social,	  statist,	  and	  nationalist:	  “to	  promote	  economic	  diversification	  by	  building	  
new	  skills	  within	  the	  workforce,	  to	  capture	  for	  national	  purposes	  the	  value	  added	  in	  processing	  
that	   had	   heretofore	   accrued	   to	   the	   advanced	   industrial	   nations,	   and	   to	   reduce	   the	   states’	  
dependency	  upon	  unstable	  world	  markets	  for	  primary	  produce.”117	  Algeria	  thus	  nationalized	  its	  
industries,	   taking	   “majority	   ownership	   of	   its	   French-­‐built	   industry	   in	   February	   1971,”118	   and	  
monopolizing	  its	  mineral	  deposits	  in	  state	  coffers	  for	  leverage	  with	  citizens.	  Beginning	  in	  1966,	  
SONATRACH	   established	   partnerships	   with	   nine	   oilfield	   service	   firms	   [under	   terms	   ensuring]	  
that	  in	  the	  period	  during	  which	  the	  foreign	  firm	  realizes	  its	  profit	  –	  about	  15	  years	  –	  technology	  
and	   know-­‐how	   [were]	   localized.	   By	   first	   nationalizing	   the	   technical	   structure	   serving	   the	   oil	  
industry,	  Algeria	  was	  able	  to	  acquire	  100	  percent	  ownership	  of	  the	  exploration	  and	  production	  
companies	   by	   1974	   and	   achieve	   almost	   total	   control	   of	   operations.	   Dependence	   on	   foreign	  
sources	  of	  exploration	  and	  production	  technology	  was	  reduced	  or	  eliminated.119	  





In	   Algeria	   the	   problem	  of	   intra-­‐elite	   conflict	   has	   dominated	   internal	   politics	   during	   the	   entire	  
period	   from	   1954-­‐1968.	   There	   has	   been	   a	   constant	   turnover	   in	   top	   political	   leadership	   and	  
political	   careers	   are	   made	   and	   unmade	   with	   great	   rapidity…Rather	   than	   developing	   into	   a	  
‘political	  class’	   that	   jealously	  guards	   its	  prerogatives	  and	  power,	   the	  Algerian	  political	  elite	  has	  
been	   composed	   of	   numerous	   clans,	   factions,	   and	   cliques,	   none	   of	   which	   has	   been	   powerful	  
enough	  to	  dominate	  the	  entire	  political	  system.120	  
	  
This	  elite-­‐level	  disunity	  produced	  two	  related	  class-­‐political	  trends.	  The	  first	  was	  to	  precocious-­‐
Keynesian	  settling	  of	  elite	  conflicts	  through	  side-­‐payments	  to	  constituents,	  managed	  by	  military	  
leaders	  and	  effectively	  replacing	  political	  with	  developmental	  collective	  action	  problems	  –	  that	  
is,	   trading	  political	   for	  economic	  coherence	   (§3.b.1).	  Waldner’s	  account	  of	   the	  early	  stages	  of	  
state-­‐formation	  may	  need	  to	  be	  adjusted	  or	  modified,	  however,	  to	  grasp	  Algeria’s	  specificity.121	  
On	   the	  one	  hand,	   if	   the	  Algerian	  state	   resolved	  or	  overcame	  rather	   than	  deflected	   intra-­‐elite	  
conflict,	   itself	   unclear,	   it	   did	   so	   by	   physical	   and	   political	   force	  more	   than	   by	   coalition-­‐based	  
popular-­‐class	  incorporation.	  In	  the	  latter	  image,	  suiting	  the	  Syrian	  and	  Turkish	  experience,	  the	  
side-­‐payments	   to	   popular,	   horizontal,	   class-­‐based	   constituencies	   afforded	   non-­‐state	   agents	  
collective	   power	   to	   frustrate	   subsequent	   state	   policies.	   In	   Algeria,	   the	   state	   provided	   public	  
outlays	  on	  a	  class	  basis	  while	  parcellizing	  citizens	  through	  competitive	  access	  to	  officials.	  Thus,	  
Algerians	  were	  politically	   incorporated	  or	   integrated	   into	   the	  centralized	   state	  not	  as	  a	   class-­‐
constituency	  but	  as	  individual	  or	  sectoral	  constituents	  –	  in	  short,	  creating	  a	  mirror-­‐image	  state-­‐
society	  hierarchy	  of	  discrete	  patron-­‐client	  relationships	  to	  preclude	  class-­‐conscious	  actions.	  	  
	   Integration	  of	  Algerians	  through	  material	  distribution	  and	  identity	  bargaining	  formed	  its	  
client-­‐centralization	   regime.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   1967,	   Lowi	  writes,	   a	   polity	   based	   on	   technocratic	  





Developing	  the	  economy,	  building	  up	  infrastructure,	  and	  educating	  the	  population,	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  as	  consolidating	  power	  and	  authority,	  became	  the	  major	  preoccupations	  of	  the	  leaders.	  By	  
the	  end	  of	  1967,	  after	  the	  attempted	  coup	  d’etat	  led	  by	  Tahar	  Zbiri,	  Boumediene	  was	  firmly	  in	  
control	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus.	  Moreover,	   all	  mechanisms	   that	   could	   function	   as	   conduits	   for	  
popular	   pressure	   had	   been	   neutralized…The	   practice	   of	   silencing	   alternative	   voices	   –	  
inaugurated	   by	   Ben	   Bella	   and	   reinforced	   by	   Boumediene	   –	   became	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	  
system…With	   the	   neutralization	   of	   the	   party,	   the	   harnessing	   of	   nascent	   civil	   society	  
organizations,	   and	   the	  muzzling	   of	   independent	   actors,	   Algerian	   society	   appeared	   to	   become	  
increasingly	  depoliticized.	  External	  rents	  played	  an	   instrumental	  role	   in	  this	  process,	  egging	  on	  
the	  already	  considerable	  patrimonial	  tendencies	  that	  characterized	  le	  système.122	  
	  
Material	  distribution	  constituted	  clientelism	  through	  discretionary	   social	  welfare.123	  Anderson	  
points	  out	  that	  Algeria	  thus	  developed	  a	  “politicized	  bureaucracy,”	  where	  the	  demands	  of	  mass	  
inclusion	  compelled	  the	  state	  to	  “inadvertently	  or	  purposely	  divert	  participatory	  impulses	  into	  
the	  administration	  itself.”124	  Algeria’s	  post-­‐colonial	  state	  was	  built,	  then,	  through	  a	  distributive	  
scheme	   whose	   rationale	   was	   the	   integration	   of	   citizens	   as	   separate	   interests	   and	   identities	  
repressed	   or	   channeled	   into	   one-­‐to-­‐one	   material	   interactions	   with	   ruling	   elites.	   More	  
specifically,	   the	   persistent	   political	   structure	   of	   the	   Algerian	   state	   combined	   technocratic,	  
military,	   and	   capitalist	   oligarchic	   rule	   designed	   specifically	   along	   vertical	   lines	   that	   could	   be	  
monitored,	  disciplined,	   and	   responded	   to	   readily.	  Roberts	   repays	  extensive	  quotation	  on	   this	  
aspect	  of	  Algerian	  politics:	  
	  
Fundamental	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  Algerian	  technocracy	  is	  the	  realization	  that	  the	  political	  
sphere	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  the	  military	  ever	  since	  1962,	  and	  that	  the	  civilian	  politicians	  and	  
especially	   the	   technocrats	   have	   accordingly	   been	   very	   junior	   partners	   in	   the	   successive	  
provisional	   formulas	   for	   governing	   Algeria	   on	   which	   the	   men	   who	   command	   the	   army	   have	  
periodically	   agreed	   among	   themselves.	   One	   cannot	   hope	   to	   appreciate	   the	   behavior	   and	  
ideology	  of	  the	  technocracy	  unless	  the	  dependent	  political	  positions	  of	  its	  individual	  members,	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  careers	  depend	  on	  the	  patronage	  of	  powerful	  military	  figures,	  but	  also	  
the	   narrowness	   in	   their	   political	   outlook	   which	   results	   from	   this	   client	   status	   and	   subaltern	  
political	  role,	  their	  frustration	  at	  their	  dependent	  and	  limited	  situation	  and	  their	  resentful	  will	  to	  
power	  over	  the	  less	  educated	  but	  more	  unscrupulous,	  more	  cunning,	  and	  more	  political	  power-­‐





	   This	   account	   describes	   the	   combine	   social,	   economic,	   and	   political	   bases	   of	   Algerian	  
statism,	   in	  which	  multi-­‐tiered,	  surveilled,	  managed,	  and	  striated	  concentric	  circles	  radiate	  out	  
from	  the	  core	  of	  technocratic-­‐military	  state	  managers	  and	  investors	  through	  middle-­‐figures	  and	  
then	  out	  to	  the	  lower	  levels.	  Laremont	  dates	  the	  system	  to	  an	  attempt	  to	  remove	  Boumediène	  
in	   1967.	   “Soon	   after	   the	   failed	   coup,	   Boumediène,	   as	   part	   of	   his	   effort	   to	   improve…the	  
performance	   of	   the	   economy,	   began	   shifting	   his	   bases	   of	   political	   support	   from	   a	   coalition	  
comprising	   the	   army	   and	   the	   conservative	   and	   religiously	   oriented	  ulema	   to	   a	   new	   coalition	  
comprising	  the	  army	  and	  conservative	  yet	  not	  as	  religiously	  oriented	  technocrats.”126	  Algerian	  
state-­‐formation,	   then,	   became	   a	   paradigm	   instance	   of	   centralized,	   nationalized,	   technocratic	  
high-­‐modernism	  constructed	  on	  a	  command-­‐economic	  platform	  intended	  to	  assimilate	  citizens	  
as	  dependents	  loyal	  to	  the	  equation	  of	  public	  wealth	  with	  private	  welfare.	  In	  Roberts’s	  striking	  
prose,	  “The	  state	  is	  actually	  controlled	  by	  the	  men	  who	  control	  the	  guns…For	  the	  civilian	  figure	  
with	  political	  ambitions,	  the	  political	  primacy	  of	  the	  military	  leaves	  open	  the	  role	  of	  ‘alim	  as	  a	  
career	  option,	  and	  since	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  Algerian	  state	  has	  been	  attempting	  to	  perform	  a	  vast	  
number	  of	  functions	  never	  even	  dreamed	  of	  by	  its	  pre-­‐colonial	  predecessor,	  and	  many	  of	  these	  
functions	  presuppose	   for	   their	   performance	   a	   combination	  of	   specialized	   knowledge	   and	   the	  
authority	  which	  goes	  with	  this,	  a	  secularized	  version	  of	  the	  ‘alim’s	  role	  has	  become	  available	  as	  
a	  career	  option	  to	  thousands	  of	  Algerians.”	  Startlingly,	  he	  adds	  that	  “one	  is	  tempted	  to	  say	  that	  
the	   technocrats	   are	   the	   real	   ‘ulema	   of	   the	   contemporary	   Algerian	   state.”127	   From	   the	   first	  
decade,	  and	  well	   into	  the	  1970s,	  Algerian	  ruling	  elites	  busied	  themselves	  creating	  a	  top-­‐down	  
technocratic	  apparatus	  that	  sidelined	  the	  Islamist	  opposition	  in	  organizational	  or	  official	  terms	  




land	   reforms,	   Arabization	   of	   secondary	   schools).	   But	   overall	   this	   incorporation	   strategy	   was	  
manifestly	   founded	  on	  successful	  state	  economic	  performance,	  strong	  global	  oil	  markets,	  and	  
the	   ability	   to	   continue	   satisfying	   but	   institutionally	   marginalizing	   the	   Islamists.	   As	   Zartman	  
implies,	  there	  was	  good	  reason	  for	  optimism	  in	  the	  mid	  1970s,	  given	  the	  singular	  strength	  and	  
pervasiveness	  of	   the	  army	  and	  abundance	  of	   state	   revenues.	  But	  he,	   too,	  noted	  at	   the	   time,	  
“criteria	   for	   entry	   into	   the	  political	   class	   are	   changing	   from	  wartime	   experience	   to	   technical	  
competence,”	  a	  change	  which	   that	  brings	   the	  mostly	   rural	  “mujahideen”	  military	   leaders	   into	  
direct	  conflict	  with	   the	  new	  urban	  and	  skilled	  professional	  policymakers	  capable	  of	  managing	  
the	  economy.128	  	  	  	  
	   “Governing	  over	   this	   sort	  of	  dichotomized	  political	   class	   requires	  mediating	   leaders	  or	  
brokers,”	  Zartman	  adds,	  “who	  can	  combine	  skills	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  meet	  expectations.”	  What	  is	  
more	  significant	  than	  the	  burgeoning	  bureaucracy	  and	  growing	  personnel	  mandated	  by	  all	  this	  
positioning	  among	  contending	  elites	  is	  the	  fluidity	  of	  the	  patron-­‐client	  system:	  	  
	  
No	   single	   tie,	   experience,	   or	   origin	   is	   the	   key	   to	   the	   army’s	   political	   action,	   and	   no	   constant	  
hierarchy	   of	   ties	   can	  be	   established	   as	   a	   source	  of	  motivations.	  Moreover,	   no	   combination	   of	  
past	   ties,	   experiences,	   and	  origins	   is	   sure	   to	  produce	   the	   same	  action,	   reaction,	   allegiance,	  or	  
alliance	  in	  any	  two	  individuals.	  Any	  search	  for	  such	  simple	  motivations	  seems	  quite	  vain.	  By	  the	  
same	  token,	  such	  restrictions	  are	  also	  applicable	  to	  the	  mujahideen-­‐technician	  dichotomy.129	  
	  
The	  need	  for	  “technocratic”	  competence	  that	  eventually	  forged	  an	  intra-­‐elite	  coalition	  between	  
the	  army	  and	  educated	  professional	  managers,	  economists,	   lawyers,	  and	  the	  like	  seems	  to	  be	  
the	   improvisational	  complexity	  of	  the	  mixed	  economy.	  First,	  Algeria’s	  economy	  has	   long	  been	  
motored	  by	  oil-­‐revenue	  extraction	  and	  “soft	  budget	  constraints”	  that	  created	  a	  “pre-­‐industrial	  




state.”130	  From	  1969	  forward	  Algeria’s	  rapid	  industrialization	  program	  –	  based	  on	  nationalized	  
production,	   accumulation,	   distribution,	   and	  marketing	   of	   oil	   and	   natural	   gas	   –	   satisfied	   anti-­‐
imperialist	  demands	  for	  a	  defended	  sovereignty	  as	  well	  as	  elite-­‐engineered	  coalition	  building.131	  
Presently	  and	  before	  the	  oil	  glut	  depressed	  prices,	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  dependent	  nationalism	  and	  
socialist	   capitalism	  became	  hotly	  debated	  and	   local	   fiscal	   crisis	  proved	   the	  constraints	  of	   this	  
development	  pattern.132	   It	   is	   telling	   that	  at	   this	   time	  “demands	  of	  organized	  urban	   labor	  and	  
attendant	  struggles	  over	  resources	  and	  rules	  generated	  economic	  policies	  explicitly	  designed	  to	  
redistribute	  wealth.”133	  Supported	  by	  public	  spending,	  non-­‐agricultural	  employment	  rose	  from	  
330,000	   to	   2,555,000	   between	   independence	   and	   1984;	   but,	   repeating	   century-­‐old	   patterns,	  
“this	   impressive	   growth	   was	   inadequate	   to	   absorb	   all	   the	   new	   urban	   job	   seekers.	  	  
Unemployment	  rates	  remained	  very	  high	  during	  the	  expansionary	  phase	  of	  import-­‐substitution	  
industrialization	  –	  22%	  in	  1977	  and	  18%	  in	  1984	  –	  and	  rose	  to	  24%	  in	  1990	  when	  the	  state-­‐led	  
development	  was	  in	  serious	  crisis.”134	  When	  oil	  prices	  plunged	  Algeria’s	  political	  and	  economic	  
system	  depended	  entirely	  on	  revenues	  accrued	  from	  hydrocarbon	  exports,	  leaving	  citizens	  and	  
the	  state	  alike	  exposed	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  even	  small	  shifts	  in	  global	  demand.	  
	   The	  second	  feature	  of	  Algeria’s	  domestic	  political	  economy,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  insecure	  
“petro-­‐state”	  macro-­‐structural	  distributive	  scheme	  and	   its	  putative	  socio-­‐political	   implications	  
(§3.c.2)	  was	  Algeria’s	  capitalist-­‐socialist	  economic-­‐productive	  amalgam.	  The	  mixture	  of	  private	  
or	  hidden	  market	  speculation	  and	  large-­‐scale,	  state-­‐owned	  public	  firms	  in	  heavy	  manufactures	  
was	  apparently	  intended	  to	  benefit	  military-­‐	  and	  party-­‐savvy	  capitalists	  while	  distributing	  state	  
oil	  riches	  to	  popular	  classes.	  The	  structural	  effect	  of	  this	  combination	  of	  disaggregated	  private	  




class	  formation.	  The	  perverse	  result	  of	  this	  outcome	  was	  a	  productive	  system	  that	  was	  wholly	  
articulated,	  even	  as	  a	  political	  regime,	  by	  monetary	  and	  investment	  interactions,	  yet	  without	  a	  
primary	   class	   constituency.	  With	   the	   partial	   exception	   of	   the	  UGTA,	   a	   proportionally	   small	   if	  
vocal	  union	  in	  a	  capital-­‐intensive	  authoritarian	  political	  economy,	  Algeria’s	  rulers	  grew	  wealthy	  
while	  distributing	  stabilizing	  side-­‐payments	  without	  organized	  “civil-­‐societal”	  opposition.	  	  
	   During	  this	  first	  stage,	  c.	  1962-­‐1985,	  of	  Algeria’s	  post-­‐colonial	  political	  economy	  we	  see	  
the	  growth	  of	   intra-­‐capitalist-­‐statist	   tensions	   across	  business	   sectors,	   supervised	  by	   the	   state	  
with	   decreasing	   efficacy	   and	   authority.	   At	   the	   top	   of	   the	   productive	   system	   lay	   the	  massive	  
state-­‐owned	   industries,	  but	  within	  a	  generation	  a	  growing	  small	  capitalist	  class	  was	  poised	  to	  
credibly	  condemn	  state	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  advocate	  for	  deregulation	  and	  
decentralization.	  This	  growing	  petty	  bourgeoisie,	  cultivated	  and	  facilitated	  by	  state	  agencies	  or	  
offices,	  internally	  disputed	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  economy.	  Thus	  “commerce	  and	  light	  industry	  
want[ed]	   to	   promote	   a	   consumer	   society	   to	   foster	   sales;	   it	   oppose[d]	   rapid	   development	   of	  
state	   industry	   based	   on	   relatively	   low	   wages	   and	   a	   high	   level	   of	   investment.”135	   The	   state	  
subsidized	   or	   licensed	   private	   investment	   that	   “statistically	   account[ed]	   for	   a	   low	   rate	   of	  
investment	   [but]	   produce[d]	   a	   high	   rate	  of	   profit,”	   creating	   “substantial	  wealth	  outside	   state	  
control”	   as	   entrepreneurs	   angled	   to	   “decrease	   the	   state’s	   dense	   network	   of	   administrative	  
regulation.”136	  The	  state	  responded	  by	  adopting	  structural	  economic	  reforms	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  
even	  before	  being	  “compelled”	  to	  by	  diminishing	  oil	  coffers.	  In	  the	  Five-­‐Year	  plan	  of	  1980-­‐1984,	  
successor	  to	  President	  Boumediène	  Chadli	  Benjedid	  “aimed…at	  making	  state	  enterprises	  more	  
efficient	   and	   productive.	   Very	   large	   state	   companies	   were	   broken	   into	   smaller	   ones	   that	  




enterprises	  more	  efficient	  and	  self-­‐reliant	  [,less]	  unproductive	  and	  [reliant	  on]	  the	  state	  to	  bail	  
them	  our	  of	  their	  deficits.”137	  This	  murky	  liberalization	  effort	  had	  an	  ambivalent	  relationship	  to	  
capitalization	  or	  neoliberalism;	  state	  industries,	  union	  labor,	  and	  public	  social	  provisions	  faced	  
retrenchment	  but	   the	   resulting	   free(r)	   trade	  was	  neither	  competitive	  nor	   transparent,	  but	  an	  
extension	  of	  informal,	  protected	  entrepreneurial	  activity.	  Finally,	  the	  incremental	  privatization	  
and	  deregulation	  of	   the	  public	   sector;	  growing	  commodification	  of	   labor,	  housing,	  education,	  
and	  social	  services;	  and	  the	   intensifying	  financial	   fluidity	  and	   investment	   liquidity	  were	  hardly	  
apolitical	  desiderata	  of	  impersonal	  economic	  forces.	  Rather,	  these	  developments	  constituted	  a	  
disciplinary	  apparatus	  continually	   refining	   its	  mechanisms.	  Leca	  notes	   that	  “a	  distancing	   from	  
the	   central	   economic	   positions	   of	   bourgeois	   society	   such	   as	   landowners,	   industrial	   and	  
commercial	  bourgeoisie,	  and	  salaried	  industrial	  workers”	  turned	  Algeria’s	  weak	  class	  formation	  
into	  a	  flexible	  means	  of	  social	  power:	  “Industrialization	  was	  set	  in	  motion	  by	  actors	  who	  saw	  in	  
it	  above	  all	  a	  political	  goal	  and	  a	  political	  means	  to	  legitimize	  their	  power.”138	  	  
	   Indeed,	  this	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  weakening	  command	  economy	  made	  it	  a	  crisis	  of	  rule	  
by	   the	  early	   1980s	  when	  growing	   foreign	   indebtedness	   and	  economic	   inefficiency	   forced	   the	  
state	  to	  abandon	  ISI.	  Central	  planning,	  urban-­‐labor	  biased	  planning	  twinned	  with	  nationalized	  
agricultural	  cooperatives,	  and	  huge	  public	  sector	  enterprises	  phased	  out	  in	  favor	  of	  service	  and	  
small	   industry,	  market	  decentralization,	  and	  an	  expanded	  private	  sector.	  But	   just	  as	   the	  state	  
was	  diminishing	   its	  economic	  obligations,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  were	  becoming	   impoverished.	   “As	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  world,	  economic	  liberalization	  led	  to	  greater	  inequalities	  of	  income,	  increasing	  
unemployment	   and	   more	   obvious	   corruption,	   while	   cuts	   in	   subsidies	   and	   imports	   were	   a	  




d'Aigremont	  and	  J.	  	  Dean	  report,	  the	  appearance	  of	  corruption	  and	  expensive	  lifestyles	  seemed	  
unhindered	  by	  spiraling	  domestic	  economic	  paralysis:	  
	  
In	   the	   year	   1986	   alone,	   and	   despite	   a	   sharp	   drop	   in	   oil	   and	   natural	   gas	   revenues	   owing	   to	  
depressed	  world	  prices,	  Algeria,	  nonetheless,	   succeeded	   in	  budgeting	  some	  38.5	  billion	  Dinars	  
(approximately	   £5.33	   billion)	   for	   purchases	   abroad.	   Capital	   goods	   and	   semi-­‐finished	   products	  
accounted	  for	  approximately	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  that	  amount.140	  
	  
For	  ordinary	  Algerians,	  rents	  were	  no	  longer	  available	  to	  cushion	  the	  costs	  of	  deregulation	  and	  
structural	  adjustment	  in	  social	  suffering,	  and	  by	  early	  1980s	  Algeria	  began	  disintegrating	  state-­‐
farms	  and,	  by	  1986,	  oil-­‐price	  declines	   spurred	  unprecedentedly	   “severe	  cuts	   in	   imports	   [and]	  
new	  efforts	  to	  stimulate	  public-­‐sector	  efficiency	  by	  such	  measures	  as	  abolishing	  the	  mininstry	  
of	   planning,	   giving	   greater	   freedom	   to	   the	   managers	   of	   public	   enterprises	   and	   encouraging	  
more	  competition	  among	  the	  state-­‐owned	  banks.”141	  All	  the	  while,	  and	  ostentatiously,	  “in	  the	  
midst	  of	  [this]	  economic	  and	  managerial	  crisis,	  a	  few	  people	  succeeded	  in	  not	  only	   increasing	  
their	  wealth	  but	  also	  displaying	  it	  in	  the	  form	  of	  late-­‐model	  cars,	  new	  villa	  construction	  and	  new	  
businesses.”142	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  Algeria	  –	  once	  an	  agricultural	  economy	  –	  imported	  over	  half	  
its	  food,	  a	  widely	  noted	  symptom	  of	  decline	  in	  the	  nation’s	  production	  portfolio.143	  
	   In	   his	   political	   economy	   of	   Algerian	   rent-­‐seeking	   Dillman	   laments	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  
state’s	  development	  program:	  
What	  happened	  to	  Algeria?	  How	  could	  a	  seemingly	  dynamic	  strategy	  of	  development	  produce	  
severe	  economic	  decline	  and	  a	  host	  of	  political	  dilemmas?	  The	  key	  to	  answering	  this	  question	  
lies	   in	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  developmental	  contradictions	  arising	  from	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  
rentier-­‐state	  –	  a	   state	   that	  derives	  a	   large	  proportion	  of	   its	   revenues	   from	   the	   sale	  of	  natural	  
resources	   abroad	   rather	   than	   through	   taxation	  of	   its	   citizens	   –	   and	   a	   tributary	   private	   sector.	  
The	  pricate	   sector	   that	   survived	  or	   thrived	  did	   so	  by	  maintaining	   access	   to	   state	   resources	  or	  





Parallel	  to	  this	  general	  implosion	  of	  rentier-­‐state	  economy,	  with	  its	  increasingly	  infuriated	  and	  
improverished	   citizens,	   was	   the	   rise	   of	   an	   essentially	   autonomous	   Islamist	   movement.	   Its	  
strength	  had	  already	  been	  seen	   in	   the	  state’s	  concession,	  most	  notably	   in	  education	  policies,	  
the	  gradual	  domestication	  of	  women,	  and	  favorable	  status	  under	  the	  botched	  land	  reform.	  The	  
reversal	  of	  land	  redistribution	  perhaps	  best	  exemplifies	  the	  growing	  state-­‐within-­‐a-­‐state	  social	  
and	   political	   power	   of	   the	   Islamist	   movement	   The	   state	   had	   pursued	   socialist	   labor	   in	   the	  
countryside,	  also	  known	  as	  agricultural	  auto-­‐gestion,	  which	  proved	  an	  unpopular,	  unproductive	  
technical	   land	   reform	  and	  allocation	   scheme	  abandoned	  by	   the	  early	  1970s145,	   as	   introduced	  
above	   (§3.b.1).	   This	   decision	   overlapped	  with	   government	   anxiety	   over	   the	   growing	   Islamist	  
movement	  and	  futile	  efforts	  to	  coopt	  and	  centralize	  it.	  As	  Bennoune	  implies,	  rather	  than	  attract	  
or	   incorporate	   Islamist	   constituents,	   land	   concessions	  merely	   granted	   them	  more	   autonomy,	  
confidence,	  and	  resources:	  	  	  
	  
The	  state	  decided	  to	  promote	   land	  reform,	   limiting	   the	  Algerian	   landlords’	  property	   to	   twenty	  
hectares.	   The	   rest	   would	   be	   bought	   by	   the	   state	   and	   distributed	   to	   peasants	   who	   were	  
organized	  in	  cooperatives….[the	  rural	  Sheikh	  ‘abd	  al-­‐Latif]	  Soltani	  issued	  a	  fatwa	  declaring	  land	  
reform	   un-­‐Islamic…[decreeing]	   that	   prayer	   performed	   on	   nationalized	   land	   would	   not	   be	  
accepted	  by	  God.	  They	  [allied]	  with	  petty	  intellectuals	  and	  landlords	  who	  financed	  them.146	  	  
	  
In	  the	  end,	  party	  and	  government	  leaders	  withdrew	  from	  the	  countryside,	  relinquishing	  control	  
of	  peasantry	  to	  traditional	  leaders,	  holy	  men,	  and	  rural	  power-­‐holders.147	  	  
	   Another	  example	  of	  the	  Algerian	  state’s	  failed	  efforts	  to	  draw	  motivated	  Islamists	  into	  a	  
practical	  or	  informal	  coalition	  with	  the	  military-­‐party	  regime	  occurred	  in	  gender	  and	  the	  social	  
and	  political	  treatment	  of	  women.	  In	  1962	  the	  first	  Algerian	  constituent	  assembly	  had,	  of	  196	  




world,	  higher	  than	  France	  or	  Sweden”;	  but	  the	  second	  National	  Assembly	  had	  two	  women	  and	  
from	  1965-­‐1982	  there	  were	  none.148	  This	  narrowing	  of	  women’s	  equality	  from	  its	  height	  during	  
the	  anti-­‐imperial	  war	  and	  right	  after	  independence	  culminated	  in	  the	  Family	  Code,	  opposed	  by	  
a	  large	  cross-­‐section	  of	  Algerian	  women.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  the	  Algerian	  state	  was	  resorting	  to	  
crass	  social	  compromises	  and	  transparent	  symbolic	  gestures,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  compensate	  for	  
declining	  governmental	  suzerainty.	  	  
	   For	   instance,	  the	  ruling	  classes	  continued	  trying	  to	  rally	  the	  population	  ideologically	  to	  
“pan-­‐Arab-­‐nationalism.”	  Algeria,	  among	  others	  –	  Iraq,	  South	  Yemen,	  Libya,	  the	  PLO,	  and	  Syria	  –	  
“vehemently	  objected	  to	  Sadat’s	  peace	  initiative	  with	  Israel,	  decrying	  [it]	  as	  a	  dire	  threat	  to	  the	  
Arab	  nation	  [that	  would]	  fragment	  and	  weaken	  its	  ranks.”149	  Algerian	  rulers,	  who	  self-­‐identified	  
as	  the	  vanguard	  of	  revolutionary	  Arab	  nationalism,	  enjoyed	  hosting	  great	  political	  events,	  such	  
as	  the	  Iraq-­‐Iran	  negotiations	  over	  the	  militant	  Kurdish	  Democratic	  Party	  (1975)150	  and	  the	  PLO’s	  
recognition	   of	   Israel	   (Nov	   1988).151	   As	   the	   domestic	   infrastructure,	   governing	   coalition,	   and	  
“revolutionary	   legitimacy”	   frayed	   at	   home,	   Algerian	   rulers	   imagined	   themselves	   “capable	   of	  
inspiring	   or	   supporting	   revolutions	   well	   beyond	   the	   frontiers	   of	   Arabism	   or	   Islam.	   It	   is	   no	  
accident	   that	   the	   Non-­‐Aligned	   Conference	   [was]	   held	   in	   Algiers	   in	   1973,	   or	   that	   Houari	  
Boumèdiene	   was	   then	   elected	   the	   movement’s	   president.”152	   In	   short,	   it	   testifies	   to	   the	  
detached	  if	  not	  delusional	  mindset	  of	  Algeria’s	  ruling	  class	  that	   it	  expected	  to	  sustain	  popular	  
devotion	  through	  the	  trope	  of	  its	  “revolutionary”	  ideological	  pedigree	  and	  nationalist	  renown.	  
The	  “legitimacy”	  of	  the	  FLN	  and	  the	  generals,	  much	  remarked	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  postcolonial	  
Algerian	   governance,	   proved	   incapable	   of	   guaranteeing	   incumbency,	   much	   less	   widespread	  




	   Indeed,	  by	   the	  1980s	   Islamists	  but	  also	  Berbers,	  women,	   the	  poor,	  workers,	   students,	  
and	  many	  others	  were	  beginning	  to	  demand	  and	  even	  protest	  for	  reforms.	  While	  the	  state	  had	  
mukhabarat	   (intelligence)	   services,	  biopolitical	   surveillance,	  and	  an	  extant	  disciplinary	  market	  
regime,	  these	  diverse,	  articulate,	  and	  proliferating	  social	  mobilizations	  could	  not	  be	  coopted	  or	  
manipulated.	  Indeed,	  the	  onset	  of	  global	  neoliberal	  integration,	  economic	  retrenchment,	  global	  
depression,	  and	  popular	  pro-­‐democracy	  agitations,	  found	  Algerian	  ruling	  elites	  contemplating	  a	  
state	  of	  exception	  to	  counter	  civil	  strife,	  recalling	  depredations	  of	  French	  rule.	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  
militant,	   if	   sporadic	   Islamic	   opposition	   and	   Berber	   movements,	   the	   new	   President	   Benjedid	  
“faced…his	   first	   popular	   uprising.	   This	   was	   quite	   different	   [from]	  what	   happened	   under	   Ben	  
Bella	   and	   Boumediene.	   Then	   opposition	   had	   been	   about	   court	   politics	   within	   the	   system,	  
usually	   taking	   the	   form	   of	   underground	   conspiracies	   by	   those	   disaffected	   not	   because	   they	  
contested	  the	  form	  of	  the	  regime	  but	  because	  they	  had	  lost	  out	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  power.	  Now,	  
however,	  opposition	  took	  on	  a	  different	  hue.	  It	  was	  about	  mass	  protest	  and	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  
very	   nature	   of	   post-­‐independence	   politics.”153	   Parallel	   to	   this	   rise	   of	   public	   contestation,	   the	  
Islamists	  were	   sprouting	   underground	  movements	   and	  multiple	   clandestine	   factions,	   divided	  
enough	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  to	  give	  rulers	  anxious	  comfort,	  but	   looming	  as	  a	  potentially	  unified	  
dissident	  movement	  with	  no	  fundamental	  fealty	  to	  the	  secular	  state	  and	  its	  formal	  deference	  or	  
episodic	  policy	  concessions	  to	  Muslim	  values.	  In	  just	  one	  instance	  of	  the	  impending	  war,	  “From	  
April	  7	   to	  29,	  1985,	  135	  members	  of	  an	  underground	   Islamic	  movement	  were	   tried;	  70	  were	  
condemned	  to	  prison,”	  and	  this	  after	  “both	  Boumediene	  and	  Benjadid	  ha[d]	  encouraged	  Islamic	  
tendencies”	  with	  publicly	  funded	  mosque	  constructions,	  Friday	  replacing	  Sunday	  as	  the	  national	  




teachings	   endorsed	   in	   public	   schools	   and	   presented	   on	   state	   TV	   and	   radio.154	   Despite,	   or	  
because	  of,	  such	  concessions	  Islamist	  activists	  were	  emboldened	  through	  the	  very	  mechanisms	  
that	  permitted	  them	  autonomous	  extra-­‐systemic	  social	  resources	  to	  oppose	  state	  prerogative.	  
	   To	  summarize	  the	  argument	  thus	  far:	  The	  Algerian	  state	  created	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  of	  
client-­‐integration	  that	  operated	  through	  the	  deliberate	  fragmenting	  of	  all	  potential	  civil	  society	  
achieved	  largely	  through	  the	  increasingly	  disciplinary	  commodification	  of	  public	  and	  private	  life.	  
In	  the	  meantime,	  principally	  but	  not	  exclusively	  Islamist	  sources	  of	  resistance	  found	  themselves	  
benefitting	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  differentiated	  social	  resources	  and	  systemic	  subjectivity;	  in	  
other	  words	  being	  forced	  by	  the	  coterminous	   impoverishment	  of	  state	  and	  citizen	  to	  develop	  
private	  means	  of	   survival	   inaccessible	   to	   state	  encroachment	   that	  permitted	  great	   latitude	   in	  
the	  definition	  of	  resistant	  identities	  and	  objectives.	  The	  Algerian	  state	  found	  itself	  hemmed	  into	  
a	  situation	  where	  all	  the	  reforms	  with	  which	  it	  hoped	  to	  curry	  favor	  with	  potential	  opponents	  
deepened	   the	  estrangement	  of	   state	   and	   citizen,	   unwittingly	   conveying	   to	   anti-­‐state	   activists	  
that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  deploy	  anti-­‐state	  weapons	  to	  reclaim	  subjectivity,	  at	  least	  in	  reaching	  
goals	  involving	  state	  agencies.155	  The	  coeval	  rise	  of	  Islamism	  and	  collapse	  of	  the	  governmental	  
regime	   encapsulates	   this	   trajectory	   in	   client-­‐citizenship	   under	   Algerian	   oil-­‐driven	   distributive	  
politics.	  As	  Lowi,	  summarizes	  this	  dynamic:	  
	  	  
The	   regime’s	  monopoly	   over	   distribution	   enhanced	   personal	   ties	   between	   the	   leadership	   and	  
particular	   individuals.	  With	  this	  model	  to	  draw	  upon,	  Algerians	  were	  motivated	  to	  adopt	  social	  
strategies	  that	  would	  bring	  them	  close	  to	  the	  regime,	  rather	  than	  form	  interest	  groups	  with	  like-­‐
minded	  cohorts.	  Proximity	  to	   leadership	  became	  the	  principal	  avenue	  to	  social	  promotion	  and	  
access	   to	   resources;	   it	   was,	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   a	   highly	   valued	   good.	   Thus,	   the	   system	   of	  
redistribution	   reinforced	   clientelism,	   which	   in	   turn	   bolstered	   the	   already	   strong	   collegial	  





	   Perhaps	  the	  most	  pointed	  example	  of	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  the	  client-­‐citizenship	  regime	  
is	  the	  alienation	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  from	  one	  another,	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  constellation	  of	  
Polish	   activists	   and	   citizens	   gathered	   under	   the	   Solidarity	   umbrella.	   In	   Algeria	   Islamists	   and	  
workers	  were	  estranged	  with	  only	   intensifying	  hostility,	  despite	  coincident	  protest	  desires.	   In	  
the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  members	  of	  the	  UGTA	  and	  Islamists,	  equally	  opposed	  to	  the	  authoritarian	  
rule,	  corruption,	  and	  state	  coercion,	  failed	  to	  find	  common	  purpose.	  As	  Alexander	  has	  shown:	  	  
	  
launched	   politicized	   strike	   campaigns	   against	   authoritarian	   rule	   and	   rising	   social	   inequality.	  
Because	  this	  surge	  in	  labor	  militancy	  coincided	  with	  the	  politicization	  of	  the	  Islamist	  movements,	  
Islamist	   leaders	  might	  have	  seen	   the	  unions	  as	   important	   targets	  of	  opportunity.	  By	   taking	  up	  
workers’	   grievances;	   by	   developing	   interpretive	   frameworks	   that	   enabled	   workers	   to	   think	  
about	   wages,	   prices,	   and	   inequality	   in	   Islamic	   terms;	   and	   by	   devising	   strategies	   to	   penetrate	  
union	   structures,	   Islamist	   might	   have	   used	   the	   unions	   as	   vehicles	   for	   expanding	   their	   own	  
organizations…What	  is	  striking	  is…how	  little	  effort	  they	  made	  to	  build	  support	  within	  the	  labor	  
milieu	   and	  how	   late	   those	   efforts	   came…Algerian	   Islamists	   played	  no	   visible	   role	   in	   the	   strike	  
waves	  that	  rocked	  the	  industrial	  sector	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  and	  again	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.157	  	  
	  
	  
Across	   the	  political	   spectrum,	   in	   fact,	  a	  nearly	  unanimous	  but	  not	  unified	  opposition	   formed,	  
guided	  by	  enemy-­‐of-­‐my-­‐enemy	  logic	  that	  impeded	  a	  coherent	  movement	  boosting	  an	  “address-­‐
to-­‐all.”	  The	  Algerian	  opposition	  inadvertently	  embodied	  to	  the	  experienced	  citizenship	  regime,	  
in	  which	  the	  state	  was	  nearing	  fiscal	  collapse,	  by	  organizing	  as	  compeititve,	  sectional,	  vertical,	  
issue-­‐oriented	  claimaints	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  “class-­‐action”	  mobilization.	  Somewhat	  paradoxically,	  
Berbers,	  students,	  women,	   intellectuals,	   Islamists,	  workers,	  peasants,	  and	  others	  experiencing	  
dispossession	  economically	  adhered	  even	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  divisive	  citizenship	  regime,	  failing	  
to	  converge	  on	  anything	  like	  the	  order	  of	  Solidarity	  in	  Poland.	  	  
	  	   Algerians	  ethically	  resented	  and	  bodily	  resisted	  this	  state	  “system	  of	  power,	  patronage	  




sacrifice	   in	   the	  name	  of	  some	   larger	  good.”158	  Finally	  with	  the	  sharp	  decline	   in	  oil	  prices,	  and	  
thus	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  finance	  the	  client-­‐citizenship	  regime,	  Algerians	  demanded	  “to	  know,	  
as	  one	  student	  bitterly	  stated…why	  more	  than	  half	  of	  them	  are	  jobless	  ‘while	  we	  earn	  billions	  
per	  year	  from	  natural	  gas,	  and	  [the	  former	  head	  of	  the	  ruling	  party]	  lives	  like	  a	  king’.”159	  Such	  
sentiments	  and	  sporadic	  populist160	  protest	  actions	  finally	  peaked	  in	  the	  October	  1988	  riots.161	  
These	  were	  spontaneous	  demonstrations	  that	  directly	  challenged	  the	  ruling	  class	  by	  taking	  to	  
the	  streets.	  Established	  and	  organized	  throughout	  Algeria	  but	   roughly	  constituting	  a	  separate	  
state	  within	  Algiers,	  Islamists,	  according	  to	  witnesses,	  guided	  and	  oriented	  the	  protests	  without	  
demanding	  political	  direction.	  The	  discourse	  of	   the	   rioters	   stressed	  “corruption,”	  an	  umbrella	  
concept	  for	  protesters	  graspable	  by	  diverse	  activists	  with	  money	  or	  networks	  to	  translate	  multi-­‐
group	  resentment	  into	  sustained	  collective	  agitation.	  
	   The	  Islamist	  movement,	  variegated	  but	  reciprocally	  supportive	  from	  its	  initial	  stirrings	  in	  
Constantine	  in	  1970162,	  were	  ascending	  as	  savvy	  political	  strategists.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  rioting	  and	  
state	  of	  emergency	  in	  1988,	  Volpi	  reports,	  	  
	  
In	  the	  suburb	  of	  Belcourt	  the	  soldiers	  negotiated	  with	  Ali	  Belhadj,	  the	   local	  preacher	   leading	  a	  
10,000	   strong	   mob,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   clashes	   between	   the	   security	   forces	   and	   the	  
demonstrators.	  Belhadj’s	  intervention	  indicated	  that,	  at	  that	  stage,	  although	  Islamic	  leaders	  had	  
used	  their	  organizational	  capacities	  and	  religious	  authority	  to	  transform	  an	  ill-­‐focused	  food	  riot	  
into	  a	  more	  explicitly	  political	  protest,	  they	  wanted	  only	  to	  attract	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  regime	  
(to	   obtain	   political	   concessions),	   not	   to	   bring	   about	   its	   collapse.	   In	   fact,	   in	   his	   own	   Friday	  
sermon,	   Belhadj	   had	   declared	   that	   he	   was	   ready	   “to	   meet	   the	   autorities	   and	   to	   discuss	   the	  
situation	  with	  them.”	  He	  even	  suggested	  that	  he	  could	  “ask	  President	  Chadli	  to	  replace	  the	  state	  
of	  emergency	  [with]	  Islamic	  Law.”163	  
	  
	  In	  1989	  Islamists	  mobilized	  dissent	  into	  an	  organized	  party,	  the	  Front	  islamique	  du	  salut	  (FIS),	  
or	  al-­‐jabha	  al-­‐islamiyya	  lil-­‐inqadh.	  FIS’s	  rapid	  response	  to	  the	  fortuitous	  29	  October	  1989	  Tipasa	  




credibility.164	  More	  systemically,	  the	  Benjedid	  regime	  –	  steadily	  liberalizing	  the	  economy	  since	  
Boumdiène’s	  death	  in	  1979	  –	  opened	  up	  the	  political	  system	  to	  what	  Islamists	  sneeringly	  called	  
“partyism”	  (hizbiyya)165	  while	  amending	  the	  1976	  Constitution	  to	   legalize	  competitive	  parties,	  
free	   expression,	   and	   eventually	   elections.	   On	   5	   July	   1989	   the	   National	   Assembly	   established	  
procedures	  for	  official	  registration	  from	  the	  Interior	  Ministry	  for	  political	  parties.166	  	  
	   Algerian	  “civil	   society”	  blossomed	  with	  parties	  of	  all	  persuasions	  –	  though	  the	   Islamist	  
opposition	  retained	  and	  nurtured	  its	  dominant	  position.	  “Algeria	  was	  a	  classic	  harmonic	  state,”	  
Brumberg	  writes:	  “For	  nearly	  30	  years,	  its	  generals	  and	  ruling-­‐party	  hacks	  had	  been	  absorbing	  
all	  potential	  opposition	  into	  a	  quasi-­‐socialist	  order	  that	  celebrated	  the	  alleged	  harmony	  of	  ‘the	  
Algerian	   people’.	   Islamic	   leaders	   and	   institutions	   were	   drafted	   into	   this	   hegemonic	   project,	  
thereby	   ironically	   ensuring,	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   liberalization,	  populist	   Islam	  would	  emerge	  as	   the	  
counterhegemonic	   force	   [against]	   the	   corrupt	   rule	   of	   a	  minority	   that	  was	  more	   French	   than	  
Arab,	  or	  more	  Berber	   than	  Muslim.”167	  Meanwhile,	  12	  Sep	  1989	   the	  government	   ratified	   the	  
International	  Covenants	  on	  Economic,	  Social,	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (CESCR)	  and	  Civil	  and	  Political	  
rights	  (CCPR)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Convention	  Against	  Torture	  and	  other	  Cruel,	  Inhuman,	  or	  Degrading	  
Treatment	  or	  Punishment	  (CAT),	  although	  with	  telling	  caveats	  asserting	  autonomy	  from	  outside	  
interference.	  Algerian	  ruling	  elites	  evinced	  a	  heightened	  concern	  for	  their	  jurisdiction	  over	  their	  
citizens,	  notably	  “with	  respect	   to	  the	  organization	  and	  exercise	  of	   the	  right	   to	  organize.”	  This	  
locution,	   too,	   is	   revealing:	   they	   wished	   to	   “organize	   the	   right	   to	   organize,”	   even	   adding	   a	  
stipulation	   to	  Algeria’s	  1972	   ratification	  of	   the	  Convention	  on	   the	  Elimination	  of	  All	   Forms	  of	  
Racial	  Discrimination	  limiting	  external	  authorities	  to	  “receive	  and	  consider	  communication	  from	  




	   According	  to	  Moussaoui:	  “The	  relative	  calm	  that	  Algeria	  enjoyed	  in	  1989	  was	  merely	  a	  
truce	   in	  the	  violence	   launched	  by	  the	  six	  days	  of	  riots	   in	  October.	  Le	  pouvoir…maintained	  the	  
illusion	  of	  change	  in	  reponse	  to	  the	  violent	  protests	  through	  accelerated	  institutional	  reforms:	  
	  
A	   law	  on	   political	   associations	  was	   signed,	   timidly	   recognizing	  multipartyism.	   The	   presidential	  
elections	  held	  on	  22	  December	  1989	  were	  meant	  to	  re-­‐elect	  Chadli	  for	  a	  five-­‐year	  term	  and	  pass	  
a	  referendum	  on	  a	  new	  constitution	  removing	  all	  references	  to	  socialism	  and	  the	  FLN.	  The	  1989	  
constitution	  definitively	   consecrated	  political	   pluralism	  and	   the	  equal	   institutional	   [position	  of	  
Islam].	  This	  maneuver	  reaffirmed	  the	  state’s	  monopoly	  on	  religion	  while	  symbolically	  gesturing	  
toward	  more	  and	  more	  dominant	  Islamist	  leadership.169	  	  	  
	  
For	  Roberts,	  similarly,	  1989	  is	  the	  critical	  juncture	  in	  postcolonial	  Algerian	  history	  –	  not	  because	  
of	  democratic-­‐constitutional	  reforms,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  and	  military	  restoration:	  
	  
[T]he	  moment	  one	  accepts	  that	  the	  single	  most	  important	  locus	  of	  power	  in	  independent	  Algeria	  
has	  been	  the	  army,	  the	  fact	  that	   its	  commanders	  were	  no	  longer	  members	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  the	  
FLN	  from	  1989	  onwards	  can	  no	   longer	  be	   ignored	  as	  a	  side	   issue,	   let	  alone	  seen	  as	  positive	   in	  
itself,	   for	   it	   meant	   that	   they	   could	   no	   longer	   be	   held	   to	   account	   in	   any	   political	   institution	  
whatever.	  In	  1989	  they	  withdrew	  from	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  FLN	  and	  in	  July	  1990	  they	  
forced	   President	   Chadli	   to	   surrender	   the	   defense	   portfolio	   to	   the	   then	   Chief	   of	   Staff,	   Major	  
General	   Nezzar;	   from	   that	   point	   on,	   they	   were	   a	   law	   unto	   themselves	   to	   a	   degree…without	  
precedent	  since	  1965.170	  
	  
	   The	  stage	  was	  set	   in	  1989	  for	  both	  the	  imminent	  state	  of	  exception171,	  and	  for	  a	  clash	  
between	   secular	   generals	   and	   salafi	  Muslims.	   In	  1990,	   the	  Sécurité	  Militaire	  was	   reorganized	  
into	   the	  Département	  de	  Renseignement	  et	  de	  Sécurité	   (DRS),	  “tightening	  the	  grip	  of	  power.”	  
The	  clash	  was	  not	  directly	  between	  Islam	  and	  secularism,	  but	  between	  extreme	  expressions	  of	  
ruling-­‐class	  market-­‐statism	  and	  populist-­‐Islamism,	   both	  unencumbered	   and	  unconstrained	  by	  
institutions.	  The	  FLN/FIS	  battle	  is	  poorly	  reflected	  by	  opposing	  secular	  to	  religious,	  democratic	  
to	  authoritarian,	  or	  socialist	  to	  capitalist	  interests.	  The	  conflict	  instead	  concerned	  the	  radically	  




but	  constituted	  by	  the	  client-­‐regime	  that	  precluded	  enduring	  processes	  of	  value-­‐negotiation.	  It	  
emerged	   initially	   with	   the	   relentless	   desire	   by	   ruling	   elites	   for	   unfettered	   access	   to	   crony-­‐
capitalist	  profiteering	  backed	  by	  military	  force.172	  	  
	   The	  first	  election	  results	  stunned	  observers	  and	  Algerians	  alike,	  suggesting	  that	  Islamists	  
had	   captured	   Algerians’	   anti-­‐state	   populism	   beyond	   any	   intrinsic	   desire	   for	   Islamist	   rule	   or	  
sharia	  law.	  On	  12	  June	  1990	  the	  FIS	  won	  local	  elections,	  garnering	  54%	  compared	  to	  the	  FLN’s	  
28%,	  and	  independents	  12%;	  FIS	  thus	  controlled	  856	  of	  1,541	  Popular	  Community	  Assemblies	  
and	  won	  an	  absolute	  majority	  in	  31	  of	  44	  Popular	  Wilaya	  Assemblies.173	  As	  Kapil	  elaborated	  on	  
these	  figures	  at	  the	  time,	  
	  
The	  scale	  of	  the	  FLN	  defeat	  and	  FIS	  victory	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  The	  FIS	  won	  54	  percent	  of	  the	  
popular	   vote	   nationally	   and	   took	   control	   of	   854	   (55%)	   of	   the	   1,541	   communal	   (municipal)	  
assemblies.	  This	  is	  all	  the	  more	  impressive	  given	  that	  the	  FIS	  did	  not	  even	  run	  candidates	  in	  276	  
communes.	   The	   FLN,	  which	   ran	   almost	   everywhere,	   came	   in	   a	   distant	   second	   place,	  with	   only	  
28%	   of	   the	   popular	   vote	   and	   487	   communes	   (32%)…The	   FIS	   also	   won	   32	   of	   the	   48	   wilaya	  
(provincial)	  assemblies,	  with	  the	  FLN	  taking	  only	  14.	  The	  FIS	  made	  a	  clean	  sweep	  of	  all	  the	  major	  
cities,	   including	   Algiers,	   Oran,	   Constantine,	   and	   Annaba.	   In	   Algiers,	   the	   FIS	   scored	   decisive	  
victories	  in	  even	  the	  more	  well-­‐to-­‐do	  districts.174	  
	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  FIS	  over	  the	  FLN	  was	  unanticipated,	  indeed	  shocking,	  not	  least	  as	  Algeria	  is	  a	  
largely	   secular	   society,	   in	   the	  monastic	   sense	  of	  dividing	   religious	   sacredness	   from	  secular	  or	  
profane	  occupations	  to	  preserve	  the	  strengths	  of	  each.	  The	  FIS’s	  candidates	  and	  spokespeople	  
were	  bold	   in	  their	  religious	  agendas,	  referring	  openly	  to	  modifications	   in	  dress	  codes,	  cuisine,	  
and	  the	  like.175	  Moreover,	  once	  victorious	  they	  fulfilled	  their	  promises.	  In	  Khadra’s	  words,	  early	  
Islamist	  rule	  augured	  poorly	  for	  secular	  Algerians	  should	  Islamists	  rise	  to	  national	  power:	  
	  
This	   was	   how	   they	   set	   about	   cleansing	   the	   environment;	   sympathizers’	   posts	   were	   renewed,	  
while	  the	  puppets	  of	  the	  tottering	  regime	  were	  hounded	  out	  manu	  militari.	  Women	  were	  forced	  




watched	   the	   village	   turn	   into	   a	   fortress,	   the	   good-­‐naturedness	   of	   old	   transformed	   into	  
aggression,	  idleness	  giving	  birth	  to	  chaos.176	  
	  
	   The	  Islamists	  referred	  to	  the	  regime	  not	  only	  as	  le	  pouvoir	  but	  at-­‐Taghut,	  an	  “impious”	  
tyrant	   accused	   of	   idol-­‐worship	   and	   praying	   to	   false	   gods.177	   Islamists	   supported	   democratic	  
participations	  even	  after	   clashes	  with	  the	  state	  over	  election	  procedures	   in	  summer	  1991	   led	  
officials	  to	  postpone	  elections,	  arrest	  FIS	  leaders	  Madani	  and	  Benhadj,	  and	  declare	  emergency	  
conditions.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Gulf	  crisis	  had	  radicalized	  Islamists	  beyond	  their	  “leaders.”	  
The	  FIS	  leadership	  had	  initially	  opposed	  Iraq’s	  secular	  regime,	  expressing	  muted	  support	  for	  the	  
Gulf	  state,	  but	  its	  base	  forced	  it	  to	  change	  course.178	  Islamist	  strategists	  conformed	  to	  “popular	  
feeling	   in	  Algeria	  over	  the	  Gulf	  crisis	   [that]	  obliged	  [senior]	   Islamists	   to	  modify	   their	  positions	  
very	  considerably	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  in	  touch	  with	  their	  popular	  constituency.”179	  In	  reversing	  its	  
opposition	  to	  Iraq’s	  invasion,	  the	  FIS	  risked	  indispensable	  Saudi	  subsidies180	  but	  demonstrated	  
that	  the	  Islamists	  were	  grassroots-­‐driven,	  a	  genuinely	  populist	  agitation	  with	  responsive	  elites	  –
in	   radical	   contrast	   to	  common	  experiences	  with	  client-­‐citizenship.181	  More	   important,	  neither	  
the	  arrests	  of	   its	   leaders	  nor	  the	  corruption,	   immiseration,	  parasitic	  capital-­‐securitization,	  and	  
military	  westernization	  of	  the	  state	  provoked	  Islamist	  violence	  as	  long	  as	  democracy	  promised	  a	  
significant,	   continuous	   opposition	   to	   the	   state.	   Intriguingly,	   at	   this	   point	   hope	   for	   the	  
democratic	  process	  stalled	  violent	  responses	  to	  the	  government’s	  repression.	  Soon	  after,	  Prime	  
Minister	  Hamrouche	  resigned	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  Sid	  Ahmed	  Ghozali	  who	  favored	  proceding	  
with	   the	   vote.182	   On	   30	   July	   1991,	   President	   Ghozali	   called	   3-­‐day	   meeting	   with	   45	   political	  
parties	   to	  diffuse	  political	   tensions.	  This	  was	  a	   significant	   communication	  of	  dependability	  by	  




	   I	  emphasize	  that	  this	  resort	  to	  reforms	  and	  elections	  since	  1989	  constituted	  a	  deliberate	  
shift	   in	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  from	  client-­‐	  to	  voter-­‐based.	  Each	  of	  these	  citizenship	  regimes	  is	  
undifferentiated,	  even	  though	  clearly	  they	  operate	  distinctly,	  in	  market-­‐based	  and	  democracy-­‐
based	   representative	   schemes.	   Algerians	   recognized	   by	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	   that	   client-­‐citizenship	  
was	  bankrupt	  and,	  as	  Roberts	  argues,	  we	  may	  see	  the	  abrupt	  adoption	  of	  political	  reforms	  as	  an	  
insidious	  tactic	   to	  secure	  economic	  via	  political	   liberalization	   (precisely	   the	  double-­‐movement	  
Marx	  exposes	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  “political	  emancipation”	  in	  “On	  the	  Jewish	  Question”).	  Despite	  
their	  differences,	  client-­‐based	  and	  voter-­‐based	  citizenship	  provide	  no	  enduring	  social	  resources	  
without	   state	   financial	   and	   political	   support.	   Algerians	   proceeded	   willingly,	   even	   hopefully,	  
from	  the	  exhausted	  client	  arrangement	  to	  the	  promising	  voter	  mobilization,	  and	  retained	  their	  
non-­‐violent,	  intra-­‐systemic	  participation	  despite	  appearances	  of	  state	  infractions	  and	  duplicity.	  
	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  the	  connection	  here	  between	  the	  continuous	  absence	  of	  segmented	  
public	  spaces	  across	  the	  undifferentiated	  client-­‐	  and	  voter-­‐citizenship	  regimes.	  Two	  marches	  in	  
1990	  capture	  this	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  imposed	  by	  a	  citizenship	  structure	  bereft	  
of	  autonomous	  physical	  sites	  of	  assembly,	  identification,	  and	  inspiration.	  In	  April,	  the	  FIS	  held	  a	  
massive	  march	  to	  express	  defiance	  of	  the	  FLN	  and	  the	  state:	  “The	  sheer	  size	  of	  the	  participation	  
and	   the	  discipline	  with	  which	   it	  was	   conducted	  were	   impressive	   enough,”	  Hafez	  writes,	   “but	  
what	  made	  the	  march	  significant	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  scheduled	  on	  the	  same	  day	  the	  FLN	  
was	  scheduled	  to	  hold	  its	  march	  against	  the	  political	  use	  of	  mosques	  by	  Islamists.”183	  The	  FLN	  
decided	  to	  cancel	  its	  march.	  One	  month	  later,	  in	  May,	  “a	  demonstration	  in	  favor	  of	  democracy	  
and	  against	  Islamic	  intransigence	  attracted	  as	  many	  supporters	  as	  a	  FIS	  demonstration	  –	  some	  




secular-­‐Islamist	  tensions185,	  to	  be	  sure,	  and	  signals	  that	  “public	  displays	  of	  preference	  in	  mass	  
demonstrations	  [were	  becoming]	  important	  to	  political	  status,”	  Crenshaw	  says.	  For	  purposes	  of	  
analyzing	  the	  political	  geography	  or	  spatialization	  of	  citizenship	  regimes,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  interpret	  
these	  marches	  as	  embodied	  expressions,	  performed	  on	  the	  same	  seamless	  public	  territory,	  the	  
same	  grounds	  of	  the	  either-­‐or	  contest.	  Such	  marches	  in	  public	  streets	  and	  town	  squares	  in	  the	  
end	   conveyed	   physically	   the	   non-­‐negotiable	   value-­‐orientations	   of	   the	   increasingly	   polarized	  
activist	  groups.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  the	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  
regime	  of	  client-­‐incorporation,	  oil-­‐dependence,	  low-­‐taxation	  informality,	  and	  spatial	  autonomy.	  
One	  reason	  for	  the	  growing,	  enduring	  power	  of	  Islamist	  organization	  was	  the	  state’s	  decision	  to	  
de-­‐fund	  local	  communities,	  evidently	  to	  punish	  those	  beholden	  or	  faithful	  to	  Islamist	  discourse.	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  Islamists	  expanded	  their	  reach	  and	  popular	  support	  through	  “the	  emergence	  of	  
many	  [“charitable”]	  neighborhood	  associations	  in	  vulnerable	  quarters…places	  where	  there	  are	  
chronic	  problems”	  of	  poverty,	  unemployment,	  over-­‐crowding,	  and	  psychological	  despair.186	   In	  
this	  way,	  the	  Islamists	  acted	  as	  the	  effective	  state	  many	  Algerians	  wished	  they	  had	  –	  capable,	  
efficient,	  conscientious,	  generous,	  and	  responsive	  –	  precisely	  by	  occupying	  towns,	  cities,	  homes,	  
and	  other	  sites	  coveted	  by	  the	  state	  –	  unlike	  the	  segmented	  workplace	  in	  Poland,	  for	  instance,	  
the	  FIS	  constructed	  its	  movement	  on	  places	  of	  citizenship	  relinquished	  by	  the	  Algerian	  state.187	  	  
	   Continued	  signals	  of	  state	  mendicancy	  and	  extravagance	  hardly	  helped	  the	  FLN’s	  cause.	  
It	  was	  disclosed,	  for	  example,	  that	  China	  was	  building	  a	  nuclear	  reactor	  for	  Algeria	  who	  pledged	  
to	  submit	  to	  IAEA	  supervision.188	  In	  1992	  over	  a	  hundred	  Muslim	  political	  activists	  would	  hand	  
Saudi	  Arabia	  a	  “Memorandum	  of	  Advice”	  concerning	  the	  US-­‐Saudi	  alliance	  and	  citing	  Algeria	  as	  




movements,	  or	  individuals.”189	  Meanwhile,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  American-­‐Iraq	  war	  dropped	  oil	  prices	  
to	  roughly	  eighteen	  dollars	  a	  barrel,	   forcing	  Algeria	  “to	  readjust	   its	  request	   from	  the	   IMF	  and	  
the	  World	  Bank	  and	  to	  make	  greater	  concessions	  to	  them”190,	  deepening	  the	  popular	  sense	  of	  
neo-­‐colonial	  state	  subservience	  and	  duplicity.	  Entrenched	  Algerian	  rulers	  before	  and	  during	  the	  
elections	   were	   seen	   as	   beholden	   to	   foreign	   powers,	   detached,	   and	   disloyal	   to	   religious	   or	  
national	  values	  endorsed	  openly	  by	  FIS’s	  voters.	  “I	  voted	  for	  the	  FIS	  out	  of	  revenge,”	  said	  one	  
voter	   in	   1990;	   another	   said,	   “In	   this	   country	   [a	   young	   man	   has]	   only	   four	   choices:	   you	   can	  
remain	  unemployed	  and	  celibate	  because	  there	  are	  no	  jobs	  and	  apartments	  to	  live	  in;	  you	  can	  
work	  in	  the	  black	  market	  and	  risk	  being	  arrested;	  you	  can	  try	  to	  emigrate	  to	  France	  to	  sweep	  
the	  streets	  of	  Paris	  or	  Marseilles;	  or	  you	  can	  vote	  for	  FIS	  and	  vote	  for	  Islam.”191	  Such	  support	  in	  
and	  outside	  devout	  Islamist	  circles	  resulted	  in	  a	  federal-­‐election	  victory	  in	  December	  1991.	  	  
	   On	  11	  January	  1992	  the	  state	  canceled	  these	  elections	  and	  on	  12	  January	  the	  military	  
leaders	  formed	  the	  High	  Council	  of	  State	  (HCE),	  taking	  power	  with	  the	  resignation	  of	  Benjedid.	  
On	  9	  February	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  was	  called	  and	  instantly	  “five	  detention	  centers	  opened	  in	  
the	  Sahara	  to	  hold	  thousands	  of	  FIS	  activists,	  including	  500	  mayors	  and	  councilors.”192	  “Special	  
courts,…banned	  under	  the	  1989	  constitution,	  were	  reestablished	  to	  prosecute	   ‘terrorists.’…As	  
time	  went	  on,	  the	  state	  closed	  down	  all	  the	  cultural	  and	  charitable	  organizations	  of	  the	  FIS	  and	  
ordered	  the	  destruction	  of	  all	  unofficial	  mosques,	  which	  were	  popular	  with	   Islamists.	   In	  1992	  
and	  1993,	  a	  total	  of	  166	  Islamists	  were	  sentenced	  to	  death.”193	  These	  were	  the	  same	  activists	  
and	  democrats	  who	  had	  participated	  in	  the	  state-­‐called	  elections	  and	  had	  won	  a	  plurality	  if	  not	  
a	  majority,	  only	  months	  earlier.194	  As	  even	  a	  writer	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  government’s	  reaction	  




began	  handing	  down	  death	  sentences	  with	  chilling	  regularity.”195	  While	  the	  regime	  engaged	  in	  
torture,	  its	  periodization	  is	  contested.	  In	  1992,	  the	  US	  Sate	  Department	  reported	  less	  “torture	  
and	  brutal	  treatment	  than	  in	  prior	  years”	  and,	  even	  more	  dramatically,	  a	  “medical	  team	  under	  
the	   auspices	   of	   the	   Algerian	   League	   of	   Human	   Rights	   found	   no	   evidence	   of	   torture	   in	   the	  
detention	  camps.”196	  The	  state	  banned	  FIS	  on	  4	  March	  1992.	  On	  29	  June	  President	  Boudiaf	  –	  a	  
revered	   revolutionary	   recently	   recalled	   from	   exile	   to	   direct	   his	   credentials	   to	   repairing	   the	  
country	   –	   was	   assassinated.	   On	   15	   July	  Madani	   and	   Benhadj	   were	   given	   twelve-­‐year	   prison	  
terms	  by	  the	  Blida	  military	  tribunal.	  A	  month	  and	  half	  later,	  on	  26	  August	  1992,	  a	  bomb	  attack	  
in	  Algiers	  air	  terminal	  became	  the	  first	   indiscriminate	  terrorist	  attack	  since	   independence,	   i.e.,	  
since	  the	  war	  with	  France.	  In	  1992	  Algeria	  veered	  toward	  total	  war.	  “Every	  day	  police	  officers,	  
gendarmes,	  or	  soldiers	  were	  murdered,	  nearly	  four	  hundred	  between	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  
state	  of	  emergency	  on	  February	  9,	  1992,	  and	  September	  1,	  1992.”197	  Starting	  5	  December	  1992,	  
“for	  an	  indeterminate	  period	  of	  time,”	  a	  10:00pm-­‐6:00am	  curfew	  was	  imposed	  in	  Algiers,	  Blida,	  
Tipaza,	  Boumerdes,	  Bouira,	  and	  Ain	  Defla	  wilayat,	  broadly	  a	  national	  curfew198	  On	  14	  December	  
1992,	  near	  Apreval	  mosque	   in	  Kouba,	  a	  machine-­‐gun	  attack	  on	  a	  halted	  police	  patrol	   vehicle	  
killed	  five	  officers	  –	  “the	  most	  deadly	  action…in	  1992	  against	  officers	  of	  the	  law.”199	  	  
	   Meanwhile,	  “l’ètat	  d’urgence”	  became	  quasi-­‐institutionalized	  to	  the	  resounding	  silence	  
of	  outsiders.	  In	  February	  1993	  attorneys	  Brahim	  Taouti	  and	  Ali	  Zouita	  were	  imprisoned	  as	  legal	  
council	   of	   the	  FIS.	   They	  were	  arrested	  as	   the	  Algerian	  Supreme	  Court	  prepared	   to	  hear	   their	  
appeals	  of	  the	  1992	  sentencing	  of	  seven	  Islamists	  to	  between	  four	  and	  twelve	  years,	  including	  
Benhadj	  and	  Abdelkader	  Hachani	  (respectively).	  In	  Spring	  1993	  Amnesty	  International	  “accused	  




emergency…,	  [indicating]	  that	  whereas	  torture	  had	  ‘practically	  disappeared	  between	  1989	  and	  
1991,’	   it	  was	  now	  again	  being	  used	  against	   the	   ‘extremists’	   and	   ‘was	   reported	   regularly	   in	   in	  
twenty	  detention	  centers,	  mostly	  located	  in	  the	  Algiers	  region,	  but	  also	  in	  other	  cities.”200	  The	  
result	  among	  the	  disenfranchised	  was,	  predictably,	  a	  radicalization	  of	  interpretation,	  approach,	  
and	  action.	  The	  Islamist	  critique	  conflated	  democracy	  with	  western	  hypocrisy	  and	  authoritarian	  
manipulation,	  especially	  given	  the	  generally	  positive	  response	  of	  other	  putative	  pro-­‐democracy	  
regimes,	  such	  as	  the	  US.201	  As	  Ghannoushi,	  a	  prominent	  Tunisian	  Islamist	  put	  it,	  	  
	  
The	  Western	   response	   to	   the	   cancellation	   of	   elections	   in	   Algeria	   has	   been	   a	   source	   of	   great	  
dismay	  and	  disappointment	  for	  many	  Muslims	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Muslims	  have	  discovered	  that	  
only	   the	   ends	   matters	   to	   the	   Western	   political	   rationale.	   Ethics	   and	   human	   rights	   are	  
subservient	   to	   interests;	   values	   are	   only	   necessary	   if	   they	  will	   bring	   to	   power	   ‘liberals’	   (as	   in	  
Eastern	   Europe),	   but	   they	   are	   dispensable	   if	   the	   result	   is	   power	   for	   the	   genuine	   and	   sincere	  
children	  of	  the	  land,	  and	  an	  end	  to	  minority	  regimes	  that	  are	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  colonial	  era.	  	  To	  
prevent	  the	  latter	  situation,	  prisons	  may	  be	  packed	  with	  political	  opponents	  and	  the	  state	  may	  
resort	  to	  torture,	  economic	  deprivation	  and	  even	  rape,	  as	  has	  become	  official	  policy	  as	  evident	  
in	   Amnesty	   International’s	   reports	   on	   Tunisia	   and	   Algeria.	   	   Islamists	   today	   are	   the	   victims,	  
repressed	  under	  the	  pretext	  –	  witness	  Algeria	  –	  of	  saving	  democracy	  from	  themselves.202	  	  
	  
	   The	  west	  was	  officially	  paralyzed	  over	  the	  annulled	  elections,	  belying	  the	  simplistic	  claim	  
then	  and	  now	  that	  Islamism	  had	  replaced	  communism.	  Unlike	  “anti-­‐communism,”	  anti-­‐Islamism	  
has	  not	  become	  a	  “categorical	  imperative.”203	  There	  were	  no	  Senators	  supporting	  the	  Islamists,	  
as	   John	  F.	  Kennedy	  and	   the	  CIA	  had	  backed	   the	  FLN	   in	  1957204,	  but	  nonetheless	   the	   reaction	  
was	  muted	  more	  than	  anti-­‐FIS.205	  Anglo-­‐European	  consternation	  redounded	  to	  perplexity	  about	  
how	  Islam	  related	  to	  democracy,	  modernity,	  tradition,	  and	  globalization.206	  Islamists	  were	  anti-­‐
democrats	   winning	   elections	   against	   corrupt	   and	   avaricious	   authoritarians.	   The	   conventional	  
reply	   –	   “democracy	   is	   the	   solution”	   to	   trump	   “Islam	   is	   the	   solution”	  –	   supplemented	  equally	  




‘sovereign’	   Algerians	   cannot	   be	   allowed	   to	   elect	   Islamists	   (supposedly	   anti-­‐democratic)	   who	  
appeared	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  winning	  a	  majority.	  It	  is,	  however,	  acceptable	  for	  Western	  citizens	  to	  
vote	  into	  office	  leaders	  (supposedly	  democratic)	  who,	  if	  need	  be,	  are	  prepared	  to	  go	  to	  war	  and	  
bomb	  cities	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  national	  interest.”208	  	  
	   Anger	  at	  this	  hypocrisy	  is	  widely	  attributed	  to	  the	  subsequent	  actions:	  “What	  made	  the	  
violence	  so	  intense	  was	  not	  just	  that	  the	  Government	  canceled	  the	  elections	  but,	  as	  important,	  
the	   fact	   that	   the	   international	   community	   let	   the	   Government	   get	   away	   with	   canceling	   the	  
elections.”209	  The	  HCE	  takeover,	  criminalization	  of	   the	  FIS,	  and	  resort	   to	  concentration	  camps	  
make	   activist	  Mohamed	   Talbi’s	   remark	   poignant:	   “I	   shall	   not	   forget	   that	  western	   democracy	  
said	  to	  me	  in	  the	  year	  1960	  that	  Algeria	   is	  an	   inseparable	  part	  of	  France	  and	  that	   it	   is	  French	  
territory.	  And	  I	  shall	  not	  forget	  that	  French	  democracy	  killed	  millions	  of	  Algerians,	  claiming	  that	  
they	  had	  contravened	  international	  law.	  	  So	  whom	  do	  we	  fool	  by	  this	  word	  ‘democracy’?”210	  As	  
Spencer	  summarizes	  the	  point:	  
	  
Since	   early	   1992	   the	   suspension	   of	   the	   constitution	   and	   the	   prohibition	   of	   the	   FIS	   as	   a	   legal	  
political	  party	  have	  changed	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Islamist	  movement	  within	  Algeria.	  In	  the	  past,	  
the	  FIS	  represented	  and	  encompassed	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  opinions	  and	  approaches;	  however,	  the	  
dismantling	   of	   the	   public	   organizational	   networks	   of	   the	   FIS	   undermined	   its	   cohesion	   and	  
balance.	  As	  both	  moderates	  and	  radicals	  were	  forced	  from	  the	  public	  arena	  of	  Algerian	  politics	  
(many	  through	  arrest,	  imprisonment,	  and	  military	  exile),	  the	  focus	  of	  Islamist	  activism	  devolved	  
to	   clandestine	   and	   military	   groups	   engaged	   in	   violent	   opposition	   to	   the	   military-­‐backed	  
government	  and	  the	  statements	  of	  its	  dispersed	  leadership.211	  
	  
	   Ali	  Benhadj	  made	  the	  same	  argument,	  linking	  western	  liberalism	  with	  abrogation	  of	  duty	  
and	  valorization	  of	  selfishness.212	  In	  sum,	  “The	  victory	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Salvation	  Front	  was	  a	  clear	  
indication	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   Algerian	   people	   sought	   a	   change	   after	   three	   decades	   of	  




with	  the	  masses…Fearing	  defeat,	  contemporary	  secularists	  appealed	  to	  the	  army	  to	  intervene.	  	  
They	   cheered	   as	   tanks	   crushed	   the	   ballot	   boxes	   and	   as	   thousands	   of	   citizens	   were	   jailed	   in	  
detention	  camps	  set	  up	  in	  the	  desert.	  They	  claimed	  they	  were	  protecting	  democracy	  from	  the	  
majority,	  because	  according	  to	  them	  the	  majority	  could	  not	  be	  trusted.”213	  As	  Burke	  III	  puts	  it:	  
“It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Islamists	  at	  first	  followed	  the	  path	  of	  legality	  in	  contesting	  the	  
December	   1991	   parliamentary	   elections….In	   retrospect,	   [the	   coup]	   seems	   a	   catastrophic	  
political	  miscalculatin.	   The	   repression	   that	   followed	   drove	   the	   Islamists	   to	   take	   up	   arms	   and	  
ignited	  a	  low-­‐intensity	  civil	  war…”214	  “But	  then,”	  as	  one	  BBC	  report	  remarks,	  “when	  the	  Islamic	  
Salvation	  Front	  was	  poised	   to	   sweep	   the	  board	   in	  a	  1992	  general	  election,	   they	  annulled	   the	  
whole	  process	  and	   took	  power	  back.	   The	  political	   ferment	   immediately	  moved	   into	  violence.	  	  
Armed	   Islamists	   mounted	   attacks	   across	   Algeria;	   the	   security	   forces	   fought	   back;	   and	  
sometimes	   it	  was	  hard	  to	  tell	  which	  group	  had	  carried	  out	  which	  atrocity.”215	  Thus,	  the	  FIS,	  a	  
“mass	  social	  movement”216,	  had	  been	  stopped	  from	  winning	  an	  election,	  banned,	  arrested	  en	  
masse,	  then	  forced	  to	  defend	  its	  moderation	  from	  militarist	  Islamists	  inspired	  by	  al-­‐Qa’ida.	  	  
	  
Blocked	   from	   running	   the	   state,	   the	  FIS	  was	  banned	   in	  March	  1992.	  A	   subsequent	   crackdown	  
drove	   its	   moderate	   wing	   to	   rejoin	   the	   radicals,	   who	   resorted	   to	   violence	   after	   the	   elections'	  
annulment.	   The	   Islamists	   targeted	   military	   vehicles,	   barracks,	   the	   police,	   and	   government	  
buildings.	   Another	   Islamist	   organization,	   the	   Armed	   Islamic	   Group	   	   (GIA),	   then	   appeared	   and	  
went	   even	   further,	   killing	   intellectuals,	   journalists,	   women,	   and	   foreigners	   and	   massacring	  
villagers	  in	  western	  Algeria.	  But	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  the	  GIA	  murders	  bred	  widespread	  
skepticism	  about	  the	  group's	  identity.	  Many	  observers	  suspect	  that	  the	  GIA	  	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  	  
state's	   intelligence	   service,	   	   designed	   to	   discredit	   	   the	   	   Islamists.	   These	   suspicions	   have	   been	  
heightened	  by	   the	  Algerian	  government's	   sharp	   refusal	   to	   allow	  any	   international	   inquiry	   into	  
the	  massacres.217	  
	  
At	   this	   time	  “Algeria	   featured	  prominently	   in	  Saudi	  public	  debates,	  not	   least	  because	  Sahwist	  




Saudi	  regime	  for	  not	  supporting	  the	  FIS.	  The	  entire	  Saudi	  Islamist	  field	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
Algerian	   Islamists,	  but	  for	  most	  Saudi	   jihadists	  getting	  militarily	   involved	   in	  Algeria	  was	  out	  of	  
the	  question	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  an	  internal	  conflict,	  not	  a	  classical	  jihad	  pitting	  Muslims	  
[against]	  non-­‐Muslims.	  	  Usama	  bin	  Laden	  had	  sporadic	  contacts	  with	  Algerian	  militants	  from	  his	  
base	  in	  Sudan,	  but	  it	  seems	  that	  he	  did	  not	  send	  people	  to	  Algeria.”218	  	  
	   The	   progression	   toward	   total	  war,	   the	   concentration	   camp,	   and	   psychotic	   violence	   in	  
Algeria	  mobilized	  the	  GIA,	  marginalized	  FIS,	  and	  created	  self-­‐reinforcing	  militarist	  dialectics.	  The	  
GIA	  created	  a	  political	  economy	  of	   terror,	  drawing	  strength	   in	  part	   from	  rural	  Algerians	   from	  
abandoned	  socialist	  villages	  like	  Hai	  Bounab.219	  But	  credible	  accounts	  of	  recruitment	  of	  fighters	  
and	   retention	   of	   frightening	   loyalty	   to	   the	   GIA	   testify	   that	   state	   brutality	   radicalized	  Muslim	  
commitments	  more	  than	  any	  other	  influence.	  	  One	  pseudonymous	  but	  credible	  witness	  recalls:	  	  
	  
However,	   from	   spring	   1994,	   the	   situation	   will	   completely	   change.	   Fighters	   'Islamists'	   are	  
unknown	  to	  emerge	  in	  several	  areas	  (especially	  in	  Algiers)	  and	  impose	  a	  terror	  that	  goes	  along	  
with	  the	  takeover	  of	  these	  areas	  by	  the	  army.	  And	  paradoxically,	  notwithstanding	  that	  the	  DRS	  is	  
gradually	   and	   secretly	   control	   of	   the	   whole	   direction	   of	   the	   GIA,	   a	   major	   part	   of	   the	   true	  
underground	  opposition,	  armed	  or	  not	  -­‐	  and	  above	  all	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  most	  politicized	  Jaz	  
'ara,	  which	  includes	  many	  intellectuals	  -­‐	  the	  rallies,	  ignoring	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  
GIA	   by	   the	   DRS.	  With	   the	   takeover	   by	   Djamel	   Zitouni	   Officer	   (DRS)	   in	  October	   1994,	   the	  GIA	  
became	  a	  veritable	  tool	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  insurgency,	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  chiefs	  of	  the	  DRS.220	  
	  
Similarly,	  one	  unapologetic	  memoir	  about	  life	  with	  a	  GIA	  emir	  says:	  	  
	  
From	  what	  Ahmed	  told	  me,	  he	  decided	  to	  join	  the	  GIA	  the	  day	  he	  was	  arrested	  in	  the	  Mosque	  at	  
Benramdane.	   He	   was	   there	   for	   Friday	   services	   when	   the	   police	   surrounded	   the	   building	   and	  
forced	   everyone	   to	   go	   outside.	   	   They	   hauled	   him	   down	   to	   the	   police	   station	   along	   with	   the	  
others	  suspected	  of	  having	  links	  with	  terrorists.	  They	  were	  all	  beaten.	  Ahmad	  was	  locked	  up	  in	  a	  
cell	  for	  three	  days	  and	  made	  to	  do	  disgusting	  chores,	  like	  clean	  the	  toilets.	  	  He	  told	  me	  that	  was	  
the	  day	  he	  decided	  to	  join,	  to	  get	  back	  at	  the	  police.	  But	  I	  think	  he	  wanted	  to	  join	  much	  earlier,	  
because	   he	   started	   reciting	   prayers	   and	   hanging	   around	   the	   group	   long	   before	   that.	   Besides,	  
ever	  since	  I’d	  known	  him,	  he	  hated	  the	  police	  and	  anything	  related	  to	  the	  government…He	  was	  






Finally,	  a	  fifteen-­‐year-­‐old	  became	  a	  torturer	  for	  the	  GIA	  once	  traumatized	  by	  state	  violence:	  	  	  
	  
Ahmed	   told	  me	   the	  boy	  had	   seen	  his	   four	  brothers,	  all	   terrorists,	   killed	   in	  a	   skirmish	  with	   the	  
military.	  During	  the	  same	  operation,	  a	  helicopter	  bombed	  their	  house	  and	  killed	  their	  mother.	  
Her	  body	  was	  crushed	  under	  the	  rubble.	  He	  was	  the	  only	  one	  in	  the	  family	  who	  escaped.	  After	  
that	   he	   turned	  heartless,	   devoid	   of	   any	   emotion.	  He	   dreamed	  of	   nothing	   but	   violence.	   All	   he	  
thought	  about	  was	  getting	  even…He	  was	  full	  of	  hate.222	  	  
	  
	   “By	  May	   of	   1994,	   over	   fifty	   imams	   had	   been	  murdered	   for	   condemning	   the	   killing	   of	  
civilians.”223	  By	   this	   time	  many	  of	   the	  2800	  Algerians	  who	  had	   joined	  anti-­‐Soviet	   jihad224	  had	  
returned	   to	   Algeria	   “in	   three	   waves”	   of	   anti-­‐government	   militarization.225	   The	   state	   reacted	  
with	  mass	  killings	  of	  Islamists.	  After	  the	  murder	  of	  two	  television	  journalists	  and	  a	  police	  officer,	  
for	  instance,	  the	  state	  killed	  fifty-­‐seven	  people	  in	  a	  week,	  mostly	  in	  Algiers.226	  Bin	  Laden	  wanted	  
to	  target	  the	  French-­‐supported	  Algerian	  state	  in	  1994,	  evidently227	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  the	  same	  
year	   a	   compromise	   between	   the	   generals	   and	   FIS	   seemed	   promising	   and	   imminent,	   under	  
which	  moderate	  Islamists	  would	  agree	  to	  the	  pluralism	  framework	  of	  the	  1989	  constitution	  and	  
disavow	  violence	  in	  exchange	  for	  Zeroual’s	  provisional	  recognition	  of	  FIS	  at	  least	  as	  participants	  
in	  a	  “national	  dialogue.”228	  But	  upon	  the	  reward	  of	  his	  release,	  Madani	  insisted	  on	  convening	  a	  
“full	  meeting	  of	  the	  FIS	  executive	  council…in	  order	  to	  formulate	  a	  negotiating	  position,”	  and	  the	  
potential	  cooperation	  ended	  “because	  of	  residual	  doubts	  over	  whether	  this	  meeting	  would	  also	  
include	  representatives	  of	  militant	  groups.”	  	  
	   Between	  1994	  and	  1999	  Algeria’s	  violence	  was	  an	  unthinkable	  “rain	  of	  blood,	  a	  snow	  of	  
bone…”229	  Worse	  still,	  of	  the	  Algerian	  atrocities	  “only	  the	  victims	  are	  known,	  visible,”	  not	  their	  
ghostly	  killers	  whose	  faces,	  fury,	  or	  cold-­‐hearted	  inhumanity	  remain	  shrouded.230	  By	  1996,	  116	  




of	   the	   thousand	  escapees	  were	   condemned	   to	  death.	   “The	   gravest	   development	   since	  1993,	  
however,	  was	   the	  almost	  daily	  killing	  of	   Islamists,	  either	   through	  manhunts	  or	   clashes	  during	  
searches.	  Rights	  advocates	  condemned	  the	  military	  regime’s	  use	  of	  torture,	  “disappearances,”	  
and	  the	  extrajudicial	  killing	  of	  suspected	  Islamists.”231	  Even	  apologists	  for	  militant	  anti-­‐Islamism	  
recoiled	   at	   “this	   politics	   of	   zeal	   and	   cruelty…[t]he	   chasm	   between	   Francophiles	   and	   Arab-­‐
Islamists	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  terror	  in	  Algeria…its	  terror	  and	  counter-­‐terror:	  armed	  Islamic	  groups	  
campaigning	  against	  perceived	  Francophiles,	  secularists,	  and	  emancipated	  women;	  reprisals	  by	  
the	  state	  and	  its	  ‘eradicationists,’	  who	  pass	  off	  their	  violence	  as	  the	  defense	  of	  modernity	  itself;	  
state-­‐sponsored	  killer	  squads,	  the	  ninjas	  with	  their	  ski	  masks.”232	  Recent	  research	  and	  reports	  
suggest,	   worse	   still,	   that	   the	   state	   may	   have	   perpetrated	   or	   facilitated	   atrocities	   linked	   to	  
violent	  Islamists.233	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th-­‐century,	  estimates	  ranged	  up	  to	  100,000	  killed,	  with	  
impunity	  for	  the	  state,	   its	  death	  squads,	   its	  torture	  chambers,	   its	  withdrawn	  elections,	  and	  its	  
internment	   camps.	   The	  massacres,	   executions,	   and	  disappearances	   peaked	   in	   1997,	   the	   year	  
the	  AIS	  disarmed	  and	  new	  elections	  were	  called;	  the	  GIA	  remained	  at	  war.	  So,	  too,	  did	  the	  “self-­‐
defense”	   groups,	  who	   reflected	   an	   unsettled	   strand	   in	   the	  Algerian	   client-­‐citizenship	   regime:	  
the	   failure	  of	   the	   state	   to	   integrate	   in	   a	   lasting	  manner	   the	   general	   population,	   creating	   any	  
fundamental	  dedication	  or	  identification	  beyond	  the	  cash	  nexus.	  Indeed,	  “some	  of	  the	  violent	  
massacres	  [from	  this	  time	  were]	  related	  to	  [unresolved,	  unaddressed]	  sociological	  phenomena	  
such	  as	  familial	  or	  tribal	  conflicts”	  that	  could	  feed	  off	  the	  chaotic	  atmosphere	  to	  settle	  scores	  or	  
establish	  some	  political	  gain.234	  	  
	   Likewise,	   the	   backstory	   of	   the	   violence	   continued	   to	   reinforce	   the	   political-­‐economic	  




of	  political	  elections.	  As	  Martinez	  says,	  the	  FIS	  and	  Islamist-­‐state	  war	  created	  an	  “opportunistic	  
coalition	  of	  four	  social	  groups	  with	  contradictory	  demands:	  the	  military	  entrepreneur,	  the	  petty	  
trader,	   the	   ‘hittiste’,	   and	   the	   devout	  Muslim	   activist,”	   a	   marriage	   of	   convenience	   ultimately	  
originating	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   systemic	  subjectivity	  more	   than	  “factors	   relating	   to	   identity	  and	  
culture	  along.”235	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  long	  trajectory	  of	  Algeria’s	  political	  economy	  
that	  is,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  eruptive	  war,	  almost	  eerie.	  As	  Dillman	  writes,	  
	  
After	   1991,	   structural	   adjustment	   and	   debt	   rescheduling	   took	   place	   as	   regime	   oligopolists	  
dominated	  trade	  and	  privatization	  in	  a	  country	  whose	  infrastructure	  was	  partially	  destroyed	  by	  
civil	  conflict.	  Instead	  of	  an	  Islamic	  republic,	  Algeria	  ended	  up	  with	  something	  more	  like	  a	  banana	  
republic.	  The	  pre-­‐coup	  dirigiste	  state	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  state	  of	  rent-­‐seekers.	  Military	  officers,	  
functionaries,	   and	   businesspeople,	   collectively	   referred	   to	   as	   a	   political-­‐financial	   mafia,	  
systematically	  privatized	  public	  resources.	  Corruption,	  bribery,	  influence	  peddling,	  and	  violence	  
became	  the	  norm	  rather	  than	  the	  exception.236	  
	  
	   The	  Algerian	  civil	  war	  is	  generally	  dated	  1992-­‐1997.237	  The	  latter	  date	  marks	  the	  October	  
1997	  unilateral	  cease-­‐fire	  of	  the	  Armée	  Islamique	  du	  Salut	  (AIS,	  the	  military	  wing	  of	  the	  FIS)	  and	  
the	  peak	  intensity	  of	  violence.238	  By	  then,	  Ashour	  says,	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  “pragmatic	  
de-­‐radicalization”	  prevailed:	   roughly,	  battle	   fatigue	  and	   leadership	   capable	  of	   compromise.239	  
Still,	  among	  the	  AIS,	   lawless	  violence,	  massacres,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  continued	  after	  
that	   atrocious	  peak.240	  How	   to	   characterize	   the	  1992-­‐	   fighting	   in	  Algeria	  has	  been	   contested,	  
pointedly	  over	  the	  diffusion	  and	  representation	  of	  the	  violence.	  The	  pervasive	  militarization	  of	  
Algerian	   society	   by	   the	   1990s	   underdetermines	   and	   under-­‐specifies	   the	   political	   dynamics	   of	  
Islamist/state	  conflict	  from	  the	  1980s	  forward.241	  Some	  writers	  emphasize	  that	  tiny	  minorities	  
were	  at	  war	  with	  scant	  popular	  followings,	  a	  view	  of	  increasing	  plausibility	  with	  the	  emergence	  




be	   dismissed	   just	   for	   confusing	   rational	   or	   strategic	   with	   irrational	   or	   vengeful	   elements243;	  
rationalized	   war-­‐machines	   may	   be	   more	   efficient,	   comprehensive,	   and	   legitimized	   under	   a	  
single	  ideological	  regime.244	  The	  nominal	  concern	  with	  “civil	  war”	  arises	  in	  this	  context,	  where	  
the	  society-­‐at-­‐war	  view	  promotes	  an	  image	  of	  cultural	  or	  historical	  clashes	  between	  Islamic	  and	  
Francophone	  values.245	  But	  structural	  arguments	  can	  explore	  cultural	  and	  institutional	  sources	  
without	  reducing	  violence	  to	  old	  hatreds	  or	  historical	  inevitability.246	  
	   Despite	  the	  putative	  conclusion	  of	  major	  hostilities	  by	  then,	  in	  1999	  Amnesty	  reported	  
thousands	  of	  civilians	  killed,	  often	  “extrajudiciously	  by	  security	   forces	  or	  by	  militias	  armed	  by	  
the	  state,	  others	  were	  deliberately	  and	  arbitrarily	  killed	  by	  armed	  groups	  defining	  themselves	  
as	   ‘Islamic.’”	   The	   report	   also	   indicated	  unfair	   trials;	   random	  detentions	  under	   “anti-­‐terrorist”	  
laws;	   detentions	  without	   trial;	   “torture	   and	   ill-­‐treatment	   by	   security	   forces	   especially	   during	  
secret	   detentions	   but	   also	   in	   prisons”;	   dozens	   of	   disappearances	   following	   arrest	   by	   security	  
forces;	  “hundreds	  of	  people	  sentenced	  to	  death,	  the	  vast	  majority	  in	  absentia;	  and	  “scores”	  of	  
abductions	  as	  well	  as	  torture	  and	  rape	  by	  armed	  groups.247	  Algeria’s	  Criminal	  Code	  Article	  144,	  
amended	   in	   2001,	   allows	   one-­‐year	   detentions	   for	   defaming	   persons	   or	   institutions	   of	   the	  
government.248	   As	   recently	   as	   2006	   President	   Bouteflika	   pardoned	   journalists	   imprisoned	   on	  
this	  charge.249	  While	  that	  may	  be	  good	  for	  the	  journalists,	  it	  is	  still	  an	  act	  of	  clemency,	  hence	  of	  
a	  state	  of	  exception.	  Finally,	  in	  2006	  SIPRI	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1992	  removed	  Algeria	  from	  its	  
list	  of	  major	  armed	  conflicts,	  defined	  as	  1000	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  per	  annum.250	  Algeria	  seems	  






§5.c	   Theory	  and	  Evidence	  
	  
	   My	  theoretical	  model,	  presented	  in	  the	  introduction	  (§I.b.3)	  and	  reiterated	  above	  (§3.c),	  
derives	  Algerian	  violence	  under	  martial	  law	  from	  the	  undifferentiated	  client-­‐citizenship	  regime	  
that	   eradicated	   systemic	   subjectivity	   under	   fiscal	   crisis,	   effectively	   expelling	   dissidents	   from	  
publicly	   relevant	   social	   action.	   The	   argument	   specifies	   that	   the	   state	   incorporated	   non-­‐state	  
agents	  in	  distributive	  networks	  that	  linked	  state	  and	  citizen	  through	  the	  discretionary,	  informal,	  
undifferentiated	  social	  resource	  of	  private	  loyalty.	  My	  explanation	  claims	  that	  the	  asymmetrical	  
dependence	  of	  social	   resources	  on	  state	  revenues	   is	   the	  source	  of	  Algeria’s	  violence,	  and	  the	  
core	  distinction	  from	  Poland’s	  differentiated	  worker-­‐citizenship.	  It	  adds	  that	  in	  these	  two	  cases	  
social	   and	   spatial	   aspects	   of	   citizenship	   regimes	   were	   derivative,	   secondary	   influences	   on	  
dissident	  actions	  and	  decisions;	  that	  is,	  social	  ties	  and	  political	  spaces	  defines	  the	  of	  agents	  and	  
spaces	   engaged	   in	   the	   violent	   reclamation	   of	   subjectivity	   under	   undifferentiated	   citizenship	  
structures.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Poland’s	  horizontal	  social	  ties	  among	  workers	  and	  segmented	  factory	  
spaces,	  Algeria’s	  client-­‐citizens	  were	  integrated	  into	  the	  state	  in	  competitive	  social	  relationships	  
and	  seamless	  or	  zero-­‐sum	  public	  spaces.	  The	  Algerian	  state’s	  abrupt	  replacement	  of	  the	  client-­‐
regime	  with	  a	  voter-­‐regime	  appeared	  to	  promise	  a	  differentiated	  citizenship-­‐regime	  based	  on	  
institutionally	  guaranteed	  electoral	  processes.	  Annulment	  of	  election	  results	  and	  suspension	  of	  
democracy	  thus	  returned	  voters	  to	  their	  status	  as	  objectified	  clients	  of	  an	  insolvent	  state.	  This	  
double	  loss	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity,	  I	  argue,	  provoked	  anti-­‐systemic	  Algerian	  violence.	  
	   The	  history	  of	  Algeria’s	  distributive	   client-­‐citizenship	  eventuating	   in	  a	   sadistic	   terrorist	  
war	  between	  the	  state	  and	  Islamists	  confirms,	  I	  think,	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  undifferentiated	  




encouraged	   the	   violent	   response	   to	   martial	   law	   by	   extinguishing	   effective	   membership	   in	  
Algerian	  political	  life.	  This	  section	  will	  analyze	  the	  plausibility	  of	  this	  explanation	  by	  working	  the	  
model	  back	  through	  the	  historical	  narrative,	  revisiting	  the	  history	  more	  explicitly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
model.	  I	  will	  ask	  if	  the	  emergence	  of	  FIS/GIA	  corroborates,	  qualifies,	  or	  challenges	  my	  account	  
of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  causal	  pathway	  from	  citizenship	  regime	  to	  opposition	  strategies.	  A	  test	  of	  
my	  model’s	  validity	  will	  adduce	  evidence	  from	  the	  actions	  and	  discourses	  of	  Algerian	  activists,	  
focusing	   on	   key	   moments	   of	   state-­‐citizen	   interaction	   from	   the	   revolution	   against	   France	   to	  
state	   formation,	   imposition	  of	  martial	   law,	  and	   the	   Islamist	  uprising.	  As	   in	   the	   corresponding	  
section	   in	   the	   last	   chapter,	   I	  will	   address	   variations	   in	   the	   citizenship	   regime,	   beginning	  with	  
non-­‐explanatory	  social	  ties	  and	  political	  spaces,	  then	  elaborating	  the	  effects	  of	  undifferentiated	  
systemic	  subjectivity	  and	  experiential	  evaluation.	  	  
	   My	   theoretical	   model	   claims	   that	   client-­‐citizenship	   fosters	   vertical	   and	   competitive	  
social	  ties,	  because	  the	  state	  creates	  an	  institutional	  incentive	  system	  in	  which	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
must	  compete	  for	  scarce	  resources	  doled	  out	  from	  the	  oil-­‐revenues	  of	  ruling	  patrons.	  This	  is	  a	  
predictable	  developmental	  choice	  given	  the	  availability	  of	  monocultural	  export	  rents	  that	  could	  
deploy	  precocious	  Keynesian	  development	  to	  assimilate	  under	  a	  state	  apparatus	  the	  unusually	  
pertinacious	  sub-­‐populations	  pressing	  demands	  on	  the	  state	  at	  independence.	  In	  this	  sense,	  as	  
we	  have	  seen,	  the	  Algerian	  client-­‐citizenship	  regime	  minimized	  transaction	  costs	  of	  integrating	  
multiple	   identities	   and	   claims.	   Despite	   sharing	   religious	   homogeneity	   with	   Polish	   Catholics,	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  Algerian	  state	  builders	  did	  not	  enjoy	  a	  cohesive	  cultural	  landscape,	  
although	  this	  difference	  does	  not	  bear	  explanatory	  weight.	  The	  historical	  narrative	  clarified	  how	  




some	  extent	  creating	  a	  fight	  “around”	  the	  state	  between,	  ultimately,	  the	  military	  and	  Islamists.	  
	   This	  commentary	  refers	  to	  a	  double	  movement.	  On	  one	  hand,	  Algeria	  had	  a	  given	  social	  
field	  of	  deep,	  labile	  value	  pluralism.	  Muslims	  are	  Berbers,	  Arabs,	  Salafi	  reformers,	  secularists,	  or	  
militants.251	  Workers	   are	   labor-­‐intensive	   peasants,	   capital-­‐intensive	   oil-­‐sector	  workers,	   street	  
merchants,	   ex-­‐patriots,	   or	   bureaucrats.252	   Feminists	   are	   secularists,	   Islamists,	   Berbers,	   and	  
Francophone.253	   Citizens	   speak	   Arabic,	   French,	   Berber	   and	   have	   never	   settled	   this	   contested	  
linguistic	   politics.254	   Finally,	   as	   we	   witnessed	   in	   the	   state’s	   brief	   post-­‐1988	   experiment	   with	  
liberal	   reforms	  promising	  a	  differentiated	   voter-­‐citizenship,	  Algerian	  democrats	   are	  populists,	  
Islamists,	  conservatives,	  anti-­‐étatistes,	  third-­‐worldists,	  and	  nationalists.255	  In	  short,	  the	  Algerian	  
state	  inherited	  contentious	  ethnic,	  class,	  linguistic,	  regional,	  and	  religious	  social	  formations	  that	  
proliferated	   a	   series	   of	   tactically	   or	   temporarily	   shifting	   relations	  among	   vertically	   integrated	  
social	   ties.	   The	   state	   formation	  pattern,	   therefore,	   received	  a	  political	   society	   accustomed	   to	  
negotiating	   rather	   fluidly	  multiple	  hierarchies	  and	   identities	  –	   rather	   than	  an	  Algerian	  people	  
inclined	  to	  stable	  horizontal	  social	  ties	  on	  the	  order	  of	  a	  universal	  class	  of	  Algerian	  citizens.	  On	  
the	   other	   hand,	   the	   state	   then	  exploited	   by	   deepening	   this	   historical	   pattern	   by	  modernizing	  
this	   social	   structure	   of	   competing	   “identitarian	   striations”	   under	   bureaucratic,	   industrializing,	  
and	  standardizing	  state	  centralization	  stabilized	  by	  rent	  distribution.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   A	  central	  indicator	  of	  this	  is	  the	  counter-­‐intuitive	  case,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Polish	  experience,	  
that	  Alexander	  reveals	  of	  Islamist-­‐labor	  alienation	  under	  the	  common	  suffering	  of	  dictatorship	  
and	  incipient	  liberalization	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Rather	  than	  join	  forces,	  Islamists	  and	  the	  UGTA	  barely	  
acknowledged	  each	  other,	  deploying	  the	  discrete	  social	  resources	  of	  client-­‐citizenship.	  Islamists	  




labor	   as	   a	   systemic	   competitor.	  We	   saw	   this	   dynamic	   as	  well	   in	   Islamist	   and	   secular	   gender	  
agendas,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Berber	  struggles	  against	  the	  “Arab	  nationalist”	  state.	  In	  each	  instance,	  the	  
structure	  of	  citizenship	  seems	  to	  have	  prevented	  possible	  social	  alliances	  across	  identities,	  not	  
to	  mention	  the	  elevation	  of	  declared	  grievances	  or	  claims	  to	  transcendent	  political	  or	  economic	  
programs.	  As	  one	  result	  of	   this,	  under	  extreme	  duress	   Islam	  served	  as	  the	  expected	  umbrella	  
identity	  that	  could,	   if	  only	  abstractly	  and	  temporarily,	  constitute	  the	  “we”	  of	  Algerian	  citizens	  
against	  the	  state’s	  citizenship	  system.	  
	   In	  addition,	  and	  relatedly,	  the	  mosque	  became	  the	  political	  kernel	  of	  the	  movement,	  but	  
only	  by	   replicating	  Algeria’s	   zero-­‐sum,	   seamless	   contest	  over	  physical	   sovereignty	  and	   spatial	  
prerogative.	  Again,	  we	  saw	  here	  the	  double	  movement	  of	  intensifying	  and	  instrumentalizing	  a	  
proclivity	  endemic	  to	  Algerian	  political	  spaces,	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Muslim	  turuq	  networks.	  Post-­‐
colonial	  Algerian	  state	  builders,	  deliberately	  avoiding	  concentrations	  of	  horizontally	   identified	  
regime	  opponents	  or	  civil	  societal	  associations,	  prevented	  the	  creation	  of	  civic	  spaces.	  This	  may	  
have	  reflected	  nationalist	  commitments	  to	  an	  indivisible	  public	  sphere,	  but	  the	  result	  was	  the	  
absence	  of	  any	  counterpart	  to	  the	  factory-­‐fortress	   in	  Poland.	   In	  Algeria,	  as	  we	  discover	   in	  the	  
historical	   narrative,	   the	   absence	   of	   segmented	   or	   compartmentalized	   or	   designated	   political	  
places	  for	  dissidents	  meant	  instant	  confrontations	  with	  the	  state	  over	  the	  public	  sphere	  at	  the	  
first	  sign	  of	  congregation	  or	  reciprocal	  visibility	  as	  activists.	  When	  Algerians	  opposed	  the	  state,	  
they	  took	  to	  the	  streets,	  but	  when	  the	  state	  cracked	  down	  they	  took	  to	  the	  mosques	  or	  to	  the	  
Islamic	  political	  party.	  But	  this	  secondary	  space	  failed	  to	  provide	  a	  site	  of	  activism	  distinct	  from	  
state	  claims,	  as	  Algerian	  ruling	  elites	  felt	  equally	  threatened	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  requisitioning	  




imposed	  automatic	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  claims	  against	  the	  state’s	  equal	  right	  to	  the	  public	  commons	  
or	  the	  mosque.	  Without	  segregated,	  political	  spaces,	  there	  was	  no	  protected	  or	  guaranteed	  or	  
non-­‐threatening	  site	  of	  dissident	  convocation.	  In	  addition	  to	  forcing	  the	  mosque	  to	  stand	  in	  as	  
the	  resort	  of	  activist	  recognition,	  it	  raised	  the	  stakes	  against	  a	  state	  that	  saw	  itself	  as	  Muslim.	  In	  
short,	  the	  political	  arrogation	  of	  mosques,	  compelled	  by	  the	  state’s	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  
regime,	  constituted	  another	  attack	  on	  state	  power	  itself.	  This	  compression	  stands	  in	  contrast	  to	  
Poland’s	  communist	  regime,	  which	  did	  not	  envision	  itself	  as	  the	  working	  class	  itself	  but	  as	  the	  
government,	  representative,	  management,	  or	  union	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  
	   Finally,	   and	  with	   singular	   causal	  weight	   in	  my	  model,	  we	  have	   seen	   the	  effects	   in	   the	  
historical	   narrative	  of	   the	  undifferentiated	   citizenship	   regime.	  Algerian	   ruling	   elites	   created	  a	  
systemic	  subjectivity,	  as	  I	  have	  emphasized,	  reliant	  on	  asymmetrical	  state-­‐citizen	  status.	  That	  is,	  
the	  effective	  citizenship	  of	  Algerians	  relied	  on	  state	  solvency,	  and	  vanished	  therefore	  without	  it.	  
This	  is	  in	  contradistinction	  to,	  for	  instance,	  labor-­‐citizenship	  or	  voter-­‐citizenship,	  institutionally	  
secure	  social	  resources,	  generally	  speaking,	  that	  do	  not	  remove	  their	  constituents	  from	  citizen	  
status	  when	  the	  state	  itself	  is	  in	  crisis	  (financial	  or	  political);	  production	  facilities	  and	  electoral	  
processes	  endure	  because	  their	  procedures	  and	  resources	  have	  autonomy	  from	  state	  revenues.	  
This	   is	  not,	   of	   course,	   a	   general	   claim	   about	   the	   endurance	   of	   production-­‐	   or	   election-­‐based	  
incorporation	  strategies	  but	  about	   the	  effects	  on	  systemic	   subjectivity	  absent	  enduring	   social	  
resources	  for	  effective	  citizenship.	  Surely	  electoral	  procedures	  and	  worker-­‐citizenship	  can	  come	  
to	  be	  imperiled	  by	  a	  drastic	  fiscal	  crisis,	  so	  that	  striking	  and	  voting	  are	  ineffective	  and	  increase	  




	   Indeed,	  the	  narrative	  suggests	  that	  Algerian	  ruling	  elites	  discerned	  this	  correlation	  in	  the	  
period	   following	   the	   1988	   riots	   and	   state	   repression.	   The	   liberalization	   feint	   in	   the	   political	  
realm,	  in	  this	  light,	  represents	  a	  meaningful	  shift	  from	  client-­‐	  to	  voter-­‐citizenship,	  tantamount	  
to	  a	  promised	  move	  from	  undifferentiated	  to	  differentiated	  citizenship.	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  in	  
the	  historical	  record,	   I	  believe,	  evidence	  of	  the	  powerful	  disincentive	  of	  differentiated	  citizen-­‐
regimes	  precisely	  in	  this	  brief	  electoral	  opening	  in	  Algeria	  between	  1989	  and	  1992.	  In	  that	  short	  
time	   we	   found	   the	   state	   attacking	   Islamists,	   even	   arresting	   their	   leaders	   and	   attempting	   to	  
obstruct	  the	  FIS	  and	  discourage	  its	  adherents,	  and	  yet	  only	  with	  the	  cancellation	  of	  the	  federal-­‐
level	  elections,	  i.e.,	  only	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  differentiated	  social	  resources	  –	  campaigning	  and	  
voting	  that	  sustained	  non-­‐violence	  despite	  manifest	  state	  coercion	  –	  did	  Algerian	  activists	  resort	  
to	  sustained	  collective	  violence.	  This	  was	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  Algerian	  military-­‐state	  expelled	  
Algerian	  citizens	  from	  meaningful	  political	  membership,	  throwing	  them	  back	  upon	  the	  bankrupt	  
and	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  regime	  of	  crony-­‐capitalist	  clientelism.	  
	  




	   §5.d	   Concluding	  comments	  	  
	  
	   Familiarity	  with	  the	  narrative	  of	  Algeria	  in	  the	  1990s	  would	  not	  necessarily	  assist	  one	  in	  
predicting	  the	  country’s	  place	  in	  the	  Arab	  uprisings	  since	  2011.	  Algeria’s	  horrific,	  even	  sadistic	  
violence,	  followed	  by	  pallid	  resolution	  through	  episodic	  referendums,	  formulaic	  elections,	  and	  
discretionary	  amnesties	  might	  suggest	  exhaustion,	  a	  desire	  for	  peace	  at	  any	  cost.	  On	  the	  other	  




left-­‐to-­‐lose	   revolt	   to	   justify	   retroactively	   the	   losses	   that	  have	   ravaged	  Algerians’	  memory	  and	  
bequeathed	  a	   lost	  generation.	   In	  the	  event,	  Algeria	   fittingly	  played	  a	  mixed	  role	   in	  the	  MENA	  
rebellions	  against	  entrenched	  authoritarian	  rule.	  Algerians	  were	  among	  the	  first	  protestors	  to	  
come	  out	  in	  force,	  coeval	  with	  the	  self-­‐immolation	  of	  a	  mortified	  Tunisian	  in	  Jan	  2013,	  but	  have	  
also	   formed	   among	   the	  more	  muted	   long-­‐term	   democratic	   movements.	   All	   is	   surprisingly256	  
quiet	  on	  the	  Algerian	  western	  front,	  relative	  to	  other	  Arab	  and	  Muslim	  populations,	  for	  many	  
reasons:	   policing	   that	   banned	   processions	   or	   concentrations	   of	   protests	   in	   public	   spaces,257	  
battle-­‐	   and	   loss-­‐	   fatigue,	   and	   increased	   acceptance	   or	   efficiency	   of	   the	   regime	   under	   what	  
Nathan	  refers	  to,	  in	  the	  Chinese	  context,	  as	  legitimizing	  “input	  institutions.”258	  
	   Given	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  surprising	  or	  unpredictable	  results	  
of	  more	  recent	  Algerian	  political	  activism	  deepens	  hesitations	  I	  have	  addressed	  above	  regarding	  
explanations	  of	  the	  Polish	  case	  and	  our	  capacity	  generally	  to	  explain	  opposition	  strategies	  with	  
apodictic	  surety.	  I	  wish	  here	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  core	  political-­‐philosophical-­‐analytical	  problem	  that	  
hounds	  this	  account	  of	  the	  fighting	  in	  Algeria.	  That	  problem	  deserves	  a	  fine	  point	  for	  my	  study	  
and	  any	  social	  explanation	  deriving	  violence	  from	  objective	  conditions	  of	  suffering	  or	  exclusion:	  
the	  circularity	  where	  suffering	  (dispossession,	  exclusion,	  or	  hunger)	  is	  said	  to	  cause	  violence	  as	  
resistance,	  perhaps	  even	  as	  a	  reclamation	  of	  one’s	  existence	  of	  human	  dignity	  or	  capacity;	  and	  
violence	  is	  said	  to	  measure	  or	  index	  suffering.	  My	  explanatory	  model	  is	  tautological	  in	  this	  way	  if	  
it	  does	  not	  separate	  its	  concepts	  from	  its	  causal	  pathway	  –	  that	  is,	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  establish	  distinct,	  
non-­‐conflated	  indices	  of	  violence	  and	  suffering,	  and	  to	  persuade	  one	  of	  their	  reciprocal	  rather	  
than	   identical	   dynamics.	   But	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   is	   a	   reason	   social	   science	   continues	   to	  




are	  imbricated	  conceptually	  or	  practically.	  After	  all,	  if	  suffering	  causes	  violence,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  
imagine	  what	  a	  falsifiable	  explanatory	  model	  of	  this	  interaction	  would	  look	  like.	  
	   Having	  noted	  the	  ambiguous	  status	  of	  the	  tautology	  claim,	  I	  will	  take	  up	  the	  problem	  of	  
circularity	   as	  helpfully	   as	   I	   can	   for	   the	  Algerian	   case.	  Describing	  Algerians’	   “popular	   response	  
[to]	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  financial	  means	  of	  the	  state,	  the	  growing	  debt	  burden,	  and	  the	  return	  of	  
shortages…on	  the	  heels	  of	  an	  industrial	  disinvestment	  strategy	  and	  the	  stimulation	  of	  domestic	  
consumption,”	  Lowi	  concludes:	  
	  
The	  violence	  in	  Algeria	  between	  1992	  and	  2002	  was...a	  form	  of	  (political	  expression).	  It	  is	  what	  
remains	  when	  all	  other	  avenues	  are	  closed.	  Violence	  serves	  to	  fill	   the	  void	   left	  by	  failing	  social	  
and	  political	  relations.	  In	  this	  context,	  violence	  functions	  as	  a	  type	  of	  social	  institution:	  one	  that	  
assumes…responsibility	   for	  punishing	  mistreatment	  and	  repairing	  or	  overcoming	   the	  condition	  
of	   exclusion,	   marginality,	   having	   been	   dishonored	   or	   humiliated.	   Violence,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   a	  
phenomenon	  of	  pure	  affirmation	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  
	  
Algeria	  has	  occasioned	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  before,	  typically	  from	  reflections	  on	  the	  revolution	  
against	  France.	  Sartre	  voiced	  a	  logic	  of	  violence	  against	  a	  “false	  bourgeois	  universality”	  similar	  
to	  my	  analysis	  earlier	  (§2.e):	  “What	  the	  intellectuals	  failed	  to	  understand	  was	  that	  the	  Algerian	  
rebellion	  –	  an	  insurrection	  of	  the	  poor,	  disarmed,	  and	  hunted	  by	  a	  police	  regime	  –	  could	  not	  but	  
choose	  guerrilla	  war	  and	  the	  use	  of	  bombs.”259	  Hafez’s	  summary	  remark	  offers	  a	  more	  prosaic	  
expression	  of	   this	  position:	  “The	   [case	  of	  Algeria	  shows]	  how	  shifts	   from	  political	   inclusion	   to	  
expulsion	  contribute	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  rebellious	  Islamist	  movements…The	  absence	  of	  institutional	  
channels	  for	  conflict	  mediation	  and	  political	  contestation	  encourages	  rebellion	  by	  delegitimizing	  
the	  ruling	  regime	  and	  disempowering	  moderate	  voices	  within	  the	  movement.”260	  
	   To	  make	  sense	  of	  such	  arguments,	  perhaps	  we	  must	  uncover	   the	  enthymeme	  at	   their	  




that	  injury	  or	  death	  in	  battling	  oppressive	  rule	  has	  a	  greater	  value	  than	  acquiescence.	  This	  is,	  as	  
scholars	  of	  suicide	  bombing	  have	  noted,	  a	  dangerous	  turn	  for	  ruling	  elites	  and	  state-­‐builders,	  as	  
sovereign	   power	   is	   constructed	   entirely	   on	   the	   sanctity	   of	   the	   physical	   body	   –	   that	   is,	   on	   its	  
primary,	  unequaled	  sacredness	  to	  citizens.	  Revolutionary	  risk-­‐taking	  and	  self-­‐sacrificial	  violence	  
always	  breaks	  the	  bracing	  contract	  of	  sovereign	  power,	  at	  which	  point	  anything	  can	  be	  justified	  
or	  witnessed.	  Parallel	   to	   this	   inversion	  of	  state	   intimidation	  and	  prerogative,	   inscribed	  on	  the	  
fearful	  body,	   the	  subject	  of	   this	   released	  embodiment	  changes,	   too.	   It	   is	  not	  merely	   that	   the	  
fighter’s	  body	   is	  offered,	  but	   in	   that	  process	   the	  human	  value	  on	  which	  sovereign	  power	  and	  
citizen	   subordination	   relies	   also	   collapses.	   Death,	   in	   sum,	   is	   revalued.	   In	   his	   On	   Suicide:	   a	  
Discourse	  on	  Voluntary	  Death,	   Jean	  Améry	  provides	  a	  moving	   if	  slightly	  tangential	   insight	   into	  
the	  suicidal	  mind.	  He	  argues	  nearly	  romantically	  that	  death	  by	  one’s	  own	  hand	  represents	  the	  
ultimate	   freedom	   of	   humanity;	   defending	   or	   advocating	   suicide,	   he	   declares,	   “We	   arrive	   at	  
ourselves	   only	   in	   a	   freely	   chosen	   death”	   that	   flees	   this	   “ridiculously	   everyday	   life	   and	   its	  
alienation.”	  Instead	  of	  Selbstmord	  (self-­‐murder)	  Améry	  refers	  to	  Freitod	  (voluntary	  death),	  and	  
“insists	  that	  psychology	  belongs	  to	  the	  ‘logic	  of	  life’	  while	  suicide	  lies	  ‘outside	  of	  this	  logic.’”261	  	  
	   Améry’s	   embrace	  of	   self-­‐willed	   self-­‐annihilation	   is	   a	   response	   to	   the	  Shoah,	   especially	  
the	  madness	  of	  murder	  “where	  there	  is	  no	  why,”	  that	  is,	  an	  utterly	  evacuated	  life/death	  in	  the	  
extermination	  camp.	  In	  this	  juxtaposition,	  a	  dignified,	  willful,	  voluntary	  death	  seems	  more	  than	  
justified	  –	   it	   seems	  necessary,	  admirable,	  or	  even	  saintly.	  The	  political	   self-­‐sacrifice	  or	  suicide	  
mission	  of	  the	  saint	  (Socrates,	  Gandhi,	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.,	  et	  al.)	  consecrates	  in	  blood	  the	  
transcendence	  of	  the	  sovereign’s	  possession	  of	  the	  human	  body.	  As	  Cioran	  says,	  “Sainthood	  is	  




movement	  toward	  the	  sky.	  Blood	  is	  one	  of	  its	  constant	  obsessions.	  Saintliness	  is	  a	  triumph	  over	  
blood.”262	  To	  spill	  blood	  for	  a	  higher	  purpose	  than	  mere	  survival,	  to	  preserve	  bare	  biological	  life	  
to	  “triumph	  over	  blood”	  means	  to	  see	  something	  as	  of	  greater	  value	  than	  one’s	  physical	  life.	  On	  
this	   reasoning,	   Husserl	   held	   “that	   one’s	   death	   signifies	   a	   voluntary	   sacrifice	   [and]	   bestows	  
sublime	   dignity	   and	   elevates	   the	   individual’s	   suffering	   to	   a	   sphere	   which	   is	   beyond	   each	  
individuality.	  We	   can	   no	   longer	   live	   as	   private	   people.”263	   If	   these	   remarks	   seem	   excessively	  
abstract	  or	  jarring	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  savage,	  malicious	  violence	  against	  others,	  often	  bystander	  
citizens,	  it	  is	  not	  to	  equate	  exterminated	  Jews	  to	  the	  GIA,	  of	  course,	  but	  to	  broach	  the	  problem	  
of	  explaining	  a	  willful	  embrace	  of	  death,	  given	  our	  usual	  predicates	  about	  the	  sanctity	  of	  life.	  As	  
it	  is	  for	  the	  sovereign,	  so	  it	  is	  for	  social	  science	  –	  without	  the	  fear	  of	  death,	  perhaps	  we	  are	  lost.	  
	   Even	  if	  that	  overstates	  the	  dilemma	  for	  social	  science	  of	  revolutionary	  self-­‐sacrificial	  risk,	  
we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  potentially	  circular	  explanation	  of	  violence,	  now	  adding	  a	  sort	  of	  valorization	  
of	  willful,	  embraced,	  dignified	  death	  to	  the	  more	  animal-­‐in-­‐a-­‐cage	  image	  of	  the	  repression-­‐into-­‐
resistance	  thesis.	  No	  longer	  does	  the	  beast	  or	  thing	  stir,	  bounce,	  and	  erupt;	  it	  is	  human	  will	  at	  
the	  height	  of	  its	  fully	  formed,	  conscious	  decision-­‐making.	  None	  other	  than	  Michnik	  offers	  us	  the	  
“ethics”	  of	  combat	  in	  conditions	  of	  systemic	  expulsion	  and	  debasement:	  	  	  
	  
The	  nineteenth-­‐century	  terrorists,	  so	  perspicaciously	  depicted	  by	  Dostoevsky	  in	  The	  Possessed,	  terrible	  as	  
they	  were,	  had	  a	  certain	  ethics:	  they	  paid	  with	  their	  own	  lives	  for	  taking	  the	   lives	  of	  their	  enemies.	  The	  
terrorism	   of	   today’s	   Russia	   is	   the	  work	   of	   cowardly	   bandits	  who	   are	   interested	   in	   nothing	   but	  money,	  
whether	  they	  are	  doing	  the	  bidding	  of	  politicians	  or	  not.264	  
	  
He	   channels	  Dostoyevsky	  who	  asks	   skeptically	  of	   liberal	   equality:	   “what	   liberty?...Understand	  
me:	  voluntary,	  completely	  conscious	  self-­‐sacrifice…is,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  a	  sign	  of…the	  highest	  form	  




this	  is	  surely	  the	  moralized	  political	  ethos	  of	  Algerian	  Islamists	  at	  war	  with	  a	  greater	  force	  that	  
showed	  no	  sign	  of	  compromise	  or	  negotiation.	  
	   But,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  such	  an	  explanation	  seems,	  if	  descriptively	  compelling,	  plausible,	  or	  
informative,	  still	  problematic.	  Most	  simply,	  it	  would	  seem	  difficult	  to	  match	  the	  extent	  of	  state	  
and	   Islamist	   infringements	  on	  overall	  Algerian	  welfare	   in	  an	  adequately	  precise	  way	  to	  assess	  
interactive	  effects.	  For	  instance,	  we	  might	  need	  to	  pinpoint,	  measure,	  and	  ascertain	  how	  much	  
state	  repression	  corresponds	  with	  and	  “causes”	  how	  much	  citizen	  violence,	  which	  seems	  always	  
an	  elusive	  register.	  A	  more	  vernacular	  formulation	  of	  this	  potential	  objection	  is	  to	  say	  that	  if	  the	  
Algerian	  society	  and	  polity	  were	  so	  suffocating	  as	  to	  “cause”	  the	  GIA	  to	  slaughter	  whole	  villages	  
of	  unarmed	  civilians,	  why	  was	  violent	  Islamist	  militancy	  attractive	  to	  so	  few	  people,	  who	  could	  
numerically	  have	  been	  simply	  the	  average	  percentage	  of	  lunatics?	  After	  all,	  Roberts	  insists	  that	  
Algeria’s	   “main	   division	   is	   not	   an	   ideological	   one,	   and	   that,	   far	   from	   their	   being	   little	   or	   no	  
middle	   ground,	   it	   is	   the	   extremes	   –	   the	   hardline	   eradicators,	   the	   doctrinaire	   secularists	   of	  
Ettahaddi	   and	   the	   RCD,	   and	   the	   Islamist	  maximalists	   of	   the	   GIA	   –	  which	   are	   based	   on	   small	  
minorities,	  with	   the	  middle	  ground	  virtually	  everything	  and	  everyone	  else.”266	   This	   remains	  a	  
pressing	  issue	  for	  explanations	  of	  social	  violence	  –	  the	  difficulty	  of	  knowing	  if	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
violent	  people	  or	  actions	  are	  direct	  responses	  to	  a	  “structural”	  antecedent	  cause	  or	  are	  perhaps	  
especially	   susceptible	   to	   responding	   to	   that	   cause	   in	   a	   particular,	  minority	  manner	   for	   some	  
reason	  internal	  to	  themselves	  and	  external	  to	  a	  social	  explanation.267	  
	   So,	  even	  if	  “objective”	  conditions	  appear	  to	  favor	  social	  agitation	  or	  political	  resistance,	  
as	  a	  general	  rule	  reliable	  predictions	  of	  self-­‐risking	  or	  -­‐sacrificing	  behavior	  will	  be	  prohibitively	  




particular	  attention	  to	  Algeria’s	  violence:	  “The	  process	  of	  revolutionary	  mobilization…involves	  a	  
multitude	   of	   individual	   choices	   based	   on	   extremely	   complex	   patterns	   of	   motivation,	   even	   if	  
discontent	  is	  high	  and	  structural	  factors…propitious:	  
	  
The	   individual’s	   choice	   will	   depend	   on	   how	  much	   influence	   he	   or	   she	   has	   over	   the	   expected	  
outcome	  (a	  perception	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  action	  will	  actually	  make	  any	  difference	  to	  society’s	  
decision),	  the	  anticipated	  sanctions	  associated	  with	  a	  public	  position,	  and	  the	  emotional	  need	  to	  
act	   autonomously	   and	   to	   avoid	   anger,	   shame,	   or	   guilt.	   The	   individual	   cannot	   predict	   the	  
consequences	   of	   alternative	   choices,	   so	   the	   anticipation	   of	   sanctions	   is	   also	   contingent	   on	  
cognitive	   processes	   such	   as	   selective	   information	   processing…Individual	   behavior	   will	   matter[,	  
moreover,]	  	  as	  it	  alters	  the	  equilibrium	  of	  people’s	  revolutionary	  thresholds	  –	  the	  tipping	  point	  at	  
which	   it	   becomes	   worthwhile	   for	   the	   individual	   to	   make	   public	   a	   private	   opposition	   to	   the	  
existing	  order.268	  
	  
So	  while	   it	   is	   intuitively	  and	  historically	   compelling	   to	   think	   that	  Algeria’s	   state	  of	  emergency	  
would	  trigger	  physical	  resistance	  comparable	  to	  countless	  uprisings	  against	  slavery,	  colonialism,	  
apartheid,	  and	  comparable	   forms	  of	  effective	  mass	   incarceration,	   the	  argument	   that	  violence	  
results	   from	  systemic	  reification	  raises	  hard	  questions	  about	  alternatives	  to	  harsh	  and	  vicious	  
self-­‐sacrificial	  aggression	  against	  the	  state.	  I	  have	  challenged	  the	  repression-­‐resistance	  thesis	  (I,	  
§2.d)	  on	  philosophical-­‐conceptual	  grounds	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  objectification	  
and	  near-­‐objectification	  that	  generates	  the	  double	  paradox	  of	  objectively	  caused	  resistance.	  If	  
besieged	  persons	  are	  reduced	  to	  objects,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  where	  the	  energy,	  desire,	  or	  will	  to	  
revolt	  comes	  from;	  but	  if	  they	  are	  not	  yet	  “things,”	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  their	  actions	  can	  be	  
objectively	  caused.	  We	  may	  choose	  to	  stipulate	  here	  probabilistic	  claims,	  invoking	  the	  language	  
of	  conditionality,	  likelihood,	  or	  contribution,	  as	  Hafez	  does	  cautiously.	  	  
	   But	  as	  Dunn	  says,	  there	  are	  many	  responses	  to	  repressive	  or	  brutalizing	  conditions:	  	  
	  
If	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  be	  ruled	  by	  you,	  and	  you	  control	  the	  territory	  on	  which	  I	  live,	  I	  have	  in	  essence	  




attempt	  to	  capture	  that	  territory	  from	  you.	  If	  you	  resist	  my	  attempts	  (as	  you	  no	  doubt	  will),	  and	  
if	  you	  can	  secure	  the	  cooperation	  of	  many	  others	  in	  your	  resistance,	  I	  face	  a	  pressing	  temptation	  
to	   expel	   not	   merely	   you	   but	   also	   a	   substantial	   proportion	   of	   your	   collaborators	   from	   the	  
territory.269	  
	  
We	  may	  ask,	   in	   light	  of	  Dunn’s	  observation	   (which	  recalls	  Hirschman’s	  exit,	  voice,	  and	   loyalty	  
options),	  whether	  any	  group	  ever	  has	  no	  resources,	  so	  that	  it	  must	  resort	  to	  violence	  to	  reclaim	  
subjectivity.	  Indeed,	  given	  the	  options,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  violence	  is	  not	  an	  automatic	  or	  perhaps	  
even	   common	   reaction	   to	   objectifying	   conditions.	   Far	   more	   typical	   is	   the	   response	   of	   one	  
Chinese	   dissident:	   “[The	   Communist	   Party]	   had	  me	   tight	   in	   their	   fists	   for	   fifteen	   years	   until,	  
when	  the	  breath	  of	  my	   life	  was	  almost	  squeezed	  out,	   I	   finally	  fled.”270	  Walzer	   insists	  that	  this	  
reaction	  –	  peaceful	  flight	  –	  proves	  that	  it	  is	  never	  true	  that	  there	  is	  no	  choice	  except	  resort	  to	  
violence.271	  Why,	  we	  might	  re-­‐ask,	  were	  mosques	  not	  akin	  to	  Polish	  factories,	  and	  the	  removal	  
of	  support	  to	  the	  state	  similar	  to	  the	  strike	  option?	  Perhaps	  the	  initial	  social	  divisions	  in	  Algerian	  
society	   forced	   the	   state	   to	   adopt	   vertical	   and	  discretionary	   citizenship	   structure	   as	   a	   path	  of	  
least	  resistance.	  It	  seems	  that	  some	  supporting	  ideological	  and	  socio-­‐political	  factors	  interceded	  
at	  the	  point	  where	  the	  victims	  of	  state	  emergency	  decided	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  that	  it	  was	  worth	  
it	  to	  risk	  their	  lives	  to	  defend	  their	  society	  or	  their	  loved	  ones.	  More	  simply	  put,	  an	  explanation	  
of	  Algeria’s	  violence	  must	  provide	  supporting	  or	  supplemental	  reasons	  that	  exit,	  flight,	  or	  flat-­‐
out	  cowering	  in	  docility	  was	  not	  the	  response	  to	  Algerian	  despotism.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  the	  
systemic	  elimination	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  and	  eradication	  of	  Algerian	  systemic	  subjectivity	  
is	  not	  the	  central	  condition	  of	  possibility	  or	  likelihood	  of	  social	  violence;	  but	  it	  is	  to	  suggest	  the	  




	   This	  deduction	  means	  that	  the	  structural	  and	  hermeneutic	  argument	  linking	  eradication	  
of	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  to	  political	  violence	  requires	  some	  other	  factor	  that	  converts	  the	  impetus,	  
temptation,	  or	  provocation	  to	  angry	  uprising	  into	  actualized	  aggression.	  My	  explanatory	  model	  
claims	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  forced	  Algerians	  to	  assert	  themselves	  coercively,	  
that	  is,	  to	  reclaim	  their	  subjectivity	  anti-­‐systemically,	  in	  order	  to	  impede	  state	  prerogative.	  This	  
model	  makes	  two	  bold	  assumptions	  that	  (1)	  people	  desire	  subjectivity	  and	  (2)	  if	  they	  are	  denied	  
this	  desire,	  they	  will	  risk	  themselves	  to	  fulfill	   it.	  But	  an	  inherent	  need	  for	  systemic	  subjectivity	  
seems	  dubious,	  as	  does	   the	  willingness	   to	   fight	   for	   it	  physically.	  Why	   risk	  one’s	  health	  or	   life	  
rather	  than	  wait,	  hide,	  flee,	  acquiesce,	  or	  collaborate,	  or	  some	  other	  commonsense	  alternative?	  
Hence	  we	  may	  need	  more	  than	  a	  supplemental	  explanatory	   factor	   that	   tipped	  Algerians	  over	  
the	  fence	  toward	  violence;	  we	  may	  need	  an	  explanation	  for	  what	  put	  them	  on	  the	  fence	  in	  the	  
first	  place	  –	  what	  made	  Algerians	  react	  to	  oppressive,	  exclusive,	  punishing	  conditions	  violently	  
when	  there	  presumably	  were	  other	  options?	  Several	  possibilities	  present	  themselves	  here.	  	  
	   First,	  maybe	  there	  were	  no	  other	  reasonable	  options	  in	  this	  case.	  As	  I	  have	  said,	  there	  is	  
a	  difference	  between	   two	  kinds	  of	  absent	   systemic	   subjectivity.	  One	  can	   lack	  any	  capacity	   to	  
impede	  ruling	  elites,	  yet	  be	  relatively	  unburdened	  by	  state	  policies;	  in	  contrast,	  one	  can	  lack	  all	  
criteria	  of	  meaningful	  citizenship	  and,	  in	  addition,	  feel	  suffocated	  by	  state	  actions.	  I	  assume	  that	  
in	  most	  cases,	  the	  latter	  condition	  will	  create	  greater	  incentives	  to	  violent	  resistance,	  short	  of	  
totalitarian	  destruction	  of	  all	  human	  will.	  I	  believe	  the	  evidence	  shows	  this	  circumstance	  held	  in	  
Algeria,	   in	  which	   the	   state	   surrounded	  and	   suffocated	   the	  opposition	  without	   controlling	   the	  
territory	  available	  popular	  revolt.	  One	  intervening	  or	  enabling	  factor	  that	  might	  supplement	  the	  




capacity:	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state’s	  simultaneous	  despotic	  and	  infrastructural	  power.	  
In	  addition,	  second,	  as	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  in	  one	  thread	  of	  the	  narrative,	  Algerians	  possessed	  
the	   ethical	   propensity	   and	   political	   resources	   to	   revolt	   against	   centralizing	   governments	   that	  
attacked	  them,	  as	  the	  Algerian	  state	  manifestly	  did.	  One	  need	  not	  cite	  old-­‐fashioned	  notions	  of	  
anti-­‐modern	   tribes	   and	   clans	   to	   revisit	   Shils’s	   remarks	   about	   tensions	  between	   “society”	   and	  
“state”	  under	  circumstances	  like	  Algeria’s:	  
	  
Efforts	  might	  be	  made	  to	  form	  societies,	  but	  without	  a	  common	  self-­‐denomination,	  societies	  will	  
not	  be	  formed	  by	  the	  populations	  who	  live	  in	  the	  territory	  which	  bears	  the	  name.	  Steps	  toward	  
the	   transcendence	   of	   parochiality	   in	   postcolonial	   Africa…have	   come	   to	   nothing…The	  
governmentally	   promulgated	   societies	   of	   Africa	   and	   the	   middle	   east	   have	   not	   attained	  
integration;	   they	   had	   not	   commonly	   used	   names.	   They	   had	   no	   common	   center	   on	   which	   to	  
focus	   their	  attention.	  They	  did	  not	  have	  an	  effective	  center	   to	  begin	   to	  create	   the	   institutions	  
from	   which	   a	   common	   culture	   could	   be	   formed.	   There	   was	   no	   sufficient	   attachment	   to	   the	  
territory	   of	   all	   the	   different	   and	   separate	   societies	   living	   on	   them	   to	   support	   resistance	   to	  
disintegration.	  There	  was	  no	   institutional	  arrangement	  to	  which	  the	  partners	  of	  the	  union	  had	  
enough	   of	   an	   attachment	   to	   cause	   them	   to	   attempt	   to	   coerce	   others	   –	   and	   their	   own	   fellow	  
countrymen	  –	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  union	  from	  collapsing.272	  
	  
Certainly	  the	  ability	  to	  resist	  state	  centralization	  or	  standardization	  of	  the	  citizenry	  may	  be	  just	  
as	  “modern”	  as	  the	  state’s	  desire	  to	  politicize	  or	  administer	  the	  population.	  Having	  said	  that,	  it	  
seems	  clear	  that	  the	  state	  could	  imprison	  the	  Algerian	  population	  but	  not	  control	  the	  prisoners	  
in	  part	  because	  they	  refused	  to	  construct	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  that	  could	  endow	  citizens	  with	  
effective	  social	  resources	  that	  would	  secure	  incumbency	  and	  private	  economic	  cupidity.	  When	  
we	  add	  to	  this	  primary	  causal	  condition	  of	  withdrawn	  systemic	  subjectivity	  the	  positive	  social	  
resources	  outside	  sovereign	  control	  and	  deployed	  previously	  by	  anti-­‐colonial	  revolutionaries	  in	  
the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  centuries,	  we	  begin	  to	  resolve	  the	  collective	  action	  and	  free	  rider	  









Oh,	   you	   people	   who,	   when	   you	   talk	   about	   anything,	   must	   immediately	  
declare:	   that	   is	   foolish,	   that	   is	   clever,	   that	   is	  good,	   that	   is	  bad!	  And	  what	  
does	   it	   all	   amount	   to?	   Do	   you	   think	   you	   can	   uncover	   the	   vital	  
circumstances	  of	  an	  action	  with	  your	  questions?	   	  Are	  you	  sure	  you	  know	  
how	  to	  get	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter:	  	  why	  did	  it	  happen?	  	  Why	  did	  it	  have	  
to	  happen?	  If	  you	  were,	  you	  wouldn’t	  be	  so	  hasty	  with	  your	  decisions.	  
JW	  von	  Goethe1	  
	  
This	  conception	  of	  history	  depends	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  expound	  the	  real	  process	  
of	  production,	   starting	  out	   from	  the	  material	  production	  of	   life	   itself,	  and	   to	  
comprehend	  the	  form	  of	  intercourse	  connected	  with	  this	  and	  created	  by	  this	  
mode	  of	  production	  (i.e.,	  civil	  society	   in	   its	  various	  stages),	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  all	  
history;	   and	   to	   show	   it	   in	   its	   action	   as	   State,	   to	   explain	   all	   the	   different	  
theoretical	  products	  and	  forms	  of	  consciousness,	  religion,	  philosophy,	  ethics,	  
etc.,	  etc.,	  and	  trace	  their	  origins	  and	  growth	  from	  that	  basis;	  by	  which	  means,	  





	   This	  conclusion	  has	  three	  brief	  sections.	  The	  first	  reviews	  the	  arguments	  of	  my	  project	  
to	  convey	  their	  coherence	  in	  explaining	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  to	  despotic	  coercion.	  
The	  second	  section	  responds	  to	  analytical	  challenges	  to	  those	  arguments	  beyond	  the	  concerns	  
raised	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  narrative.	  The	  third	  draws	  theoretical	  insights	  from	  those	  arguments,	  
should	  they	  prove	  persuasive	  or	  provocative.	  
	   My	   project	   presupposes	   that	   self-­‐risking	   political	   violence	   remains	   to	   be	   adequately	  
explained	   or	   theorized,	   despite	   the	   proximity	   of	  my	   causal	  model	   to	   intuitive	   and	   academic	  
studies	  that	  link	  physical	  uprising	  to	  suffocation,	  frustration,	  humiliation,	  and	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  
institutional	  means	  of	  getting	  attention	  or	  satisfying	  needs.	  People	  tend	  to	  see	  violence	  of	  any	  
kind,	  but	  particularly	  social	  or	  political	  violence,	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  double	  rupture	  in	  the	  equilibrium	  
between	  a	  system	  and	  its	  inhabitants.	  In	  this	  image	  of	  violence,	  conventionally	  defined	  (§2.b),	  




exceeded,	  leading	  to	  exceptional	  acts	  of	  destruction.	  This	  disturbed-­‐equilibrium	  model	  is	  often	  
supported	  with	  causal	  claims.	  First,	  some	  third	  term	  must	  disrupt	  the	  balance	  between	  system	  
and	  subject	  by	  causing,	  e.g.,	  a	  systemic	  shock	  or	  new	  social	  grievance.	  Second,	  different	  kinds	  of	  
violence	   index	  distinct	  qualities	  of	   these	  disruptions	  –	  shame	  from	  exclusion	  may	  trigger	  self-­‐
sacrificial,	  impulsive	  violence	  while	  anger	  over	  corruption	  may	  inspire	  self-­‐preserving,	  strategic	  
violence.3	   In	   sum,	   violence	   is	   conceived	   as	   the	   menacing	   or	   destructive	   physical	   aggression	  
triggered	  when	  the	  reciprocity	  between	  system	  and	  subject	   is	  breached	  such	  that	  they	  fail	  or	  
forbid	  each	  other’s	  fundamental	  demands;	  and	  the	  form	  of	  this	  breach	  specifies	  the	  form	  of	  the	  
reactive	  violence.	  An	  explanation	  of	   violence,	   then,	  entails	   temporally	  ordering	   these	   factors:	  
balance	  (of	  systemic	  and	  social	  demands)ðdisruptionðimbalanceðviolence.	  This	  image/model	  
implies	  that	  disruptions	  to	  the	  balance	  between	  systemic	  and	  social	  demands	  explain	  violence.	  	  
	   Given	   the	  different	   results	  of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  martial	   law,	   the	  reasonable	   if	  partial	  
presuppositions	   in	   this	   view	   have	   inspired	   the	   puzzle,	   historical	   narratives,	   research	   design,	  
causal	  explanation,	  theoretical	  model,	  and	  conceptual	  analyses	  of	  my	  project.	  I	  have	  provided,	  I	  
hope,	  reasons	  to	  link	  self-­‐risking	  political	  violence	  to	  expulsion,	  by	  compulsory	  political	  systems,	  
from	  citizenship	  regimes	  that	  had	  constituted	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  in	  the	  habituating	  use	  of	  social	  
resources.	  Distinguishing	  the	  effects	  of	  differentiated	  or	  undifferentiated	  citizenship	  regimes	  in	  
sustaining	  or	  eliminating	  the	  material	  means	  of	  systemic	  willing,	  I	  have	  urged	  that	  we	  replace,	  
in	  general,	  immediate	  with	  experiential	  evaluations	  and	  human	  with	  subjective	  social	  ontology.	  
I	  have	  endorsed	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  dehumanization	   thesis	  while	  qualifying	   its	   constitutive	  




	   Thus,	  I	  began	  the	  project	  by	  critically	  reviewing	  Fanon’s	  argument	  that	  revolution	  results	  
from	  a	  subjective	  resistance	  to	  encroaching	  objectification.	  My	  overall	  purpose	  in	  this	  detailed	  
textual	  account	  of	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis	  was	  to	  locate	  an	  impasse	  for	  social	  explanation	  in	  
the	  gap	  between	  objective	  conditions	  and	  subjective	  evaluations	  of	  human	  suffering.	  If	  it	  is	  the	  
willful	  subject,	  and	  not	  the	  inanimate	  object,	  that	  resists	  dehumanization,	  then	  an	  explanation	  
of	  violence	  will	  relocate	  from	  a	  social	  ontology	  of	  human	  universals	  to	  that	  of	  subject	  formation	  
and	  specific	  situations.	  If	  a	  violation	  of	  subjective	  rather	  than	  human	  conditions	  causes	  violence	  
it	  would	  appear	  to	  withdraw	  us	  from	  social	  scientific	  explanation	  to	  anthropological	  description.	  
But	  I	  inverted	  these	  inferences	  from	  the	  object-­‐subject	  divide	  to	  propose	  that	  by	  receding	  from	  
the	  immediate	  point	  of	  violence	  –	  the	  disturbed-­‐equilibrium	  image	  –	  to	  the	  historical	  processes	  
of	  subject	  formation	  we	  may	  access	  the	  relevant	  causal	  pathways.	  
	   Prompted	  by	  these	  productive	  tensions	  in	  Fanon’s	  paradigmatic	  dehumanization	  thesis,	  
I	  then	  held	  up	  the	  contrasting	  dissident	  responses	  to	  brutal	  martial	  law	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  as	  
an	  example	  of	  the	  intercession	  of	  institutional	  arrangements	  between	  objective	  and	  subjective	  
conditions.	  Reporting	  on	  research	  into	  postwar	  Polish	  and	  postcolonial	  Algerian	  state	  formation	  
and	  social	  movements,	  I	  proposed	  that	  Polish	  non-­‐violence	  and	  Algerian	  violence	  derived	  from	  
the	  distinct	   citizenship	   regimes	   that,	   in	  hard	   times,	   sustained	  Poles’	   systemic	   subjectivity	  but	  
eliminated	  Algerians’,	  reducing	  the	  latter	  to	  systemic	  objects	  or	  “dehumanized”	  entities	  whose	  
capacity	   to	  obstruct	   state	  absolutism	  was	   forced	  outside	  of	  a	   legible,	  existing	   system.	  Similar	  
objective	  (political,	  social,	  and	  material)	  deprivations,	  I	  discerned,	  were	  mediated	  by	  differential	  
subjectivities	  in	  the	  two	  citizenship	  regimes.	  The	  Polish	  state	  constituted	  citizens	  as	  subjects	  in	  




policy	  changes	  was	  the	  strike.	  Because	  workers	  retained	  the	  social	  resource	  of	  labor	  power	  to	  
contest	   sovereign	  power	  under	   state	  crisis,	  Polish	  citizens	   retained	   their	   systemic	   subjectivity	  
and	  thus	  the	  credibility	  of	  a	  sustained	  non-­‐violent	  strategy.	  The	  Algerian	  state	  cultivated	  client-­‐
citizens	  whose	  social	  resource	  for	  challenging	  state	  decisions	  was	  the	  threat	  of	  shifting	  loyalty	  
and	  withdrawing	  support.	  This	  capacity	  depended	  on	  Algerian	  state	  solvency	  and	  vanished	  with	  
fiscal	   crisis	   and	   state	   coercion,	   eradicating	   Algerians’	   effective	  membership	   in	   the	   polity	   and	  
restricting	  recuperation	  of	  their	  subjective	  will	  to	  anti-­‐systemic	  violence.	  	  	  
	   Given	  comparable	  objective	  deprivation	  under	  states	  of	  emergency,	  I	  then	  inferred	  that	  
opposition	  strategies	  stemmed	  from	  citizens’	  experiential	  evaluations	  of	  state	  performance	   in	  
terms	  of	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  In	  responding	  strategically,	  agents	  appraised	  the	  practical	  effect	  
and	  political	  meaning	  of	  martial	   law,	  based	  on	  the	  actual	  or	  potential	  continuity	  of	   the	  social	  
resources	  of	  effective	  citizenship.	  Activists	  evaluated	  their	  immediate	  conditions	  through	  their	  
historical	  experiences	  of	  interacting	  with	  ruling	  classes	  through	  the	  institutional	  resources	  that	  
transformed	  their	  citizenship	   into	  subjectivity.	  Citizen-­‐subjects	   integrated	   into	  the	  centralizing	  
state	  in	  dominant	  modes	  of	  state-­‐society	  coercion	  and	  cooperation	  reacted,	  in	  the	  decision	  on	  
violence,	  not	   to	  empty	  bellies	  or	   cruel	   rulers,	  but	   to	   the	   status	  of	   their	   systemic	   subjectivity.	  
Thinking	  as	  citizen-­‐subjects	  in	  political	  regimes,	  people	  under	  duress	  asked	  not	  only	  if	  the	  state	  
was	  meeting	  their	  particular	  needs	  or	  respecting	  their	  grievances,	  but	  if	  they	  retained	  the	  social	  
resources	  that	  had	  constituted	  their	  citizen-­‐subjectivity.	  They	  asked	  if	  they	  remained	  citizens	  as	  
objects	  of	  the	  state	  or	  as	  subjects	  in	  the	  state.	  To	  answer	  that	  question	  entails	  an	  evaluation	  of	  
present,	  objective	  social	  conditions	  and	  resources	  that	  continue	  or	  disrupt	  dissidents’	  systemic-­‐




and	  need	  and	  to	  who	  they	  are.	  Polish	  worker-­‐citizens	  and	  Algerian	  client-­‐	  or	  voter-­‐citizens	  who	  
used	  their	  social	  resources	  to	  press	  material	  grievances	  responded	  to	  martial	   law	  as	  an	  effect	  
on	  political	  personhood	  –	  on	  the	  citizen-­‐subjectivity	  that	  promotes	  intra-­‐systemic	  dissent.	  
	   This	  explanation	  and	  theoretical	  model	  prompted	  me	  to	  examine	  in	  related	  discussions	  
the	  concepts	  of	  violence	  and	  subjectivity,	  to	  texture	  the	  descriptions	  of	  opposition	  strategies.	  In	  
an	  extended	   critical	   treatment	  of	   the	  dependent	   variable,	   violence,	   I	   addressed	   the	   subjects,	  
objects,	   and	   evaluations	   that	   constitute	   actions	   and	   analyses	   of	   violence	   (and	   non-­‐violence).	  
This	  discussion	  analyzed	   the	  combined	  but	  discrete	  elements	  of	  my	  argument,	  which	   invokes	  
subjective	  evaluations	  of	  objectification.	  My	  contention	  in	  these	  assessments	  was	  that	  we	  will	  
not	  explain	   sustained	  collective	  violence	  as	  a	   reaction	   to	  objective,	   immediate	  constraints	  on	  
human	  desires;	  rather,	  we	  will	  get	  better	  traction	  by	  asking	  how	  particular	  conditions	  sustain	  or	  
infringe	   subjects	   in	   given	   regimes	  of	  practical	   citizenship.	   In	   turn,	   this	   thesis	   provoked	  me	   to	  
contend	  that	  reliable	  social	  knowledge	  –	  i.e.,	  comparative	  social	  explanation	  –	  requires	  a	  theory	  
of	  the	  subject.	  The	  logic	  was	  that	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  include	  in	  social	  science	  an	  ongoing	  examination	  
of	   its	   rational	   procedures	   and	   premises,	  we	  must	   inquire	   into	   the	   ontological	   substrate	   that	  
justifies	  ethnography’s	  explanatory	  inferences	  and	  theories.	  I	  mobilized	  the	  distinction	  between	  
universals	  and	  mechanisms,	  then,	  to	  endorse	  subject-­‐formation	  over	  abstract	  human	  dignity	  as	  
the	  preferred	   image	  of	  our	   concept	  of	  political	   agency.	   To	  propose	   this	   subjective	  ontology	   I	  
revisited	  the	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  experiences	  in	  light	  of	  fundamental	  commitments	  and	  events	  –	  
that	  is,	  the	  universal	  dynamics	  of	  subject	  formation	  in	  particular	  situations	  that	  may	  offer	  a	  way	  




	   My	  explanatory	  model	  of	  how	  experiential	  evaluations	  of	  the	  social	  resources	  that	  form	  
citizenship	  regimes	  determines	  non-­‐violent	  versus	  violent	  resistance	  under	  martial	  law	  remains,	  
however,	  vulnerable	  to	  several	  criticisms.	  My	  objective	  here	  will	  be	  more	  to	  qualify	  than	  reject	  
or	  contest	  weakness	   in	  my	   thesis;	   it	   seems	  more	   instructive	   to	   sustain	   that	   reject	  compelling	  
problems	  confronting	  unresolved	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  project.	  Hence	  I	  will	  qualify	  the	  limitations	  of	  
my	  approach,	  assess	  loose	  hinges	  in	  my	  argument,	  and	  discuss	  problems	  with	  the	  theory.	  As	  to	  
qualifications	  I	  will	  work	  from	  the	  problems	  in	  my	  approach	  to	  specific	  issues	  with	  my	  account.	  	  
	   First,	  one	  must	  be	  candid	  about	  inferences	  drawn	  from	  low-­‐N	  samples.	  My	  conceit	  is	  to	  
have	  analyzed,	  compared,	  and	  held	  constant	  similar	  and	  different	  variables	  drawn	  from	  modern	  
Polish	   and	   Algerian	   political	   history	   (§3)	   but	   this	   is	   a	  modestly	   valuable	   procedure.	   However	  
carefully	  constructed,	  a	  two-­‐case	  research	  design	  cannot	  generate	  dispositive	  natural	  or	  social	  
scientific	  findings.	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  disclaim	  general	  theoretical	  proof,	  promising	  to	  offer	  a	  
partially	  speculative	  model	  that	  may	  inform	  other	  projects	  or	  be	  correct	  in	  just	  these	  two	  cases.	  
But	  then	  this	  may	  be	  evasive.	   I	  appear	  to	  have	  chosen	  a	  two-­‐case	  puzzle	  and	  then	  disavowed	  
theoretical	  pretensions	  on	  grounds	  that	  my	  project	  has	  only	  two	  cases,	  all	  the	  while	  speaking	  in	  
robust	  scientific	  phraseology	  about	  causal	  pathways,	  models,	  mechanisms,	  and	  variables.	  I	  have	  
adduced	  findings	  from	  more	  cases	  –	  such	  as	  the	  consensus	  in	  MENA	  studies	  that	  participation	  
and	  violence	  are	  inversely	  related	  –	  but	  one	  must	  ask:	  Is	  there	  a	  theory	  here	  or	  just	  two	  stories?	  	  
	   One	  blunt	  reply	  is	  that	  what	  happened	  in	  Algeria	  has	  little	  or	  no	  interpretive	  bearing	  on	  
whether	   labor-­‐power	   and	   worker-­‐citizenship	   prevented	   violent	   militancy	   against	   communist	  
Polish	  rule.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  analytically	  clear	  and	  perhaps	  too	  obvious	  to	  delve	  into	  here.	  




may	  be	  simply	   invalid.	  For	   instance,	   in	  discussing	  “similarities,”	   I	  claimed	  that	  because	  Algeria	  
and	  Poland	  share	  histories	  of	  religious	  militancy,	  Catholic	  or	  Algerian	  religious	  discourses	  seem	  
unlikely	   to	  explain	   the	  divergent	  outcomes.	  But	   there	   is	   no	  apodictic	   reason	   to	   suppose	   that	  
Algeria’s	   political-­‐religious	  historical	   experience	   tells	   us	   anything	   about	  Poland;	   indeed,	   there	  
are	  commonsense	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  to	  know	  whether	  Polish	  Catholicism	  deserves	  credit	  for	  
non-­‐violence	  in	  a	  specific	  historical	  period	  one	  should	  confine	  oneself	  to	  studying	  the	  one	  case	  
over	  time.	  My	  response	  is	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  inferences	  drawn	  from	  the	  historical	  logic	  
extracted	  from	  case	  narratives	  and	  to	  add	  merely	  that	  comparisons	  raise	  puzzles	  and	  suggest	  
explanatory	  variables,	  but	  do	  not	  establish	  definitive	  causal	  pathways.	  The	  historical	  narratives	  
and	  the	  comparisons	  are	  for	  this	  reason	  structured	  as	  parallel	  case	  studies	  whose	  explanations	  
should	   stand	  on	   their	   own	  within	   the	   cases.	   So	   there	   are	   two	   stories	  here,	   but	  with	   a	   single	  
theory	  about	  citizens	  and	  subjects	  that	  offers	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  their	  different	  results.	  
	   Along	  these	  lines,	  with	  respect	  to	  my	  specific	  account	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  protest	  
outcomes,	  I	  will	  stress	  that	  I	  do	  not	  propose	  that	  worker-­‐	  and	  client-­‐	  citizenship	  have	  timeless	  
or	  uniform	  relationships	  to	  systemic	  subjectivity.	  If	  Polish	  Solidarity	  mobilized	  its	  strike	  capacity	  
as	  an	  address-­‐to-­‐all	  that	  rippled	  beyond	  the	  working	  class	  across	  horizons	  of	  Polish	  subjectivity,	  
it	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  worker-­‐citizenship	   is	  generally	  differentiated,	  universal,	  or	   systemically	  
subjective.	  The	  qualitative	  nature	  of	  regime	  differentiation	  itself	  depends	  on	  the	  super-­‐ordinate	  
disciplinary	  or	  infrastructural	  apparatus	  that	  workers	  occupy	  –	  the	  specific	  production	  regime	  of	  
state-­‐labor	  centralization,	  shop	  floor	  dynamics,	  effects	  of	  skilling	  and	  de-­‐skilling,	  and	  so	  on4	  will	  
shape	  in	  specific	  political	  systems	  and	  historical	  periods	  the	  citizenship-­‐regimes	  in	  practice	  that	  




argument	  proposes,	  systemic	  subjectivity	   formed	  by	  social	   resources	   in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
citizenship	  regime.	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  generalize	  about	  these	  particular	  and	  circumstantial	  social	  
resources	  for	  other	  cases	  or	  periods,	  but	  to	  offer	  this	  approach	  to	  empirical	  and	  practical	  ethics	  
as	  it	  brings	  regimes	  and	  citizens	  as	  objects	  and	  subjects	  into	  the	  real	  politics	  of	  social	  violence.	  	  
	   Something	  similar	  could	  be	  said	  about	  the	  three	  variations	  in	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  that	  
I	  have	  stressed.	   I	  claimed	  that,	   in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria,	  differentiation	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime	  
was	  the	  variation	  that	  explained	  the	  outcomes,	  and	  the	  one	  that	  decided	  the	  public	  relevance	  
of	  social	  ties	  and	  political	  space	  as	  refined	  tools	  of	  systemic	  subjects.	  But,	  again,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  
of	  this	  as	  a	  universal	  rule	  of	  social	  protest	  outcomes.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  
operable	  regime	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  other	  effects	  of	  the	  regime,	  but	  
one	  can	  imagine	  a	  different	  lexical	  or	  causal	  order.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  Algerian	  revolution,	  the	  
militants	  lacked	  French-­‐provided	  social	  resources	  to	  found	  a	  citizenship	  regime;	  but	  the	  Casbah	  
secured	  political	  space	  to	  form	  the	  FLN	  underground	  movement	  and	  state,	  seemingly	  reversing	  
the	  order	  presented	  in	  my	  study	  –	  political	  space	  was	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  address-­‐to-­‐
all	  of	  the	  anti-­‐imperial	  revolt.	  For	  the	  variables,	  argument,	  and	  mechanism	  upheld	  in	  my	  work	  
this	  principle	  of	  situated	  universals	  recommends	  dialectical	  social	  logics	  over	  time	  that	  will	  vary	  
in,	  for	  instance,	  the	  temporal-­‐spatial	  order	  of	  explanatory	  effects.	  
	   As	  to	  the	  weaknesses	  in	  my	  argument,	  I	  have	  raised	  several	  in	  concluding	  the	  narratives	  
of	  Polish	  and	  Algerian	  state	  and	  subject	  formation.	  As	  to	  specific	  flaws	  in	  the	  comparison,	  every	  
difference	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  presents	  a	  potential	  misinterpretation	  in	  my	  analysis.	  Poland	  
and	  Algeria	  had,	  evidently,	  distinct	  bureaucratic	  apparatuses,	  literary	  cultures,	  ideological	  links	  




or	  urban	  versus	  rural	  cruces	  of	  anti-­‐state	  activism	  over	  time.	  Indeed,	  as	  I	  have	  intimated,	  there	  
is	  only	  so	  much	  theoretical	  or	  explanatory	  purchase	  one	  can	  find	  in	  comparing	  variables	  across	  
cases.	  But	  I	  think	  the	  abundant	  counter-­‐theses	  raise	  a	  more	  difficult	  problem	  from	  my	  project,	  
that	  of	  falsifiability.	  This	  category	  of	  analysis	  has	  come	  under	  critical	  pressure	  in	  the	  philosophy	  
of	  natural	  and	  social	  science,	  as	  well,	  but	  in	  ordinary	  language	  terms	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ask,	  how	  
would	  we	  know	  if	  the	  explanation	  is	  wrong?	  Here,	  specifically,	  one	  might	  ask,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  
that	  sustained	  non-­‐violence	  does	  not	  prove	  the	  presence	  of	  differentiated	  citizen-­‐subjectivity?	  
Through	  the	  thesis	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  distinguish	  between	  objective	  conditions	  and	  subjective	  
evaluations	  in	  large	  measure	  as	  a	  response	  to	  this	  objection.	  In	  the	  Polish	  case,	  for	  instance,	  it	  
seems	  objectively	  incontrovertible	  that	  neither	  fiscal	  crisis	  nor	  martial	  law	  had	  systematic	  effect	  
on	   the	   strike	  option,	  whether	  or	  not	  Solidarity	  activists	   felt	  defeated.	   Likewise,	  Algerians	  had	  
measurably	  no	  effective	  systemic	  political	  resources	  after	  the	  annulment	  of	  the	  1991	  elections	  
results,	   and	   so	   were	   political	   denaturalized	   by	   the	   retracted	   offer	   of	   a	   differentiated	   voter-­‐
citizen	  regime.	  I	  have	  tried,	  on	  these	  grounds,	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  model	  does	  not	  sneak	  a	  theory	  
into	   its	   variables	   because	   the	   presence	   or	   absence	   of	   a	   differentiated	   citizenship	   regime	   is	  
objectively	  measurable	  apart	  from	  its	  effects,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  brief	  histories.	  	  
	   As	  to	  the	  theory	  or	  model,	  I	  will	  qualify	  the	  mechanism	  of	  subjectivity	  as	  a	  human	  drive	  
relevant	  to	  the	  materialist	   interpretation	  of	  citizenship	  regimes.	  My	  argument	  largely	  rests	  on	  
the	  mechanism	  –	  universal	  causal	  property	  –	  of	  subjectivity,	  or	  willfulness	  Nietzsche	  describes	  
in	  the	  Genealogy	  but	  I	  believe	  appears	  in	  these	  and	  other	  cases	  that	  I	  have	  researched.	  My	  first	  
reply,	  just	  to	  set	  it	  aside,	  would	  be	  to	  insist	  that	  an	  objection	  here	  should	  be	  to	  this	  mechanism	  




causal	  substrate	  that	  justifies	  explanation,	  but	  surely	  the	  need	  for	  systemic	  subjectivity	  may	  not	  
be	  it.	  Subjectivity	  may	  be	  non-­‐measurable	  in	  conventional	  terms,	  but	  I	  do	  think	  it	  is	  observable	  
as	  an	  effect	  of	  political	  systems	  when	  agents	  are	  heard	  making	  arguments	  and	  pursuing	  causes	  
to	  secure	  their	  capacity	  for	  agency	  in	  whatever	  system	  of	  prohibition	  can	  satisfy	  their	  subjective	  
drive.	  That	  is,	  subjectivity	  is	  not	  the	  drive	  to	  secure	  freedom,	  but	  to	  fulfill	  one’s	  will,	  to	  live	  in	  
the	   vanishing	   point	   Fanon	   unwittingly	   discerned	   between	   structure	   and	   agency,	   object	   and	  
subject,	  regime	  and	  actor.	   I	  have	  also	  conceived	  subjectivity,	  unusually,	  as	  physically	  borne	  of	  
regimes-­‐of-­‐becoming	  that	  allow	  one	  to	  act	  in	  a	  meaningful	  field.	  If	  this	  is	  not	  a	  mechanism	  for	  
social	  research	  to	  adopt,	  especially	  the	  process	  of	  subject-­‐formation,	  it	  may	  still	  help	  to	  explain	  
the	  dynamics	  of	  violent	  and	  non-­‐violent	  dissidents.	  Subjectivity	  could,	  for	  instance,	  be	  a	  sort	  of	  
human	  bottom	  line,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  dehumanization	  thesis,	  where	  its	  determining	  impact	  
on	  our	  actions	  diminishes	  once	  our	  essential	  needs	  are	  met.	  This	   is	  why	   I	  have	  espoused	   the	  
mechanism	  of	  subject-­‐formation	  as	  the	  universal	  and	  predictive	  feature	  of	  our	  social	  lives	  as	  an	  
experimental	  substrate	  of	  explanatory	  models	  rather	  than	  as,	  itself,	  such	  a	  model.	  	  
	   Finally,	   I	  have	  described	  citizenship	  regimes	  as	  necessarily	  material	   in	   linking	  state	  and	  
non-­‐state	  actors	  –	  the	  capacity	  of	  citizens	  to	  compel	  concessions	  or	  reforms	  from	  the	  state	  in	  
both	  cases	  derived	   from	  their	  use	  of	   their	   social	   resource	   to	  withdraw	  material	   support	   from	  
ruling	  elites.	  Poles	  could	  withdraw	  labor	  power	  and	  Algerians	  could	  take	  their	  loyalty	  to	  another	  
patron.	   Once	   again,	   this	  may	   apply	   only	   to	  my	   cases	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   contingent	   or	   coincidental	  
commonality	  across	  these	  specific	  resources,	  though	  it	  seems	  evident	  that	  states	  form	  regular	  
patterns	  of	   interactions	  with	   citizens	   that,	   construed	  as	   routine	   regimes	  between	   formal	   and	  




is	  strangely	  materialist	  rather	  than	  subjective,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  construed	  as	  “idealist.”	  
That	  is,	  while	  I	  gesture	  repeatedly	  to	  the	  subjective	  effects	  of	  un/differentiated	  citizen-­‐regimes,	  
the	  “action”	  of	  the	  thesis	  really	  rests	  with	  the	  material	  properties	  of	  the	  regimes	  themselves,	  
and	  thus	  could	  stand	  alone	  without	  ever	  mentioning	  experience,	  memory,	  internalized	  iterated	  
interactions,	  and	  the	  like.5	  This	  objection	  deepens	  given	  my	  stipulation	  that	  the	  causal	  power	  of	  
differentiated	  citizenship	   regimes	   is	   that	   they	   remained	  materially	  present	  and	   immanently	   if	  
not	  immediately	  operable.	  It	  is	  the	  material	  presence,	  the	  endurance	  of	  the	  visible	  weapon	  as	  a	  
reference	  to	  its	  past	  and	  future	  utility,	  one	  might	  say,	  that	  enables	  the	  experiential	  evaluation	  
to	  perceive	  systemic	  subjectivity	  although	  it	  remains	  virtual.	  Accounts	  of	  experiential-­‐historical	  
evaluation	  seem	  causally	  secondary,	  particularly	  because	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  memories	  of	  past	  
state-­‐provided	  tools	  have	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  effect	  beyond	   immediate	  conditions.	   Indeed,	   the	  
latter	  would	  offer	  a	  “purely	  idealistic”	  description	  of	  past	  experience	  trumping	  present,	  which	  is	  
an	  outcome	  I	  find	  suspect	  for	  reasons	  sketched	  above	  (§2.e).	  It	  may	  seem	  less	  than	  pristine	  or	  
parsimonious,	  but	  the	  cases	  suggest	  to	  me	  the	  interdigitation	  of	  “ideal”	  and	  “material”	  factors	  
in	  shaping	  protest	  decisions,	  an	  imbrication	  that	  seems	  to	  reflect	  political	  complexities	  without	  
yielding	  to	  nihilistic	  particularism	  or	  schematic	  modeling.6	  	  
	   Nonetheless,	   it	   is	   correct	   to	   receive	   my	   argument	   as	   primarily	   materialist,	   from	   one	  
angle,	   as	   differentiation	   of	   social	   resources	   within	   citizenship	   regimes	   is	   the	   independent	  
variable,	   and	   thus	   achieves	   the	   explanation,	   while	   experiential-­‐historical	   evaluation	   is	   an	  
intervening	  variable	  inseparable	  from	  the	  material	  regime	  and	  resources.	  In	  short,	  a	  thoroughly	  
materialist	   account	   of	   differentiated	   citizenship	   regimes	   correlating	   with	   violent/non-­‐violent	  




over	   half	   the	   thesis).	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	   contrasting	   results	   of	   comparable	  
martial	  law	  in	  Poland	  and	  Algeria	  “boils	  down”	  to	  the	  continuity	  versus	  discontinuity	  of	  material	  
resources	  to	  use	  against	  the	  state	  –	  the	  enduring	  potential	  of	   the	  strike	  versus	  eradication	  of	  
voting	  and	  patronage.	  As	  a	  spare	  model,	  the	  thesis	  could	  have	  been	  confined	  to	  a	  single	  set	  of	  
descriptions	  of	  variations	  in	  citizenship	  regimes	  as	  they	  form	  subjects	  of	  sociality,	  spatiality,	  and	  
regularity.	   The	   ambiguous	   optical	   status	   of	   the	   extant	   strike	   option,	   however,	   cannot	   be	  
dismissed	   in	   retrospect,	  as	   though	  martial	   law	  did	  not	  appear	  explicitly	   to	  eradicate	  previous	  
social	   resources	   from	  Polish	  political	   life.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   fidelity	   to	  a	  materialist	   framework	   that	  
compels	  the	  resort	  to	  experiential	  and	  subjective	  citizen	  evaluation	  because	  objectively	  Poles,	  
like	  Algerians,	  lacked	  material	  weapons	  against	  the	  state	  for	  a	  significant	  period	  under	  martial	  
law	  without	  resort	  to	  violence.	  If	  the	  objective	  persistence	  of	  potentially	  recuperated	  resources	  
against	   the	   state	  permitted	  Poles	   to	   remain	  non-­‐violent,	  on	  material	   grounds	   this	   correlation	  
requires	  an	  explanatory	  supplement.	  	   Indeed,	   I	   have	   faced	   the	   reverse	   objection:	   if	   the	  
material	   social	   resources	   (the	   strike)	   were	   manifestly	   impotent	   under	   martial	   law,	   then	  
citizenship	  regimes	  and	  social	  resources	  did	  not	  matter,	  as	  the	  state	  of	  emergency	  decimated	  
them.	   I	  have	  also,	  along	  these	   lines,	  been	  told	  that	  “material”	  resources	  had	  no	  effect	   if	   they	  
were	  still	  present	  but	  for	  objective	  reasons	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  absent,	  in	  which	  case	  it	  proves	  
the	  opposite	  of	  my	  argument:	   that	  systemic	  subjectivity	   is	   trivial,	  as	  my	  own	  cases	  prove.	  For	  
this	  reason,	  given	  the	  ambivalent	  implications	  of	  a	  material	  account	  of	  differentiated	  citizenship	  
regimes	  under	  state	  crack-­‐down,	  I	  have	  felt	  compelled	  analytically	  to	  add	  systemic-­‐subjectivity,	  
experienced	  historically,	  as	  a	  causal	  factor	  linking	  sustained	  or	  ruptured	  citizen-­‐subject-­‐regimes	  




	   I	  will	  conclude	  with	  a	  theoretical	  meta-­‐commentary	  on	  my	  explanation	  and	  model.	  If	  my	  
argument	  is	  right,	  it	  raises	  important	  political-­‐philosophical	  paradoxes	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  
regimes,	   sovereignty,	   subjectivity,	   and	  violence.	   First,	   states	   that	  wish	   to	  prevent	   violent	   and	  
potentially	  incumbency-­‐threatening	  opposition7	  should	  afford	  citizens	  social	  resources	  that	  give	  
them	   effective	   means	   to	   challenge	   the	   state,	   specifically	   to	   constrain	   its	   prerogative.	   This	  
means	  that	  sustained,	  collective,	  violent	  social	  agitation	  registers	  rulers’	  strategic	  incompetence	  
but	  the	  state’s	  fealty	  to	  the	  sovereign	  imperative.	  If	  states	  refuse	  to	  offer	  citizens	  resources	  to	  
demand	  and	  win	  state	  concessions	   they	  reduce	  activists	   to	  disenfranchised	  expellees	  without	  
systemic	   subjectivity,	   tempting	   blowback.	  Whether	   the	   Algerian	   state	   crippled	   or	   benefitted	  
itself	   in	  the	  long	  run	  by	  cancelling	  elections	  and	  declaring	  war	  on	  its	  opponents	  may	  never	  be	  
resolved,	  but	   it	   is	   dubious	   that	   retaining	   voter-­‐citizenship	  would	  have	  prevented	   ruling	  elites	  
from	   retaining	   dominant	   social	   power.	   Rulers	   increase	   the	   longevity	   of	   their	   incumbency,	   all	  
things	   equal,	   by	   providing	   non-­‐state	   actors	   systemic,	   reliable,	   legible	  means	   of	   limiting	   state	  
power.	  If	  this	  sounds	  like	  how-­‐to	  advice	  for	  reactionary	  governance,	  the	  oddity	  is	  that	  only	  via	  
genuine	  social	  “empowerment”	  in	  effective	  citizenship	  structures	  can	  ruling	  elites	  secure	  their	  
positions.	  This	  practical	  observation	  echoes	  classical	  contract	  theories,	  of	  course,	  by	  imagining	  
the	  fates	  of	  state	  and	  citizen	  bound	  together	  in	  a	  symbiotic	  regime,	  lest	  the	  center	  not	  hold.	  	  
	   If	  this	  position	  constituted	  the	  whole	  of	  one’s	  political	  imagination,	  it	  would	  of	  course	  be	  
an	  affront	  to	  anarchist	  and	  other	  theories	  skeptical	  of	  sovereign	  power	  or	  antagonistic	  to	  state	  
primacy	  in	  determining	  ordinary	  people’s	  fortunes.	  But	  this	  “advice	  to	  the	  king”	  is	  contextual,	  
not	  absolute,	  and	  applies	  only	  as	  long	  as	  states	  and	  citizens	  constitute	  distinct	  social	  locations	  




then	  it	  appears	  that	  maximal	  benefit	  to	  each	  from	  the	  arrangement	  would	  be	  reciprocal;	  that	  is,	  
the	  interest	  of	  each	  is	  tethered	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  other	  and	  that	  this	  mutuality	  is	  secured	  by	  
both	  parties	  cooperatively	  and	  simultaneously	  yielding	  and	  gaining	  systemic	  agency.	  Of	  course	  
this	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  simply	  a	  social-­‐democratic	  platitude,	  leaning	  on	  harmonious	  dreamscapes	  
denying	  ontological	  clashes	  between	  organized	  political	  machines	  and	  plural	  individual	  desires.	  
But	  the	  point	  in	  observing	  this	  reciprocity	  is	  itself	  critical	  and	  realist,	  not	  naïve	  or	  utopian,	  in	  our	  
current,	  increasingly	  post-­‐sovereign	  environment.	  There	  is	  a	  second	  paradox,	  related	  to	  the	  first	  
about	  relinquishing	  power	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  it.	  The	  first	  paradox	  arising	  from	  the	  above	  analysis	  
of	  differentiated	  citizenship	  regimes	  suggests	  that	  providing	  citizens	  with	  social	  resources	  limits	  
the	  state’s	  subsequent	  capacity	  to	  determine	  citizens’	  demands	  while	  also	  constituting	  citizens	  
as	  subjects	  who	  remain	  non-­‐violent,	  intra-­‐systemic,	  or	  docile	  as	  they	  press	  for	  their	  grievances	  
to	  be	  resolved.	  If	  a	  state	  provides	  an	  effective	  citizenship	  regime	  it	  gains	  control	  over	  the	  means	  
of	  systemic	  subjectivity	  but	  cedes	  control	  over	  the	  objectives	  of	  citizens’	  resistance.	  If	  the	  state	  
denies	  effective	  citizenship,	   then,	   it	   sacrifices	  control	  of	   subjectivity	   for	  control	  of	  citizenship.	  
The	  state	  in	  this	  sense	  determines	  the	  form	  and	  extent	  of	  its	  own	  indeterminacy;	  in	  designating	  
citizen-­‐subjectivities,	  states	  decide	  whether	  to	  control	  subjects	  or	  citizens.	  The	  obverse	  of	  this	  
paradox	  emerges	  in	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  dissolution	  of	  systemic-­‐subjectivity	  and	  effective	  citizenship	  
regimes	  altogether.	  The	  second	  paradox	  arises	  in	  the	  shared	  experiential	  evaluation	  under	  high-­‐
modernist,	  centralized,	  territorial	  sovereign	  and	  post-­‐modernist,	  capitalist-­‐statist-­‐militarist	  non-­‐
sovereign	  conditions.	  The	  unitary	  experience	  of	  reification	  and	  expulsion	  –	  of	  life	  at	  the	  whim	  of	  
unaccountable	  socio-­‐political	  forces	  in	  a	  regime	  devoted	  to	  preventing	  systemic	  subjectivity	  –	  in	  




reduced	  to	  dreaming	  only	  of	  a	  citizenship	  regime	  in	  which	  a	  recovered	  state	  will	  yield	  its	  power	  
in	  exchange	  for	  compliance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  


















1  I will defend this assumption by explaining my last-minute decision to drop from the final draft of the thesis its most 
theoretical and speculative chapter, on the subject in social science. Social explanation entails explicit, perspicuous ontological 
statements about the universal substrate or causal mechanism that validates inferences drawn from comparative research. This 
desideratum has forced social sciences to confront problems of universal versus particular ethnographic claims since the 
nineteenth-century. The main dilemma is that theories respecting particularity cannot be converted into universal explanations 
while theories providing universal statements produce more particular exceptions than general rules. Because scientific ambition 
desires generalization, our tendency has been to name universal human characteristics that define or motivate all social behavior. 
Early expressions of this will-to-universalize were biological (“all humans laugh the same way”); abstract (“all humans seek 
dignity” or “to maximize profits”); or a combination of these (“all humans ban incest”). Observing the priority social sciences 
have assigned to the second tendency – abstracting from diverse social activities a general human trait, typically dignity – I held 
in chapter six that universal abstractions cannot be mechanisms precisely because they had to be evacuated of particular 
subjective motivations. I emphasized subjective, not cultural, particularity to think about how “evental subjectivization” affects 
social explanation, including mine of Polish non-violence and Algerian violence under state coercion. In short, borrowing from 
psychoanalysis, I encouraged social sciences to replace abstract human characteristics with situated-subjective intensifications as 
its ontological premise. Subject-formation provides social research a general substrate, with irreducibly particular expressions, 
that is superior to concepts like “dignity.” A comment by Slavoj Žižek urged me in this direction, especially as it invoked the 
central categories of my project, subjectivity and evaluation:  
[T]o discern the fact that with the fourth type of judgment we achieve the level of the Subject, one does not even need a 
sophisticated conceptual apparatus: it suffices to remind oneself that this type contains what we – inadequately – call 
evaluation, evaluative judgment which (according to philosophical common sense) concerns the Subject (“subjective 
valuation”). It is not enough, here, just to draw attention to the elementary fact that, with Hegel, judgment is not 
“subjective” in the customary meaning of the term but a matter of the relationship of the object to its own Notion – the 
radical conclusion to be drawn that there is not Subject without a gap separating the object from its Notion – that this 
gap between the object and its Notion is the ontological condition of the Subject’s emergence. The Subject is nothing 
but the gap in the Substance, the inadequacy of the Substance to itself: what we call “Subject” is the perspective 
illusion by means of which the Substance perceives itself in distorted (“subjective”) form. More crucially, the fact is 
here generally overlooked that such a type of judgment on the correspondence of an object to its own Notion implies a 
kind of reflective redoubling of the Subject’s will and desire [For they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political 
Factor (Verso 1991), 131]. 
 My sixth chapter was a response to this attack on naïve images of subjectivity. Žižek scorns the conceit that we can 
understand or explain social action on the assumption that agents know, express, pursue, or can satisfy the fundamental desires 
that might drive them to outcomes like violence. If the psychoanalytic trajectory of the last century is at all instructive, it radically 
discourages our basic premises that subjects can report, correct, translate, or foreclose their desires in the form of remediable 
grievances. Žižek’s psychoanalytic subjectivity integrates universal patterns of intensification or meaning-making and particular 
cultural or social or political symbols, images, and fantasies. The concern that compelled a sixth chapter, then, was the prospect 
that Polish and Algerian subjects may have responded to historical events, in Alain Badiou’s sense, effecting their actions in ways 
my model excludes. Specifically, if conjecturally, resentment of the post-colonial state may have formed as an expression of the 
“unfinished revolution” that constituted Algerians as warriors denied victory, captive to the “modern” institutions and ethics that 
justified martial law. In turn, the historical achievement of labor and intellectual activism culminating in Solidarity may have 
achieved the universal revolution of the address-to-all-citizens, hence constituting Poles as peaceful subjects of a dying 
authoritarian colossus. Subject-formation plays out in many ways, but the point is: I would not wish to exclude the possibility that 
“evental subjectivization” constituted Polish and Algerian subjects as distinct candidates for violence. I thus devoted a final 
chapter to contrasting theories of the subject, on the intellectual-analytical grounds that we should not exclude potentially 
damaging theoretical challenges to the assumptions that shape our discipline. Put another way, I examined whether theories that 
subjects are constituted by a “gap between the object and its Notion” undermine reigning social-scientific predicates, whether 
subject-formation confounds or confines explanations based on rational actors or abstract humans.  
 My project was initially designed to test the limits of social explanation by working from inside out: case studies would 
complicate universality, which would yield subjectivity. A separate treatment of subject-formation answered the dehumanization 
problematic posed in the introduction, which may now seem unanswered. This silence could be the apposite dialectical response 
to the psychoanalytic challenge to liberal-detached abstract humanity. But I excised the chapter for a more prosaic reason, if with 
an analytic rationale. A stand-alone chapter on subjectivity threatened to demote or subsume the specific discussion of citizenship 
regimes, itself the potential groundwork for asking whether the structural-experiential model needs a psychoanalytic supplement. 




                                                                                                                                                       




1 Poems, Part 2, 1929-1938, L. Baxendall, tr. (Eyre Methuen 1976). 
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1 Jack Gilbert, “The Forgotten Dialect of the Heart,” The Great Fires: Poems, 1982-1992 (Knopf 2005 [1994]), 5. 
2 On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (Harcourt, Brace, & World 1965), 2-3. 
3 Merton was answering Bernard Bailyn’s comment that the aphorism “appears to have a rather impressive antiquity.”    
4 Vis., The squirrel’s. 
5 Racine bemoaned, “Mais je n’ai trouvé qu’un horrible mélange”; quoted in Paul Valéry, Reflections on the World Today, F. 
Scarfe, tr. (Pantheon 1948), 10. 
6 Hemingway said about one Hemingway scholar: “If you shot him he’d probably bleed footnotes” [Philip Young, “The Writer in 
Decline,” D. Noble, ed., Hemingway: A Revaluation (Whitston 1983), 231]. The staunchly anti-academic Hemingway filled his 
novels with literary citations, references, influences, and theories, of course. 
7 Gnome aptly means “maxim, aphorism” and “an ageless and often deformed dwarf of folklore who lives in the earth and usually 
guards precious ores or treasures” [Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam 1981), 487]. As either aphorism or troglodyte, 
the dwarf de-forms by living in the earth (or archive) and guarding his treasures (or documents).      
8 Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants, 3 fn. *. 
9 By “ethnography” I mean “writing about people.” Ethnos (ἔθνος) refers to people, as in Volk, a people, and connotes language-
users or “ethnicity”; graphia (γραφία), writing. That ethnography has come to refer to a specific kind of writing about language-
users merits a separate genealogy, or perhaps ethnography. Writing about language-users now implies writing about them in one 
way, about their ethnic or linguistic traits, presuming what is central to human action is its ethnic or meaning-giving properties 
that social researchers must take it as their job to capture or inscribe. 
10 Judith Butler, “Jacques Derrida,” London Review of Books, 26:21 (4 Nov 2004), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n21/judith-
butler/jacques-derrida. 
11 Note a related question concerning Derrida’s critique of exemplarity vis-à-vis social explanation, e.g., visible in legal theory. 
Derrida denies the logic of exemplarity in which hegemonic systems subsume others, thus: (1) law exemplifies “rule of law,” (2) 
law/“rule of law” exemplifies society; (3) law/“rule of law”/society exemplifies progress; (4) law/“rule of law”/society/ progress 
exemplifies value, etc. Derrida thinks such exemplary subsumptions or “instantiations” leave remainders, elements that overflow 
the two terms in the example. Derrida may ignore discernible patterns or logics in how discourses posit exemplary subsumptions; 
he himself adduces examples whose meaning, by his argument, should be indecisive or obscure [Irene Harvey, “Derrida and the 
Issues of Exemplarity,” D. Wood, ed., Derrida: A Critical Reader (Blackwell 1992), 199]. Here is the claim that one must stake 
an epistemological ground determine what meanings cannot be determined. Derrida may provide an example of non-exemplarity, 
but that could advance his claim about the permanent and irreducible remainder of any example. I merely wish to seize Derrida’s 
insight that interstitial meanings and practices support but exceed logos, law, codification, regulation – returning to the juridical 
plane, that law is not merely “founded on non-law,” i.e., borne of social violence, improvisation, power, or barbarism; and not 
merely sustained by non-law; but is also perpetuated necessarily by multiple culturally inscribed ethical exceptions. This insight 
pertains, in its various formulations, to the problem in this project of subjectivity, objectification, violence, and “ideality” {see 




                                                                                                                                                       
12 James Wood, “A Reply to the Editors,” n + 1, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 139. Wood recounts a lecture on Beethoven’s piano sonatas in 
which Alfred Brendel kept interrupting his “quotations…of the music with his Viennese mumbling.” Gradually “his ‘quotes’ 
overwhelmed his commentary; in a sense, he was incapable of quoting. Or rather, he could only quote: Brendel had approached 
Benjamin’s idea of a book entirely made of quotes.” Are Brendel’s performances of Beethoven thus also merely uninterrupted 
quotation? If so, it is his Beethoven for which we applaud Brendel, as much as a real Beethoven we applaud through Brendel.   
13 In his 1966 work, Les Mots et les choses, rendered as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage 
1970), with his approval, Michel Foucault churlishly made a “request to the English-speaking reader: “In France, certain half-
witted ‘commentators’ persist in labeling me a ‘structuralist.’ I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used 
none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis. I should be grateful if a more serious public 
would free me from a connection that certainly does me honor, but that I have not deserved” (xiv). Foucault’s remark is apposite 
in light of this dissertation’s oral defense, which probed whether my structural explanation of Polish non-violence and Algerian 
violence requires supplemental discussions of a quasi-hermeneutics of iterated citizen-subjectivity. I am grateful to the committee 
for urging me to clarify the need for this supplement, which I attempt below (§1.b.3.b, §1.b.3.c).   
14 Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton 2008), 97. On analogous aesthetic dilemmas between law-seeking 
concreteness and nihilistic artistic abstraction, see Giorgio Agamben, “A Self-Annihilating Nothing,” The Man Without Content, 
G. Albert, tr. (Stanford 1999 [1994]), 56-57. 
15 Quoted in Joseph Cuomo, “A Conversation with W. G. Sebald,” L. Schwartz, ed., The Emergence of Memory: Conversations 
with W. G. Sebald (Seven Stories 2007), 94-95. 
16 Mario Vargas Llosa, “Cien Años de Soledad: Realidad Total, Novela Total,” Introduction, Gabriel García Márquez, Cien Años 
de Soledad (Real Academia Española 2007 [1967]), xxvii [“Este proceso es, literalmente, una canibilización: esos materiales son 
digeridos plenamente por la nueva realidad, trocados en una sustancia distinta y homogénea”] [SR, tr.]. 
17 David F. Wallace, Interview with C. Rose, quoted in Jenny Turner, “Move Your Head and the Picture Changes,” Review of 
Helen DeWitt and Ilya Gridneff, Your Name Here (helendewitt.com), London Review, 30:17 (11 Sep 2008), 23.  In this view – 
which might apply to good writing in history, anthropology, or social science – veracity anneals efficacy. As Wallace remarked, 
similarly if more severely, Tolstoy’s narratives reflected a time-space experience one would be false to imitate: “I just – stuff 
that’s like that, I enjoy reading, but it doesn’t feel true at all. I read it as a relief from what’s true. I read it as a relief from the fact 
that I received five hundred thousand discrete bits of information today, of which maybe twenty-five are important. And how am 
I going to sort those out, you know?” [quoted in Wyatt Mason, “Smarter than You Think,” NYRB, LVII:12 (15 July 2010), 12].  
Mason adds that reliable narratives are “fantasies – a ‘making visible.’ They put before us things that cannot be seen in life: other 
hearts, other minds. Their endurance is the proof of their value and the confirmation of our need for such shows of rationality” 
(15).   
18 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (California 2001), 14. 
19 Evidently tin-eared to the potency of eclecticism, Carlin Romano resentfully damns “eponymous crutches – Derridean this and 
Foucauldian that – all citations to prestigious academics meant to add false authority to your views.” Cheering up, he urges us all, 
sincerely, to write novels dedicated “for Susan Sontag,” to celebrate singularity – if only hers [“The Newspaper Appreciation as 
Death Kit,” Chronicle Review, 51:19 (14 Jan 2005), B12].     
20 Quoted in Keith Thomas, “Diary,” London Review, 32:11 (10 Jun 2010), 37.  
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1 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin 1990 [1963]), 11. 
2 The classic binary freedom/tyranny is notoriously problematic, especially if the terms are posited as symmetrical or ontological. 
We are wont to think that freedom as the absence of tyranny but not tyranny as the absence of freedom; that tyranny is a concrete 
political regime but freedom an abstract existential condition; that ordinary language correctly says humans are naturally free but 




                                                                                                                                                       
this project assays, the opposition cannot be resolved and need not be retained as an abstract conceptual dichotomy [Hilary 
Putnam distinguishes dualism from dichotomy in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (Harvard 2003), 9ff.]. 
3 In a related framework, Jeff Goodwin calls “state constructionism” the process “in which certain state structures and practices 
actively form or ‘construct’ revolutionary movements as effectively as the best professional revolutionaries, by channeling and 
organizing political dissent along radical lines” [No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 
(Cambridge 2001), 25]. 
4 In a similar, if more ambitiously totalizing, account Stathis Kalyvas argues that, despite expressive variation, civil wars possess 
a “deep structure” across cases [The Logic of Civil War (Cambridge 2006), 9]. In my relatively modest study, I would offer only 
that the citizenship regime as a mode of subject-formation helpful in refining the objectification-freedom binary.    
5 Emmanuel Levinas calls this potential “infinition” – ethical and empirical life merged in a radical becoming. “The relation with 
infinity cannot, to be sure, be stated in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks it. Its very infinition is 
produced precisely in this overflowing. The relation with infinity will have to be stated in terms other than those of objective 
experience; but if experience precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows thought, 
the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest sense of the word.” One might say: only the infinite attests 
coherently to freedom {“Preface,” Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Klower 1991 [1961]), 23, 25}. 
6 James Gilligan, Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic (Vintage 1996). Indignity or pain may also silence the voice or 
etiolate the will [Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The aftermath of violence – from domestic abuse to political terror 
(Basic 1992)]. These two options – resistance or necropolitics – typify the symptomatic alternatives attributed to violence: either 
enlivening negation (vengeance) or deadening survivalism (death-in-life repression). Note that either may be seen as the purely 
biological and automatic response of the animal man.      
7 This raises a central problem in studies of violence, the seemingly equal likelihood that a desire for greater freedom will induce 
one to comply with rather than confront a social system – as such, radically opposed strategies derived from the same desire. This 
is to suggest, as well, that survival will often be preferred to freedom as its necessary antecedent condition of possibility. 
8 Bertolt Brecht expressed this sensibility in suggesting it would be easier for the East German government in 1953 to “dissolve 
the people and elect another” [“Wäre es da/ Nicht doch einfacher, die Regierung/ Löste das Volk auf und/ Wählte ein anderes?”] 
{“The Solution” [“Die Lösung” (1953)]}. 
9 Jason Brownlee, “Low Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism,” Comparative Politics, 34:4 (Jul 
2002), 478; see also Marsha Posusney, “Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle Eastern Lessons for Political Theory,” Comparative 
Politics, 36:2 (Jan 2004). 
10 I.e., the Middle East and North Africa, or MENA. It is unclear whether the admirable anti-colonial effort to rename “Middle 
East” as “West Asia,” will catch on or, if so, have a significant impact.  
11 In most European and Anglo-American political theory (and ideology) authoritarianism precedes “free” political constitutions, 
i.e., is the generic regime that liberty must overcome and purge. In this view authoritarianism’s internal dissidents must choose to 
support or impede enlightened principles and practices, by either adopting or refusing norms external to the tyrannical regime. In 
this impression, the inhabitants of authoritarian political systems must draw their liberating commitments from elsewhere, outside 
the political system. This seemingly obvious premise has critical implications. First, it suggests that authoritarian regimes do not 
offer internal resources for resistance or negotiation, which is false. Second, it suggests that, for so-called reasons of state, rulers 
could be justified in repressing dissent, on the grounds that dissidents necessarily represent foreign values, desires, or objectives.  
12 Note the implication, resonant in human rights discourses, that physically coercive uprisings against authoritarian regimes are 
not meaningfully violent because they seek to undo dehumanizing violence; conversely, liberal-democratic regimes opposed with 
physical means are seen as confronting violence or terrorism that undermines the conditions of human flourishing. 
13 Technically, mechanisms are causal by definition, as universal statements with robust causal properties (see fn. 41 below). 
14 This theory is vividly portrayed in the film “Total Recall,” in which a corporation has monopolized and charged a fee for the 
oxygen in a space station on Mars. When rebels resist the fees, the company cuts off the air supply, mutating and crippling the 
inhabitants, and leading to a Maoist revolution. Critically, the native inhabitants have been dehumanized beyond autochthonous 




                                                                                                                                                       
15 Note that contrasting psychoanalytic accounts link violence to the removal or “weakening” of external authority, provoking a 
physically performed jouissance of reactivated, ritualized authority and community {Julia Kristeva, The Sense and Nonsense of 
Revolt: The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis, J. Herman, tr. (Columbia 2000 [1996]), 23ff.}. 
16 Frantz Fanon, “On Violence,” The Wretched of the Earth, R. Philcox, tr. (2004 [1963]), 15. 
17 This indifference was, typically, exacerbated by instreumental familiarity [see Kalyvas, Logic of Violence (2006), 234-235. 
18 The status of Fanon’s psychoanalytic revisionism exceeds this study, but his rejection of standard Freudian models alludes to 
“the difficulties [of] seeking to ‘cure’ a native properly, that is to say, when seeking to make him thoroughly a part of the a social 
background of the colonial type. Because it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the 
other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question constantly, ‘In 
reality, who am I?’…It seems to us that in the cases here chosen the events giving rise to the disorder are chiefly the bloodthirsty 
and pitiless atmosphere, the generalization of inhuman practices, and the firm impression that people have of being caught up in a 
veritable Apocalypse”{Wretched of the Earth, C. Farrington, tr. (Grove 1963 [1961]), 250-251}. French-trained analyst Fanon 
condemned the equation of strong mental health with normalized, pacified adjustment to domination. Slavoj Žižek insists that 
such political objections define the opposed logics of psychoanalytic theory and practice, which – as Fanon says – ought not to be 
fused. “The theoretical ‘regression’ of revisionism,” Žižek writes, 
emerges most clearly in the relationship posited between theory and therapy. By putting theory at the service of 
therapy, revisionism obliterates their dialectical tension: in an alienated society, therapy is ultimately destined to fail, 
and the reasons for this failure are provided by theory itself. Therapeutic “success” amounts to the “normalization” of 
the patient, his adaptation to the “normal” functioning of existing society, whereas the crucial achievement of 
psychoanalytic theory is precisely its explanation of how “mental illness” is based on a certain “disconent” endemic to 
civilization as such. The subordination of theory to therapy thus requires the loss of the critical dimension of 
psychoanalysis [“Is There a Cause of the Subject?” J. Copjec, ed., Supposing the Subject (Verso 1994), 88].  
Žižek holds that a hermeneutic of suspicion is endogenous, not external, to psychoanalysis. Quoting Russel Jacoby, he stresses, 
“Pyschanalysis is a theory of an unfree society that necessitates psychoanalysis as a therapy” [Social Amnesia: A Critique of 
Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing (Harvester 1977), 122; Žižek, “Is There a Cause of the Subject (1994) 88]. This is an 
important sub-argument to have in place about contested theories of subjectivity.  
19 Fanon’s practical-theoretical views betray a conventional enlightenment moral psychology in which militant action restores the 
truth of the whole person. Revolutionary moments overcome the split between conscious object and unconscious subject within 
the colonized. These alignments invert the liberal binary, conscious subject and unconscious object, but retain the potential for 
revolutionary re-unification of conscious subjects. As Françoise Vergès writes,  
In Fanonian psychology, difference can only be invidious, and the unconscious is the negative of consciousness; it 
masks the consciousness. The goal is therefore to destroy the white mask on black consciousness. Behind the mask is 
the truth…To Fanon, emancipation was the recovery of a wounded masculinity. In Algeria, Fanon found the virile male 
that would belie the colonial construction of emasculated masculinity. With the Algerian nationalist fighter, Fanon 
found a man whose masculinity had been wounded but who had, in contrast to the black man of the Antilles, the 
courage to attack the castrating master, the Frenchman, and to castrate him in return [Monsters and Revolutionaries: 
Colonial Family Romance and Métissage (Duke 1999), 210] 
20 I am deliberately conflating distinctions in Fanon’s analysis among oppression, suppression, and repression. Repression is the 
proper concept for the redirection of urges into the unconscious. Fanon appears uninterested in creative processes of sublimation, 
perhaps since racist violence foregrounds physical-psychic trauma over cooperative social repression. Hence, his essay, “Colonial 
War and Mental Disorders,” Wretched of the Earth, records only destructively repressed rather than productively sublimated 
traumas: impotence after a wife’s rape, “undifferentiated homicidal impulsions” after surviving a “mass murder,” “anxiety 
disorders of the depersonalization type” after murdering a French woman, and so on.    
21 It is central to Fanon’s vision, and to my project, to envisage human being as human becoming, but not as a trendy post-modern 
wink. I think Fanon shared Sartre’s “existentialist” position that subjects are neither radically autonomous nor imprisoned; rather, 
belief in only those options showed “bad faith,” where “good faith” consists in living through our situated and immanent selves 
simultaneously [Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, H. Barnes, tr. (Washington Square 1966 [1943]), 56ff.]. Where Fanon 
departed from Sartre – and, I suspect, social science must depart from axioms of rational detachment – is in partitioning 
subjectivity as free/un-free, or willful/habitual. Fanon does not endorse, suitably, Sartre’s distinction between accidental actions 




                                                                                                                                                       
22 Fanon assimilates, I believe, Nietzsche’s monistic subjectivity to a Marxism adjusted for colonial race and class composition:  
A quantum of power is just such a quantum of drive, will, effect – more precisely, it is nothing other than this very 
driving, willing, effecting, and only through the seduction of language (and the…errors of reason petrified therein), 
which…misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by an effecting something, by a ‘subject,’ can it appear otherwise. 
For just as common people separate the lightning from its flash and take the latter as doing as an effect of a subject 
called lightning, so popular morality…separates strength from the expression of strength as if there were behind the 
strong an indifferent substratum that is free to express strength – or not to. But there is no such substratum; there is no 
‘being’ behind the doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is simply fabricated into the doing – the doing is everything” 
{Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, M. Clark/A. Swensen, trs. (Hackett 1998 [1887]), 25}.  
23 Fanon makes this point strongly, whether or not the point is strong. Objects cannot will objects, subjects cannot will subjects; 
the key point being that subjects cannot will themselves, at least not in the dualistic sense that at time T1 there is a subject and at a 
later time T2 this subject has, qua agential decision-maker, willed her own subjectivity. Fanon’s view, a key one in my findings, 
is that subjectivity and willing are not agential in this sense. Agitators will as subjects, from within their subjectivity; they do not 
choose but express this subjectivity. This does not imply that their capacity to exercise their subjective will is constant; conditions 
permitting or impeding subjective will vary. But this variation does not suggest, Fanon thinks, that there are conditions of more 
or less “freedom” in deciding what one’s subjective will is. 
24 Again Fanon echoes Nietzsche, here the last line in the Genealogy of Morality: “man would rather will nothingness than not 
will…” (op. cit., 118). In a simple sense, Fanon reiterates the view that humans are willful creatures that defend willing itself; 
between not exercising my will and exercising it destructively, I would rather destroy. This drives not only Fanon’s theory of 
violence, but also his anxiety that violence can express a will-to-nothingness, in Nietzsche’s words “an aversion to life, a 
rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life [that] is and remains a will.” For Fanon, this negation would take 
the form of post-colonial nationalism, parochialism, and regression from the project of universal human emancipation.  
25 The Fanon literature debates whether this claim simply means dehumanization re-humanizes. But this claim has two meanings, 
one cynically fatalist, one cheerfully open-ended. For some, “On Violence,” a seminal essay but insufficient for grasping Fanon’s 
social-psychology, deploys Hegel’s master-slave dialectic to say, cynically, that dehumanization is a necessary stage in achieving 
fully human, i.e., self-conscious freedom. If so, Fanon must think the Algerians owe France a debt of gratitude for freeing them. 
This is Judith Butler’s critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to Wretched of the Earth: “Indeed, his view makes the colonizer into 
the primary subject of violence. And this claim seems to contradict his other claim, namely, that under these conditions, violence 
can be understood to bring the human into being. If we subscribe to his first thesis, we are left with the conclusion, surely faulty, 
that colonization is a precondition for humanization, something that civilizational justifications for colonization have always 
maintained, and a view which…Sartre wanted vehemently to oppose” [“Violence, Non-Violence: Sartre on Fanon,” Graduate 
Faculty Philosophy Journal, 27:1 (2006), 12]. Fanon’s account avoids Butler’s reproach. He seems to think that people naturally 
struggle with all virtual and actual limits and promises of human life; it is not necessary in general but in Algeria to achieve this 
existence through a horrifying war of independence from imperial dehumanization. The near-object who rebels, re-subjectivizes 
or re-humanizes herself, transcends a cruel condition; this does not entail that cruelty is a necessary condition of transcendence.   
26 Fanon, “On Violence” (2004 [1963]), 2. 
27 Czesław Miłosz, “Foreword,” Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and other essays, M. Latynski, tr. (California 1985), xi. 
28 On relevant problems of intentionality, see Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics (MIT 1996). 
29 Refining this argument, Goodwin writes that “the formation of strong revolutionary movements is found in peripheral societies 
in which especially repressive and disorganized states possess geographically and socially delimited power [No Other Way Out 
(2001), 26].  
30 Along just these lines, Fanon explains violence ruefully; he does not “defend” it. Indeed, his physicalism is pitched against 
ethical views that confuse justification and explanation on grounds that we can always choose our actions. It is this view Fanon 
attributes to collaborating “native intellectuals,” a view that is anything but trivially polemical on his part and for purposes of 
social research. For Fanon, as psychoanalyst and Marxist, the belief in liberal or rational detachment is a political and analytical 
error in that it expresses without comprehending the elitism of its own premises. For Marx or Dewey, it mistakes the position and 
ideology of privilege with those of everybody else, and misunderstands the ideological basis of its own thought, thus instantiating 
“pure ideology” (§2.e).  
31 The need to ground reliable social knowledge in a physical ontology is more openly stated where natural science is integrating 




                                                                                                                                                       
psychologically minded West” [Rethinking Psychiatry: From Cultural Category to Personal Experience (Free 1988), 150]. To be 
sure, this integration varies in quality, e.g., ideological derivations of social outcomes from biological needs: “The claims that 
human warfare, sexual dominance, love of private property, and hate of strangers are human universal are found over and over in 
the writings of socio-biologists, whether they be biologists, economists, psychologists, or political scientists” [Richard Lewontin, 
Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA (Harper 1992), 91]. A bad practice does not, of course, condemn the practice itself.   
32 See Michael Ignatieff’s attempt at a universally acceptable “human rights minimalism” limited to physical security [“I. Human 
Rights as Politics II. Human Rights as Idolatry,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at Princeton University 
(April 2000)]; Wendy Brown’s dismissal of it [“‘The Most We Can Hope For . . .’: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism,” 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 103:2/3 (Spr/Sum 2004); and Raymond Geuss’s critique of any “universal right” [History and Illusion 
in Politics, (Cambridge 2001), 131-152]. 
33 Conceived in the early 1990s among United Nations personnel to counter the perceived priority of military security, “human 
security” should comprise (1) physical [welfare]; (2) juridical [rights]; (3) subjective [power]. Physical safety and juridical rights 
do not secure resources to compel the state to respect civilian demands. Political subjectivity is one primal right that conditions 
effective demands for other rights, e.g., food, shelter, or speech. Which component of human security is the primary condition of 
the others is, however, indeterminate. Citizens need minimal caloric intake, legal space, and coercive capacity to advance their 
human security. They lack, and see themselves as lacking, these aspects of human security in varying ways across time and place. 
How physical, juridical, or subjective capacities are weighted objectively and subjectively in particular contexts needs to be 
specified, which remains a problem for efforts to universalize the concept of human security. 
34 The “perestroikan” assault on the universal ontology underylying quantitive, rational-choice, and game-theoretic methods was 
in part a simple reaction to the apparent rise of incommensurable national/religious identity movements. In retrospect the assault 
may have been an anxious projection re. the capacity of qualitative particularists to proceed without universal assumptions. 
35 It is plausible to argue that all nouns convey process and endpoint. If I am in the process of driving I have achieved driving. 
This confusion plagues nouns ending in tion that “fall upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and covering up all the 
detail,” as Orwell said, with “pacification” as his main example [“Politics and the English Language” (1946)]. 
36 Jamie Mayerfeld, “The Measurement of Suffering,” Suffering and Moral Responsibility (Oxford 1999), 55ff. 
37 Albert Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action (Princeton 1982), 6. 
38 John Gray, “Plural Values,” Two Faces of Pluralism (New 2000), 34ff. 
39 Daniel Wilkinson, Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala (Houghton Miflin 2002); 
Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (Duke 2000). 
40 Michel Wieviorka, Violence: a new approach, D. Macey, tr. (Sage 2009 [2005]), 72 [translation amended]. 
41 “For proponents of process tracing, the distinction between a causal pathway and a causal mechanism imposes an obligation to 
not claim too much. Identifying causal pathways in a critical ingredient of science. But the identification of mechanisms has been 
celebrated as going one step further, as adding deep explanatory knowledge…Those who identify processes but not mechanisms 
should take great pains to demarcate properly their explanatory accomplishments” [David Waldner, "What are Mechanisms and 
What are They Good For?" (manuscript on file with author); and “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms,” H. Kincaid, ed., 
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science (Oxford 2011), 6]. 
42 Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science,” The Methodology of the Social Sciences, E. Shils/H. Finch, eds., trs. (Free 1949 
[1904]), 72 [translation amended]. 
43 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1998 [1887]), 51, 53. For commentary, see “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” Morality, 
Culture, and History: Essays on German Philosophy (Cambridge 1999), 13ff.; “Plato, Romanticism, and Thereafter,” Outside 
Ethics (Princeton 2005), 206-208; “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton 2001), viii-xviii; 
Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, C. Gordon, ed., K. 
Soper et al., trs. (Pantheon 1980 [1976]), 80-92; The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, M. 
Senellart, ed., G. Burchell, tr. (Palgrave 2008), 2-3; Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, C. Boundas, ed., M. Lester with C. 
Stivale, trs. (Columbia 1990 [1969]); Roberto Esposito, “Totalitarian or Biopolitics? Concerning a Philosophical Interpretation of 
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1 Angelus is a Roman Catholic prayer ritual, called by a ringing bell, commemorating Christ’s incarnation.  
2 Czesław Miłosz, “The Spirit of History:  Warsaw, 1939-1945,” A Treatise on Poetry, Miłosz/R. Hass, trs. (Ecco 2001), 30.   
3 On Poland’s economic transitions, see Alice Amsden, et al., The Market Meets its Match: Restructuring the Economics of 
Eastern Europe (Harvard 1994); Jeffrey Sachs, Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy (MIT 1993); Frances Millard, The 
Anatomy of the New Poland: Post-Communist Politics in the First Phase (Elgar 1994); Ray Taras, “Leaderships and Executives,” 
S. White, et al., eds., Developments in East European Politics (Duke 1993), 178-179. For an extensive and methodical account of 
Poland’s institutional transformation, see Ray Taras, Consolidating Democracy in Poland (Westview 1995), 113-218; Michael 
Bernhard, Institutions and the Fate of Democracy: Germany and Poland in the Twentieth Century (Pittsburgh 2005), 183-246. 
On postcommunist activism, see Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic 
Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993 (Michigan 1999), 108-139. 
4 For discussion of the conflict, see Severine Labat, Les islamistes algériens: Entre les urnes et le maquis (Éditions du Seuil 
1995); Hugh Roberts, “The armed rebellion and the continuation of politics,” Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002 (Verso 2003 [1993]).  
5 John Waterbury, “Democracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East,” G. Salamé, 
ed., Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (I. B. Taurus 1994), 39. 
6 As I argue below (§3.c.1) culture and dignity poorly predict variable outcomes. As constants they cannot explain change; as 
variables, their own changes must be explained. In terms of culture, empirical research crucially makes this correction. “Islam” 
and “Catholicism” cannot explain variation in Muslim and Catholic political decisions over time and space. Religious culture 
interacts with other variables to influence social action. This is not to proffer a materialist or realist view that culture or religion 
does not matter; but to insist that culture matters as one evaluative prism subject to material or realist pressures. Culture refers to 
regularities and legible patterns in social action or signification that include variation, strategy, adaptation, or inconsistency 
[Katherine Ewing, “The Illusion of Wholeness: Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency,” Ethos, 18:3 (Sep. 1990), 
252]. 
7 For a critique of dominant analytical perspectives from this period, see my “Global Books and Local Stories: Theory and Anti-
Theory in Social Research,” C. Lowney, ed., Identities [Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna) 1998]. 
8 Relevant theories, not yet a recognized literature, remain scattered but promising. Timur Kuran argues that bandwagon effects 
under widespread preference falsification can produce unpredicted revolutions, reconciling “structuralism and individualism,” but 
in a seemingly circular model [“Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989,” World 
Politics, 44:1 (Oct 1991), 22, passim]. James Ron shows that democratic consolidation can increase violence where radical state 
opponents fear losing their systemic relevance, but it is unclear if this is a model or narrative [“Ideology in Context: Explaining 
Sendero Luminoso’s Tactical Escalation,” Journal of Peace Research, 38:5 (Sep 2001)]. Michael Liu attributes the difference 
between Poland’s 1981 coup and Iran’s 1979 revolution to “the capacity of the leadership, bureaucracy, and military to deal with 
revolutionary situations,” although the explanatory variable eventually diffuses to include “state relations to other states, classes, 
and religion, as well as relations between the religious elite and classes” [“States and Urban Revolutions: Explaining the 
Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Poland,” Theory and Society, 17:2 (Mar 1988), 180, passim]. 
9 Two decades later, we still must heed Lucian Pye’s call for “finer shades of typologies of political systems between classic 
polar opposites of authoritarian and democratic. In the wake of the crisis of authoritarianism we can expect a wide variety of 
systems that will become part authoritarian and part free and will fall far short of any reasonable definitions of democracy” 
[“Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” APSR, 84: 2 (1990), 13]. But we must also refine typologies of pre-crisis 
authoritarianism [David and Ruth Collier, “Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating ‘Corporatism’,” APSR, 73:4 (1979)] 
as we continue to re-map formal “regime-type” and social power [see David Waldner, “Policy History: Regimes,” International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier Science LTD 2001)].  
10 It may not be wise to compare the 2011 Arab uprisings to the 1989 Central European transitions. Poland scholar Michael 
Kennedy rejects the comparison, citing three structural differences: non-violent ruling elites and opponents; imperial cooperation 




                                                                                                                                                       
2011 has many more geopolitical actors with very different associations with and commitments to democracy."); global 
economic recession. In short, "civil society could institutionalize transformations following 1989 because national authoritarians 
and global geopolitical forces reinforced that change with a prosperous economic outlook channeling that trajectory" ["Arab 
Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and Historical Frames: 2011, 1989, 1968," Jadaliyya (11 Oct 2012), 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2853/arab-spring-occupy-wall-street-and-historical-fram]. Hugh Roberts rejects Algeria-
Communism analogies, insisting the FLN – unlike the CP’s – was not socialist, a party, or opposed ideologically by a mass 
movement [Battlefield Algeria (2003), 108-111]. Note these views reject likening, not comparing, the cases. The equation is 
common among journalists and regime opponents. Anthony Shadid reported: “Tunisia’s uprising [has] electrified the region. The 
most enthusiastic suggested it was the Arab world’s Gdansk, the birthplace of Solidarity in Poland, which heralded the end to 
Communist rule in Eastern Europe” [“Joy as Tunisian President Flees Offers Lesson to Arab Leaders,” NYT (14 Jan 2011), at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15region.html?_r=2&h].  
11 “The basis of the system [is] the same as it was before the war…Local fortunes are to be made in imports, property, and 
construction and the domestic economy is one of consumption rather than production, dependent on the pipelines leaving 
Algeria’s ports and the container ships coming in, without a self-sustaining base that might survive the interruption of either” 
[James McDougal, “After the War: Algeria’s Transition to Uncertainty,” Middle East Report, no. 245, 37:4 (Win 2007), 40]. 
12 John Entelis, “The Unchanging Politics of North Africa,” Middle East Policy, XIV:4 (Win 2007), 23-28]. 
13 Patricia Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice, and race in colonial Algeria (I.B. Taurus 1995). 
14 To most outsiders, Algeria connotes only the violence represented by its celebrated signifiers: eminent French émigrés such as 
Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida who fled effective statelessness or anti-Semitism; Fanon’s analysis of anti-imperial militancy 
in Les Damnés de la Terre (1962) and Gillo Pontecorvo’s portrait of it in La battaglia di Algeri (1966), used by the American 
military in counter-insurgency training; and images of Arab piracy invoked by pugilists to attack Islam [e.g., Christopher 
Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (Twelve 2007), 176-177]. These images of US state builders’ 
battling with Muslim corsairs to free American captives in the 18th-19th centuries recalls events in which Christian universal 
egalitarianism trumped anti-Muslim racism in American thought – and hypocrisy eroded cultural sanctimony. Evidently, owning 
slaves made it hard to moralize about being made into slaves [Anouar Majid, Freedom and Orthodoxy: Islam and Difference in 
the Post-Andalusian Age (Stanford 2004), 65-73; for a brisk history, see Frederick Leiner, “At War with Algiers,” The End of 
Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa (Oxford 2006)].           
15 James McDougall, “Savage war? Codes of Violence in Algeria, 18302-1990s,” Third World Quarterly, 26:1 (2005), 118. 
16 Reactionary states and oppositions are often seen as mutually caused, as in Saudi Arabia [Robert Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: 
Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Verso 2009); Asad Abukhalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, 
and Global Power (Seven Stories 2003)]. 
17 For eyewitness reports of the incremental reforms, see Timothy Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (Vintage 1999); Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after 
Communism (Vintage 1995). For technical reports, see Jon Elster, ed., The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism 
(Chicago 1996); D. Stark and L. Bruszt, eds., Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Prosperity in East Central 
Europe (Cambridge 1998). To compare another peaceful transition from state repression, consider the reconciliation process in 
South Africa [Aletta Norval, “Reconstructing National Identity and Renegotiating Memory: The Work of the TRC,” T. Hansen/F. 
Stepputat, eds., States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Duke 2001)]. 
18 Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux 2003), 19. Even 
ignoring the 2011 Arab uprisings, Feldman poses the puzzle poorly with respect to Algeria. Muslims did form a “popular 
democratic movement” precisely because they saw “democracy as the solution to what ail[ed] their country” if it brought them to 
power. Feldman explicitly thinks Islamists are not “freedom-loving” because they are not liberals. This conflation of democracy, 
liberalism, freedom, and secularization exposes the tendentious exclusions of those “universal” ethical postures.  
19 Democratic or participatory inclusion has incorporated Islamists peacefully in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, with Yemen and 
Egypt as unclear case; aggressive political exclusion has militarized Islamists in Afghanistan, Gaza, Chechnya, Xinjian, Algeria, 
Iraq, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, FATA, and the Ferghana Valley. In some cases, the state has massacred Islamist opponents (pre-
invasion Iraq, Syria), creating a third category of genocidal repression (§3.a).   
20 Algerian rulers claimed to derive legitimacy from their Islamic faith and participation in the liberation war against France. The 




                                                                                                                                                       
Poland’s leaders, in contrast, sanctified communism in secular and modern terms as negotiating with or transforming Poles’ basic 
beliefs. But neither Algeria’s religious nor Poland’s secular “sacralization” project succeeded. Both regimes had to bargain and 
pay for “legitimacy” and were anyway discredited, or “de-sacralized,” long before they imposed martial law.      
21 This does not imply that Algerian Muslims or Polish Catholics gave their primary allegiances elsewhere or could not legitimize 
national-secular states. It is simply one, and a minor one, of their shared traits that their religious movements had global support.   
22 This wrangling over assets should not be construed as either a religiously coded material contest or a materially coded 
secular/religious contest. Material wealth is required to defend beliefs and to build institutions, whatever faith they express. Note, 
too, that the presence of religious agitation against secular states implies neither a basic conflict between religious and secular 
beliefs nor any inherent polarity in the social logics of secular and religious faith, symbols, rituals, desires, or sacrifice.     
23 Activists called the movements “uprisings.” Edward Said, in Algiers following the October 1988 riots and repression, declared: 
“Algeria had just had its own intifada” {“Palestine Agenda,” The Politics of Dispossession (Vintage 1994 [1988]), 145}. Poles 
for their part cheered when historian Lech Trzeciakowski, at the June 1981 commemoration of the 1956 worker-strike and state-
reprisals in Poznań, called the movement an “uprising,” a word with “an almost sacred connotation [that Poles] reserve…for the 
armed attempts to regain Poland’s independence” [John Kulczycki, “The Beginnings of the Solidarity Movement in Poznań, 
1980-1981,” Polish Review, xxvii:3/4 (1982), 154].  
24 My category of systemic subjectivity is similar in this respect to the concept of intentionality in David Waldner’s account: 
 [I]ntentionality is an invariant principle, taken to be a constant feature of human consciousness. Intentionality means, 
informally, that consciousness is directed upon an object, that humans have desires about objects, and that agency 
pursues these desires. We can easily intervene to shape specific preferences; subsidizing an object increases demand for 
that object. But that intervention, like making fuel present or absent, is not a variable; the mechanism, here 
intentionality, is an invariant property ["What are Mechanisms and What are They Good For?" (manuscript on file with 
author); also see “Process Tracing and Causal Mechanisms” (2011), 6]. 
25 This “dominant pattern” by which a citizenship regime constitutes systemic subjectivity may be a constellation of state tactics 
and techniques rather than one reductive means. The citizenship regime is not a zero-sum contest among, e.g., urban labor, rural 
peasants, national-party voters, or clients. Effective citizenship can be any simple or complex arrangement of systemic subjective 
interpellations. That Algeria fostered client-citizenship and Poland labor-citizenship does not mean every country’s citizenship 
regime is similarly dominated by a single recruitment scheme. The citizenship regime may instead subjectivize non-state actors in 
overlapping and discrete modes of incorporation that nonethess constitute a single pattern, as under Mexico’s PRI: “By breaking 
society down into three main sectors – the labor sector, the agrarian sector, and the populist sector – and through creating the 
means for their political representation, the PRI’s corporate approach to governance claimed a comprehensiveness that, 
theoretically at least, placed it above contestation” [Nicholas Higgins, Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion: Modernist Visions 
and the Invisible Indian (Texas 2004), 128].  
26 At the risk of overclarifying, I am distinguishing “mere” juridical, formal citizenship (passport and specified rights conferred 
within a bounded territory) from effective citizenship or citizen-subjectivity. Unless otherwise noted, citizenship will refer below 
to effective means of state-citizen interaction that situate citizens as systemic subjects by affording them useful social resources.  
27 I am grateful to Mark Kesselman for helping me to develop this terminology. 
28 An additional stipulation concerns limitations on the exit option; the resort to anti-systemic violence also depends on agents’ 
ability to realize their will by withdrawing from a given system and re-situating their subjectivity in another system. 
29 Barbara Fields, "Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America," New Left Review, 181 (May/June 1991). 
30 I thank certain members of my committee for ribbing me sympathetically about my model-fetish – the old-fashioned wish to 
insert carefully conceived variables into causal pathways. I do not defend “positivist” rigor except to say that this stylized and 
formal presentation is not intended to rigidly order practical, conditional, messy human affairs, but in part to explore whether an 
“excessively” modeled argument sheds light on the whoop and wharf of political life.  
31 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990), 30-31. 
“Common-pool resource refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large to make it costly (but not 




                                                                                                                                                       
32 Ellis Goldberg, “Smashing Idols and the State: The Protestant Ethic and Egyptian Sunni Radicalism,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 33:1 (Jan 1991), 32. Partha Chatterjee had issued a related call to disaggregate majoritarianism [“Secularism 
and Tolerance,” R. Bhargava, ed., Secularism and its Critics (Oxford 1998), 348]. 
33 On the similar benefits of informal rather than formal policy mechanisms in arms control conventions rather than treaties, see 
Russell Hardin, Indeterminacy and Society (Princeton 2003), 34-35.  
34 Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?” Comparative Politics (April 1973), 429. 
35 Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon 
(Columbia 2000), 72. 
36 Mark Lichbach extends rational-actor models of dissent (including modes of mobilization and motivation) to the “non-rational 
or irrational behavior” of, e.g., “philanthropic or religious” groups [The Rebel’s Dilemma (Michigan 1998), chs. 7-11]. 
37 For Ian Hacking “social constructionism” should be associated exclusively with contingent social processes and dissociated 
from anti-universal or anti-essentialist contentions [The Social Construction of What? (Harvard 1999), 6-19]. 
38 In several key works on US protest movements, popular resistance is said to reflect or express institutional design, although 
with significant variation in outcomes or processes [see Peter Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” 
APSR, LXVII:1 (March 1973); Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They 
Fail (Vintage 1979); John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Illinois 
1982)]. Later works challenged such views, given the generative power of subaltern mobilization in forcing institutional revisions 
[e.g., Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago 1982); cf. M. Lichbach 
and A. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge 1997); Ted Gurr, Peoples versus 
States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (USIP 2000), esp. ch.3].   
39 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge 2001), 38-52, esp. 48-50. 
40 Jillian Schwedler shows that inclusion in state policy procedures pacified Yemeni Islamists behaviorally but not ideologically; 
Here the analysis of institutional effect on social mobilization emphasizes state capacity to contain ideological differences within 
a shared incentive structure [Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge 2006)].          
41 Alexander Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (Columbia 2001), 25-27.   
42 For a similar account, see Ignacio Lewkowicz, Pensar Sin Estado: La Subjetividad En La Era De La Fluidez (Paidos 2004). 
43 Ira Katznelson, “Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics;” Marc Ross, “Culture and Identity in Comparative 
Political Analysis;” Alan Zuckerman, “Reformulating Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics,” 
M. Lichbach and Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics (1997). 
44 Michael Burawoy and János Lukács, The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to Capitalism (Chicago 
1992), 113-114. In a critique of Burawoy’s explication of the politics of production, Adam Przeworski offers a similar account: 
At any moment there exist in any society several organizations that seek to realize goals that entail militancy, support, 
collaboration, or at least compliance of large numbers of individuals. As they pursue their goals, organizations compete 
to instill in individuals particular collective identities and to evoke from them particular behaviors….Their strategies 
involve symbols and organization; persuasion and coercion. Hence, struggle about class precedes eventual struggles 
between classes. The result of this strategic interaction at every moment is some structure of identities on the basis of 
which individuals act in collective life, the structure of collective action. In turn, the effect of collective actions is a 
structure of identity. And so history marches on [“Class, Production, and Politics: A Reply to Burawoy,” Socialist 
Review, 89:2 (1989), 94]. 
Elsewhere, he writes, similarly: “Economic, political, and ideological conditions jointly structure the realm of struggles that have 
as their effect the organization, disorganization, and reorganization of classes. Classes must thus be viewed as the effects of 
struggles structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously economic, political, and ideological” [Capitalism and Social 
Democracy (Cambridge 1985), 47]. 




                                                                                                                                                       
46 Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (Chicago 1980), xi. The author notes that “all sorts of analytic strategies 
have been devised to distinguish what is specific to an encounter and what is typical, general, or even universal. Such 
strategies, which include multiple and repetitive questioning in different contexts, the use of several modes of 
elicitation, the search for pattern, consistency, and redundancy, confirmation in the research of others, the evaluation of 
informants, and, ultimately, self-reflection and evaluation, must be regarded with a certain skepticism, for they may – 
and often do – serve as rationalizations for the objectification of the negotiated reality and its attribution to the Other. 
They frequently presuppose a degree of lucidity that is impossible for any participant within the encounter (x). 
47 Arthur Lupia and Matthew McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Cambridge 
1998), 97. 
48 Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology” (1990), 106, 110. She continues:  
It is not a material entity, a thing of any sort, that you can hand down like an old garment, pass on like a germ, spread 
like a rumor, or impose like a code of dress or etiquette. Nor is it a collection of disassociated beliefs – “attitudes” is the 
favored jargon among American social scientists and the historians they have mesmerized – that you can extract from 
their context and measure by current or retrospective survey research…Nor is it a Frankenstein monster that takes on a 
life of its own… 
49 Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology” (1990), 112. 
50 Michael Burawoy, “Painting Socialism: Working-Class Formation in Hungary and Poland,” S. McNeil, et al., eds., Bringing 
Class Back In: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives (Westview 1991), 315. 
51 The subject in this model adopts the naïve view of agents as capable of ascertaining, describing, and pursuing her desires 
publicly. Once explicated and interrogated, the model could engage two other images of the subject, the psychological and the 
psychoanalytic, either of which could be contribute to founding and mobilizing a political regime. The psychological subject may 
manipulate expressions of desires strategically, requiring social analysis to adapt to a complex communication game.  In contrast, 
the psychoanalytic subject is monistically constituted by desire, thus may be capable of neither perceiving nor manipulating 
desires, requiring analysis to infer or expose underlying ambitions (for more, see fn. 1).  
52 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Beacon 1995), 24. 
53 For a complementary argument, see Charles Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement 
Theory: The Iranian Revolution in 1979,” American Sociological Review, 61 (1996). 
54 I adopt “social agitation” from Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 
20th Centuries (Norton 1959) 1, 51, passim. I am grateful to Ira Katznelson for discussing this concept/variable with me.  
55 Michael Burawoy and János Lukács, The Radiant Past (1992), 113. 
56 Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland: The Workers’ Defense Committee “KOR” (Praeger 1992), 52. 
57 Claire Spencer, “The Roots and Future of Islamism and Algeria,” A. Sidahmed/A.Ehteshami, eds., Islamic Fundamentalism 
(Westview 1996), 94, 97. 
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1 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (1998 [1887]), 52. 
2 Setting aside the forbidding problem of intention makes only stronger my claim that the simple statement “X injures Y” is itself 
far more complex than generally recognized. The legal international definition of genocide contains the most notorious example 
of including intentionality in the concept of violence. According to the Genocide Convention, if a lunatic with poor math skills 




                                                                                                                                                       
kills thousands of Catholics to drive them out of a territory, but does not intend to exterminate them, is not guilty of genocide. 
Between the two equally mad murderers, the one who kills far fewer Catholics commits genocide even if he succeeds in killing 
only one Catholic. Meanwhile, with this inevitably addlepated definition, genocide is considered the greatest of all crimes.  
3 Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge 2001), 21; cf. Gyanendra Pandey, “Negotiating the Boundaries of 
Political Violence,” Routine Violence: Nations, Fragments, Histories (Stanford 2006). 
4 Applying this principle to “peace” of mutual assured destruction, for example, Daniel Ellsberg writes: 
The notion common to nearly all Americans that ‘no nuclear weapon has been used since Nagasaki is mistaken…Again 
and again, generally in secret from the American public, US nuclear weapons have been used, for quite different 
purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone’s head in a direct confrontation, whether 
or not the trigger is pulled [“Call to Mutiny,” Introduction, EP Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., Protest and Survive 
(Monthly Review 1981), reprinted in Monthly Review, 33:4 (Sept 1981), 1]. 
5 Alain Badiou, “We Need a Popular Discipline: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis of the Negative,” Interview by Filippo Del 
Lucchese and Jason Smith, Critical Inquiry, 34 (Summer 2008), 653. 
6 This complication applies to derivations of violence from deprivation. Violence “for fun” may be seen as resistance against 
being deprived of fun [Oskar Verhaaik, Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan (Princeton 2004), ch. 4]. 
Clearly in such a case, any action at all can be described as a response to deprivation, i.e., as attacking or removing an absence. It 
is a relevant insight here because motivations of laughter, enjoyment, or pleasure clarify that wounds, actions, interpretations, and 
amusements are not neatly arrayed along a spectrum from “objective” to “subjective” criteria of violence. Put simply, jouissance 
is not obviously a more subjective than objective criterion of violence, just as visible physical wounds are not necessarily more 
injurious than verbal insults. Again the point is that conceptually “violence” can coherenly mean nearly anything, and thus must 
be stipulated purposefully to isolate dependent variables, while recognizing that ideal-types are fictive.  
7 Charles Tilly, “Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories in Contentious Politics,” K. Worcester, et al., Violence and Politics:  
Globalization’s Paradox (Routledge 2002), 17. This definition exemplifies heuristic concept-formation; it is partial but useful. It 
excludes, for example, “impulsive” destruction, yet hooliganism seems like collective violence [Bill Buford, Among the Thugs: 
The Experience, and the Seduction, of Crowd Violence (Norton 1991)]. The same ambiguity applies to his other excluded terms, 
such as accidental, incremental, and even individual violence, which counterpose the concept “structural violence.” Concepts are 
never right or wrong, complete or incomplete, of course, but more or less useful for certain explanatory or descriptive objectives. 
8 By this definition, operations of an army surgical unit would be “violent” because they constitute “episodic social interaction 
that immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and/or objects [and] results at least in part from coordination among 
persons who perform the damaging acts.” We might specify non-palliative or non-medical “physical damage,” stressing it must 
“include forcible seizure that overcomes restraint or resistance” or violates the desire of the victim. 
9 Alas, Slavoj Žižek, who has intervened in debates on violence dating from Sorel and Benjamin, creates more confusion than 
clarity in declaring Gandhi more violent than Hitler:   
My point is what people perceive as violence is the direct subjective violence. It’s crucial to see violence that has to be 
done repeatedly to keep the things the way they are. I am not just talking about structural violence, symbolic violence, 
violence in language, etc. In that sense Gandhi was more violent than Hitler. Hitler killed millions of people. It was 
more reactive killing. Hitler was active all the time not to change things but to prevent change…Gandhi didn’t support 
killing. With his actions – boycott and all that – he helped the British imperialists to stay in India longer. This is 
something Hitler never wanted. Gandhi didn’t do anything to stop the functioning of the British Empire or the way it 
functioned here. You have to think why was India called the jewel of the empire? That for me is a problem. Let us 
locate violence properly [Shobhan Saxena, “Was Gandhi more violent than Hitler?” Interview with Žižek, Indian Times 
(12 Jan 2010), http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Main-Street/entry/was-gandhi-more-violent-than]. 
Žižek insists that physical force, whether disruptive or preservative of social arrangements, is violent. Beyond that equivalence he 
wants to claim reactionaries are less disruptive of those arrangements than revolutionaries, and in that specific sense Hitler was 
not violent to existing modes of coercion and domination. His claim that Gandhi’s non-violence was more reactionary and thus 
more violent than Hitler’s is, of course, preposterous even if his campaigns did delay decolonization. Žižek had said something 
different not long before: that with “passive revolution [Gandhi] led the anti-British resistance. Instead of directly attacking the 
colonial state, he organized movements of civil disobedience, of boycotting British products, of creating a social space outside 




                                                                                                                                                       
Gandhi, Žižek is right to recognize that if violence is conceived as disruption of prevailing or hegemonic conditions, then non-
violence, as in Poland, could be seen as “more violent” than Algeria’s fighting, which effectively sustained the dominant order.  
10 Hence Eqbal Ahmad refers to revolutionary Iranians’ “nonviolent but militant character” [“Comments on Skocpol,” Theory 
and Society, 11: 3 (May 1982), 294]. 
11 The timing of Polish working class unification and organization associated with militant non-violence depends on whether one 
thinks the intellectuals led the workers, or vice-versa, to the Solidarity uprising, itself a debate about the relationship between the 
1970 strikes and 1976 founding of the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR). I cannot adjudicate disagreements among leading 
reseachers on Poland, but it seems justified to locate a critical juncture in December 1970, when organizational composure and 
interpretive clarity replaced confusion and chaos following state brutality and massacres. In 1970, several elements of non-violent 
militancy that would define Solidarity appeared: “a national working-class insurrection”; “workers…in control of…factories”; 
zones of self-rule; an elected inter-factory strike committee which kept order in the streets and organized essential supplies”; and 
twenty-one demands presented to the state and reissued in 1980 at Gdansk [Neil Ascherson, The Polish August: The Self-Limiting 
Revolution (Viking 1982), 101-102]. 
12 [“C’est moins la force des bras que la moderation des cœurs qui rend les hommes indépendents et libres.”]. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, quoted in Aurelian Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748-1830 
(Princeton 2012), 1 [SR, tr.]. 
13 Michael Kennedy, “The Next Left and its Social Movements,” open sourced (21 May 2012),  
http://www.academia.edu/1757931/_2012_The_Next_Left_and_Its_Social_Movements. 
14 This is a central argument presented by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty (Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869). 
15 On the constitutve trace of violence in “history” and “law,” Hent de Vries says, “Since one cannot avoid speaking, since there 
can be no denunciation of violence without the act or gesture of a certain phrazein, one must oppose violence, if not in the name, 
then at least with the help of another – less violent – violence” [“Violence and Testimony: Kierkegaardian Meditations,” Religion 
and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from Kant to Derrida (Johns Hopkins 2002), 136]. 
16 Thus Gandhi’s political philosophy situated non-violence in a novel conception of human relations that repudiated “western” 
instrumentalism as inhumane and violent, broadly conceived. His concept “ahimsa,” which may be translated as “non-injury,” 
entails not merely absence of physical damage, but a more comprehensive “practice of virtue in thought, speech, and body” 
attaining “purity” [Dhirendra Datta, The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Wisconsin 1953), 88; also see Leela Gandhi, “After 
Colonialism,” Postcolonial Theory (Columbia 1998); Gyan Prakash, “Introduction,” Prakash, ed., After Colonialism: Imperial 
Histories and Postcolonial Displacements (Princeton 1995); Partha Chatterjee, “The Moment of Manoeuvre: Gandhi and the 
Critique of Civil Society,” Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minnesota 1986); Uday Mehta, “Gandhi on Democracy, 
Politics and the Ethics of Everyday Life,” Modern Intellectual History, 7:2 (2010); “Gandhi and the Common Logic of War and 
Peace,” Raritan, 30:1 (2010); Farah Godrej, “Nonviolence and Gandhi's Truth: A Method for Moral and Political Arbitration,” 
Review of Politics, 68:2 (Spr 2006); Ashis Nandy, “From Outside the Imperium: Gandhi’s Cultural Critique of the West,” 
Alternatives, 7:2 (1981); for more reluctant applause, see Leela Gandhi, “Concerning Violence: The Limits and Circulation of 
Gandhian ‘Ahimsa’ or Passive Resistance,” Cultural Critique, no. 35 (Win 1996-1997)]. 
17 Michael Taussig belittles social science for ignoring this paradox in Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza (Chicago 
2003), 5, passim]. His account of the cyclical, reactive, ad hoc violence in Colombia recalls the post-1992 Algerian atrocities.  
18 In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt poses this problem in terms of the capacity to hold a genocidal society responsible.  
19 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (Oxford 2006), 86-90; Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (2001), 21. 
20 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization, E. Jephcott, tr. (Blackwell 1995 [1939]), 444-447. 
21 James Scott’s phrase denotes “the aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society,” including expansive state 
commitments to “the improvement of all the members of society – their health, skills, and education, longevity, productivity, 
morals, and family life” – producing a “population [whose] skills, vigor, civic morals, and work habits would increase its tax base 
and field better armies” [Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale 1998), 




                                                                                                                                                       
22 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, A. Sheridan, tr. (Vintage 1979 [1975]); Michael Mann, “The 
Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” Archives européennes de sociologie, 25 (1984). 
23 Foucault states: “We must cease once and for all to describe the effect of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ 
it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (194); see James Scott’s 
version of productive anatamopolitics in Seeing Like a State (1998). 
24 Foucault “is not looking for a relation between two givens, power and knowledge. As always, he is trying to rethink the entire 
subject matter, and his knowledge and power are to be something else. Nobody knows this knowledge; no one weilds this power” 
[Ian Hacking, “The Archaeology of Michel Foucault,” Historical Ontology (Harvard 2002), 74]. 
25 I should concede the vulnerability of this comparison. In contrast to Mann’s dyadic transition from despotic to infrastructural 
power, Foucault delineates three sequential but overlapping modes of power: sovereign, disciplinary, and governmental or 
biopolitical (anatamopolitica and thanatopolitical). To be sure, Mann is concerned with how despotic and infrastructural power 
foster distinct trajectories of state-society interactions more than with periodization of the two; still, the dialectical logic of state-
society contention that gradually yields cooperation and even synthesis or synchronicity implies a succession of one power by the 
other. The relationships among Foucault’s forms of power are more numerous, dense, contradictory, even mystifying. It seems to 
me Foucault realized that even as modern European social practices and political institutions turned to training productive and 
docile bodies or creating surveillance systems and internalized normative obligations to populations, he recognized the continuity 
of the force of last resort, sovereign power. It may seem counterintuitive that these forms of power overlap as they posit radically 
variegated subjectivization processes. The sovereign rules by letting live and making die; the disciplinarian rules by training, 
regulating, and systematizing; and biopower governs by making live and letting die. The subjects of sovereign, disciplinary, and 
bio-power are distinct kinds of people, he says, from unseen/punished rebel to trained/fired worker to achieving/dying monad 
(the rough models of these types are peasants; workers, soldiers, students, analysands; and neo-liberal citizens). More technically 
one might express Foucault’s typology and genealogy of sequentially predominant “technologies of power” via the subject/object 
configuration in the relevant persons. Sovereign power constitutes state-society relations as subject versus object, that is, as two 
forces external to each other that episodically clash mortally over the prince’s capacity to prevent social change. In disciplinary 
power manager and worker, commanding officer and grunt, therapist and patient, teacher and pupil perform as subject and object, 
perhaps; but rather than the alienated alterity of sovereignty, trainer and trainee together perform mutually dependent work that 
generates and stabilizes social change by empowering productive subjects. In another contrast the biopolitical subject internalizes 
her individual responsibilities to a population, and thus the requirement to act as both subject and object of her survival [William 
Walters, “Some Critical Notes On ‘Governance,’” Studies in Political Economy, 73 (Spr/Sum 2004). Thomas Biebricher and Eric 
Vance Johnson, “What's Wrong with Neoliberalism?” New Political Science, 34:2 (2012); Tim Goddard, “Post-welfarist risk 
managers? Risk, crime prevention and the responsibilization of community-based organizations,” Theoretical Criminology, 16:3 
(2012); Ronen Shamir, "The age of responsibilization: on marketembedded morality," Economy and Society, 37:1 (2008); 
Elizabeth Comack and Tracey Peter, “How the Criminal Justice System Responds to Sexual Assault Survivors: The Slippage 
between ‘Responsibilization’ and ‘Blaming the Victim,’” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 17:2 (2005); John Clarke, 
“New Labour’s citizens: activated, empowered, responsibilized, abandoned?” Critical Social Policy, 25:4 (2005); Garry Gray, 
“The Responsibilization Strategy of Health and Safety: Neo-liberalism and the Reconfiguration of Individual Responsibility for 
Risk,” British Journal of Criminology, 49 (2009); Christopher Grey, “Management as a Technical Practice: Professionalization or 
Responsibilization?," Systems Practice, 10:6 (1997); Jane Scoular and Maggie O’Neill, "Regulating Prostitution: Social 
Inclusion, Responsibilization and the Politics of Prostitution Reform,” British Journal of Criminology, 47 (2007); Martin 
Silverstein, “What’s Race Got to Do with It? Responsibilization Strategies at Parole Hearings,” British Journal of Criminology, 
45 (2005); Christopher Spearin, “Against the Current? Somali Pirates, Private Security, and American Responsibilization,” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 31:3 (2010); Bilge Yesil, “Watching Ourselves: Video surveillance, urban space and self-
responsibilization,” Cultural Studies, 20:4 (Jul/Sept 2006); Jonathan Dean, “Baden-Powell’s Scouting for Boys: governmentality, 
state power and the responsibilization of youth,” Conference paper, “Contesting the State," University of Kent (13 May, 2011)]. 
How these distinct kinds of power, with their evident trajectory toward increasingly “internalized” subject-object imbrication, can 
co-exist seems perplexing, unless they “inhabit” one another. The central example and tendency here would be the deployment of 
sovereign means to enforce biopolitical ends – e.g., the state can order its police to defend the biopolitical system of “letting die” 
in which those who cannot afford insurance perish. Sovereign power here reinforces biopower rather than sovereign power itself 
by securing neo-liberal corporate prerogatives, compliant customers, and a “favorable investment environment” (i.e., no protests). 
26 In his later work, Foucault posits a third, increasingly pervasive mode of power: bio-political governmentality. Exemplified by 
capitalist market behavior, governmental subjectivity evinces internalized norms of responsibility to “the population,” conceived 
only in the 1800s {History of Sexuality, v. 1, R. Hurley, tr. (Vintage 1990 [1976], 135ff.;“Society Must be Defended”: Lectures 
at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, M. Bertani/A. Fontana, eds., D. Macey, tr. (Picador 2003 [17 Mar 1976], 239ff.: Security, 
Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, M. Senellart, ed., G. Burchell, tr. (Picador 2007 [1 Feb 




                                                                                                                                                       
27 James Ron, State Violence in Serbia and Israel: Frontiers and Ghettos (California 2003), 20. Ron is one of few who detect the 
Foucault/Mann overlap, though he stresses the replacement of despotic with infrastructural power without sufficient explication. 
More penetrating is his insight that infrastructural power achieves its efficacy when subjects’ exaggerate its virtues relative to 
despotic power. Thanks to Xiaoyu for directing me to this passage. 
28 I am echoing Marx’s insight, confirmed in personal experience, that systems like states and firms shape but under-determine 
subjects. Long before Foucault generalized that enclosed social practices yield remainders, extant desires, wills, or “resistances,” 
Marx provided a concrete, if complex, variable for this incompleteness: socio-political appropriation of productive competence, 
ingenuity, and income. Capital creates the subject of labor through the very skills (community, literacy, endurance, and techné) it 
converts into weapons to transcend bourgeois values and incentives. In a line Deleuze pursues, Marx percieves that exploitative 
subjectivization always deposits the seeds, or immanent logics, of its own undoing within the physicality of the subject. His line 
about the bourgeoisie’s digging its own grave is too casually recalled only as a “systemic contradiction” between production and 
consumption, at the expense of his parallel claim about the novel social powers of worker-subjectivity entailed by the system they 
would undermine. That is, for Marx the internal-systemic impetus to revolutionary overthrow was imbued in workers’ subjective 
lives, steeply defined by physical immiseration, only to erupt when objective contradictions overwhelmed the ideological binders 
of commodity fetishism (when objective-systemic contradictions reoriented subjects from commodity fetishism, liberal fantasy, or 
reliogious palliatives to worker consciousness). If Marx located systemic contradiction in dualistic subjectivity that retained an 
unstable citizenship apparatus, later “post-structuralist” theorists worried that homogenized liberal democratic societies stabilized 
monistic subjectivity, relocating the contradiction to the ideational plane. In this sense, 20th-century society is said to be socially 
and politically consolidated but analytically vulnerable – unable, to put it simply, to give an account of itself, or to foreclose its 
incoherence. The Foucauldian political economist Timothy Mitchell has meticulously portrayed this shift: 
The twentieth century’s new regime of calculation did not produce, necessarily, a more accurate knowledge of the 
world, despite its claims, nor even any overall increase in the quantity of knowledge. Its achievement was to 
redistribute forms of knowledge, increasing it in some places and decreasing it in others. At the same time, it 
transferred this knowledge to new sites. By a series of removals, it opened up a certain distance, the distance between 
the field and the computing office, between the farmer and the colonial survey officer, between the iron triangulation 
marker and the paper map. The distance of such removals, repeated countless times in the cadastral survey and in 
increasing numbers of other projects, was to have a strange effect. The act of removal began to appear not as an action 
but as something more profound. The distance from the field to the map and back again, from the village to the 
computing office, would come to mark what seemed an absolute gap: the divide between reality and its representation, 
between an image-world and its object. The question of accuracy or truth could now be cast as the degree of 
correspondence between the objectworld on one side of this divide and the maps, images, and numbers on the other. 
This strange effect gave rise to new objects and forms of calculation—among the most important of them, the economy 
[“The Character of Calculability,” Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (California 2002), 92-93]. 
29 To complement the specific power-forms I have attributed to Foucault, here we may draw out his distinction between ideology 
and procedures. As Michel de Certeau reconstructs this rarely attended distinction, even disciplinary power – renowned for the 
allegedly internalized panoptic gaze of the central punitive figure – is “refined and extended without recourse to an ideology: 
Through a cellular space of the same type for everyone (schoolboys, soldiers, workers, criminals, or the ill), the 
techniques perfected the visibility and the gridwork of this space in order to make of it a tool capable of disciplining 
under control and “treating” any human group whatever. The development is a matter of technological details, 
miniscule and decisive procedures. The details overcome theory: through these procedures the universalization of a 
uniform penalty – imprisonment – is imposed, which inverts revolutionary institutions from within and establishes 
everywhere the “penitentiary” in place of penal justice [Practice of Everyday Life, S. Rendall, tr. (California 1984), 46]. 
Certeau’s reading ramifies in polar inferences: (1) the construction of subjects is so pervasive an embodied rigor that it annuls 
ideology; or (2) the constitution of disciplined and “docile” bodies, by narrowing power to physical prowess, frees ideology. The 
latter incapsulates Certeau’s œvre and the related claim I urge about these cases: that the regimes produced a gap between their 
precedural and normative assimilation of non-state agents. Put another way, the Polish and Algerian states failed to inculcate 
normative consensus and to generate a physical, regulatory, or disciplinary rigor that obviated inculcated, statist normativity.  
30 So there are at least two ways a regime’s plans to structure citizens may go awry. It may lose control over the direction of its 
own institutions, even if they continue to determine citizens’ subjectivity. This insight appears in Marx’s comments on liberalism. 
Liberal democracy may dig its own grave but still transform people into individualists. Second, the regime may fail to determine 
those citizens’ subjectivity within those institutions; in a reversal of Marx’s argument, a regime may determine its institutions but 
not its subjective personnel. This possibility ramifies into two alternatives. A regime may fail to determine its institutions and its 
subjective personnel; or, as in Poland and Algeria, it may partially succeed in shaping its subjective personnel. In the latter cases, 
the regimes had little control over state capacity and citizen loyalty, while still defining the subjective orientation of its leading 




                                                                                                                                                       
he planned, but the runaway train will still shape their actions and subjective states. Indeed, survivors may have been re-
constituted by the sabotaged train, perhaps becoming committed anti-terrorist activists thwarting the saboteur’s future objectives.     
31 Wlodzimierz Brus, quoted in Boris Kagarlitsky, The Dialectic of Change, R. Simon, tr. (Verso 1990), 164. In a letter titled, 
“The Polish War,” Adam Michnik refers to “the Polish Jaruzelskian war (to use the term coined in the streets of Warsaw)” [“The 
Polish War: Letter from Bialoleka, 1982,” Letters from Prison and other essays, M. Latynski, tr. (California 1987), 40]). Martial 
law was formally and typically referred to as a “declaration of war.”   
32 High Roberts rejects the phrase “civil war” to denote the violence in Algeria under martial law, given the small, opportunistic 
uprising of the GIA, against Luis Martinez’s view that the fighting signaled a civil “war economy” [Hugh Roberts, “Algeria’s 
Veiled Drama,” Battlefield Algeria (2003), 255-259; Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998, J. Derrick, tr (Columbia 
2000 [1998]), 116ff.]. Citing Algeria’s “mass violence against civiliants” and “large-scale civil war violence,” Stathis Kalyvas 
apparently disagrees with Roberts [“Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” Rationality and Society, 11:3 
(1999), 244]. But the positions may be bridged if we use his thesis to combine qualitative and quantitive indices of civil war; that 
is, if combatants’ minority violence shows a perceived need to conscript or persuade majority followers, as Kalyvas argues, then 
it is not the quantity but quality of violence which may decide the validity of the term “civil war.” 
33 William Saroyan, “My Cousin, Dikran, the Orator,” My Name is Aram (Faber and Faber 1963 [1941]), 132-133. 
34 Quoted in Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (Routledge 2001), 37-38, emphasis added. Historical and causal explanation may normalize 
violence, too. As such, Alon Confino claims,  “Holocaust historiography has seen the strangeness of the past – for example, the 
difficulty that contemporaries had with grasping…the extermination – as something history writing has to overcome, instead of 
seeing it as a historical sensation of the period that shaped the event as a subjective experience of contemporaries. This enormous 
body of work characterized by an almost positivist attachment to facts banished from the story of the Holocaust the strangeness 
of the period instead of integrating them into the narration of how things were” [Foundational Pasts: The Holocaust as Historical 
Understanding (Cambridge 2012), 52]. 
35 The scene is an interview-based ethnography of a cotton workers’ strike of 1933. “In 1934 Steinbeck befriended several labor 
organizers and was…engrossed by their stories,” an experience “that led to his best work,” a “radically new…straightforward and 
gritty” style [Robert Gottleib, “The Rescue of John Steinbeck,” The New York Review, LV:6 (17 Apr 2008), 81].       
36 In Dubious Battle (Penguin 1979 [1936]), compiled from 163-171. 
37 Roberto Esposito, “Community and Violence,” T. Campbell, tr., unpublished manuscript, 6. Also see Kalyvas’s explanation of 
“barbarism,” that is, exceptionally vicious violence in civil war, as “a function of the degree of insecurity faced by armed actors,” 
as posited by “the security thesis” [The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006), 84]. 
38 This desired lawman is “the modern subject: an autonomous individual who has liberated himself from all merely traditional 
bonds and has independently assumed responsibility for the organization of his own life. Since this individual is subordinated to 
the law of rational specificity, it is tempting to conceive the optimal organization of life as a form of rational self-legislation” 
[Raymond Geuss, “The Actual and Another Modernity: Order and Imagination in Don Quixote,” History of European Ideas, 34 
(2008), 15].     
39 Michael Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land (Chicago 2004), 48. 
40 Perhaps too simply, but it is ambiguous whether Steinbeck portrays or advocates a philosophically naïve understanding of law 
as potentially an exception to violence. In his 1989 lecture at Cardozo Law School, “Force De Loi: ‘Le Fondement Mystique De 
L'autorité’” Jacques Derrida emphasizes the centrality of “force” in “law enforcement.” More important is the kind of force at 
play in law’s claim to constitute itself lawfully, justly, representatively – conflating is and ought in stating legal or juridical 
coherence. In illocutionary performance, the founding law says that it empirically does and ethically should represent the nation 
or people [Danilyn Rutherford, Laughing at Leviathan: Sovereignty and Audience in West Papua (Chicago 2012), 183]. This 
presents two contrasting problems for law’s self-description. If law represents a consensual people, culture, society, or nation, 
then it is “thin,” lacking autonomous features and warranting no specific attention. If law transcends a people, culture, society, or 
nation, it raises concerns about its unifying force, i.e., about its utility in a divided polity. One defense of law, usually as “rule of 
law,” conjoins these representative and transcendent aspects of law, rendering law a unique process that incrementally brings a 
people to its higher disposition or nature [see Giorgio Agamben, “The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter 
Benjamin,” D. Heller-Roazen, ed., tr., Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy (Stanford 1999 [1992 lecture, 1998 




                                                                                                                                                       
Cohen, ed., Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader (Cambridge 2001); Christopher Norris, Derrida (Harvard 
1987), 195ff.]. 
41 Tahar Ben Jelloun This Blinding Absence of Light, L. Coverdale, tr. (Penguin 2006), 23. The book “is based on real events 
drawn from the testimony of former inmate of Tazmamart Prison, Morocco.” 
42 Jean Améry, At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities, S. Rosenfeld/S. Rosenfeld 
(Indiana 1980), 9.  
43 We may distinguish here two kinds of prohibition: (1) the repressive, incapacitating ban by the tyrant; and (2) the productive, 
empowering sublimation of the subject, captured in Julia Kristeva’s claim that “there is no revolt without prohibition of some 
sort” {Revolt, She Said, Interview with Philippe Petit, S. Lotringer, ed., B. O’Keefe, tr. (Semiotext[e] 2002), 31}. As I suggested 
in the Introduction to and motivating design of this project, we must not be glib about the repression-resistance connection, which 
is mediated by multiple material and ideational variables. So, given Kristeva’s remark conditioning revolt on prohibition, which 
in most practical situations will combine repression and sublimation, a crucial question is how these will interact – at what point 
will repression snuff out the re-directed energies of revolt to create totalitarian suffociation? This section raises this problem.  
44    When in danger the sea-cucumber divides itself in two… 
 We know how to divide ourselves, how true, we too. 
 But only into a body and an interrupted whisper. 
 Into body and poetry 
[Wisława Szymborska, “Autonomoia/Autonomy,” Sounds, Feelings, Thoughts: Seventy Poems by Wisława Szymborska, M. 
Krynski/R. Maguire, trs. (Princeton 1981), 136-137; quoted in Wai Chee Dimock, “Time Against Territoriality: National Laws 
and Literary Translations,” A. Sarat, et al., ed., The Place of Law (Michigan 2003), 31]. Similarly, we may invoke Jamaican-born 
Claude McKay’s resistance poem, “If We Must Die,” composed during the US’s 1919 Red Summer race riots: 
If we must die, let it not be like hogs 
Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot, 
While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs, 
Making their mock at our accursed lot. 
If we must die, O let us nobly die, 
So that our precious blood may not be shed 
In Vain; then even the monsters we defy 
Shall be constrained to honor us though dead! 
O kinsmen! We must meet the common foe! 
Though far outnumbered let us show us brave, 
And for their thousand blows deal one deathblow! 
What though before us lies the open grave? 
Like men we’ll face the murderous, cowardly pack, 
Pressed to the well, dying, but fighting back! 
45 The paradigm case is the “Hama rules” crushing of Islamists by Syria’s Ba’athist regime (1982). It seems a stretch to hold up 
the return of Islamist rebellion against the Syrian regime as confirming the repression-resistance thesis. It seems worth positing 
that repression can defeat resistance rather than always produce it [Compare Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” Middle 
East Reports (Nov-Dec 1982); Yahya Sadowski, “The Evolution of Political Identity in Syria,” S. Telhami/M. Barnett, eds., 
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Cornell 2002); Yvette Talhamy, "The Syrian Uprising: The Muslim Brotherhood 
Reborn," Middle East Quarterly (Spr 2012); Raphaël Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Hurst 2013)]. 
46 To simplify a complex and layered discussion, I am bracketing potentially pognant distinctions raised by recent social theory 
between reification and objectification [Timothy Bewes, Reification, or the Anxiety of Late Capitalism (Verso 2002), 102-110].  
47 As Avery Gordon writes,  
It’s hard to convey what happens to someone confined indefinitely in conditions designed to break down all resistance 
to authority, the self’s or another’s, in twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The ones who beat it have a worn strength, 
dignified, that nevertheless lets you know the cost of the battle; the others have become shadows, mournful specters. 
Under such deficient and deadly conditions, prisoners are no longer (and to the extent to which they were before is 
questionable) conceived as human in any meaningful sense at all [“Abu Ghraib: imprisonment and the war on terror,” 




                                                                                                                                                       
48 Hannah Arendt says, “under normal circumstances…spontaneity can never be entirely eliminated insofar as it is connected not 
only with human freedom but with life itself, in the sense of simply keeping alive” [Origins of Totalitarianism (1979 [1948]), 
438]. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “[P]ower centers are defined much more by what escapes them or by their impotence 
than by their zone of power. In short, the molecular, the microeconomics, the micropolitics, is defined not be the smallness of its 
elements, but by the nature of its ‘mass’ – the quantum flow as opposed to the molar segmented line...something always escapes” 
[A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, v. II, B. Massumi, tr. (Minnesota 1987 [1980]), 217]. Andrei Plesu reports 
experiencing not “an atmosphere of hysterical necessity, of absolute rigor” in prison, but “the imperfection of evil…[I]ntellectual 
life under dictatorship is possible, paradoxically, because it is potentially impossible…[T]he reduced possibility of a normal 
intellectual life enables its irruptive force, its capacity to profit from all the cracks of the system, to be enormous” (63) 
[“Intellectual Life Under Dictatorship,” Representations, 49 (Win 1995), 64]. In the same vein, Michel Foucault comments:  
It would not be possible for power relations to exist without points of insubordination which, by definition, are means 
of escape. Accordingly, every intensification, every extension of power relations to make the insubordinate submit can 
only result in the limits of power. The latter reaches its final term either in a type of action which reduces the other to 
total impotence (in which case victory over the adversary replaces the exercise of power) or by a confrontation with 
those whom one governs and their transformation into adversaries…[B]etween a relationship of power and a strategy of 
struggle there is reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal. At every moment the relationship of 
power may become a confrontation between two adversaries. Equally, the relationship between adversaries in society 
may, at every moment, [occasion] mechanisms of power.  The consequence of this instability is the ability to decipher 
the same events and the same transformations either from inside the history of struggle or from the standpoint of the 
power relationships.  The interpretations which result will not consist of the same elements of meaning or the same 
links or the same types of intelligibility, although they refer to the same historical fabric and each of the two analyses 
must have reference to the other. In fact it is…the disparities between the two readings that make visible those 
fundamental phenomena of ‘domination’ which are present in a large number of human societies [“How is Power 
Exercised?” L. Sawyer, tr., Afterword, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Chicago 1983), 225-226 [translation altered]. 
49 Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (Picador 2001 [1984]), 64. 
50 Timur Kuran, Public Lies, Private Truths: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Harvard 1995), 31ff. He adds,  
“Conversely, when we opt to suppress a thought, misrepresent a want, or assume a phony demeanor, we feel discomfort at having 
compromised our personhood” (31). Here the “need for self assertion” refers to an “individual’s quest for autonomy” (31-32); 
subjectivity is thus confined to individualism, apparently ruling out by fiat collective subjectivity. The potency of retaining non-
“compromised…personhood” may, though, be collective-social as well as individual-personal. 
51 Tzvetan Todorov, Facing the Extreme (1996), 16.   
52 John Kleinig, “Humiliation, Degradation, and Moral Capacity: A Response to Hörnle and Kremnitzer,” Israel Law Review, 
44:169 (2011). 
53 Again, this raises a paradox in our concept of dehumanization. Is pure abjection – the execution of the regicide Damien in the 
beginning of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, for instance – a condition of indignity (where dignity is violated) or a condition of 
no-dignity (of the absence of any dignity to be violated)? It seems we need, minimally, three categories: dignity, indignity, and 
no-dignity to capture the (perhaps undefinable) path from humanization to dehumanization.  
54 But then, as I have insinuated, there is no reason to think the systemically objectified beast or thing would rise up; rather, we 
would expect, with Fanon, the motivating provenance of such an uprising to be the remnant of the subject in the beast-becoming. 
Here I should clarify that I am using “beast” and “animal” to signal a conventional separation from humanity (or human animals) 
on grounds of language, reflexivity, consciousness, or transcendance, while eschewing an essential differentiation [along these 
lines, see Steve Baker, “The Animal’s Line of Flight,” The Postmodern Animal (Reaktion 2000), esp. 136ff.].    
55 Here, humiliation must be socially compelled, not collectively desired – symptomatic rather than endemic {see Gilles Deleuze, 
“Psychoanalysis and the Problem of Masochism,” Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, J. McNeil, tr. (Zone 1991 [1971])}. 
56 Given many forms of voluntary, passionate humiliation, an inescapable regime must impose such indignity for an explanation 
of social violence to invoke the concept usefully. “Indignity” must here exclude, e.g., repentant humiliation of willful sacramental 
obedience to affirm the Christian monastic calling [Talal Asad, “Discipline and Humility in Christian Mysticism,” Genealogies of 
Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Johns Hopkins 1993), 155ff; also see the remarks on “why 




                                                                                                                                                       
57 Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Harvard 1996), 262. A decent rather than just society is Sidney Morgenbesser’s idea(l).  
58 “As contrasted with a freedom that consists in being able to do as one wishes, [freedom of choice] might be described as 
freedom to will as one wishes” [Mortimer Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes (Collier 1985), 147]. In this context, it is striking 
that Irving Goffman compares religious militancy to quotidian self-restraint:  
Personal documents about religious asylums and radical political movements suggest…that an individual can 
voluntarily renounce his will, take on the “armor of obedience, and actively embrace curtailments of what he would 
ordinarily consider to be his self-interests. Militancy of this kind can thus be seen as a game the individual plays against 
himself. A minor domestic version is found in self-discipline techniques: an individual who is his strong-minded self 
while shopping does not allow himself to buy favorite sweet foodsl, knowing that at home there will be times when he 
will be weak-minded self [Strategic Interaction (Pennsylvania 1969), 86-87, fn. 1]. 
59 As Freud insisted, it appears to be inherent in human willfulness to denigrate aspects of our dignity to achieve other aspects 
that we hold more dear, “binding ourselves to the mast” and “rebuking the heart” to achieve an objective other than immediate 
comforts, as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno put it: “The ‘self’ – autos – is not spoken of until…the repression of the 
instinct by reason has succeeded…[T]he identical ‘I’ of Homer could be seen as the result of a mastery of nature carried out 
within the individual. This new self trembles within its thing-itself – a body – once the heart has been rebuked” [Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, J. Cumming, tr. (Continuum 1990 [1944]), 48, fn. 5]. For contrast, see the comments and references in Brian 
Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari (MIT 1992), 191-192, fn. 43. 
60 Among many nineteenth-century political philosophers anxious about the “leveling” of human value under social and political 
equality, Nietzsche was among the first to identify modern European egalitarian “slave moralism” with nihilistic self-repression.   
61 CLR James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (Vintage 1989 [1963]), 15-16.  
62 In a related finding, Eugene Genovese discusses the evolving ideologies of slaves under seigneurialism and capitalism from 
restorationist secession to egalitarian revolt [From Rebellion to Revolution (Louisiana 1979)]. 
63 Hanna Krall and Marek Edelman, Shielding the Flame, J. Stasinska/L. Weschler, trs. (Holt 1977), 46; quoted in Todorov, 
Facing the Extreme (1996), 16. 
64 Albert Camus, Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, A, Bower, tr. (Vintage 1991 [1951]), 8-11; Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, C. 
Farrington, tr. (Grove 1963 [1961]), 43: “The native knows all this [colonial dehumanization] and laughs to himself every time he 
spots an allusion to the animal world in the other’s words…[T]he native laughs in mockery when Western values are mentioned 
in front of him…in revenge…[for] the violence with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and aggressiveness which 
has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life and of thought of the native.” James refers to slaves’ “remarkable 
liveliness of intellect and vivacity of spirit…and secret pride and feeling of superiority to their masters” [Black Jacobins (1989 
[1963]), 17-18]. The master has the mirror anxiety: “And my whole life, every white man’s life in the East, was one long struggle 
not to be laughed at” {George Orwell, “Shooting an Elephant,” Inside the Whale and Other Essays (Penguin 1957 [1936]), 96}. 
These are all highly politicized versions of Ian Hacking insight: “[W]hat makes the laughter possible is the existence of the 
polarity” within a consciousness [“Truthfulness,” Common Knowledge, 11:1 (2005), 171]. 
65 Indeed, suicide rates may decline with resistance to communal suffering, coincident with Emile Durkheim’s description of 
anomic suicide [Suicide: A Study in Sociology, J. Spaulding, tr. (Free 1951 [1897]), 241ff]. One confirming study demurs that 
Durkheim ignores how the “social meaning of the suicide act” constitutes solidarity [Nadia Dabbagh, Suicide in Palestine: 
Narratives of Despair (Olive Branch 2005), 12-13; cf. Jack Douglas, The Social Meaning of Suicide (Princeton 1967), 163].  
66 Arthur Koestler, “The Art of Fiction lxxx,” D. Fallowell, Interviewer, Paris Review, no. 92 (Summer 1984), 186.   
67 It is crucial to remember that even within conditions of detention and torture there are distinct subject positions. For instance, 
Henri Alleg, a French Algerian tortured during the revolution, writes: “In any case it was in their interest to look after me: if they 
wanted to torture me again, I must not be too weak; if they decided on the other hand to execute me, they had to have (other than 
the normal bullet wounds) a ‘clean’ body in case of an autopsy” {The Question, J. Calder, tr. (Nebraska 2006 [1958]), 83}. 
68 For a literary/empirical reflection on the social effect of losing “what’s right” see Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat 
Trauma and the Undoing of Character (Touchstone 1994), 5ff.; also see Stanley Milgram, “Epilogue,” Obedience to Authority: 




                                                                                                                                                       
69 The promise of freedom seems to replace ironic sarcasm about hypocritical despots with grave militant discipline. During the 
war, the “indigenous Algerians [were] very disciplined...[S]ome young men were assaulting smokers” {Mouloud Feraoun, 
Journal 1955-1962: Reflections on the French-Algerian War, J. Le Sueur, ed., M. Wolf/C. Fouillade, trs. (Nebraska 2000 [12 
Nov 1955]), 15}. Similarly, as Polish strikers took over the Gdansk shipyard their “guards saw to it that no strangers entered the 
area and that no alcohol was distributed” [Stanislaw Starski, Class Struggle in Classless Poland (South End 1982), 62]. It seems 
revolutionary fervor, sprung from hope, favors serious activity, where short-term defeats against inevitably defeated foes spark 
haughty laughter. Fanon reports the Algerian “Djamila Bouhired’s laughter on hearing…her death sentence…, that smile…the 
quiet manifestation of inner certainty that [remains] unshakeable” [“Concerning a Plea,” Toward the African Revolution, H. 
Chevalier, tr. (Grove 1967 [al-Moudhahid, no. 12 {15 Nov 1957}), 73].  
70 Theodore Dalrymple, “A Prophetic and Violent Masterpiece,” Essay on Anthony Burgess, A Clockwork Orange (1962), City 
Journal (Win 2006), www.city-journal.org, 1. 
71 Lorna Rhodes, Total Confinement: Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison (California 2004), 65-75. 
72 Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge 1989), 41ff.; cf. Judith 
Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The aftermath of violence – from domestic abuse to political terror (Basic 1992), 61ff. 
73 Mourad Benchellali, with Antoine Audouard, “Detainees in Despair,” NYT (14 Jun 2006), A23.  He adds, “After months of 
disappointment [with the process], you try to develop an immunity to hope, but hope is an incurable disease.” Humiliation as a 
mechanism of control – under conditions of total biopolitical capture – is consciously deployed [David Rose, Guantánamo: The 
War on Human Rights (Free 2004), chs. 2, 4]. 
74 Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (2001), 22. 
75 I concede that I may be generalizing from personal experience, but I recall feeling especially tormented when asked to decide 
my own punishment. I also felt pained by having no audience for efforts at comedic reprieve, e.g., asking my sentence to reflect 
“time served.” This latter point has perhaps sensitized me to the crucial element of communal humor among captives.    
76 James Gilligan, Preventing Violence (Thames and Hudson 2001), 66; Reporting on extensive, long-term, control-based study 
of prison inmates, Gilligan reports “shame” as the principal cause of violence [Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic 
(Vintage 1997), 103ff.; Lonnie Athens identified the following cycle, triggered by “coercive subjugation”: defianceðfearð 
panicðsubmissionðhumiliationðrevenge [Richard Rhodes, Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist 
(Vintage 1999), 112-113]. 
77 Alfred McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Metropolitan 2006), 8.  
The opposite condition would be the removal of constraints on cruelty [Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How 
Good People Turn Evil (Random House 2007)]. But, crucially, violence against the weak here does not reflect simply a bolstered 
subjectivity. Rather, “anonymity,” “situational pressure,” and “cognitive dissonance” – various fragmentations of the subject – 
enable viciousness, which then reconstitutes a novel subjectivity [Zimbardo, “Revisiting the Stanford Prison Experiment: a 
Lesson in the Power of Situation,” Chronicle Review, 53:30 (30 Mar 2007), B6].    
78 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, D. Heller-Roazen, tr. (Zone1999 [1998]), 55. 
79 To study “mechanisms of power…involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, according to 
what processes, and with what effects, power is applied” {Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (2007 [1978]), 2}.      
80 Heller-Roazen translates Agamben’s terms as “human/inhuman,” where one suspects “non-human” would be preferable to 
convey a state of pure abandon between human life and biological death. “Inhuman” also implies cruelty, an unusual epithet for 
camp dwellers. But if cruelty is refigured as brutality (“brute”), then we find “the inhuman is in fact something that is all too 
human. We use the word inhuman not to denote higher and lower orders (such as gods or animals) but instead to refer to human 
behavior that is…below the bar of civilization, unworthy of how we would like humans to be” [Leland de la Durantaye, Giorgio 
Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford 2009), 284]. The tension between inhuman (a degraded human condition) and non-
human (a “reduction” to an animal or objective state) only reiterates or illustrates Agamben’s depiction of the unsayable line 
between human and inhuman. 
81 During the American invasion of German-occuped Brittany, the French resistance figure and translator Louis Guilloux wrote, 
“The least effort is costly; I often have trouble dragging myself from one place to the next; I go to bed tired; I wake up tired” 




                                                                                                                                                       
by comparing it to our attitude toward life from one day to the next. Apart from some of Woody Allen’s characters, most people 
do not regard every dawn as another day closer to death, although it is. We consider ourselves in an either thriving or unnatural 
condition. Guilloux’s debilitation affronts this attitude, rather than being seen as merely some hastened version of human fate.     
82 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (1999 [1998]), 55; internal quotation is from Zdzislaw Ryn and Stanislaw Klodzinski, An 
der Grenze zwischen Leben und Tod: Eine Studie über die Erscheinung des “Musselmanns” im Konzentrazionslager [On the 
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